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Abstract 
In order to tackle climate change, to increase energy supply security and to foster the sustainability and 
competitiveness of the European economy, the EU has made the transition to a low-carbon economy a 
central policy priority. This report builds on the first study conducted by the JRC in 2011 (Critical Metals in 
Strategic Energy Technologies), where critical metals were identified, which could become a bottleneck 
to the supply-chain of the low-carbon energy technologies addressed by the Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan (SET-Plan), namely: wind, solar (both PV and CSP), CCS, nuclear fission, bioenergy and the electricity 
grid. Fourteen metals were identified to be a cause for concern. After taking into account market and 
geopolitical parameters, five metals were labelled ‘critical’, namely: tellurium, indium, gallium, neodymi-
um and dysprosium. The potential supply chain constraints for these materials were most applicable to 
the deployment of wind and PV energy technologies.   
 
In the follow-up study reported here, other energy and low-carbon technologies are investigated that not 
only play an important role in the EU's path towards decarbonisation but also may compete for the same 
metals as identified in the six SET-Plan technologies. Eleven technologies are analysed including fuel cells, 
electricity storage, electric vehicles and lighting. As in the first report, sixty metals, i.e. metallic elements, 
metallic minerals and metalloids are considered; only iron, aluminium and radioactive elements (used as 
fuel in nuclear plants) were specifically excluded. Graphite was also included, reflecting its status as one 
of the critical raw materials identified by the EU Raw Materials Initiative. Where possible, the study 
models the implications for materials demand as a result of the scenarios described in the EU Energy 
Roadmap 2050. Consequently, the results obtained in the first study are updated to reflect the data that 
has become available in the roadmap. 
 
This second study found that eight metals have a high criticality rating and are therefore classified as 
‘critical’. These are the six rare earth elements (dysprosium, europium, terbium, yttrium, praseodymium 
and neodymium), and the two metals gallium and tellurium. Four metals (graphite, rhenium, indium and 
platinum) are found to have a medium-to-high rating and are classified as 'near critical', suggesting that 
the market conditions for these metals should be monitored in case the markets for these metals deteri-
orate thereby increasing the risk of supply chain bottlenecks. The applications, i.e. technologies, of par-
ticular concern are electric vehicles, wind and solar energy, and lighting. As in the first report, ways of 
mitigating the supply-chain risks for the critical metals are considered. These fall into three categories: 
increasing primary supply, reuse/recycling and substitution.  
 
In addition, a number of topics were identified as possibly meriting further research, but could not be 
considered within the immediate scope of this study. These include conducting further studies to look at 
raw materials requirements for hybrid and electric vehicles for a wider range of technology uptake and 
penetration scenarios; developing new and more detailed scenarios for the uptake and technology mix of 
options for stationary energy storage; undertaking similar studies in defence and aerospace; improving 
statistics on the contribution of recycling to world production for a number of metals; and investigating 
the contribution of greater traceability and transparency to reducing raw materials supply risk. 
 
Finally, it is important not to overstate the bottlenecks due to the risks of raw material shortages for key 
technologies. This is because there are still many years before the large uptake of some technologies and 
in the coming years, there are numerous options that will become available to mitigate the identified 
risks. 
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Glossary 
A-USC advanced ultra-supercritical (power gen) LMS lithium manganese spinel (battery) 
AA-CAES advanced adiabatic CAES LTSC low temperature superconductors 
AC-DC alternating current – direct current MCFC molten carbonate fuel cells 
AFC acid fuel cells MED multi-effect distillation 
ANL  Argonne National Laboratory MIGD million imperial gallons per day 
BAT Best available technology MSF multi-stage flash (distillation) 
BEV battery electric vehicles NCA nickel cobalt aluminium (battery) 
CAES compressed air energy storage NCM nickel cobalt manganese (battery) 
CCFL cold-cathode fluorescent lamp NEW-IG EU  
New Energy World Industrial Grouping in 
conjunction with the EU 
CCGT combined cycle gas turbines   NiCd  nickel-cadmium (battery) 
CCS carbon capture and storage NiMH  nickel-metal hydride (battery) 
CFB  circulating fluidised bed combustion  OTEC ocean thermal energy conversion 
CFL compact fluorescent lighting OWC oscillating water column 
CHP combined heat and power PAFC phosphoric acid fuel cells 
DC direct current PCC pulverised coal combustion 
DD direct drive PCM phase change material 
DMFC direct methanol fuel cells PEM proton exchange membrane 
DZR  dezincification brass PEMFC polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cells 
e equivalent PHES pumped hydro energy storage 
EGS enhanced geothermal systems PHEV plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 
EPD Environmental Product Declaration R&D research and development 
EV electric vehicles RD&D R&D and demonstration 
FCV fuel cell vehicle RO reverse osmosis 
HEV hybrid electric vehicles ROR run-of-the-river 
HTSC High temperature superconductors SHS sensible heat storage 
HTTS high temperature thermal storage SMES superconducting magnetic energy storage 
ICE internal combustion engine SOFC solid oxide fuel cells 
ICT information and computer technology STDA Selenium Tellurium Development Association 
IEA International Energy Agency TES thermal energy storage 
IGCC integrated gasification combined cycle toe tonnes of oil equivalent 
LCA life cycle assessment ULCO ultra-low CO2 
LCD liquid crystal display USC ultra-supercritical (power generation) 
LCE lithium carbonate equivalent USGS United States Geological Survey 
LCO lithium cobalt oxide (battery) V system vanadium system 
LED light emitting diode VCD vapour compression distillation 
LFL linear fluorescent lighting   
LFP lithium iron phosphate (battery)   
 
 
 
Units Conventional SI units and prefixes used throughout: {k, kilo, 1000} {M, mega, 1,000,000} 
{G, giga, 109} {kg, kilogram, unit mass} {t, metric tonne, 1000 kg} 
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Executive Summary 
 
In order to tackle climate change, to increase energy supply security and to foster the sustainability and 
competitiveness of the European economy, the European Union (EU) has made the transition to a low-
carbon economy a central policy priority. The EU is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 
80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050. The European Commission analysed the path towards the 2050 
targets and their implications within its EU Energy Roadmap 2050.   
 
Study Aims 
This report presents the results of a study with the aim to identify the metals which could become a 
bottleneck to the supply-chain of various low-carbon energy technologies. It builds on the existing re-
search conducted by the European Commission's JRC in 2011 (Critical Metals in Strategic Energy Technol-
ogies). Where possible, this current study models the implications for materials demand as a result of the 
scenarios described in the EU Energy Roadmap 2050. The study considers 17 technologies, including fuel 
cells, electricity storage, electric vehicles and lighting, and the re-addressed six technologies analysed in 
the first study.   
 
Methodology 
This study uses a bottom-up approach, compiling an inventory of all metals used in each technology. For 
each technology, an appropriate functional unit (e.g. kg/MW) has been used along with forecasts of 
demand. Sixty metallic elements, metallic minerals and metalloids were considered; only iron, aluminium 
and radioactive elements (used as fuel in nuclear plants) were specifically excluded. Graphite was also 
included, reflecting its status as one of the critical raw materials identified by the EU Raw Materials 
Initiative. The materials in greatest demand were identified and their uses analysed in depth.   
 
Results 
The results of the metals demand in the EU for the 32 most significant materials, as a percentage of the 
average supply over the decade 2020-2030, are shown in Figure 1. Dysprosium was identified as being 
the most ‘at risk’, with the EU requiring over 25% of expected world supply to meet EU demand for 
hybrid and electric vehicles and wind turbines. Other materials of significance and their associated key 
technology include: (for hybrid and electric vehicles) lithium, graphite, neodymium, praseodymium and 
cobalt; (for solar energy) tellurium, indium, tin and gallium; (for fuel cells) platinum; (for lighting) indium, 
terbium, europium and gallium; (for wind) neodymium and praseodymium; and (for nuclear) indium.   
 
Figure 1: EU metals demand for energy technologies, as % of average supply 2020-2030 
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To assess their criticality further, the 32 materials were analysed according to a combination of market 
and geopolitical factors, resulting in a reduced list of metals (see Table 1).  
 
Eight metals were given a high criticality rating and therefore classified as ‘critical’. These include six rare 
earth elements (dysprosium, europium, terbium, yttrium, praseodymium and neodymium), as well as 
gallium and tellurium.   
 
Six materials were given a high-medium rating and classified as ‘near critical’. It is suggested the market 
conditions for graphite, rhenium, hafnium, germanium, platinum and indium are monitored in case these 
metals markets deteriorate with the effect of posing supply chain bottleneck risks.   
 
Table 1: Criticality ratings of shortlisted raw materials 
High High-Medium Medium Medium-Low Low 
REE: Dy, Eu, Tb, Y Graphite REE: La, Ce, Sm, Gd Lithium Nickel 
REE: Pr, Nd Rhenium Cobalt Molybdenum Lead 
Gallium Hafnium Tantalum Selenium Gold 
Tellurium Germanium Niobium Silver Cadmium 
  Platinum Vanadium  Copper 
  Indium Tin     
  Chromium     
 
Uncertainties and Sensitivity 
The above ratings should be regarded as an illustration of the possible supply-chain bottlenecks that 
could occur under business-as-usual conditions as they are subject to the following uncertainties: 
 
• the demand for low-carbon technologies 
• the technology mix between competing sub-technologies 
• the materials composition and associated quantities of some components 
• the substitutability of key materials in certain technologies  
• the projected supply of various metals to 2020 and 2030. 
 
The sensitivity to these sources of uncertainty was investigated in depth for hybrid and electric vehicles 
and lighting. For hybrid and electric vehicles, this highlighted the sensitivity of the results to widely differ-
ent demand forecasts. The technology mix between permanent magnet motors and induction systems 
was also found to be a key sensitivity, as to some extent was the choice of battery chemistry. For lighting, 
a key sensitivity was found to be the timing and penetration of LED lighting versus phosphor lighting. 
 
Risk Mitigation 
The study considered ways of mitigating the supply-chain risks for the critical metals. These fell into three 
categories: increasing primary supply, reuse/recycling and substitution, although continued innovation 
underlies many of these risk mitigation strategies: 
 
• Increasing primary supply: The development of rare earth mines within Europe is in its early 
stages. The Norra Kärr deposit in Sweden is relatively attractive given its high proportion of 
heavy rare earths. An alternative option in the short term is to process rare earth concentrates 
from tailings, by-product sources or from mines opened outside Europe. For gallium and telluri-
um, the data indicate that Europe already has a degree of self-sufficiency; however, opportuni-
ties may exist to create further refineries to boost recovery of these materials. 
• Reuse/ recycling and waste reduction: Significant improvements have already been made in the 
recycling of post-industrial waste streams such as magnet, semi-conductor and photovoltaic 
scrap. Recycling post-consumer waste streams is more challenging due to issues with collecting, 
sorting and pre-processing and the long lifetimes of certain product groups. Nevertheless, there 
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are short term opportunities and initiatives for the recovery of rare earth magnets from hard disc 
drives and rare earth phosphors from lighting. 
• Substitution: The increased price of these materials has resulted in significant reduction in mate-
rials intensity for some applications, such as the reduction of dysprosium and neodymium in rare 
earth magnets, of terbium and europium within rare earth phosphors and the minimisation of 
the thickness of tellurium within thin film solar panels. Systemic approaches to materials substi-
tution are also being widely considered including alternative motors technologies e.g. asynchro-
nous or switch reluctance; and alternative lighting technologies e.g. LEDs, OLEDs and quantum 
dots. There are also opportunities to substitute the current use of critical materials from tradi-
tional applications where other materials are suitable e.g. eliminate tellurium from steel alloys. 
 
Possible further research 
A number of topics were identified as possibly meriting further research, but could not be considered 
within the immediate scope of this study. These include: 
 
• A meta-study of the raw materials requirements for hybrid and electric vehicles considering a 
wider range of technology uptake and penetration scenarios than was not possible within this 
project. 
• The implications of missing or exceeding targets for the uptake of low carbon technologies. 
• Research into the implications for raw materials of continued improvements of internal combus-
tion engines, including advanced lead acid batteries and catalytic convertors. 
• Development of new and more detailed scenarios for the uptake and technology mix of options 
for stationary energy storage in particular. 
• Similar studies could be undertaken for other sectors such as defence and aerospace. 
• An investigation into the location of production of the energy technologies and the stage of the 
value chain conducted within Europe. 
• Improving statistics on the contribution of recycling to world production for a number of metals. 
• An assessment of the appropriate scale and location of recycling technologies. 
• The purity of the raw materials required for different decarbonisation technologies. 
• Contribution of greater traceability and transparency to reducing raw materials supply risk. 
 
Recommended actions 
To conclude, there are numerous risk mitigation strategies available, but ultimately a combination of 
actions is required by both governments and businesses. Table 2 summarises a list of possible policy 
actions to mitigate raw materials risk. It is noted that some of these are already underway. 
 
However, it is important not to overstate the risks of raw materials bottlenecks for key technologies. This 
is because there are still many years before the large uptake of some technologies and there are numer-
ous options available to mitigate the risks identified. 
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Table 2: Possible policy actions to mitigate raw materials risks for the EU path to decarbonisation 
Type Recommended action 
Data collec-
tion & dissem-
ination 
• Collect better data on the production, use, trade and prices of minor metals 
including gallium and other by-product metals 
• Conduct research on product, material flows in the economy, and supply chains 
such as for the aerospace and defence sectors 
• Publish regular studies on supply, demand, prices and outlook for critical metals 
for materials designated as being critical or near critical for EU decarbonisation 
• Conduct further research on the contribution of recycling to world metal produc-
tion 
• Improve the traceability and transparency of raw materials supply chains 
• Disseminate information on material risks and mitigation solutions to SMEs 
Primary 
production 
• Encourage the development of new mines and refineries in Europe, in particular 
for heavy rare earth elements, tellurium and gallium 
• Build greater public acceptance of mining and refining, including the enforcement 
of appropriate environmental and social standards  
• Support RD&D to lower the environmental impact of mining and refining 
• Raise awareness of valuable by-product metals in mining/refining waste streams, 
among major mining companies in particular 
• Improve geological mapping for critical metals, including revisiting the geological 
potential of old mines and refineries, urban mines and spoils 
Resource 
efficiency 
• Investigate recycling potentials for post-industrial waste streams, including im-
proving resource management control procedures within companies 
• Improve collection rates of WEEE and other end-of-life products in order to indi-
rectly increase the availability of scrap in supply chains 
• Develop new mechanical pre-processing techniques for WEEE to effectively dis-
mantle end-of-life products and to minimise/capture fines for recycling 
• Promote the benefits of reuse and remanufacturing at a EU policy and company  
level such as by supporting the uptake and certification of reuse standards 
• Increase the product lifetimes of key products and components including wind 
turbines, engineering components and solar photovoltaic 
Design & 
innovation 
• Promote eco-design practices to better allow disassembly, recycling and reuse 
• Support RD&D for the development of recycling technologies for CRMs in WEEE, 
including pre-processing  and metallurgical recover techniques 
• Continue RD&D for substitution of supply constrained materials such as for heavy 
rare earths within magnets and lighting phosphors or tellurium within steel alloys 
• Support research in technologies such as nanotechnologies, with the potential to 
reduce materials requirements of key technologies such as photovoltaic solar 
International  
co-operation 
• Continue to collaborate internationally to exchange knowledge 
• Consider the formation of additional International Metals Study Groups 
Stockpiling & 
procurement 
• Consider long-term incentives and risk in procurement decisions 
• Explore possibilities to secure materials supply chain 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In order to tackle climate change, to increase energy supply security and to foster the sustainability and 
competitiveness of the European economy, the EU has made the transition to a low-carbon economy a 
central policy priority. To ensure this, the EU created the Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan) 
with the aim to accelerate the development of low-carbon energy technologies throughout the EU in 
support of their subsequent large-scale deployment by 2020 (European Commission (EC), 2007a; EC, 
2007b). The SET-Plan prioritised six technologies: nuclear fission, solar photovoltaics (PV) and concen-
trated solar power (CSP), wind, bioenergy, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and the electricity grids. The 
EU also committed itself to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050. The 
Commission has since analysed the pathway towards the 2050 targets and their implications within its EU 
Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011a; EC, 2011b).   
 
The Roadmap looks at a number of scenarios which explore different routes towards decarbonisation of 
the energy system, all of which imply major changes such as in fossil fuel prices, energy technologies and 
electricity networks. A number of scenarios to achieve an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
(implying some 85% decline of energy-related CO2 emissions including from transport) provide illustrative 
long-term projections. The Roadmap scenarios highlight the following ten structural implications for the 
transformation of the EU energy system (EC, 2011b):  
 
1. Decarbonisation is possible – and can be less costly than current policies in the long-run. 
2. Higher capital expenditure and lower fuel costs are expected. 
3. Electricity will play an increasing role in meeting final energy demand. 
4. Electricity prices are forecast to rise until 2030 and then decline. 
5. Household expenditure on energy and energy-related products will increase. 
6. Energy savings throughout the system are crucial. 
7. The share of renewables within the energy mix rises substantially. 
8. Carbon capture and storage has to play a pivotal role in system transformation. 
9. Nuclear energy provides an important contribution. 
10. Decentralisation and centralised systems increasingly interact. 
 
To realise the milestones on emission reductions given in the Roadmap, the implementation of the SET-
Plan, as outlined above, is of crucial importance. To support the development and implementation of the 
SET-Plan, a dedicated information system - the Strategic Energy Technologies Information System (SETIS) 
- was established. SETIS provides a central role in the successful implementation of the SET-Plan by 
helping to identify energy technology and RD&D objectives, striving to build consensus around the SET-
Plan programme, identifying new opportunities and assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the SET-
Plan in delivering energy and climate change policy goals. SETIS is managed and operated by the JRC.   
 
As part of the SETIS activities, JRC/SETIS conducted a study in 2010/11 to investigate the potential role 
that material supply chains could play in hindering the large-scale deployment of low-carbon technolo-
gies addressed within SET-Plan, namely: wind, solar (both PV and CSP), CCS, nuclear fission, bioenergy 
and the electricity grid (Moss et al., 2011). It identified 14 metals as being a cause for concern with re-
spect to EU SET-Plan needs as a percentage of world supply. Five metals were labelled ‘critical’ after 
taking into account market and geopolitical parameters: tellurium, indium, gallium, neodymium and 
dysprosium. The potential supply chain constraints for these materials were most applicable to the 
deployment of wind and solar (PV) energy technologies.   
 
Two years prior to the first JRC study, the EU Raw Materials Initiative (EC, 2008a) was set-up due to 
similar concerns on materials shortages that would affect the EU economy in general. An ad hoc Working 
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Group analysed the economic importance and potential supply risk of various raw materials (EC, 2010a) 
and identified the following materials to be critical: antimony, beryllium, cobalt, fluorspar, gallium, ger-
manium, graphite, indium, magnesium, niobium, platinum group metals (PGMs), rare earth elements 
(REEs), tantalum and tungsten (EC, 2010a). The study also highlighted that the following technologies 
could be affected: electricity storage (Li-ion batteries), synthetic fuels, solar photovoltaics, fibre optics, 
displays (TV, monitors), fuel cells, catalysts, permanent magnets, laser technology, micro-capacitors and 
medical technology.   
 
Likewise, US Department of Energy studies (Bauer et al, 2010 and 2011) - which addressed similarly 
related issues on the deployment of wind turbines, electrical vehicles, solar cells and energy-efficient 
lighting - identified the following 14 elements as being ‘critical’: nine rare earth elements (yttrium, lan-
thanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, samarium, europium, terbium and dysprosium) and indi-
um, gallium, tellurium, cobalt and lithium. Studies elsewhere have identified potential supply-chain risks 
to catalytic convertors, polishing media, glass additives, etc. There is therefore evidently a worldwide 
concern about materials supply for a wide spectrum of hi-tech technologies. 
 
 
1.2 Scope and approach 
This study builds on the first JRC study and aims to identify the metals, which could be a potential supply-
chain bottleneck to other low-carbon energy technologies, as well as other selected critical technologies, 
for the European economy. It therefore models, where possible, the scenarios of the EU Energy Roadmap 
2050 in order to provide an assessment of the risks of supply chain bottlenecks in the pathway to the 
decarbonisation of the EU energy sector.   
 
This study considers an additional eleven technologies, including fuel cells, electricity storage, electric 
vehicles, lighting, technologies that improve energy efficiency in industry and buildings and other tech-
nologies that may be competing for the same resources. The results from the first JRC study (Moss et al., 
2011; Moss et al., 2013) are taken into account and updated to reflect the data that has become available 
in the Energy Roadmap. 
 
The methodology that has been used for the study is based on a bottom-up approach, i.e. first compiling 
an inventory of all metals used in each technology, followed by an analysis to identify which metals 
appear significant (e.g. using criteria based on supply and demand, thereby eliminating ‘safe’ materials 
from the analysis). For each technology an appropriate functional unit (e.g. kg/MW) has been used to 
quantify the requirements alongside projections of technology uptake.   
 
The widest selection of metals has been included, encompassing metallic elements, metallic minerals and 
metalloids. In total, the usage of sixty different elements was considered, with only iron, aluminium and 
radioactive elements (used as fuel in nuclear plants) specifically excluded. The usage of graphite was also 
considered, given its identification as a critical raw material (EC, 2010a). More in-depth analyses of the 
significant metals are presented, including criticality arguments based on market and geopolitical factors. 
More detailed descriptions of the critical metals are supplied in Appendix 6, which includes relevant 
background information on sources, supply chain, suppliers, applications (end-users), market price and 
future availability.   
 
The study complements other relevant analytical work being undertaken at the level of the European 
Commission (e.g. on stockpiling, material flow analysis, work on analysis of critical raw materials) and 
provides a useful input which can help the Commission in its implementation and further development of 
its related policies. 
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1.3 Structure of the report 
The structure of the report is the following: 
 
• Chapter 2 introduces each of the low-carbon technologies to be analysed. 
• Chapter 3 outlines the calculations for the materials composition of each technology. 
• Chapter 4 presents the quantification of the metal requirements. These results are screened by 
expected supply to identify the list of significant metals, and includes how the results can be in-
fluenced by different uptake and technology mix scenarios cited by different sources, in particu-
lar the electric vehicle and lighting sectors are analysed. 
• Chapter 5 evaluates the market and geopolitical risks associated with the list of significant met-
als. A further reduced list of metals is identified, with these metals designated as ‘critical’. 
• Chapter 6 considers the mitigation strategies available to alleviate potential bottlenecks, includ-
ing primary production, reuse, recycling and waste management and substitution. 
• Chapter 7 provides the report’s conclusions and recommendations. 
 
There are six Appendices. Appendix 1 provides detailed information on each technology that is analysed 
in the report. The remaining five Appendices provide useful background material for the study: 
 
• Appendix 1: Technology Descriptions 
• Appendix 2: Data on the current worldwide use of each metal 
• Appendix 3: A graphical illustration of long-term metal production trends 
• Appendix 4: Statistics on recycled metals production 
• Appendix 5: Political risk ratings for different countries 
• Appendix 6: Summaries of each of the critical metals 
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2 Technology Descriptions 
 
The descriptions of all the technologies (apart from road transport efficiency and desalination) are taken 
primarily from the JRC's 2011 Technology Map (EC, 2011c), which provides a concise and authoritative 
assessment of the state of the art of each technology, their current and estimated future market penetra-
tion and the barriers to their large-scale deployment, as well as the on-going and planned R&D and 
demonstration efforts to overcome technological barriers. These technological descriptions are supple-
mented by other sources where appropriate. 
 
Where possible, this current study assesses materials demand as a result of the scenarios described in the 
EU Energy Roadmap 2050. The study considers 17 technologies, including fuel cells, electricity storage, 
electric vehicles and lighting (as listed in Table 3), and re-addresses the six technologies analysed in the 
first study (see Table 4).   
 
Desalination has been included as it is potentially an important technology for the global supply of fresh 
water. Furthermore, it is important to consider other technologies competing for the same resources, 
such as in the electronics and information and computer technology (electronics/ICT) sector, so that the 
relative criticality of a particular metal may be accurately assessed. For example, rare earth magnets are 
used in wind turbines, but their largest application is in hard disc drives. These technologies are consid-
ered within the sector study in Section 4.4. More detailed information on the technology descriptions, 
where appropriate, is given in Appendix 1.  
 
Table 3: The additional eleven technologies analysed in this second study 
No. Key decarbonisation technology 
1 Hydropower 
2 Geothermal energy 
3 Marine energy 
4 Co-generation or combined heat and power 
5 Advanced fossil fuel power generation 
6 Fuel cells and hydrogen 
7 Electricity storage in the power sector 
8 Energy intensive industries 
9 Energy efficiency in buildings 
10 Road transport efficiency* 
11 Desalination* 
Source: EC, 2011c 
*Road Transport Efficiency and desalination were not included in  
the 2011 Technology Map 
 
 
Table 4: The six SET-Plan technologies analysed in the first JRC study 
No. SET-Plan technology 
1 Nuclear Energy (fission) 
2 Solar energy (PV and CSP) 
3 Wind energy 
4 Bioenergy (including biofuels) 
5 CCS 
6 Electricity (smart) grids 
Source: EC, 2011c and Moss et al, 2011 
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3 Materials Composition of the Technologies 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the calculations that have been made to estimate the materials composition of each 
technology. It provides details of the assumptions and references that have been used to quantify the 
materials requirements in each technology. For example, it provides information on the types of alloys 
used, their composition and the amounts that are needed per technology. 
 
The methodology used is a bottom-up approach, first compiling an inventory of all metals used in each 
technology using an appropriate functional unit, such as kg/MW. In Chapter 4, the metals demand is 
determined by scaling up according to the projected uptake of the technology under various scenarios. 
These results are presented alongside the expected supply figures.  
 
The widest selection of metals has been included, where metals refers throughout the report to metallic 
elements, metallic minerals and metalloids. In total the usage of sixty different elements was considered, 
with only iron, aluminium and radioactive elements (used as fuel in nuclear power plants) specifically 
excluded. Graphite was also included, reflecting its status as one of the critical raw materials identified by 
the EU Raw Materials Initiative (EC, 2010a). 
 
3.2 Hydropower 
Three different sources of data were used to assess different types of hydropower. First, data for materi-
als was obtained from an Environmental Product Declaration (EPD) of 14 Nordic hydropower plants 
owned by Vattenfall power company (Vattenfall AB, 2011). These include hydropower plants ranging in 
output from less than 5 MW to 590 MW. This life cycle assessment (LCA) provided information on the 
mass and percentage of materials used per MWh for a single year (see Figure 2). The number of hours 
used in this calculation was inferred by determining the total power capacity of the 14 hydropower 
stations, information for which can be found on the individual websites of each hydropower station. 
Knowing that the average total hydropower per year produced by Vattenfall’s hydroplants is 30.9 TWh, 
and that this LCA examined 31% of this electricity, it was possible to determine estimates for the mass 
per unit of power for each material required.  
 
Figure 2: Use of metals for 14 Vattenfall hydropower stations (excludes steel and aluminium) 
 
 
Source: Vattenfall AB, 2011 
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Second, an Environmental Product Declaration (EPD) for Wildegg-Brugg (Axpo Hydro Energy, 2009) run-
of-the-river power plant in Switzerland was examined. This plant has a total power output of 50 MW and 
an average annual generation of 300 GWh. The EPD provides data regarding the mass of a given material 
needed per MWh (Table 5), which in combination with the power output and annual generation values 
can be used to estimate the mass of materials required per unit of installed capacity. 
 
For small scale hydropower, an EPD for Au-Schönenberg (Au-Schönenberg hydro power plant, undated) 
hydropower plant, also in Switzerland, was used. This hydropower plant produces 2.1 MW of power and 
has an average annual electricity production of around 5.6 GWh. The EPD provided data on the mass of 
material required per MWh (Table 6). The procedure employed for obtaining the mass of materials per 
unit of power was similar to those outlined above.   
 
Table 5: Materials used at the run-of-the-river 
hydro-power plant at Wildegg-Brugg (Switzeland) 
Element g per average net MWh 
Nickel 18 
Chromium 4.15 
Baryte 1.23 
Copper 4.76 
Magnesite 5.94 
Zinc 0.117 
Zirconium 0.000,001,9 
Source: Axpo Hydro Energy, 2009 
 
Table 6: Materials used at the small-scale hydro-
power plant at Au-Schönenberg (Switzerland) 
Element g per average net MWh 
Nickel 34.5 
Chromium 12.8 
Baryte 0.202 
Copper 3.02 
Magnesite 10.4 
Zinc 0.311 
Zirconium 0.000,011 
Source: Au-Schönenberg hydro power plant, undated 
 
Taking into account the above descriptions, the metals requirements for hydropower, are based on the 
following figures (kg/MW).  
 
Table 7: Hydropower metals requirements 
Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Ni 31.0 Zn 5 
Mo 2.9 Mn 1.7 
Cu 67 Ti 0.24 
Mg 1.92 Sn 0.003,08 
Cr 12.5 Zr 0.000,013 
Pb 5.36   
 
3.3 Geothermal energy 
The alloys that are used in well piping contain some of the metals that are of interest to this study, includ-
ing chromium, molybdenum, nickel and copper. These metals are principally used in alloys for well pipes 
that must be able to operate under conditions of high temperatures (up to 500°C), high acidity (pH=1), 
high salinity and gas content (CO2, H2S, CH4). 
 
The data for the materials required for geothermal systems was obtained from an LCA published by 
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), (Argonne National Laboratory, 2010). Additional information ob-
tained from Butting1 regarding typical pipes used in geothermal plant was used in conjunction with the 
ANL data to infer other possible material usage. In total six types of steel or other alloys were examined 
                                                             
1 Conversation with Sylvia Muller, Butting (Sales and marketing), July 2012 
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for three different geothermal systems. The percentages of constituent elements in these materials are 
given in Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Composition of key steel or other alloys used in geothermal plants, % (balance is iron) 
Steel or other alloy Ti Mn Nb V Cr Cu Mo Ni Co and Ta 
K-55 - 1.5 - - 0.15 0.2 - 0.2 - 
X-56 0.09 1.4 0.05 0.05 - - - - - 
T-95 - 0.25 - 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.15 0.4 - 
316L - 2 - - 18.5 - 2.5 15 - 
625 0.4 - - - 23 - - 58 4.15 
825 1.2 1 - - 23.5 3 3.5 46 - 
Source: Industry websites 
 
For enhanced geothermal systems (EGS), the analysis assumes a medium-sized plant producing 50 MW 
with 25 wells, each with a depth of 5 km. For binary cycle plants, the analysis assumes a power output of 
10 MW with 5 wells, each 1.5 km deep. For the flash steam plant, a power output of 48.4 MW is assumed, 
with 22 wells, each 2.5 km deep (Argonne National Laboratory, 2010).   
 
Taking into account the above descriptions, the metals requirements for geothermal energy, are based on 
the following figures (kg/MW): 
 
Table 9: Geothermal metals requirements 
Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Ta 64.0 Nb 128 
Ni 120,155 Ti 1,634 
Mo 7,209 Cu 3,605 
Cr 64,405 Mn 4,325 
 
3.4 Marine energy 
3.4.1 Tidal barrage and tidal current energy 
Although the planned tidal power project at the Severn River estuary in the UK has been put on hold by 
the British government because of high costs, several analyses were made in advance including a life cycle 
assessment (LCA). As a result of the LCA, an overview was given showing the required quantities of mate-
rials for a tidal barrage power plant, with a planned capacity of 8,640 MW (216 turbines at 40 MW each 
(DECC, 2010) with an estimated energy output of 16.8 TWh annually. Huge quantities of materials are 
required for the construction of a tidal barrage. Concrete, consisting of coarse and fine aggregate as well 
as cement, and reinforcement bars account for the bulk of the material (Sustainable Development Com-
mission, Black & Veatch, 2007; Kelly et al., 2012). Moreover, metallic raw materials are needed for tur-
bines and embankments. In the LCA study of (Kelly et al., 2012), it is assumed that the turbines consist of 
about 10% copper and 90% steel.   
 
Table 10: Estimated quantities of metals for the turbines of the  
Severn Tidal Barrage (Kelly et al., 2012) 
Element Quantity 
(tonnes) 
Tonnes 
per MW 
Tonnes 
per MWh 
Copper 43,200 5 2.6 
Steel 388,800 45 23.1 
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A more detailed listing of the turbine composition can be found in (DECC, 2010) where percentage shares 
are given for the relevant materials of a 40MW Alstom turbine, which was taken into consideration for 
the Severn tidal power plant. 
 
The Seagen turbine is representative of maritime turbines which are driven by (tidal) currents. The device 
considered here has a capacity of 1.2 MW and weighs 465 tonnes. Similar materials requirements are 
expected for other turbines. Its main components are a tall tower with a platform on top (over the 
ocean’s surface) and the crossbar carrying the turbines. For these three components, which represent 
89% of the total mass, steel is the main material used. Therefore steel is the most important material 
under consideration (Douglas et al., 2008). Steel and other relevant materials are shown below. 
 
Table 11: Relative composition of a hydro turbine 
Element Percentage 
(mass) 
 Carbon Steel   76 
 Stainless Steel   4 
 Special Alloys   4 
 Silicon Steel   11 
 Copper   5 
 Insulation   0 
 Other   <1 
Source: DECC, 2010 
 
 
Table 12: Materials for the Seagen turbine 
Element Quantity 
(tonnes) 
Kilograms 
per MW 
Steel 412.9 344 
Stainless 
steel 2.8 2.3 
Iron 33.9 28.3 
Copper 4.7 3.9 
Composites 9.3 7.8 
Other 1.4 1.2 
Source: Douglas et al., 2008 
 
3.4.2 Wave energy 
The Wave Dragon is an example of a technology for harvesting energy from ocean waves. It is an over-
topping device, which means that a reservoir above sea level is filled by waves and then the water is 
released back to sea level, driving a turbine on its way down (Soerensen et al., 2012). Raw materials 
inventory analyses were made for the Wave Dragon’s generator and electrical transformer: the results 
are shown in the tables below (Soerensen and Naef, 2008). Another wave energy converter is the Pelamis 
wave power plant. For the prototype mostly steel was used, but it is assumed that in the future more 
specialized materials will be used, such as concrete or glass-reinforced plastic (Parker et al., 2007). 
 
Table 13: Materials for the generator of the Wave Dragon 
Element Quantity (kg) kg/MW 
Ferronickel, 25% Ni 1,500 214 
Copper, at regional storage   5,800 829 
Cast iron  10,900 1,557 
Steel, electric, un- and low-alloyed  10,000 1,429 
Polypropylene, granulate  20 3 
Glass fibre  280 40 
Source: Soerensen and Naef, 2008 
 
 
Table 14: Materials for the electrical transformer of the Wave Dragon 
Element Quantity (kg) kg/MW 
 Copper, at regional storage   3,500 500 
 Aluminium, production mix, at plant   100 14 
 Reinforcing steel, at plant   9,000 1,286 
 Synthetic rubber, at plant   9,000 1,286 
 Polypropylene, granulate, at plant   400 57 
 Silicone product, at plant   6,800 971 
 Steel, electric, un- and low-alloyed, at plant   7,000 1,000 
Source: Soerensen and Naef, 2008 
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3.4.3 Ocean thermal energy conversion 
Ocean thermal energy conversion typically consists of two main components: the intake pipes in which 
the cold water is pumped up from the depth, and a heat exchanger for vaporising the working fluid. 
Currently the materials for the cold water pipes are the focus of research.  In 2011 Lockheed Martin was 
developing a composite material with fibreglass as its main component (Millera et al., 2012). Therefore it 
is assumed that mineral raw materials are needed, mostly for the heat exchanger. Investigations regard-
ing possible materials for OTEC heat exchangers began in the 1980s. As a result of this work, titanium 
became the material of choice due to its favourable corrosion properties, followed by stainless steel 
which has the advantage of being less expensive than titanium. Copper-nickel alloys are not suitable 
because they are susceptible to corrosion in an ammonia-rich environment. Aluminium alloys are of 
interest but the problem here is the shorter lifetime compared to stainless steel and titanium (Darby, 
1984; Kapranos and Priestner, 1987). Quantitative data of the required materials in relation to the in-
stalled capacity are not available.   
 
3.4.4 Osmotic power 
According to (Skilhagen et al., 2007), osmotic power generating systems are very similar to conventional 
desalination plants (see Section 3.12). 
 
3.4.5 Overall metals demand 
 
Taking into account the above descriptions, the metals requirements for marine energy, are based on the 
following figures (kg/MW): 
 
Table 15: Marine energy metals requirements 
Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Cu 5.00 
Mo 0.05 
Ni 0.22 
Cr 0.31 
Ti 0.01 
 
3.5 Co-generation or combined heat and power (CHP) 
Material requirements for district heating CHP and micro-CHP were obtained. The materials for district 
CHP were obtained from an academic paper examining the life cycle of a district CHP for 240 dwellings 
(Oliver-Solà et al., 2009). The combined heating and electric power was 0.84 MW, including a supplemen-
tary peak boiler unit, and the materials examined included the infrastructure for transporting hot water 
to the homes and heat exchangers installed in the homes. 
 
The materials for the micro-CHP system were taken from a life cycle analysis of a micro-CHP system with 
a Stirling engine (Gazis and Harrison, 2011). This system has an output of 24 kW of heat and 1 kW of 
electricity, resulting in a total power output of 25 kW. The mass per unit power is calculated using this 
value. For components made of stainless steel, type 43 steel was employed as a typical material for the 
purposes of estimating quantities of elements. For the iron-neodymium magnets contained within this 
CHP a typical composition of N32Fe14B was used. For the composition of the brass components, dezincifi-
cation (DZR) brass was examined. The composition of the main materials for this system is illustrated in 
Figure 3.   
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Figure 3: Materials composition of a micro-CHP system incorporating a Stirling engine 
 
Source: Gazis and Harrison, 2011 
 
Other types of micro-CHP system are also available or are likely to become available in the near future. 
These include systems that use fuel cells, which are dealt with in a separate section. Materials require-
ments for CHP used in large-scale power plants proved difficult to obtain. Such systems require piping to 
carry away hot water to locations near the plant where it may be used for heating. Suitable piping does 
not require unusual alloys and is therefore unlikely to impact on supplies of critical metals.   
 
Taking into account the above descriptions, the metals requirements for co-generation, are based on the 
following figures (kg/MW): 
 
Table 16: Cogeneration metals requirements 
Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Cu 44,448 
Sn 168 
Ni 541 
Cr 1,033 
Mn 108 
Zn 9.0 
Pb 0.5 
 
3.6 Advanced fossil fuel power generation 
3.6.1 Materials required for ultra-supercritical (USC) and advanced ultra-supercritical (A-
USC) coal power plants 
The overall plant efficiency is influenced by the internal efficiency of the steam turbine more than any 
other component. In addition further net efficiency gains can be achieved by enhancing boiler efficiency 
and reducing auxiliary consumption. Consequently, the focus here will be on materials for turbines, 
boilers and pipes which allow for higher steam temperatures hence increasing energy efficiency.   
Materials for boilers and pipework  
The materials used for boilers and pipework are dependent on the conditions employed. In general, 
steam conditions of up to 610°C are achieved using steels with around 12% chromium content. By using 
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coatings on Ni-chrome steel it is possible to push the steam conditions up to around 640°C. The materials 
requirements for different steam conditions are summarised in Table 13. 
 
In order to achieve advanced ultra-supercritical steam conditions, furnaces, pipework and other compo-
nents which come in contact with high temperature steam will need to be built from high-performance 
materials such as nickel-based super alloys. Compared to the chromium steels which are currently used, 
nickel-based alloys are more expensive and more difficult to weld. The nickel materials required cost 
around 20 times more than those for the current state-of-the-art technology boilers. However, due to the 
increased efficiency the payback period is expected to be around 12 months. Over the past decade, a 
significant amount of research has been devoted to developing the necessary materials for advanced 
ultra-supercritical power plants. To date these materials have not been used in power plant applications, 
test plants are currently under construction in India and China. Commercial 700°C steam power plants are 
not expected to be in commercial operation in Europe until 2020.2  
 
Table 17: Materials for boilers, pipes, headers for different steam conditions 
Steam conditions Metal alloy Commercial 
time frame 
600/620°C 25-30 MPa NF616, T91, T92 2009-2017 
Up to 650°C Austenite, Ni-chrome steels with coating 2017-2020 
700/720°C up to 35 MPa Ni super alloys 2020-2030 
Source: IEA, Clean Coal Centre, 2011 
 
There are currently around five nickel super-alloys under consideration for use in pipes and furnaces in 
700°C steam power plants. They are: for thin sections, Inconel 740, Haynes 282 and Inconel 617; for thick 
sections, Inconel 740H and Nimonic 263. Most of these materials were developed for the aerospace 
industry, except for Inconel 740H which has been developed especially for the power generation industry. 
A typical 800 MWe power plant will require around 1,000 tonnes of Ni-based materials for the furnaces 
and piping alone. However, it is hoped that with improvements in design this figure will come down to 
around 500 tonnes.   
 
Table 18: Boiler materials for 700°C power plants (%) 
 Nimonic 263 Inconel 740H Inconel 740 Haynes 282 Inconel 617 
Ni 52 48 48 57 44.5 
Co 20 20 20 10 12.5 
Cr 20 25 25 20 22 
Mo 6 0.5 0.5 8.5 9 
Mn 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 1 
Ti 2.4 1.35 1.8 2.1 0.6 
Al 0.6 1.35 0.9 1.5 1.15 
Nb  1.5 2   
Cu 0.2     
Fe 0.7  1.1   
Source: VGB PowerTech, 2005, Advances in Materials Technology for Fossil Power Plants,2010 for Inconel 740H 
 
To model the materials demands for pipes and furnaces in 700°C steam power plants, Inconel 740 and 
740H have been used, as these are materials are the most promising. Inconel 617 was excluded because 
of problems experienced with this material during the Comtes 700 project.   
                                                             
2 Personal communication with Doosan Power Systems (August 2012) 
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Table 19: Metals requirements for boilers  
and pipework for current best technology 
 kg/MW 
Ni 2.5 
Cr 111.25 
Mo 5 
Mn 6.25 
Fe 1091.25 
W 18.75 
Nb 0.75 
V 2.5 
Assumptions – T92 alloy is used 
Table 20: Metals requirements for boilers and 
pipework for A-USC 700°C power plants 
 kg/MW 
Ni 656.25 
Co 187.50 
Cr 281.25 
Mo 56.25 
Mn 3.75 
Ti 21.56 
Nb 9.38 
Assumptions – Inconel 740H used for thick sections  
and Inconel 740 used for thin sections 
 
3.6.2 Materials requirements for gas and steam turbines 
Gas and steam turbines are complex pieces of machinery and accordingly have far from trivial materials 
requirements. A typical gas turbine contains over 1,000 precision cast parts, made from a range of differ-
ent metal alloys, aluminium, titanium and ferritic and austenitic steels (Rolls Royce, 2008). It is expected 
that the technology for steam turbines for A-USC power plants can be adapted from gas turbines and 
compared to boilers and pipes fewer technological advances are required.   
Materials requirements for steam turbines for A-USC power plants 
A large steam turbine for a 700°C steam coal power plants will require around 100 tonnes of nickel super 
alloys. The composition of the alloy will depend on the specific component, and the different alloys used 
are 263, 617 and 625. The compositions of these alloys can be found in Table 21.3 The metals require-
ments for steam turbines for A-USC power plants are shown in Table 22. It is assumed that equal amounts 
of all three Ni-alloys are used. Components of the turbine which do not require the use of Ni-alloys have 
not been considered.   
Materials requirements for gas turbine blades 
Due to the temperatures that turbine blades are exposed to, they have the most demanding materials 
requirements of any turbine component. Turbine blades are required to withstand very high centrifugal 
forces whilst operating at temperatures in excess of the melting point of the alloy. Consequently, re-
search in this area has been focused on increasing temperature capabilities of the material used.   
 
Ni-based super alloys are the predominant material for turbine blades of modern land-based gas turbines. 
These alloys are limited to metal temperatures of 900°C to 927°C: for higher energy efficiency materials 
with higher temperature capabilities are required. Turbine blades are exposed to high centrifugal stress 
and very high temperatures during service; this puts great demands on the materials required for the 
blades (Martinsson, 2006). 
 
A step change in temperature capability was realised by the introduction of single crystal superalloys. 
Single crystal superalloys have been developed for use in aerospace applications and have been selected 
for development for industrial turbine applications. Rhenium is used in single crystal super alloys to stop 
them becoming micro-structurally unstable, thus improving creep strength and longevity. Single crystal 
superalloys contain 3 to 6% rhenium; however, it is anticipated that for industrial turbine applications a 
lower proportion of rhenium is favoured due to cost. The composition of the second generation single 
crystal used for gas turbine blades is presented in Table 23 (Bhangu and Ford, 2011). The metals require-
ments for turbine blades in the current best technology industrial gas turbines are presented in Table 24 
(it is assumed that CMSX-4 alloy is used).   
                                                             
3 Personal communication with Skoda Power (August 2012) 
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Table 21: Nickel superalloys used for  
steam turbines (%) 
 Nimonic 
263 
Inconel 
617 
Haynes 
625 
Ni 52 44.5 59 
Co 20 12.5 1 
Cr 20 22 21 
Mo 6 9 9 
Mn 0.6 1 0.5 
Ti 2.4 0.6 0.4 
Al 0.6 1.15 0.4 
Nb - - 2.5 
Ta   1.2 
Cu 0.2 - - 
Fe 0.7 - 5 
Nb+Ta is 3.7, it has been assumed that 1/3 of this is Ta and 2/3 is Nb 
 
Table 22: Metals requirements for  
A-USC turbines 
 kg/MW 
Ni 64.79 
Co 13.96 
Cr 26.25 
Mo 10.00 
Mn 0.88 
Ti 1.42 
Al 0.90 
Nb 1.03 
Ta 0.51 
Fe 2.38 
 
 
Table 23: Composition of second generation 
single crystal nickel-based superalloys (%) 
 CMSX 4 PWA 1484 Rene N5 
Ni 61.7 59.3 61.6 
Co 9.0 10.0 8.0 
Cr 6.5 5.0 7.0 
Mo 0.6 2.0 2.0 
Ti 1.0   
W 6.0 6.0 5.0 
Ta 6.5 9.0 7.0 
Al 5.6 5.6 6.2 
Re 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Hf 0.1 0.1 0.2 
 
 
 
Table 24: Metal requirements for  
gas turbine blades 
 kg/MW 
Ni 0.617 
Co 0.090 
Cr 0.065 
Mo 0.006 
Ti 0.010 
W 0.060 
Ta 0.065 
Re 0.030 
Hf 0.001 
Assuming that a 200MW turbine requires 200kg  
of weld alloy for the blades 
Source: Alstom Thermal Power, 2012 
 
 
To date, the single crystal nickel alloys used in industrial gas turbines have all been developed for aero-
space applications. However, this does not necessarily make them suitable for industrial gas turbine 
applications, where the environment is often more corrosive due to the choice of fuels. These applica-
tions require alloy compositions with high levels of chromium to protect against corrosion. Alloys contain-
ing around 12-15% chromium have been developed and are expected to be used in turbine blades for 
industrial gas turbines in the future (Caron and Lavigne, 2011).  
 
3.6.3 Gas fired power plants  
For gas fired power plants, such as a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) plant and Integrated Gasifica-
tion Combined Cycle (IGCC) plant, it is expected that the materials advances required for increased ener-
gy efficiency will be for gas turbines. LCA data has been used to determine the material compositions and 
requirements of a combined cycle gas power plant (Ataei et al., 2012). Nickel alloys are required for some 
of the gas turbine components due to the high temperatures which they are exposed to in this form of 
power generation. It is assumed that IGCC power plants have similar metals requirements to CCGT plants.   
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Table 25: Metal inventory of a 400MW CCGT power plant 
Metal Amount (kg) kg/MW 
Aluminium 440,000 1,100 
Copper 440,000 1,100 
Chromium steel 1,800,000 4,500 
Nickel 6,300 15.75 
Chromium 976 2.44 
Cobalt 720 1.8 
 
3.7 Fuel cells and hydrogen 
Fuel cells that operate at low temperatures require catalysts to accelerate electrochemical processes, and 
the usual choice of catalyst is platinum. Other metals such as ruthenium may also be employed. High 
temperature fuel cells do not generally require platinum catalysts. Information regarding the constituent 
elements in fuel cells was found for solid oxide fuel cells (SOFCs), proton exchange membrane fuel cells 
(PEMFCs) and direct-methanol fuel cells (DMFCs).   
SOFCs 
SOFCs operate at high temperatures and therefore do not require noble metal catalysts such as platinum. 
The electrically active parts of SOFCs are mainly made of ceramics or of a mixture of ceramics and metals 
(a ‘cermet’). The anode, for example, is typically made of a cermet which includes the elements nickel, 
oxygen and zirconium. The most common electrolyte is YSZ, which is made of yttrium, oxygen and zirco-
nia (Y2O3/Zr2) and the cathode is usually made of lanthanum, samarium, magnesium and oxygen (LSM) in 
the form LaxSryMn03. For SOFCs material usage was obtained from a Sixth Framework Programme project 
providing life cycle assessment (LCA) of fuel cells (NEEDS, 2008). The SOFCs analysed here were stationary 
systems consisting of a stack, a heat exchanger, an inverter, an air and fuel supply and a reformer and 
burner. For the purposes of our analysis only the materials in the stack were examined since the uses 
examined would not require the additional components. The data for SOFCs was presented in terms of 
the requirements in 2008 and the predicted requirements for 2025. To obtain values for 2020 material 
requirements, the mean of values for 2008 and 2025 were used: for 2030 the value for 2025 was em-
ployed. 
 
This LCA includes only the main structural materials used to create the fuel cells, however, and does not 
supply information on the electrolytes or anodes. Further information was also obtained from a review of 
critical materials in SOFCs (J. Thijssen, LLC, 2011), which provided data such as the mass of material 
required per unit volume (Table 26). Using the combination of this data with the NEEDS project data, it 
was possible to estimate the mass required of a given material per MW (Table 29). 
 
Table 26: Metal content of electrically active components of SOFC 
Element 
Typical critical metal 
content for SOFC (mg/cm
2
) 
Lanthanum 4 
Yttrium 10 
Cerium 1 
Gadolinium/samarium <0.3 
Cobalt 0.5 
Source: J. Thijssen, LLC, 2011 
PEMFCs 
PEMFCs operate at low temperatures, and therefore require platinum as a catalyst on both the cathode 
and the anode. For PEMFCs the materials usage was obtained from the same NEEDS project referenced 
above, where the system examined included materials for the balance of plant and for a reformer. For the 
analysis here only the stack was examined. The materials usage includes chromium steel 18/8, for which 
18% is chromium and 8% is nickel. The data for PEMFCs was presented in terms of the requirements in 
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2008 and the predicted requirements for 2025 (Table 27). To obtain values for 2020 material require-
ments the mean of values for 2008 and 2025 were used: for 2030 the value for 2025 was employed.   
 
Table 27: The chromium steel and platinum requirements for PEMFCs 
Material kg/kW (2008) kg/kW (2025) 
Chromium steel 18/8 plant 0.1 0.02 
Platinum, at regional storage 0.000,75 0.000,22 
Source: NEEDS, 2008 
DMFCs 
For DMFCs the important materials for this analysis are those used as catalysts. Information regarding 
typical state-of-the-art loadings was obtained following discussion with an expert in this field, Martin 
Hogarth. Average values for the loading of platinum and ruthenium at the anode were estimated to be 
2 mg/cm2 and 1 mg/cm2 respectively. At the cathode only platinum is used, the estimated loading of 
which was 1 mg/cm2. Such a combination of loadings would provide around 90 mW/cm2. From this data it 
is possible to calculate the mass required per unit of power for both platinum and ruthenium.   
 
Table 28: Typical loading of platinum and ruthenium of a DMFC 
Element Typical loading at 
cathode (mg/cm
2
) 
Typical loading at 
anode (mg/cm
2
) 
Platinum 1 2 
Ruthenium - 1 
Source: Conversation with Martin Hogarth, fuel cells expert (July 2012) 
 
 
Taking into account the above descriptions, the metals requirements for co-generation, are based on the 
following figures (kg/MW): 
 
Table 29: Fuel cells and hydrogen metals requirements 
Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Pt 67.9 La 38.0 
Ru 22.0 Gd 1.2 
Cr 48,323.2 Sm 1.2 
Ni 282.0 Ce 8.0 
Y 8.4 Co 10.8 
 
 
3.8 Electricity storage in the power sector 
Different options for power storage are at different levels of technological maturity and face different 
constraints for their (more extensive) deployment. Moreover, energy storage is a costly option and the 
need for energy storage can be reduced through upgrades in the electricity networks, flexible generation, 
demand side management or curtailment of regenerative energy production. A recent publication (sum-
marised in Table 67) compared the different technologies available on various terms (Evans et al., 2012). 
Due to the reliability requirements for grid applications, it is reasonable to expect that proven technolo-
gies are more likely to see the largest increase in deployment in the short- to mid-term. However, costs 
and technological maturity are not the only factors affecting deployment. For example, geographical 
constraints limit the use of pumped hydro storage and underground CAES, and large-scale underground 
hydrogen storage is tied to local geology (Genoese and Wietschel, 2011). 
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Table 30: Key features of selected power storage technologies 
 Capacity (MW) Runtime $/kW $kWh Maturity 
Mechanical storage      
CAES underground 5-400 1 to 24+ h 800 50 Commercial 
CAES above ground 50 2 to 4 h 2,000 100 Developed 
Pumped hydro 100-5,000 1 to 24+ h 600 100 Mature 
Flywheels 0.25 ms to 15 m 350 5,000 Demonstration 
Electrical storage      
Supercapacitors 0.3 ms to 60 m 300 2000 Developed 
SMES 0.1-10 ms to 8 s 300 10,000 Developed 
High-temperature  
thermal storage 
     
 0-60 1 to 24+ h  60 Developed 
Chemical storage      
Lead-acid 0-40 s to h 300 400 Mature 
Sodium-sulphur 0.05-8 s to h 3,000 500 Commercial 
Nickel-cadmium 0-40 s to h 1,500 1,500 Commercial 
Lithium-ion 0.1 m to h 4,000 2,500 Demonstration 
Fuel cells 0-50 s to 24+ h 10,000  Developing 
Source: Evans et al., 2012 
 
3.8.1 Mechanical storage 
In the different strategies for mechanical energy storage, electrical energy is converted into kinetic or 
potential energy and then back into electrical energy. This implies that the basic technology needed is 
essentially the same as conventional power generation technologies where electricity is obtained by 
means of a generator.   
Pumped storage hydropower 
Pumped storage hydropower has essentially the same raw materials requirements as hydropower sta-
tions (Oertel, 2008), including iron, nickel, copper, chromium and aluminium (Axpo Hydro Energy, 2012). 
 
Table 31: Specific metal requirements at the Löntsch storage plant 
Element g/MWh kg/MW 
Iron 500 1000 
Nickel 30 60 
Chromium 10 20 
Aluminium 10 20 
Copper 30 60 
Notes: The Löntsch storage plant used a drop of 370 m to produce 60 MW of power.  
The average yearly energy production amounts to 120 million kWh (120 GWh),  
with an equivalent operation time at maximum load of 2000 hours. 
Source: after Axpo Hydro Energy, 2012, rounded 
Compressed air energy storage (CAES) 
Generating electricity from compressed air using current technology, involves driving a turbine with the 
compressed air together with the combustion products of natural gas. The burning of natural gas is 
necessary to prevent freezing. The temperature is close to 700°C (Oertel, 2008), which is lower than that 
in normal gas turbines – implying less stringent material requirements, as materials do not have to keep 
their properties at such high temperatures. In adiabatic facilities, where the heat of compression is stored 
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and used to compensate for the cooling during rapid expansion, the conditions that the turbine must 
withstand are milder. 
 
Table 32: Metal inventory of a CAES facility with 2 MW for 10 hours 
Element tonnes/MW tonnes/MWh 
Steel (includes construction) 320 32 
Aluminium 2.5 0.25 
Copper 5 0.5 
Source: Klobasa et al., 2008, rounded; MWh for a single charge-discharge cycle. 
Flywheels 
Flywheels themselves may be made out of steel, aluminium-manganese-magnesium alloys or titanium 
(low speed), or of glass or carbon fibre reinforced plastics (high speed). Table 33 shows an overview of 
key properties of these materials. Due to the combination of low material density and high tenacity yield, 
the higher energy density / light flywheels (e.g. out of carbon fibre reinforced plastic) rotating at high 
speeds are preferred over heavier and slower metal-based flywheels.  
 
Table 33: Key properties of selected flywheel materials 
Element Density 
(kg/m
3
) 
Tenacity 
(MN/m
2
) 
Theoretical maximum 
energy density (Wh/kg) 
Steel (AISI 4340) 7,800 1,800 32 
Al-Mn-Mg-alloy 2,700 600 31 
Titan (TiAl6Zr5) 4,500 1,200 37 
Glass fibre reinforced plastics 2,000 1,600 111 
Carbon fibre reinforced plastics 1,500 2,400 222 
Source: Oertel, 2008; Notice that a low density combined with high tenacity lead to higher energy densities. 
 
 
3.8.2 Chemical and electrochemical storage 
Hydrogen 
When considering power storage in the form of hydrogen, it is necessary to realize that several different 
components are necessary to (a) produce hydrogen from electricity via electrolysis, (b) store it (under-
ground storage or high pressure storage in 70 MPa tanks or liquid storage or metal hydrides), and (c) 
produce electricity from the stored hydrogen, for example by using a fuel cell (Wietschel and Ball, 2009). 
The raw material requirements for a sample hydrogen storage facility were analysed in an internal Fraun-
hofer project considering different concepts for stationary storage (Klobasa et al., 2008). Performance 
and material data for a sample hydrogen storage system using proton exchange membrane (PEM) elec-
trolysis for hydrogen production, pressure vessels for storage and a gas engine for electricity production 
are shown below (Table 34).   
Lead-acid batteries 
Batteries in general and particularly lead-acid batteries are mostly designed for specific applications, 
leading to a large number of different designs. The design of the electrode must provide both mechanical 
support for the active material and electronic conductivity for the collected current. The most common 
plate design is the grid plate or pasted plate. A network of lead wires is filled with pellets of active materi-
al. The grid itself may be produced by casting lead or lead alloys or by expanding or punching sheet metal.   
 
The basic material for positive and negative active material usually is ‘gray oxide’, a fine powder consist-
ing of about 70–80% lead oxide (PbO) and the remainder lead. This powder is mixed with water and 
sulphuric acid to form a paste, which is applied to the grid by pasting machines. The selection of appro-
priate alloying additives is of immense importance, since the rate of grid corrosion is influenced by the 
composition of the grid alloy. In particular, antimony improves the cycle stability of the active mass in the 
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positive electrode, but its addition must be limited (to <2%) to reduce the production of hydrogen (Berndt 
and Spahrbier, 2001). 
 
Table 34: Composition for an exemplary hydrogen storage system 
  Unit Hydrogen (ND PEM 
with gas engine) 
Pl
an
t 
d
et
ai
ls
 Power kW 2,000 
Max. operating time per cycle hours 10 
Capacity kWh 20,000 
M
at
er
ia
ls
 
Al kg 600 0.471% 
Resin kg 1,200 0.943% 
Ir kg 4 0.003% 
Cu kg 2,250 1.768% 
Pt kg 4 0.003% 
PVC kg 500 0.393% 
Steel kg 122,400 96.167% 
Viton kg 320 0.251% 
 
Table 35: Composition of a representative lead-acid battery 
Material Percentage g/kWh
1
 
Lead 25 5.2 
Lead oxides 35 7.2 
Polypropylene 10 2.1 
Sulphuric acid 10 2.1 
Water 16 3.3 
Glass 2 0.4 
Antimony 1 0.2 
Note 1: estimated from a lead-acid battery, Varta type E12V75N with 12 Volt, 80 Ah, 19.8 kg 
Source: Gaines et al., 2010 
 
A further vital factor is the addition of metals that achieve a fine structure in the hardened material (fine 
grain alloys). Otherwise, alloys with such low antimony content cannot be cast flawlessly. The addition of 
small amounts of selenium (approx. 200 g/tonne) is especially effective. Selenium forms fine lead selenide 
(PbSe) particles in the molten alloy, which act as nucleants during the solidification process causing the 
formation of a great number of crystals, thus attaining the desired fine grain structure (Varta, 2012). Lead 
batteries with these types of alloy lose water so slowly that, for standby applications under normal condi-
tions, the refilling intervals are longer than five years. At the same time, the residual antimony content 
stabilizes the cycling performance to such an extent that more than 1,000 charging/discharging cycles are 
possible. Starter batteries in motor cars, based on such a design, do not have to be refilled during their 
normal service life of approximately five years when used under normal operating conditions. 
Nickel-cadmium (NiCd) batteries 
As shown in Table 36, the nickel content of NiCd batteries is generally between about 20% and 25%, but 
there may be as little as 15% or as much as 40% cadmium. The energy content based on the specific 
material requirements of NiCd batteries for Ni is in the range of 4-5.5 g/Wh and for Cd 3-5 g/Wh. A NiCd 
battery has only half of the energy density of a nickel metal hydride (NiMH) battery. They are also less 
durable and also more affected by memory effect. Also as NiMH batteries do not need the toxic heavy 
metal cadmium, it is expected that NiCd batteries will pushed from the market. There might be some 
exception in some smaller market segments, due to the advantages NiCd batteries have over NiMH 
batteries such as better cycle stability, greater maximum charge/discharge, better (low) temperature 
resistance and better mechanical robustness and insensitivity against inferior charges and total discharge 
(BatteryUniversity.com, 2012, RWTH Aachen University, 2012). 
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Table 36: Average material content of different NiCd batteries 
Material 
(weight-%) 
Portable battery 3 types of batteries 
2 types of 
AA batteries 
EV 
Literature a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) i) 
Al 
   
0.019 0.01 0.02 0.03 
     
Cd 16.4 15 15-25 15-20 39.4 35.3 28.4 33.17 34.2 24.6 25 15 
Co 0.5 
  
0.6 2.08 2.56 1.43 
  
1.4 
  
Cu 
    
0.03 
    
2.05 2 
 
Cr 
   
0.017 
        
Fe 
 
40 
 
29-40 0.01 0.03 0.04 12.92 27.7 
  
35 
Li 
    
0.05 0.07 0.04 
     
Mn 
   
0.083 
 
0.01 
      
Ni 20.5 22 20-25 15-20 14.3 19.8 33.3 24.32 26.4 31.22 30.8 22 
Zn 
   
0.06 0.9 0.01 0.03 
     
Hydroxide 8.1 
        
6.38 6.2 
 
H2O (demin.) 8         
11.48 12 5 
KOH (30%) 3.5 2 
          
KOH (clean) 
         
5.22 5 
 
LiOH (clean) 
         
0.7 
  
Steel 39.2 
        
13.8 14 
 
Plastic 
 
5 
       
3.1 3 10 
PA 2.6 
           
PVC 1.1 
           
Rubber 0.3 
           
Other 
 
16 
       
0.1 2 13 
Sources: a) Rydh and Karlström, 2002; b) Vassura et al., 2009; c) Lankey and McMichael, 1999; d) Rydh and Svärd, 2003; e) Mantuano et al., 
2006; f) Rudnik and Nikiel, 2007; g) Cuenca et al., 2009; h) Sullivan and Gaines, 2012; i) Fisher et al., 2006 
 
Table 37: Specific material use of different types of NiCd batteries 
Material 
Specific material use [g/Wh] 
Portable 
battery
a
 
Portable 
battery
b
 
Electro car 
battery
c
 
Steel 9.8  2.40 
Cd 4.09 3-5 4.30 
Cu   0.36 
Fe    
Ni 5.11 4-5 5.46 
Hydroxide 2.03  1.12 
H2O (demin.) 2.00  2.01 
KOH (30%) 0.86   
KOH (pure)   0.91 
LiOH (pure)   0.12 
Plastic   0.54 
PA 0.65   
PVC 0.26   
Co 0.12  0.24 
Rubber 0.06   
Other   0.02 
a) Rydh and Karlström, 2002; b) Lankey and McMichael, 1999; c) Cuenca et al., 2009 
Redox-flow batteries 
Different types of redox-flow batteries have been studied over the years. In the 1970s, the focus was on 
the iron-titanium system in which titanium was later replaced by chromium. In the meantime, vanadium 
redox couples have been shown to be a particularly interesting variant of redox flow batteries, with the 
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systems vanadium bromide and zinc bromide more recently coming into development. An overview of 
the various systems is given in Table 38 and their specific material requirements in Table 39 (Angerer et 
al., 2009). 
 
Table 38: Key figures of different redox flow batteries 
System Iron/ 
Chromium 
Vanadium/ 
Vanadium 
Vanadium/ 
Bromine 
Zinc/ 
Bromine 
Voltage [V] 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.8 
Capacity [Ah/l] 33.5 21.4 26.8 54.0 
Energy density [Wh/l] 40.2 27.9 37.5 96.0 
 
Table 39: Comparison of raw materials requirements for redox flow batteries 
System Iron/ 
Chromium 
Vanadium/ 
Vanadium 
Vanadium/ 
Bromine 
Zinc/ 
Bromine 
Fe Cr V V
3+
 V
4+
 Zn Zn 
Specific required 
amount [kg/kWh] 
3.47 3.23 2.92 1.36 1.36 0.34 1.02 
Source: (Angerer et al., 2009) 
Lithium-ion battery 
Lithium ion batteries contain metal oxides, for example cobalt oxide, carbon as graphite, lithium which 
enables the electricity transport in the cell interior, a water-free organic solvent, which is mixed with 
conducting salts, copper and aluminium for the electrodes and other materials that are part of the manu-
facturers trade secret. Table 40 shows average material contents for portable Li-ion batteries and Table 
41 shows shares of recyclable materials (lithium, cobalt and nickel). 
 
Table 40: Average material content of portable Li-ion batteries 
Battery component Product data 
sheets in mass-% 
Casing ∼20–25 
Cathode material (LiCoO2) ∼25–30 
Anode material (graphite) ∼14–19 
Electrolyte ∼10–15 
Copper electrode foil ∼5–9 
Aluminium electrode foil ∼5–7 
Separator - 
Source: Georgi-Maschler et al., 2012 
 
Table 41: Shares of selected recyclable materials in weight of 
lithium-ion battery systems (in weight-%). 
 Li-Ion-LiCoOx Li-Ion-LiNiOx 
a) b) a) b) 
Lithium 4.7 2.7  3 
Cobalt 22 23.3  18 
Nickel   22  
a) Angerer et al., 2009; b) Noll et al., 2012 
Sodium-sulphur (NaS) batteries 
NaS batteries are characterized by the low cost and wide availability of the raw materials used. As shown 
in Table 42, the sodium content of NaS batteries is about 8% if the entire system is considered. In a single 
cell it is significantly larger and lies between approximately 14% and 18%. The sulphur content is approx-
imately 1.5 times the sodium content: 12% with respect to the total battery unit and between 21% and 
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29% with respect to the individual cell. The high specific material requirements amount to 0.8 g/Wh for 
sodium and 1.2 g/Wh for sulphur (Cuenca et al., 2009). 
 
Table 42: Material requirement of various NaS batteries 
Materials Share (weight-%) 
Total 
battery
a)
 
Total 
battery
b)
 
2 single 
cells
c)
 
Al 22.7  15.3 36.4 
C (Graphite) 2  2.5  
Cu 3.4  4.2  
Na 8 8 17.8 13.8 
S 12.5 12 29.4 21.6 
α-Al2O3 2.3  1 3.9 
β-Al2O3 10.2  2.7 17.7 
Steel 12.8 <60 13 0.3 
Polypropylene 8  7.7  
Glass 4.3  1.4  
Ceramics  20   
Sand 15.2    
Other 8.7    
Sources: a) Sullivan and Gaines, 2010; b) Cuenca et al., 2009; c) Sullivan and Gaines, 2012 
 
3.8.3 Electrical and electromagnetic storage 
Supercapacitors 
In supercapacitors, mostly materials with extremely high surface areas are used as electrode materials, 
among which carbon based materials - for example various forms of activated charcoal - are the most 
common. Other forms of high-surface carbon such as graphene, carbon nanotubes, or aerogel are cur-
rently being investigated. Other supercapacitors use polymers, such as polypyrrole or polyaniline, or 
certain metal oxides, i.e. RuO2, Fe3O4, or MnO2, as electrode materials.   
 
A variety of electrolytes can be used in supercapacitors ranging from aqueous solutions of various inor-
ganic salts and acids (e.g. KOH and H2SO4) to organic solvents (e.g. acetonitrile) with quaternary salts of 
ammonia or alkyl ammonia salts. To avoid the formation of a galvanic cell, the same material (mostly Al) 
is usually used for the supercapacitor’s casing, current collectors and power connectors. Additionally, a 
thin, porous and chemically inert material is required to mechanically separate the electrodes and to 
prevent a short circuit, e.g. paper, porous plastic foils or ceramic materials (Schneuwly and Gallay, 2000; 
Halper and Ellenbogen, 2006; Wang et al., 2012). 
 
Table 43: Material compositions of various supercapacitor technologies 
Material Fraction 
(w%) 
Specific 
Demand
a)
 [kg/kWh] 
Activated charcoal 45-50 45-100 
Electrolyte [e.g. KOHa or 
H2SO4
a, or acetonitrile] 
30 30-60 
Al foil 20 20-40 
Plastic foil 1 1-2 
Al power connectors 4-5 4-10 
Note a: Based on energy density of 5-10 Wh/kg 
Source: Trapp, 2012 
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Superconducting coils 
Utilizing superconductive properties of special compound materials superconducting magnetic energy 
storages (SMES) are suitable to act as short-term storages in power systems. Such materials can be classi-
fied by the critical temperature where the superconducting state is reached: High temperature supercon-
ductors (HTSC) with critical temperatures (Tc) less than 77 K (temperature of liquid nitrogen) and low 
temperature superconductors (LTSC) with lower critical temperatures. LTSC require coolants such as 
liquid helium at 4.2 K or super fluid helium at 1.8 K. 
 
A broad spectrum of high temperature superconducting compound materials has been discovered. How-
ever, in the field of SMES, mainly niobium (LTSC) and yttrium (HTSC) compounds as well as magnesium 
diboride (HTSC) are used. Beside the demand for the superconducting material copper is required as a 
stabilizer.   
 
Table 44: Material compositions of various superconductor cables 
Material Fraction [%] Reference 
Cu 80 
(Hartikainen, 2005) Nb 10.6 
Ti 9.4 
Cu + Ni-Alloy 95 
(Lehner, 2011) 
Ag 3 
Cu + Ni-Alloy ca. 97 
(Selvamanickam, 2011) 
Rare Earth-BaCuO-HTS 1 
 
3.8.4 Thermal storage 
One of the latest studies concerning life cycle assessment of thermal heat storage devices was executed 
by Oró et al. (2012) where both sensible and latent heat storage schemes were taken into consideration.   
 
Sensible heat storage (SHS) 
As there are different designs of SHS devices, a LCA was made for a solid as well as for a molten salt 
energy storage system. The solid system is based on high temperature concrete and with a maximum 
operating temperature of 390°C it has a capacity of 350 kWh. Table 39 gives an overview of the materials 
used in total and per kilowatt hour. 
 
Table 45: Materials for high temperature concrete heat storage for 350 kWh 
Element kg kg/kWh 
Tubes of steel 1,516 56.6 
High temperature  concrete 26,757 4.3 
Metalsheets 173 76.5 
Rockwool 403 0.5 
Source: Oró et al. 2012 
 
The molten salt device considered here uses 3,300 tonnes of KNO3 and 2,200 tonnes of NaNO3. These 
5,500 tonnes of salt lead to a capacity of 600 MWh. The required quantities of salt and other materials 
are shown in Table 46. 
 
Another example for a raw materials inventory analysis is given by (Heath et al., 2009), where two differ-
ent approaches of molten salt storage systems are examined. The first system consists of a hot salt tank 
and another tank for cold salt, whereas for the second system only one tank is needed to generate a 
thermal gradient. Both systems have the same capacity of 300 MWh (see Table 47). 
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Table 46: Materials for molten salt heat storage with a capacity of 600 MWh 
Element Tonnes kg/kWh 
KNO3  3,300 5.50 
NaNO3 2,200 3.67 
Stainless steel  18 0.03 
Firebricks  1,270 2.12 
Carbon steel  555 0.92 
Ceramic fibre 10 0.02 
Aluminium sheet  4 0.01 
Sand 418 0.70 
Foamglas 4 0.01 
Source: Oró et al. 2012 
 
Table 47: Materials for different molten salt heat storage devices with a capacity of 300 MWh 
Element tonnes 
(2-tank) 
kg/kWh 
(2-tank) 
tonnes 
(thermocline) 
kg/kWh 
(thermocline) 
Thermal mass     
Silica sand    17,900 59.67 
KNO3  10,240 34.13 3,072 10.24 
NaNO3 15,360 51.20 4,608 15.36 
     
Heat exchanger     
 Calcium Silicate   78 0.26 38 0.13 
 Stainless Steel   411 1.37 179 0.60 
     
Storage tank     
 Calcium Silicate   51 0.17 26 0.09 
 Carbon Steel   885 2.95 456 1.52 
 Mineral Wool   283 0.94 158 0.53 
 Stainless Steel   6 0.02 3 0.01 
Source: Heath et al. 2009 
 
Latent heat storage 
For the latent heat storage KNO3 and NaNO3 are used as well, although in a slightly different mixture 
consisting of 54% KNO3 and 46% NaNO3. The heat storage system has a latent heat of fusion of 100 kJ/kg 
and with the reported 2,100 kg of the phase change material (KNO3 and NaNO3) about 58 kWh of energy 
can be stored Oró et al. (2012). 
 
Table 48: Material requirements for a sample latent heat storage facility 
Element kg kg/kWh 
 Concrete  6,600 113.79 
 Tubes of steel  202 3.49 
 Metalsheets  427 7.37 
 KNO3  1,134 19.55 
 NaNO3  966 16.66 
 Metalsheets  81 1.39 
 Rockwool  50 0.86 
 Foamglas 69 1.20 
Source: Oró et al. 2012 
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3.9 Energy-intensive industries 
The EU is aiming for a 20% cut in Europe's annual primary energy consumption by 2020, where in 2010, 
25% (292 Mtoe) was by industrial users (EC Eurostat, 2012). The work of the SETIS Technology Map on 
energy efficiency and CO2 reduction in industry has to date been to focus specifically on three energy-
intensive industries, which between them accounted for almost 43% of the EU-27’s final energy consump-
tion within industry in 2010: cement, iron & steel, and pulp & paper. 
 
Each of these industries has now developed a roadmap modelling different scenarios as to how to in-
crease energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions with reference to best available technologies and in 
comparison to high efficiency reference plants: 
 
• For the cement industry, the results show that, by implementing technological improvements 
available, a thermal energy improvement of around 10% is possible between 2006 and 2030. This 
corresponds to a decrease of about 4% in CO2 emissions from clinker manufacture. However, the 
results are relatively insensitive to higher CO2 and fuel prices, indicating the large number of eco-
nomically feasible retro-fits already available (EC, 2010b). 
• For the iron and steel industry, the modelling identified large improvements possible for both 
primary and secondary steel production routes. For primary steel a reduction of 14-21% of CO2 
emissions is possible, with a reduction of around 11% available within secondary steel produc-
tion. These equate to an energy reduction of around 10%. Higher CO2 and fuel prices could moti-
vate further reductions to some extent (EC, 2012a). 
• For pulp and paper, the results of the modelling show that a reduction of 50-60% of CO2 emis-
sions is possible by 2050 - given the right circumstances regarding investment patterns and avail-
able and emerging technologies. However, to achieve an 80% reduction in CO2 emissions, break-
through technologies will have to be developed and available for implementation by 2030 (CEPI, 
2011). 
 
The following sub-sections provide a summary of the initiatives and interventions available for each 
industry. Many of these include retro-fits, site specific interventions, alternative fuels and materials, and 
emerging technologies, which are not currently available. Due to the more piecemeal nature of these 
interventions, and consequently the lack of an appropriate scenario to model, the results are more de-
scriptive than quantitative. Nonetheless the research conducted did not identify a reliance on critical or 
scarce materials. Instead the technologies appear to be making use of more common materials such as 
aluminium, copper, stainless steel, plastics etc. Many of these materials have been identified in other 
technologies and have therefore been captured elsewhere in the analysis. 
 
3.9.1 Cement industry 
For the cement industry, the main processes identified include: 
• decrease of the proportion of clinker in cement 
• use of alternative fuels 
• site-specific energy efficiency measures 
• deployment of CCS 
• fluidised bed technologies. 
 
The first two processes are defined as co-processing, i.e. utilising waste products within the cement 
production process. The benefits of this are reducing the raw material and fuel requirements of cement 
production and reducing the associated emissions; as well as improving the competitiveness of the indus-
try. On the substitution towards alternative fuels and materials, CEMBUREAU the European Association 
reports the following progress (Table 49): 
 
• On alternative fuels, the European cement industry used the energy equivalent of approximately 
26Mt of coal in 2006 for the production of cement. This represented a substitution rate of 18% 
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across Europe away from fossil fuels (CEMBUREAU, 2009). A significant proportion of these alter-
native fuels were waste materials that might otherwise have been destined for incineration of 
landfill. By incorporating these alternative fuels the calorific value of the waste is utilised in the 
production process, as well as being effectively decomposed through the high burning condi-
tions. In addition, the ash generated can be used as an alternative raw material in the production 
of clinker. If current trends continue for the use of alternative fuels these could amount to CO2 
reductions of 18Mt CO2 by 2020 and 23.5 Mt of CO2 by 2030 (EC, 2011c). 
 
• On alternative raw materials an estimated 14.5Mt per year were utilised in the production of 
cement, representing a substitution rate of approximately 5% of the total raw materials (CEM-
BUREAU, 2009). These alternative raw materials include contaminated soil, coal fly ash and blast 
furnace slag. The effect of using these raw materials is to reduce the need for the quarrying of 
traditional raw materials such as clay, shale and limestone; hence reducing the environmental 
footprint of these activities. On the reduction of clinker content within cement, the JRC technolo-
gy map estimates that if these trends continue these could amount to CO2 reductions of 4.7 MT 
CO2 by 2020 and 8.0 MT of CO2 by 2030 (EC, 2011c). 
 
As for site-specific energy efficiency measures these incorporate a wide range of possible activities, (EC, 
2010c) some of which will include improved process control, alternative fuels and raw materials (covered 
above), co-generation or combined heat and power (see Section 3.5) and carbon capture and storage 
(also covered elsewhere). Fluidised bed technology is currently being researched as a potential break-
through technology, although it is possible deployment is considered to be relatively far in the future. 
 
Table 49: EU cement co-processing 
Type of co-processing Average EU 
substitution rate 
Alternative fuels 18% 
Alternative raw materials 5% 
Alternative constituents 12% 
Source: CEMBUREAU, 2009 
 
This review of energy efficiency in the cement industry therefore did not identify any particular role for 
critical metals, but rather a continuation of best practice in the industry. 
 
3.9.2 Iron and steel industry 
For the iron and steel industry, the main sub-technologies identified include: 
 
• integrated production – dissemination of BAT 
• electric arc furnaces, direct-reduced iron and smelting reduction 
• ultra-low CO2 steelmaking (ULCOS). 
 
The dissemination of BATs for integrated steel production focuses in the following areas: 
 
• Improved and optimised systems to achieve smooth and stable processing by using: 
o process control optimisation including computer-based automatic control systems  
o modern, gravimetric solid fuel feed systems  
o preheating, to the greatest extent possible, considering the existing process configura-
tion.  
• Recovering excess heat from processes, especially from their cooling zones. 
• Optimised steam and heat management e.g. CHP, insulation and heat recovery. 
• Applying process integrated reuse of sensible heat as much as possible.  
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Alternative production processes such as electric arc furnaces have significantly lower energy use (by 
around 80%); however, their adoption is limited by the availability of scrap. In 2011 42% of steel produc-
tion in Europe was from electric arc furnaces (up from 40% in 2007), (EUROFER, 2012). Worldwide post-
consumer steel recovery rates were at 83% with industry targets steel recovery of 90% for 2050 (Table 
50). 
Table 50: Post-consumer steel product recovery rates and targets by sector 
Sector Recovery 
rate 2007 (%) 
Recovery rate 
2050 (%) 
Life cycle 
in years 
Construction 85 90 40-70 
Automotive 85 90 7-15 
Machinery 90 95 10-20 
Electrical & domestic appliances 50 65 4-10 
Weighted global average 83 90 N/A 
Source: World Steel Association, 2012 
 
The European steel industry has embarked on a co-operative R&D initiative to enable drastic reduction of 
at least 50% carbon dioxide emissions from steel production. Four processes are currently being demon-
strated, although commercial deployment in not expected until the late 2020s (World Steel Association, 
2012): 
 
• ULCOS-BF process – top gas recycling in combination with CCS: Blast furnace top gas recycling re-
lies on separation of the top gas so that the useful components can be recycled into the furnace 
as a reducing agent. The CO2 is captured and stored. 
• ULCOWIN: Alkaline electrolysis of iron ore: Electrolysis is commonly used to produce metals oth-
er than steel and requires large amounts of electricity. The process would depend on a CO2-lean 
electricity source such as hydro or nuclear power. 
• ULCORED - advanced Direct Reduction in combination with CCS: Direct-reduced iron is produced 
from the direct reduction of iron ore by a reducing gas produced from natural gas.  
• ULCOS Smelting reduction (HIsarna) in combination with CCS: Hlsarna combines a melting cy-
clone for ore melting and a liquid-bath smelter vessel for final ore reduction and hot metal pro-
duction. It produces fairly pure CO2, which can be captured allowing for major CO2 reductions. 
Construction of the HIsarna pilot plant was completed in 2011 and hot commissioning began the 
same year at Ijmuiden in the Netherlands at an 8 tonne/hour scale. 
 
3.9.3 Pulp and paper industry 
For the pulp and paper industry, the main sub-technologies identified include: 
 
• CHP generation (covered in Section 3.5) 
• use of recycled fibres in integrated paper production 
• innovative drying technologies and mechanical pulping optimisation 
• bio-route: integrated bio-refinery complexes. 
 
On the use of recycled fibres, recovered paper and board has increased considerably over the past two 
decades and recovered paper now represents around 44% of the total raw materials in the industry. This 
corresponds to the increasing EU recycling rates of paper and board, which have increased from 52% in 
2000 to a current level of around 70% in 2010. These recycling rates are the highest of any geographic 
region anywhere in the world (CEPI, 2011).   
 
A number of site-specific type energy-saving measures are possible such as CHP (covered in Section 3.5), 
innovative drying technologies and mechanical pulp optimisation: 
 
• On CHP, CEPI note that as of 2010 95% of the industry’s electricity was generated on-site by CHP.  
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Electricity consumption has fallen in the industry by 6% since 2010, with direct CO2 emission hav-
ing fallen by 20% and indirect emissions by a third over the same period. 
 
• Leading machine supplier, Metso, advertise various energy saving techniques for installation 
(Metso, 2012): 
o Process optimizer for the automation of mechanical pulping with the effect of reducing 
fibre property variation, increasing production volumes and an energy saving of up to 5% 
o PowderDry dryers designed for high drying capacity. These high intensity and energy ef-
ficient air dryers can lead a reduction of 50% in energy consumption  
o New generation refiners for paper and board stock preparation to replace two existing 
traditional refiners and deliver 40% savings in electrical energy.  
 
Figure 4 shows the industry pathway for CO2 emissions reduction by 2050. Much of the immediate reduc-
tions are based on the interventions mentioned above. After 2030, breakthrough technologies such as 
integrated bio-refinery complexes are expected to make a contribution.   
 
Figure 4: EU pulp and paper industry CO2 emissions reduction projection 1990 - 2050 (in million tonnes) 
 
 
Source: CEPI, 2011 
 
 
3.10 Energy efficiency in buildings 
3.10.1 Introduction 
 
As an introduction to energy efficiency in buildings, it is useful to provide data on the relative proportion 
of energy consumption associated with different uses. Approximately 40% of final energy consumption in 
the EU is within buildings; 27% is within residential buildings and 13% within the services sector.  
 
For household energy consumption the dominant use is for space heating, accounting for around two 
thirds of household energy consumption (Figure 5). Water heating, lighting and appliances make up most 
of the remainder. For offices the pattern of energy use differs somewhat, with lighting accounting for 
over half of typical energy consumption (Figure 6). Heating and cooling are the other contributors to total 
energy consumption. This data is used as a guide in covering the main aspects associated with energy 
efficiency in buildings in this chapter. 
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Figure 5: Household energy consumption in the EU, 2009 (%) 
 
Source: Enerdata, 2011 
 
 
Figure 6: Annual energy consumption in a typical office building (%) 
 
 
Source: EC, 2011e 
 
 
3.10.2 Construction materials 
 
A key aspect for determining the overall energy efficiency of a building is its design and the materials 
from which it was originally constructed. The results of scenario modelling on potential energy efficiency 
improvements associated with residential buildings identifies that a 45% improvement in useful energy 
demand is achievable under a high policy intensity scenario by 2030. This includes refurbishment rates of 
around 2.5% per year for existing buildings, as well as new building.  In total this could lead to a reduction 
of 54 Mtoe by 2030 against a baseline scenario. The refurbishment of existing housing stock accounts for 
70% of the total improvement (Figure 7). Comparable results are found for the tertiary sector (27 Mtoe 
energy efficiency savings by 2030, of which 80% is from refurbishment). 
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Figure 7: Energy efficiency potentials from existing and new buildings,  
high policy scenario (EU-27 Mtoe) 
 
Source: EC, 2009 
Refurbishment of existing stock 
A key part of the refurbishment of existing housing stock is the installation of insulation materials for 
walls, roofs, floors and windows. The main types of insulation are mineral fibres and polyurethane or 
polystyrene foams (Figure 8). Other types of insulation include those derived from textiles. The main 
materials involved are therefore rock, slag and glass (mineral wool) and plastics; no metal requirements 
are identified. 
 
Figure 8: Insulation types broken down by market value (%) 
 
Source: Market Transformation Programme, 2007 
 
For windows, this includes the installation of double glazing and the associated frame and roller blinds; 
none of which has specific metals requirements of interest. One emerging technology of interest, howev-
er, is the increasing use of metal coatings to improve the energy efficiency of glass. There are three main 
types to consider with respect to energy performance:4 
 
• Reflective coatings, which work by reflecting heat away from buildings, and hence reduce the 
need for cooling and ventilation. These include gold- and silver-containing alloys, typically with 
tin, of a thickness of around 3 nm. Alternative reflective coatings are titanium nitride and vanadi-
um nitride.   
                                                             
4 Pilkington Glass, personal communication (July 2012) 
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• Low emissivity coatings, which operate by keeping heat inside a building, and therefore reduce 
the need for heating. The main material used is fluorine doped tin oxide at around 100-200 nm 
thickness. Other materials that are potentially suitable include indium tin oxide and gallium or 
antimony zinc oxides. None of these latter materials is currently used commercially. 
• Thermo-chromic coatings, which are temperature sensitive, combining both the above properties 
by reflecting heat away at high temperatures and keeping heat inside at lower temperatures. The 
main material considered for this purpose is vanadium dioxide at a thickness of 100-200 nm. 
 
It is expected that the use of energy efficient coatings will become more widespread over time, as they 
become more commercially available and as building codes and regulations encourage greater energy 
efficiency within buildings. However, given the thickness of these different types of coatings, their contri-
bution to the overall demand for these metals is expected to be relatively limited. 
New buildings 
For new buildings a review of the typical composition of an office building highlights concrete as the 
dominant material representing 80% of the construction materials (Figure 9). Other bulk materials such as 
steel, gypsum plaster and brick make up most of the remaining materials. Similar construction materials, 
albeit in differing proportions, will be typical for the construction of residential property. This analysis 
does not therefore identify any specific metals requirements for further consideration. 
 
Figure 9: Construction materials for a generic office building (% of weight) 
Source: EC, 2011e 
 
 
3.10.3 Lighting and electrical appliances 
 
For electrical appliances the evidence highlights that large improvements in energy efficiency have al-
ready been achieved for a large number of products (Figure 10). For many product categories, improve-
ments of greater 50% in energy efficiency have been achieved between 1996 and 2011.   
 
However, the evidence from energy efficiency scenario modelling suggests that further improvements are 
possible. Under a high policy intensity scenario, i.e. much higher LED penetration (up to 90% in 2030), 
savings of nearly 11 Mtoe across the EU-27 by 2030 are thought to be achievable. This represents a 27.8% 
reduction against the baseline scenario. Over half of the estimated energy efficiency savings are associat-
ed with lighting (Figure 11). Approximately a quarter of the savings relate to electronics and IT (televi-
sions, computers etc.), with the remainder covering electrical appliances such as fridges, freezers, wash-
ing machines, dishwashers and tumble driers. The key question to consider with respect to this study, 
however, is the extent to which particular materials enable greater energy efficiency of these appliances. 
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Figure 10: Increases in energy efficiency of household appliances 
 
 
Source: BOSCH, 2012 
 
 
Figure 11: Contribution of different types of electrical appliances to energy efficiency (%)  
 
 
Source: EC, 2009 
Lighting 
For lighting this involves the shift away from incandescent and halogen lamps towards compact fluores-
cent lamps (CFLs) (now largely complete) and the later shift to LED technology. Details can be found 
below on the material composition.  Ceramic halide lighting has been excluded from this study due to its 
small share of the lighting market.   
Fluorescent lighting 
For fluorescent lighting the composition of a typical linear fluorescent lamp (LFL) in the EU is shown in 
Figure 12, courtesy of data provided by the European Lamp Companies Federation. The majority of 
weight of fluorescent lighting is glass (95%), as well as various metal components, including 1.7% of tri-
band phosphor. Other materials include resins and hard paper. The weight of a linear fluorescent lamp 
(LFL) is assumed to be 120 g (European Lamp Companies Federation, 2012).   
 
For CFLs the materials composition differs somewhat, including 55% of glass by weight and 20% of both 
electronics and plastics within a typical 120 gram bulb (European Lamp Companies Federation, 2012). 
Metal content is approximately 3% (copper, aluminium, tin and manganese), with around 0.75% of tri-
band phosphor. 
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Figure 12: Quantitative estimates of the weight of fluorescent lamp composition 
 
  
Source: European Lamp Companies Federation, personal communication (Dec 2012) 
 
 
Of particular interest is the content of the tri-band phosphor. Rare earth oxides comprise 65% of the tri-
band phosphor, along with various other metals.5 This represents 1.33 g per LFL and 0.59 g per CFL.  This 
compares to 0.66 g estimated by US Department of Energy in their critical materials strategy (Bauer et al., 
2010). As for the composition of rare earths within phosphors slightly different estimates exist, as shown 
in Table 51. This partly reflects the diversity of compositions used by different types and brands.  Here the 
Lynas combined estimates have been used.   
 
Table 51: Estimates of the composition of rare earth content of phosphors (%) 
Element CFL LFL Combined 
Estimate* 
Lanthanum 8.5 22.0 8.5 
Cerium 20.1 6.5 11.0 
Europium 4.5 4.5 4.9 
Terbium 5.0 5.0 4.6 
Yttrium 62.0 62.0 69.2 
Gadolinium - - 1.8 
Sources: *Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2010; Bauer et al., 2010 
 
LED Lighting 
LED lighting consists of a number of different components, and the market is still undergoing rapid evolu-
tion, with many different types of LEDs with differing compositions.   
 
One example material composition is shown in Figure 13, for the Osram Golden Dragon white LED chip 
(mass of approximately 230 mg). The majority of the weight is copper and polymers. However, there is 
also significant silver, germanium and tin content, as well as doping of rare earths. The role of the rare 
earth phosphor (cerium doped yttrium aluminium garnet) is to convert blue light into white light, which 
remains a considerably cheaper method than to mix the light produced by red, green and blue LEDs. 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 European Lamp Companies Federation, personal communication (Dec 2012) 
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Figure 13: Materials composition of white LED chip  
 
Source: European Lamp Companies Federation, personal communication (Dec 2012) 
 
Data is also available from a detailed US study by Lim et al. (2011) who estimated the material content of 
different types of LEDs, considering 20 separate materials. Here the results of that study have been 
averaged just for the high brightness LEDs analysed. These results have been rescaled according to chip 
size6 and by expert judgement where certain key metals such as indium were not detected because of the 
study methodology.7 The key differences between these estimates are the use of indium-doped gallium 
nitride versus germanium as the choice of semi-conductor, and differing estimates for the content of the 
base and precious metals contained. Data from both studies have therefore been combined here to 
reflect the diversity and evolution of different types of LEDs. 
 
Three main applications of LED lighting are considered: bulbs, tubes and street lighting. Each of these has 
a different number of LEDs (Table 52). In addition to the above metals within the LED itself, there is also 
some nickel, chromium, copper and zinc as part of the bulb structure (US DOE, 2012).   
 
 
Table 52: High brightness LED content by application 
Lighting type Number of 
replacement LEDs 
Incandescent lamp 5-12 
Compact fluorescent lamp 5-12 
Fluorescent lamp 40-50 
Streetlight 60-80 
Source: Aixtron, 2012 
Electrical appliances 
For electrical appliances more generally, the main materials used include plastics, glass, steel, aluminium, 
copper and electronic circuit boards. As many of these materials are relatively generic across a large 
number of different appliances, an overview of these materials can be found in Section 4.4. 
 
In terms of potential energy efficiency improvements, a review of the eco-design criteria literature (IVF 
Industrial Research and Development Corporation, 2005; ISIS, 2007; EC, 2008b; bio Intelligence Service, 
ERA Technology, 2011) for key product categories (televisions, computers, ovens, washing ma-
chines/dishwashers, fridges/freezers etc.), reveals the following list of potential energy efficiency im-
                                                             
6 General lighting uses a chip size of 1mm2, material content scales by area. Personal communication, Michael Heuken, Aixtron (July 2012) 
7 Gallium content is approximately eight times of that of indium with the semiconductors (Indium Corporation, 2011). 
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provements: 
 
• changing the use of stand-by modes 
• greater insulation/sealing of doors and windows 
• improved temperature and other sensors 
• lower temperature functionality 
• higher efficiency heat exchanges and motors 
• noise reduction. 
 
In general terms these energy efficiency improvements do not appear to be linked to particular metals 
requirements. For example, many relate to changing the functionality and design of the appliances; and 
for improved insulation and noise reduction the associated materials are largely plastics and foams. It is 
therefore assumed that the materials associated with most electrical appliances are similar to those 
identified in the sector study for electronics/ICT, and no further analysis is required. The electronics/ICT 
analysis includes a range of materials from the bulk metals such as copper and tin, to minor and precious 
metals such as tantalum, rare earth elements, gold, silver and PGMs. 
 
A few examples of specific materials leading to improved energy efficiency of appliances were identified. 
For washing machines, brushless DC direct drive motors were identified as being able to deliver estimated 
improvements of around 6% to the motor efficiency (EC, 2007c). These imply the introduction and use of 
rare earth based permanent magnets within washing machines, which is of interest with respect to this 
study. The report provided statistics of their uptake at 0.5% market share for 2005. The cost benefit 
analysis within the report suggested that the payback period for cost of DD motors versus the energy 
savings would be more than 130 years, and that further increased uptake appears unlikely. 
 
For televisions and computers, one of the enablers for improved energy efficiency is the changing materi-
al composition of the screens. Figure 14 shows data for past and forecast sales of different types of 
televisions. It shows the phasing out of the older and more energy intensive technology - cathode ray 
tubes - with newer and more energy efficient LCD televisions; which occurred between 2004 and 2008. 
The television sales data also shows a second shift in television type that is already underway. This is 
between cold-cathode fluorescent lamp (CCFL) backlit LCD screens to LED backlit screens.   
 
Many of the key materials, such as indium tin oxide, are common to both LCD technologies; however, the 
shift from CCFL to LED backlights does bring some changes to material composition (see above section on 
lighting). These include the greater use of gallium, yttrium, gold and silver.  However the data shows that 
this shift has now largely been completed. For example, in 2012 LED backlit TVs are expected to account 
for 60% of worldwide television sales, increasing to 85% by 2014 (Figure 14). In comparison to lighting, 
the market for displays (televisions and computer screens) is expected to be much smaller due to the 
relative size difference in LED chip size. Figure 15 shows how high brightness LED material area is ex-
pected to develop up to 2015. This shows associated material demand for displays holding steady at 
around 20 billion mm2. In terms of material demand, sales of 250 million LED televisions worldwide may 
equate to around 15% of worldwide demand for yttrium in 2015 (2,700 tonnes), (Metal Pages, 2012). 
 
An alternative type of electronic appliance to be considered is smart meters, which offer the potential to 
reduce energy consumption by providing real-time information to consumers regarding their energy use. 
A study by the European Smart Metering Alliance identifies that, through encouraging changing consumer 
behaviour, smart meters can achieve reductions in energy bills of 15-20% (BEAMA, 2010). Very limited 
information was identified on their material composition, although designs appear to incorporate a 
combination of plastics, metals and electronic components. 
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Figure 14: Worldwide TV forecast by type (millions of units) 
 
Source: Indium Corporation, 2012 
 
Figure 15: High brightness LED material area by market (square area, billion mm
2
) 
  
Source: Aixtron, 2012 
 
3.10.4 Heating and cooling 
 
Under a high policy intensity scenario (EC, 2009), the scenario analysis for energy efficiency, highlights 
that significant improvements of up to 50% in thermal energy efficiency are achievable by 2030. A num-
ber of appliances and technologies are considered within this section, including high efficiency boilers and 
water heaters, efficient heat exchange ventilation, solar thermal and aero-thermal energy (see geother-
mal energy). 
 
For boilers there are several possible design dimension options to improve energy efficiency; however, 
none was identified as representing particular metals requirements beyond standard materials such as 
plastics, glass, steel and base metals. Many of the options represented improved controls, heat exchanges 
and standby modes (VHK for EC, 2007): 
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• steady state efficiency and power input  
• turndown ratio and standby heat loss 
• circulation and electric heat pumps, and fans 
• air-fuel ratio, temperature, valve and weather controls. 
 
For ventilation and cooling the eco-design research identified a number of possible changes in design that 
could offer energy efficiency improvements, as well as identifying the materials involved in achieving 
them. The analysis of the material composition of current types of ventilation systems identified plastics, 
steel, aluminium and copper as the major materials. The bill of materials for the modified systems identi-
fied the same major materials within the alternative more energy efficient designs (EC, 2008a). The 
alterations included improvements in motor, fan and air flow design; motor and fan control, heat recov-
ery and noise control. 
 
For solar thermal, Figure 16 shows a diagram for the materials associated with a flat plate collector.  In a 
solar water heating system the collectors are usually installed on the roof of the building, with circulating 
fluids delivering the solar heat from the collectors to the storage tank. The heat is then transferred to the 
water in the storage tank via a heat-exchanger. Other system components are the pump and pump 
controller, temperature display, expansion vessel and valves. The major materials associated are glass, 
plastic, steel, aluminium and copper; none of which represents major metals requirements. 
 
Figure 16: Diagram of a flat plate solar thermal collector 
 
Source: Greenspec, 2012 
 
3.11 Road transport efficiency 
 
3.11.1 Electric vehicles 
 
Critical metals including rare earths are found in many applications within electric vehicles. Examples 
include cerium and lanthanum in fuel additives and rare earths in LCD screens. In this instance the focus is 
on the applications where the largest amounts of critical metals can be found, namely the electric drive 
motor and battery pack. The materials demand for electric vehicles varies depending on the range and 
type of vehicle and the battery used. A summary of these different materials demands is given in Table 
53. To estimate the materials requirements of batteries and motors for the different vehicle types, the 
vehicle specifications are shown Table 54 (MIT, 2008). The battery types and market shares are shown on 
the next pages. For graphite, it is noted that very substantial losses occur in the production of spherical 
battery grade graphite. These losses can be up to 70-75% of the raw material - flake graphite (Industrial 
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Minerals, 2012) - and the processing waste is not recoverable for use in batteries. To a certain extent 
there are manufacturing losses associated with all of the technologies and metals. However, as an indus-
trial mineral, the physical properties are as important as the chemical properties, which limit the recycling 
potential of graphite. In contrast, manufacturing losses for metals are more readily recyclable. 
 
Table 53: Materials demand for battery- and drive motor-types* in kg per vehicle, by vehicle type 
Material BEV HEV PHEV-50 Mild hybrid FCV 
Li 4.52-7.81 0.09-0.16 0.77-1.33 - 0.12-0.21 
Ni 0-46.65 0-6.67 0-7.97 - 0-1.26 
Co 0-13.91 0-1.16 0-2.38 - 0-0.38 
La - 0-1.16 - - - 
Nd 2.80 0.76-1.12 1.46 0.36 2.91 
Pr - 0-0.08 - - - 
Sm - 0-0.08 - - - 
Mn 0-60.07 0-1.25 0-10.26 - 0-1.63 
Cu 0-71.08 0-1.48 0-1.93 - 0-0.1.93 
Ti 0-38.78 0-0.81 0-6.63 - 0-1.05 
Dy 0.28 0.14-0.29 0.22 0.05 0.43 
B 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.09 
Graphite 0-85.94 0-1.79 0-14.68 - 0-2.33 
Ce - 0-0.77 - - - 
*fuel cell vehicles (FCV), battery electric vehicles (BEV), plug-in electric vehicles (PHEV), 
mild hybrids (mild HV) and hybrid electric vehicles (HEV). 
 
 
Table 54: Vehicle specifications for different types of electric vehicles 
 HEV PHEV-50 BEV FCV 
Motor power (kW) 25 40 70 90 
Battery energy (kWh) 1.0 8.2 35 1.3 
Battery Power (kW) 28 45 75 40 
Specific energy (Wh/kg) 100 135 150 100 
PHEV-30 = plug-in hybrid with a 50 kilometre all electric range. 
Batteries for electric vehicles 
Improving battery technologies is paramount to lowering overall vehicle costs and improving perfor-
mance. There are two types of battery which are under consideration; these are nickel metal hydride 
(NiMH) batteries and lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries. For HEVs, the market share predictions for battery 
types from Deutsche Bank are used, as shown in Table 55 (Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research, 
2008).  
 
Table 55: Market share of HEV batteries 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2025 2030 
NiMH 70% 65% 60% 50% 40% 30% 1% 0% 
Li-Ion 30% 35% 40% 50% 60% 70% 99% 100% 
Nickel metal hydride batteries 
NiMH batteries currently dominate the HEV market and have been the battery of choice for the Toyota 
Prius since it was first introduced. However, for BEVs and PHEVs NiMH cannot compete with Li-ion batter-
ies due to their lower energy density and due to their relatively low deep-cycling capability. Consequent-
ly, Toyota has decided to use Li-ion batteries for their new plug-in hybrid model.  As NiMH batteries are 
not widely used in BEVs or PHEVs, they will only be considered for hybrid electric vehicles. The metals 
requirements for an HEV NiMH battery are shown in Table 56; it has been assumed that the battery alloy 
used is AB5. 
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Table 56: Metals requirements for NiMH  
batteries for HEVs in kg per vehicle 
Metal HEV 
Ni 6.67 
Co 1.16 
La 1.16 
Ce 0.77 
Nd 0.23 
Pr 0.08 
Sm 0.08 
 
Lithium-ion batteries 
The main battery chemistry for the foreseeable future is expected to be Li-ion, and in 2011 they account-
ed for over 40% of the battery chemistry split; this is expected to rise to over 80% in 2015 (Frost & Sulli-
van, 2011a). The composition of Li-ion batteries varies depending on the cathode chemistries employed. 
The amount of lithium varies significantly across the different types, from around 0.2 kg to 10 kg per 
vehicle. Battery packs found in electric vehicles contain a range of materials, with the active materials 
typically representing less than 50% of the overall weight. Other materials found include copper for 
wiring and electrical parts, aluminium and plastics for casings and small amounts of precious metals in 
printed circuit boards. 
 
Four different cathode chemistries have been chosen for further investigation, presented in Table 57. 
Although, there are currently many types of Li-ion batteries in the pipeline, such as lithium air, the focus 
of this study is on these four battery types as they are likely to be the most widely used for the short-to-
medium term. It is expected that these battery types will be optimised for use in EVs in the near term and 
in the longer term, new battery chemistries with higher energy densities will be developed (IEA, 2011a). 
All of these battery chemistries are currently in commercial use in electric vehicles and are therefore well 
characterised. It is worth noting that the exact compositions of cathode chemistries vary with supply, and 
it is possible to have dual composite cathodes where two different active materials are used.   
 
 
 
Table 57: Characteristics of different Li-ion batteries* by cathode chemistry (Saft Groupe SA, 2009) 
 NCA LFP LMS-titanate NMC 
Energy (Wh/kg) Good Average Poor Good 
Power Good Good Good Average/good 
Calendar life Very good Poor above 30°C Poor Good 
Cycle life Good Good Average Good 
Safety (per kWh) Poor Good Average Poor 
Cost High Average Average High 
Maturity High Low High Medium 
*nickel cobalt aluminium (NCA), lithium iron phosphate (LFP),  
lithium manganese spinel (LMS), nickel cobalt manganese (NCM) 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
55 
 
Figure 17: Battery pack component breakdown by weight (%) 
 
 
Source: Gaines et al., 2010 
 
 
Nickel cobalt aluminium (Li Co0.15Al0.05O2) battery types (NCA) are similar to lithium cobalt oxide (LiCoO2) 
which are commonly used in laptop batteries and mobile phones. The advantages of NCA batteries are 
that they have good energy and power densities; however, they are expensive compared to other battery 
types. Toyota’s plug-in Prius uses NCA batteries (Committee on Climate Change, 2012).  
 
Table 58: Materials requirements in kg per vehicle for NCA battery types 
Material BEV HEV PHEV-50 FCV 
Li 6.23 0.13 1.06 0.17 
Ni 46.65 0.97 7.97 1.26 
Co 8.44 0.18 1.44 0.23 
Al 1.35 0.03 0.23 0.04 
Graphite 72.19 1.50 12.33 1.96 
Cu (anode) 66.82 1.39 11.41 1.81 
 
Lithium iron phosphate (LiFePO4) based batteries (LFP) have superior thermal and chemical stability 
compared to other Li-ion technologies. However, phosphate batteries have lower energy densities than 
cobalt batteries (Axeon, undated). They are used in electric vehicles manufactured by BYD, who also 
manufacture LFP cells (Axeon, undated; CreditSuisse, 2009a). 
 
Table 59: Materials requirements in kg per vehicle for LFP battery types 
Material BEV HEV PHEV-50 FCV 
Li 4.52 0.09 0.77 0.12 
Fe 39.08 0.81 6.68 1.06 
Graphite 85.94 1.79 14.68 2.33 
Cu (anode) 79.54 1.66 13.59 2.15 
 
Lithium manganese spinel oxide batteries (LMS) provide a higher cell voltage and are more thermally 
stable than cobalt-based batteries. An advantage of this cell chemistry is that it is based on manganese 
which is relatively non-toxic and inexpensive. In this instance they are considered with a lithium titanate 
oxide anode instead of a graphite anode, as these are often used in conjunction with each other. Com-
pared to graphite anodes, lithium titanate anodes offer better power and rate capability (Axeon, n.d.).  
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Table 60: Materials requirements in kg per vehicle for LMS-titanate battery types 
Material BEV HEV PHEV-50 FCV 
Li 7.81 0.16 1.33 0.21 
Mn 60.07 1.25 10.26 1.63 
Cu (anode) 71.08 1.48 12.14 1.93 
Ti 38.78 0.81 6.63 1.05 
 
Nickel cobalt manganese (LiNixCoyMnzO2) batteries (NCM) offer a compromise of cost and electrochemi-
cal performance, and in terms of energy density they are superior to LFP batteries. NCM batteries can be 
found in many consumer electrical goods and in EV prototypes (Committee on Climate Change, 2012).  
 
Table 61: Materials requirements in kg per vehicle for NCM battery types 
Material BEV HEV PHEV-50 FCV 
Li 4.64 0.10 0.79 0.13 
Ni 14.43 0.30 2.46 0.39 
Co 13.91 0.29 2.38 0.38 
Mn 12.88 0.27 2.20 0.35 
Graphite 53.08 1.11 9.07 1.44 
Cu (anode) 49.13 1.02 8.39 1.33 
Electric drive motors 
Permanent rare earth magnets are the dominant technology used for motors in all types of electric 
vehicles. A few exceptions, such as the Tesla Roadster and the Mini-E, use induction motors (Bauer et al., 
2011). Hybrid and electric drive train applications typically use 8.7% dysprosium (by weight) in their 
magnets (Bauer et al., 2010). The materials composition of the permanent magnet motors used for the 
different vehicle types is shown in Table 62.  
 
Table 62: Magnet composition (%) of drive motor by vehicle type 
 HEV 
(2012) 
HEV 
(2020-) 
PHEV-50 BEV FCV Mild 
Hybrid 
Nd 22.5 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 
Fe 66.0 66.0 66.0 66.0 66.0 66.0 
Dy 8.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
B 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 
The majority of electric vehicles use NdFeB permanent magnet technology for their drive motor, however 
some EVs currently on the market use induction motors and to reflect this, these have been included into 
our model. Induction motors do not require permanent magnets and therefore rare earth elements, 
instead they use copper coils to produce a magnetic field. Consequently, their requirements for copper 
are relatively high, for instance a typical induction motor for a fully electric BEV requires 80kg of copper.   
 
Table 63: Metals requirements for electric drive motors in kg per vehicle 
Motor Type Material HEV 
(2012) 
HEV 
(2020-) 
PHEV BEV FCV Mild 
hybrid 
Permanent 
magnet 
Nd 0.76 0.91 1.46 2.55 2.92 0.36 
Fe 2.25 2.25 3.6 7.65 8.1 0.90 
Dy 0.29 0.14 0.22 0.38 0.38 0.05 
B 0.025 0.025 0.04 0.085 0.09 0.01 
Induction Cu 25 25 40 70 80 10 
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3.12 Desalination 
A key material need in desalination plants of any type is for corrosion resistant materials. The choice of 
material is a compromise between investment and operating costs, performance and durability. The 
required characteristics for the corrosion resistant materials vary depending on the type of desalination 
plant (multi-stage flash distillation-MSF, multiple-effect distillation-MED, reverse osmosis-RO) and the 
corrosive conditions in different sections of the desalination plant (e.g. tubing, valves, pumps or evapora-
tion chambers). The most severe conditions are found in MSF plants followed by MED plants. Conditions 
in RO plants are much less severe as they operate at low temperatures (< 70°C; Malik and Kutty, 1992; 
Richaud-Minier et al., 2007)  
 
3.12.1 Thermal plants 
Different metals and alloys are used in different sections of thermal desalination plants. In addition, due 
to choices for each section that also have to do with raw material pricing in addition to technical charac-
teristics, the raw material profile of different thermal plants of the same type is also different. For exam-
ple, MSF plants in Saudi Arabia at the turn of the century used mostly steel, stainless steel, copper-nickel 
alloy and titanium for parts such as (Malik and Kutty, 1992; Hamed et al., 2001): 
 
• Brine heaters – shell made from carbon steel and tubes made from 70/30 or 90/10 Cu-Ni alloy, 
but with exceptions (Ti tubing). It is worth noting that heat exchanger tubes are the single largest 
procurement item in an MSF plant and at the same time account for 70% of corrosion failures. 
• Flash chambers – carbon steel with and without cladding of some or all of the chambers; clad-
ding in some plants is made out of stainless steel or 90/10 Cu-Ni alloy. 
• Heat rejection tubes – mostly made from Ti but with exceptions (90/10 Cu-Ni). 
 
Generally, Ti is used for the parts most at risk of corrosion and copper alloys for the less critical parts 
(Richaud-Minier et al., 2007). However, due to high costs for Ni and Ti, high alloy steels with up to 29% Cr 
(Richaud-Minier et al., 2007; Richaud-Minier, 2008) have become competitive both in performance and 
costs.  Duplex stainless steel (21.5-25% Cr, 1.5-7% Ni, 0.3-4% Mo) can be used for critical components in 
both MSF and MED plants (Outokumpu, 2010, 2012a, 2012b). For MED and MSF facilities, the most 
relevant metals for desalination technologies are Fe, Cr, Ni and Mo for stainless steel, Cu-Ni alloys, and Ti 
(also with Pd as an alloying element; Angerer et al., 2009). Examples of stainless steel requirements for 
MED and MSF facilities are Marafiq in Saudi Arabia with 10,000 tonnes stainless steel and 800,000 m3/d 
capacity and Shuweihat 2 in the United Arab Emirates with 5,800 tonnes stainless steel and 100 MIGD 
capacity, yielding metal requirements of the order of 3 kg Cr, 1 kg Ni and 0.5 kg Mo per m3/d of capacity 
(Outokumpu, 2012a, 2012b). 
 
3.12.2 Reverse osmosis plants 
In the case of RO plants, components like pumps, valves and pipes as well as the casings for the mem-
brane modules need to be resistant to corrosion. As the conditions are less severe than in thermal desali-
nation plants, lower Cr contents are acceptable (> 15% Cr; Oldfield and Todd, 1986; Malik and Kutty, 
1992; Malik and Andijani, 2005); for example, stainless steel type 1.4571/316Ti8 which is considered of 
‘marine grade’ but is not resistant to warm sea water (aalco, 2012; Saravia, 2012). 
 
 
3.13 SET-Plan technologies 
 
The first JRC study addressed the six SET-Plan technologies (wind, solar - both photovoltaics and concen-
trated solar power, carbon capture and storage, nuclear fission, bioenergy and the electricity grid) (Moss 
et al., 2011). The first study compared demand figures to the known supply figures in 2010. Furthermore, 
demand was based on the available scenarios at the time. The results are therefore re-assessed using the 
                                                             
8 Containing 16-18% Cr, 2-3% Mo, 10-14% Ni, up to 0.7% Ti depending on the content of C and N 
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same methodology as above, i.e. the results are now compared to expected supply figures rather than 
current supply estimates, and the scenarios take into account the latest projections in the EU Energy 
Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011b). The technology descriptions are essentially unchanged but the uptake mix of 
the different types of technologies within a sector can vary. These are presented here. The metals re-
quirement figures are presented in Chapter 4.  
3.13.1 Wind energy 
Recent developments have highlighted a trend to a higher share of permanent magnet electricity genera-
tors (PMG) in the future market of wind turbines. Three major items suggest this trend: 
 
• analysis of turbine prototypes introduced or announced to be introduced in the period 2011 
- 2013 
• the approximately 10-year commercial life of a wind turbine 
• the reduction of the prices of rare earths along with the projections of abundant supply 
from 2014 (Nd) and 2017 (Dy). 
 
Between 2000 and 2004, PMG had an average share of 5% of all turbine prototypes. However, since 2007 
this share has grown to 35%. In absolute numbers whereas PMG were included in one or two turbine 
prototypes per year in 2000-03; since 2010 they have been included in 11-13 turbine prototypes.   
 
The share between low-speed, direct-drive (DD) PMG and medium- and high-speed (MS/HS) PMG is 
approximately equal. However, the analysis of the turbine models presented suggests that for the off-
shore turbine prototypes, DD-PMG will prevail over MS/HS-PMG.   
 
Furthermore, based on the projections of the future energy system, it is expected that DD-PMG models 
will gain an increasing market share of future (2015-20) installations, for examples: Alstom's Haliade 150, 
Siemens SWT-6.0-154 and XEMC-Darwind / Vensys-Goldwind. These machines are likely to have a grow-
ing market share because of the contracts already signed in Europe (Alstom, Siemens) and the prospects 
for cost reduction from Chinese manufacturers (XEMC, Goldwind).  
 
Significant, non-DD prototypes offshore are represented by Vestas, Gamesa, Bard, REpower, Mitsubishi, 
Sinovel and Areva. For onshore, it is still the prototypes with electromagnets that prevail, represented by 
General Electric, Vestas, Alstom, Enercon, REpower, Nordex, Suzlon, and Sinovel. PMG turbines onshore 
are already significant at world level and therefore it is expected that the penetration of PMG onshore 
will continue. 
3.13.2 Solar energy 
A number of new scenarios for the solar energy uptake and technology mix have been identified, as well 
as the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011b), but also recent IEA roadmaps for both photovoltaic solar 
and concentrated solar power (IEA, 2011b, 2011c). Analysis of the IEA scenarios showed that the projec-
tions were relatively similar to those modelled in the first JRC study (Moss et al., 2011). In contrast the EU 
Energy Roadmap 2050 scenarios were deemed to be too pessimistic. 
3.13.3 Carbon capture and storage 
The results for CCS from the first JRC study highlighted vanadium and niobium as representing important 
materials requirements for the implementation of the EU SET-Plan. Here the results have simply been 
rescaled against projected supply, although it is noted that the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 scenarios (EC, 
2011b), are significantly more pessimistic on the uptake of CCS before 2030.   
3.13.4 Smart electricity grids 
For smart electricity grids, the first JRC study modelled the metals requirements associated with ENSTO-
E’s list of projects of European Significance to 2020 (ENTSO-E, 2010). No more up-to-date appropriate 
scenarios have been identified.  
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3.13.5 Biofuels 
 
For biofuels, the first JRC study identified that the same catalysts currently used for fossil fuels would be 
used, and therefore there would not be any additional materials requirements. The reference scenario of 
the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011b) is used. 
3.13.6 Nuclear energy 
For nuclear energy it is clear that the aftermath of the Fukushima events in Japan during 2011 have led to 
a number of countries that use nuclear energy to reconsider their energy policies. The vast majority of 
countries, however, remain firmly committed to their nuclear power programmes and – as after any 
major industrial accident – committed to learning lessons and improving safety. Nevertheless, some 
governments have turned against nuclear power and seek to implement alternatives. Within Europe, 
these countries are Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and Italy (World Nuclear Association, 2012): 
   
• Germany had 17 operational reactors prior to the Fukushima accident, but following the ac-
cident the government decided to immediately and permanently shut down the seven old-
est units and to forbid the one undergoing upgrades to restart. It has also re-instated a pre-
viously held phase-out policy that, if maintained, will see the last German reactor cease op-
erations by 2022.   
• Belgium has decided to reverse a 2009 policy that would have seen reactors operate for 
about 50 years, and instead shut them down 10 years earlier, with some now due to close 
by 2015.  
• Switzerland opted to veto the replacement of nuclear generating capacity, which means 
that, based on 50-year operating lifetimes, nuclear power generation in the country would 
cease in 2034.  
• Italy had been looking at starting a nuclear energy programme, but has now cancelled these 
plans. 
 
As a result of these major policy changes, it is therefore appropriate to model a scenario that assumes a 
significantly lower implementation of nuclear energy in Europe. The chosen scenario for this is the refer-
ence scenario of the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 scenarios (EC, 2011b), which has fairly constant net capac-
ity up to 2030.  
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4. Metal Requirements of Technologies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the quantitative results of calculating the materials requirements of energy tech-
nologies deployed during the path to the decarbonisation of the EU energy sector, building on the previ-
ous chapter in which the materials composition of each technology was determined.   
 
The approach taken in the last chapter was a bottom-up approach to compile an inventory of all metals 
used in each technology using an appropriate functional unit, such as kg/MW. In this chapter the esti-
mates of the material composition of each technology are scaled up, according to the projected uptake of 
the technology under various scenarios - although where possible and depending on which technology,  
the most extreme scenario of the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 has been used (EC, 2011b). Likewise, the 
results from the first JRC study (Moss et al., 2011) are re-assessed using the data from the Energy 
Roadmap 2050, which was not available in 2011. 
 
At the end of the chapter a reduced list of metals is derived representing the most significant materials 
requirements associated with the path to the decarbonisation of the EU energy sector. These are based 
upon the proportion of expected world supply that is estimated to be required within the EU. As project-
ed supply has been used in the analysis, a lower cut-off value has been used than in the first study (ca. 
0.3% of world supply rather than 1%). Attention is also given to use of the materials within the electron-
ics/ICT and automotive sectors, as these sectors are in competition with the energy sector for the same 
resources. 
 
4.2 Expected supply of metals 
To get a sense of scale of the EU material demand estimates, it is important to provide the context of 
metals supply estimates. The latest available data for metals supply estimates is for 2011. The EU materi-
als demand estimates can also be compared against long term supply projections for 2020 and 2030.  This 
aims to provide a more dynamic measure of materials availability.   
 
There is potentially a total of 60 materials of relevance to analyse (Table 64), so it is not practical to 
produce a detailed forecast for each of them. The approach therefore needs to be relatively generic and 
to apply largely a common data source and methodology. The length of the projections is around 20 
years – 2011 to 2030. However, due to the volatility that is inherent in many commodity markets - partic-
ularly those for many minor metals - a long-term forecast cannot be considered reliable. Indeed, even for 
the base metals (i.e. copper, lead, nickel, steel, tin and zinc) for which the markets are much more trans-
parent and less volatile than the minor metals, most forecasts are only for a period of around 2-5 years. It 
is therefore clear that the projections here should not be regarded as forecasts. Table 64 does not include 
the platinum group metals and the rare earth elements. These special groups are assessed in Sections 
4.2.1 and 4.2.2 respectively, using additional data (Johnson Matthey, 2012; IMCOA in US DOE, 2011) to 
identify the supply of the individual metals within each group.  
 
The main source of data used for the long term supply projections is historical supply data provided by 
the USGS Mineral Commodity Specialists for around 90 mineral commodities (US Geological Survey 
(USGS), 2011a). Long term supply trends have then been linearly extrapolated to form the supply projec-
tions to 2030. Some supplementary data has been included for particular metals where additional data 
was felt to be useful in providing further details or was missing from USGS data. More detail is given in 
Table 64 and in Appendix 3, where historical and predicted production data are illustrated graphically. 
For many metals an allowance has been made for supply from recycled content as indicated by (UNEP, 
2011) and other references (see Appendix 4).   
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Table 64: Current estimates and future projections of annual metal production for various metals (tonnes) 
 Metal Symbol Production 
Type 
2011 2020 2030 Compound Annual 
Growth Rate (CAGR) 
over 20 years 
Antimony# Sb Mine 198,800 261,580 317,000 2.49% 
Arsenic As Trioxide 52,000 59,400 62,800 1.00% 
Barytes* Ba Mine 7,800,000 9,112,000 10,331,300 1.49% 
Beryllium# Be Mine 300 322 405 1.59% 
Bismuth Bi Mine 8,500 11,040 14,230 2.75% 
Boron B All forms 4,300,000 4,835,600 5,498,500 1.30% 
Cadmium# Cd Refinery 30,700 33,600 37,000 0.99% 
Chromium# Cr Mine 9,145,000 12,823,600 16,911,000 3.29% 
Cobalt# Co Mine 130,700 227,000 336,700 5.11% 
Copper# Cu Mine 19,777,000 23,159,000 27,386,000 1.73% 
Gallium#1 Ga Refinery 288 450 630 4.21% 
Germanium# Ge Refinery 197 319 433 4.25% 
Gold# Au Mine 4,310 5,780 7,140 2.69% 
Graphite* C Mine 925,000 1,178,000 1,311,740 1.86% 
Hafnium2 Hf Refinery 85 112 142 2.74% 
Indium#1 In Refinery 1,360 1,900 2,500 3.26% 
Lead# Pb Mine 9,656,000 12,588,000 15,846,500 2.64% 
Lithium3 Li Li Content 20,800 28,250 36,500 3.01% 
Magnesium# Mg Primary 1,114,300 1,545,900 2,018,400 3.18% 
Manganese# Mn Mine 20,895,500 29,720,500 39,295,000 3.38% 
Mercury Hg Mine 1,930 2,375 2,875 2.12% 
Molybdenum# Mo Mine 333,300 483,210 648,340 3.56% 
Nickel# Ni Mine 2,686,500 3,752,000 5,065,500 3.39% 
Niobium# Nb Mine 78,750 131,212 180,985 4.48% 
Rhenium# Re Mine 65 89 111 2.81% 
Scandium4 Sc Refinery 10 30 50 8.84% 
Selenium4 Se Refinery 2,650 3,940 4,970 3.36% 
Silver# Ag Mine 32,050 36,600 43,075 1.57% 
Strontium Sr Mine 380,000 590,100 641,100 2.79% 
Tantalum# Ta Mine 988 1,301 1,820 3.27% 
Tellurium#1 Te Refinery 742 1,255 1,826 4.86% 
Thallium Tl Mine 10 10 10 0.00% 
Tin# Sn Mine 334,150 415,750 482,600 1.95% 
Titanium5 Ti TiO2 Content 6,000,000 6,940,900 7,986,400 1.52% 
Tungsten# W Mine 120,000 146,600 181,600 2.20% 
Vanadium V Mine 60,000 73,800 88,400 2.06% 
Zinc# Zn Mine 15,500,000 19,353,500 23,758,000 2.27% 
Zirconium Zr Mine 1,410,000 1,928,200 2,486,500 3.03% 
Source: USGS, 2012 & UNEP, 2011, for 2011 unless stated above; Oakdene Hollins projections thereafter 
#: Supply estimates include an allowance for production from recycled content as indicated by (UNEP, 2011) or other references.   
See Appendix 5 for further details on data sources and the methodology that has been used. 
* Barytes and Graphite are both technically defined as industrial minerals rather than as metals 
1: Gallium, Indium & Tellurium 2011 data from (Bauer et al., 2011) 
2: Hafnium 2011 data from (Moss et al., 2011) 
3: Lithium 2010 Li content data from (British Geological Survey (BGS), 2012a) 
4: Scandium and selenium 2011 data from (International Study Group for Nickel, 2012) 
5: Titanium 2010 TiO2 content data from (BGS, 2012a) 
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4.2.1 Platinum group metals 
 
For the platinum group metals, the USGS provides historical data on the production of platinum, palladi-
um and ‘other platinum group metals’ (USGS, 2011b). This data shows that the production ratios have 
remained fairly constant over time, with platinum and palladium production each accounting for just over 
40% of total supply of platinum group metals.  
 
Detailed supply data for the individual metals within ‘other platinum group metals’ is not published. 
However, Johnson Matthey does publish demand estimates for rhodium, ruthenium and iridium (Figure 
18). Some demand volatility is observable in the data; however, the supply of each of these metals will be 
closely linked to that of the host metals due to the relative concentrations in the ores. Supply data has 
therefore been averaged and used to disaggregate the category ‘other platinum group metals’. Produc-
tion of osmium is an order of magnitude smaller. The USGS reports imports of just 76 kg of osmium in 
2010 or 0.2% combined imports of rhodium, ruthenium, iridium and osmium (USGS, 2011b). 
 
In addition, an estimate of world production from recycled sources has been included using data provid-
ed within (Johnson Matthey, 2012) and (UNEP, 2011). Based on these data sources, Table 65 provides 
supply projections of the individual platinum group metals for 2020 and 2030. 
 
Figure 65: Demand for rhodium, ruthenium and iridium (tonnes) 
 
Source: Johnson Matthey, 2012 
 
 
 
Table 59: Current estimates and future projections of annual metal  
production for individual platinum group metals (tonnes) 
Metal Symbol 2011 2020 2030 
Platinum# Pt 259 337 414 
Palladium# Pd 277 368 463 
Rhodium# Rh 40 50 60 
Ruthenium# Ru 67 81 92 
Iridium# Ir 9 11 12 
Osmium Os 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Platinum Group Metals PGMs 652 847 1,041 
Source: Compositional and trend data derived from (USGS, 2011b; Johnson Matthey, 2012)  
#: Supply estimates include an allowance for production from recycled content as indicated by (Johnson Matthey, 2012) or (UNEP, 2011).  
See Appendix 5 for further details on data sources and the methodology that has been used. 
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4.2.2 Rare earth elements 
The USGS provides historical data on the total world production of rare earth oxides, but there are vari-
ous different projections of future supply of rare earth elements (Figure 19). The most conservative 
forecast is by junior mining company, Lynas, which predicts rare earth supply of 155,000 tonnes for 2014 
when there is a significant cut in production from Southern Chinese clays. IMCOA’s forecast, contained 
within the US Department of Energy Critical Materials Strategy, is for 200,000 tonnes of rare earth pro-
duction capacity for 2015. Tech Metals Research, (Hatch, 2011), is much more optimistic, putting 2017 
supply at 327,000 tonnes in its average scenario. 
 
For this study, the middle view - of IMCOA - has been selected as the baseline. This is in part because this 
is an independent forecast which has already been scrutinised by experts at the US Department of Ener-
gy, but also because of the considerable experience that IMCOA has in assessing the viability of future 
rare earth mine prospects. In contrast, the Tech Metals Research scenario is believed by the authors to 
be too optimistic, underestimating the difficulties of bringing new rare earth supply to the market. The 
Lynas scenario is relatively conservative, and highlights some of the risks should there be a significant cut 
in rare earth production in China. 
 
Figure 19: Estimates and projections of annual metal production  
for rare earth elements (tonnes) 
 
Sources: USGS, 2012 data till 2010, interpolation and extrapolation of Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2010 
 IMCOA in US DOE, 2011 and  Hatch, 2011. 
 
However, for the purposes of this study, detailed supply data is required on each of the individual rare 
earth elements. The composition of world rare earth supply is not presumed to remain constant over 
time, and is dependent on the composition of exactly which mines commence production. Figure 20 
illustrates this using IMCOA data (IMCOA in US DOE, 2011), which shows the composition of world 2010 
rare earth supply, of which the share of heavy rare earth elements9 is approximately 15%. The addition of 
light rare earth10 dominant mines such Mountain Pass, Mount Weld and Nolans Bore takes the heavy rare 
earth fraction of world supply down to around 10% in 2015.   
 
It is hard to predict how rare earth supply will develop further into the future, as there are some ad-
vanced rare earth projects11 with significant heavy rare earth content, as well as those that do not (Tech-
nology Metals Research, n.d.). The projections used in this study do not assume further reduction in the 
                                                             
9 Heavy rare earth elements typically include: europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium 
and yttrium 
10 Light rare earth elements typically include: lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium and samarium 
11 Advanced projects are defined as where either the mineral resource or reserves have been formally defined or where the project has 
been subject to past mining campaigns for which reliable historic data is available 
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share of heavy rare earths as a fraction of total supply beyond 2015, but a continuation of the 2015 rare 
earth supply composition. This therefore implicitly assumes a mix of different types of rare earth deposits 
that commence production. Table 66 shows the results of the projections assumed in this study for the 
individual rare earth elements. This highlights the relative difference assumed in increases of supply 
growth rates for light versus heavy rare earth elements. A five-percent recycled content has also been 
assumed for certain rare earth elements, based upon (UNEP, 2011). 
 
Figure 20: Forecast changes in the composition of world rare earth supply 
 
Source: IMCOA in US DOE, 2011 
 
Table 66: Estimates & projections of annual metal production for individual rare earth elements (tonnes) 
Metal Symbol 2011 2020 2030 Implied 
CAGR 
Lanthanum# La 35,680 79,135 124,355 6.79% 
Cerium# Ce 48,340 118,705 186,535 7.37% 
Praseodymium#12 Pr 6,790 14,510 22,800 6.58% 
Neodymium# Nd 23,020 48,360 75,995 6.49% 
Samarium Sm 3,060 5,570 8,750 5.68% 
Europium Eu 405 765 1,200 5.90% 
Gadolinium Gd 2,625 4,180 6,560 4.94% 
Terbium Tb 350 515 810 4.51% 
Dysprosium# Dy 1,840 2,490 3,915 4.05% 
Pm-Er-Ho-Tm-Yb-Lu - 2,190 3,200 5,030 4.48% 
Yttrium  Y  11,480 15,730 24,720 4.12% 
Rare Earth Elements REE 135,780 293,160 460,670 6.64% 
Source: Compositional and trend data from (IMCOA in US DOE, 2011) projections thereafter 
#: Supply estimates include an allowance for production from recycled content as indicated by (UNEP, 2011).   
See Appendix 5 for further details on data sources and the methodology that has been used. 
 
 
4.3 Metal requirements per technology 
The following pages and tables present the results of the scenario modelling for each technology. Each 
provides the full list of metals and the amounts required in tonnes for the EU in 2020 and 2030. This is 
then compared to the expected supply, as given in the previous sections, for the respective years. Unless 
otherwise stated, the derived figures are calculated using scenarios in the EU Energy Roadmap 2050. The 
full results are summarised in Section 4.5 where the reduced list of metals is also presented. 
                                                             
12 In the report praseodymium and neodymium (didymium) are treated together, as they are often not separated from each other 
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4.3.1 Hydropower 
For hydropower, the metals requirements are shown in Table 67, based upon modelling the high RES 
scenario of the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011b). In comparison to expected world supply, these 
metals requirements are very modest. 
 
Table 67: Hydropower metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Hydropower 
Ni 31.0 23.72 15.87 <0.1% <0.1% 
Mo 2.9 2.22 1.48 <0.1% <0.1% 
Cu 67 51.26 34.30 <0.1% <0.1% 
Mg 1.92 1.47 0.98 <0.1% <0.1% 
Cr 12.5 9.56 6.40 <0.1% <0.1% 
Pb 5.36 4.10 2.74 <0.1% <0.1% 
Zn 5 3.83 2.56 <0.1% <0.1% 
Mn 1.7 1.30 0.87 <0.1% <0.1% 
Ti 0.24 0.18 0.12 <0.1% <0.1% 
Sn 0.00308 0.00 0.00 <0.1% <0.1% 
Zr 0.000013 0.00 0.00 <0.1% <0.1% 
 
 
4.3.2 Geothermal energy 
For geothermal energy, the metals requirements are shown in Table 68, based upon modelling the high 
RES scenario of the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011b). This analysis highlights the usage of tantalum 
and nickel, within some of the speciality high temperature alloys, as representing relatively modest 
material requirements. 
 
Table 68: Geothermal energy metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Geothermal 
Ta 64.0 2.50 7.68 0.2% 0.4% 
Ni 120,155 4,686 14,419 0.1% 0.3% 
Mo 7,209 281 865 0.1% 0.1% 
Cr 64,405 2,512 7,729 <0.1% <0.1% 
Nb 128 4.99 15.36 <0.1% <0.1% 
Ti 1,634 64 196 <0.1% <0.1% 
Cu 3,605 141 433 <0.1% <0.1% 
Mn 4,325 169 519 <0.1% <0.1% 
 
4.3.3 Marine energy 
Of the sub-technologies considered for marine energy, only tidal barrages (akin to conventional hydro-
power plants) can be considered as a mature technology. Despite their track record, however, the instal-
lation of tidal barrages is costly and tied to specific locations. Wave energy has the greater potential, as 
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outlined in the SETIS forecast for 2020 and 2030 (EC, 2011c), which is based on the forecast provided by 
the EOEA in its Ocean Energy Roadmap (EOEA, 2010). However, wave energy is not expected to have a 
large impact on the overall EU ocean energy production.   
 
No scenario for marine energy is explicitly identified in the 2050 roadmaps. The modelling here is there-
fore based upon scenarios from DG Energy's "EU Energy Trends to 2030", where marine energy is explicit-
ly listed as tidal etc. Based on this scenario, none of the metals requirements for marine energy are 
significant (Table 69). 
 
Table 69: Marine energy metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Expected EU 
demand (tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Tidal 
Cu 5.00 250 350 <0.1% <0.1% 
Mo 0.05 2 3 <0.1% <0.1% 
Ni 0.22 11 15 <0.1% <0.1% 
Cr 0.31 15 21 <0.1% <0.1% 
Ti 0.01 1 1 <0.1% <0.1% 
 
 
4.3.4 Co-generation or combined heat and power (CHP) 
The metals requirements for CHP are shown in Table 70, based on modelling the low nuclear scenario of 
the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011b). However, these scenarios do not provide a breakdown of the 
increase in power generation required for different types of CHP. In the absence of knowledge regarding 
CHP in power stations, an assumption has been made that district CHP will account for 50% of uptake, 
while micro-CHP using Stirling engines will account for a further 25% of uptake, with the remaining 25% 
being supplied by fuel cell (SOFC) micro-CHP.   
 
This analysis highlights that the use of copper in heat exchangers in the next decade represents a relative-
ly modest material requirement. 
 
Table 70: Combined heat and power metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Annual EU 
Demand (tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Combined 
Heat and 
Power 
Cu 44,448 116,898 51,915 0.5% 0.2% 
Sn 168 442 196 0.1% <0.1% 
Ni 541 1,423 632 <0.1% <0.1% 
Cr 1,033 2,717 1,207 <0.1% <0.1% 
Mn 108 284 126 <0.1% <0.1% 
Zn 9.0 24 11 <0.1% <0.1% 
Pb 0.5 1 1 <0.1% <0.1% 
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4.3.5 Advanced fossil fuel power generation 
 
The share of fossil fuel power generation is expected to decrease in Europe. However, new fossil power 
plants will be built to replace decommissioned power plants. The capacity for European power genera-
tion from solids is expected to decrease in the long term, due to increasing carbon prices. Consequently, 
gas will gain an increasing share of fossil fuel generation.   
 
According to the JRC’s 2011 Technology Map, between 510 GW and 635 GW of new fossil fuel power 
plant capacity is required by 2030 (EC, 2011c). To gain an estimate of the new installed capacity per year, 
an average of this figure coupled with the reference scenario for gas and coal power generation capacity 
from the EU Energy Roadmap to 2030 is used.   
 
To allow for retrofitting of fossil fuel power stations, a figure of 5% of the total capacity by fuel per year 
has been assumed. Based on power plants currently under construction, the short term trends show an 
increase in natural gas fired Combustion Turbine/Combined-Cycle (CTCC) plants and a decrease in coal 
powered capacity (Capros et al., 2009). In Germany there are plans for 29 gas- and 17 coal-fired power 
stations - a combination of new builds and retrofits - by 2020 (Bloomberg, 2012). Capacity additions for 
coal power plants are expected to be 18.1 GW between 2011 and 2015, and 12.1 GW between 2016 and 
2020 (Frost & Sullivan, 2012a). 
 
The metals requirements for advanced fossil fuel power generation are shown in Table 71, based on the 
reference scenario from DG Energy's "EU Energy Trends to 2030".  
 
This analysis highlights that the use of cobalt, rhenium and tantalum, within some of the superalloys, 
represents the greatest material requirement. 
 
Table 71: Advanced fossil fuel power generation metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand  
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Advanced 
fossil fuel 
power 
generation 
Co 1.8 2,123 <0.1% 0.6% 
Re 0.6 0.6 0.7% 0.6% 
Ta 1.3 7.2 0.1% 0.4% 
Ni 44.3 7,435 <0.1% 0.1% 
Mo 64.2 636 <0.1% 0.1% 
Nb 9.6 106 <0.1% 0.1% 
Cr 1,428 3,182 <0.1% <0.1% 
Hf 0.0 0.0 <0.1% <0.1% 
Ti 0.2 244 <0.1% <0.1% 
W 242 1.3 0.2% <0.1% 
Mn 80.1 42.4 <0.1% <0.1% 
V 32.1 0.0 <0.1% <0.1% 
 
 
4.3.6 Fuel cells and hydrogen 
The metals requirements for fuel cells and hydrogen are shown in Table 72.   
 
The scenarios employed here for SOFCs were all obtained from New Energy World Industrial Grouping in 
conjunction with the EU (NEW-IG EU). For trucks, the average power output was taken to be 5 kW; for 
planes a value of 225 kW was assumed and for maritime uses the power output was 20 kW. The average 
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power output value for micro-CHP was assumed to be 2.5 kW, and it was assumed that 25% of the total 
CHP uptake would come from this system. As outlined in the co-generation section (3.5), the other 25% 
would be provided by micro-CHP using a Stirling engine.   
 
For PEMFCs, the scenario employed for fuel cell electric vehicles is taken from the HyWays project. The 
scenario assumes that platinum catalysts will not be replaced with cheaper alternatives. The scenario 
employed for fuel cells in materials handling is taken from NEW-IG EU and assumes that 50% of such 
devices will use PEMFCs. The scenario for PEMFCs in combined heat and power units was also obtained 
from NEW-IG EU. To model the requirements for materials in fuel cell backup units a NEW-IG EU scenario 
was used, and it was assumed that PEMFCs would be used in 100% of these devices. 
 
For DMFCs the scenarios are again taken from NEW-IG EU, with the assumption that 50% of fuel cells 
used in materials handling devices will be DMFCs and that 100% of fuel cells in portable devices will be 
DMFCs.   
 
This analysis highlights that platinum use within fuel cells represents an important material requirement 
for the decarbonisation of EU energy sector. The modelling results in an estimate that approximately 7% 
of the world’s platinum supply in 2030 could be required for fuel cells in the EU. 
 
Table 72: Fuel cells and hydrogen metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Materials 
demand 
(kg/MW) 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand  
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Fuel Cells 
Pt 67.9 5.5 28.9 1.6% 7.0% 
Ru 22.0 0.0 0.1 <0.1% 0.1% 
Cr 48323.2 1,185 1,599 <0.1% <0.1% 
Ni 282.0 59.2 216.0 <0.1% <0.1% 
Y 8.4 0.2 0.2 <0.1% <0.1% 
La 38.0 0.8 0.9 <0.1% <0.1% 
Gd 1.2 0.0 0.0 <0.1% <0.1% 
Sm 1.2 0.0 0.0 <0.1% <0.1% 
Ce 8.0 0.2 0.2 <0.1% <0.1% 
Co 10.8 0.2 0.3 <0.1% <0.1% 
 
4.3.7 Electricity storage in the power sector 
Estimates of the necessity or demand for large-scale electricity storage vary from one study to the next.  
Unfortunately, studies exist only for a few countries or regions, and most often cover only one or few 
storage technologies. In consequence, no comprehensive data exists with serious estimates as to the 
distribution of technologies that could meet that storage requirement. Recent modelling work points to a 
slow build-up of storage capacity with run-times of several hours, with essentially no new capacity being 
installed until 2020 but increasing to up to a total of 5 GW (or 40 GWh daily if it runs for 8 hours) by 2030, 
for the EU-27 plus Switzerland and Norway (Pfluger, 2012).13   
 
The estimates shown below (Tables 73 - 76) are based on these figures and using the materials require-
ments described in section 3.8. The entire possible demand is allotted to each sub-technology (i.e. total 
expected demand is not the sum of the possible demand shown for the sub-technologies). Furthermore, 
                                                             
13 These are interim results from the FP7 Project Responses (http://www.responsesproject.eu/).  This scenario results in a high penetration 
of intermittent renewable energy by imposing a CO2 cap and assuming strong increases in electricity demand and no use of CCS. These 
results reflect the optimum power storage capacity needed for the assumed simulation and optimization conditions. They do not take into 
account feasibility of installation. 
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because the modelling results are cumulative, the possible demand is also cumulative for the years 
2021-2030 in the tables below. It is important to note that in the case of mature technologies, secondary 
metals can cover a substantial share of the demand, e.g. secondary lead from lead-acid batteries. Some 
factors, such as a failure to speed up the expansion of the grid infrastructure necessary for integrating 
fluctuating renewable energies, could increase the demand for storage technologies significantly. As for 
the distribution of technologies, it is noted that because of the low specific investment costs, high effi-
ciency and proven track record, pumped hydro storage plants are currently the technology of choice for 
large-scale energy storage but they nonetheless suffer from a scarcity of suitable sites for new facilities 
(Höflich et al., 2010). 
 
Table 73: Possible compressed air energy storage metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Materials demand 
(tonnes/MWh) 
Possible Demand (tonnes) 
2020 2021-2030 
CAES 
Cu 0.50 0 20,000 
Steel 32.0 0 1,280,000 
 
Table 74: Possible pumped hydro storage metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Materials demand 
(kg/MWh) 
Possible Annual Demand (tonnes) 
2020 2021-2030 
Pumped hydro 
storage 
Ni 0.03 0 300 
Cr 0.01 0 100 
Cu 0.03 0 300 
 
Table 75: Possible lead acid batteries metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Materials demand 
(tonnes/MWh) 
Possible Annual Demand (tonnes) 
2020 2021-2030 
Lead-acid batteries 
Pb 5.20 0 208,000 
Sb 0.20 0 8,000 
 
Table 76: Possible NaS batteries metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Materials demand 
(tonnes/MWh) 
Possible Annual Demand (tonnes) 
2020 2021-2030 
NaS batteries Cu 3.40 0 136,000 
 
These results are summarised in Table 77. As the possible demand estimates are for the whole decade 
2012-2030, these results have been divided by cumulative expected world supply for each of the metals 
concerned. None of the metals require more than 0.3% of expected supply over the decade 2021-2030. 
 
Table 77: Maximum possible power storage metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Cumulative 
World Supply 
(tonnes) 
Possible 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ Cumulative 
World Supply 
2021-2030 2021-2030 2021-2030 
Power Storage 
– Summary 
Pb 59,615,850 208,000 0.3% 
Sb 2,482,650 8,000 0.3% 
Cu 202,712,100 156,300 0.1% 
Ni 29,980,000 300 <0.1% 
Cr 120,574,100 100 <0.1% 
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4.3.8 Energy intensive industries 
As described in Section 3.9, no specific metals requirements were identified for energy efficiency and CO2 
emissions reduction in industry. 
 
4.3.9 Energy efficiency in buildings – lighting 
No comprehensive scenarios already published for the sales and penetration of different lighting types 
have been identified by this study; as a consequence, scenarios have been constructed from various 
sources. A key driver on the type of lighting sales is regulation, such as the phase-out of incandescent 
lamps. Based on proposed regulatory changes, the IEA forecasts annual CFL sales of around 630 million 
within the EU, assuming that the phase-out is steady rather than fast (International Energy Agency (IEA), 
2010a). 
 
In addition to CFLs, LFLs must be considered in the study. Analysis of PRODCOM EU production data and 
EU trade statistics puts annual EU consumption at approximately 350 million LFLs for 2010.   
 
Street lighting should also be considered, as it is seen as an important market for LED lighting. The in-
stalled stock of streetlights in EU-25 was estimated at 56.1 million units in 2007 (EC, 2007c). Under the 
assumption that bulbs are replaced every three years, and that the EU market has expanded with the 
admission of two further countries into the EU, annual sales may be approximately 20 million bulbs per 
year. 
 
As can be shown (Figure 21), some growth in annual lighting sales is anticipated over time; it is forecast at 
3% per year globally. Annual growth rates for a more mature market such as the EU might be expected to 
be lower than for the world as a whole. For this study, EU annual light sales growth is modelled at a more 
modest 1.84% per year, as indicated by forecasts from McKinsey for the growth of the general lighting 
markets to 2020 (McKinsey, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 21: Global lighting sockets (billion units) 
Source: Aixtron, 2012 
 
A further parameter within the scenario concerns the penetration of LED lighting onto the market. Whilst 
neither the US Department of Energy nor IEA consider this technology shift in their studies, the lower 
manufacturing costs and the benefits offered by its higher energy efficiency mean that large scale adop-
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tion is possible. For example, forecasts show LED penetration reaching 30% of the total lighting market by 
2015 (Figure 21). Higher rates of uptake are possible, with McKinsey forecasting 46% LED penetration by 
2016, and 72% for 2020 within Europe (McKinsey, 2012). However, for modelling purposes in this study, 
LED penetration is assumed to be 5% for 2011, 30% for 2020 and 60% for 2030. This represents average 
uptake over the entire decade, although higher rates of LED uptake are discussed in section 4.6.3. 
 
The metals requirements for ‘energy efficiency in buildings – lighting’ are shown in Table 78. This analysis 
highlights the usage of heavy rare earth elements (yttrium, terbium and europium), germanium and 
gallium as representing important material requirements for implementing the path for decarbonising 
the EU energy sector. For the heavy rare earth elements their usage is mainly within fluorescent lamps, 
which are expected to be gradually replaced by LEDs over time. Nonetheless metals requirements for 
terbium and europium within EU lighting are estimated to represent nearly 10% of current global supply 
in 2011.  Yttrium is also used in fluorescent lighting with requirements of around 5% for 2011. Yttrium is 
also used to a small extent within LED lighting. For gallium and germanium, requirements within LED 
lighting are expected to grow to around 2.5% of total supply in 2030. 
 
Table 78: Lighting metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Annual EU Demand (tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand  
/ World Supply 
2011 2020 2030 2011 2020 2030 
Lighting 
Tb 36.5 32.3 22.1 10.4% 6.3% 2.7% 
Ge 0.6 4.6 11.0 0.3% 1.4% 2.5% 
Ga 0.8 5.9 14.3 0.3% 1.3% 2.3% 
Eu 38.9 34.4 23.6 9.6% 4.5% 2.0% 
Y 547.7 484.8 333.3 4.8% 3.1% 1.3% 
Au 3.4 24.7 59.2 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 
Ag 9.6 69.1 165.8 <0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 
Gd 14.6 12.9 8.9 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 
In 0.1 0.7 1.8 <0.1% <0.1% 0.1% 
Cu 1,852.0 5,271.0 10,714.0 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
La 66.9 59.2 40.6 0.2% 0.1% <0.1% 
Ce 85.7 75.8 52.0 0.2% 0.1% <0.1% 
Sn 39.7 59.3 87.9 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Ni 203.4 292.7 421.3 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Sr 85.9 75.9 52.1 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Zn 156.7 372.3 712.2 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Mg 85.2 75.3 51.7 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Zr 85.2 75.3 51.7 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Sb 0.1 0.5 1.3 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Mn 209.5 185.3 127.0 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Cr 1.3 9.2 22.0 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
W 0.0 0.1 0.2 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Pb 0.0 0.1 0.3 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
 
4.3.10 Road transport efficiency 
No suitable or detailed EU scenario for road transport efficiency is provided in the 2050 roadmap. There-
fore models are based on the forecasts produced by Deutsche Bank (Deutsche Bank Global Markets 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
73 
 
Research, 2009). These forecasts provide detailed projections for the uptake of four different types of 
vehicles (mild hybrid, full hybrid, plug-in hybrid, battery electric vehicle). The scenarios modelled for fuel 
cell vehicle motor drive scenarios are compatible with those used in the fuel cell scenarios. Figure 22 
shows the uptake of low-carbon vehicles in the EU for fuel cell vehicles (FCV), battery electric vehicles 
(BEV), plug-in electric vehicles (PHEV), mild hybrids (mild HV) and hybrid electric vehicles (HEV). 
 
Assumptions have also been made on the size and type of motor drives, and the choice of batteries 
(NiMH versus Li-ion, including specific Li-ion chemistry options). Due to the magnitude and sensitivities 
associated with the modelling results for this technology, data and scenarios have been extensively 
verified in consultation with industry stakeholders.  
 
Various other forecasts and scenarios are available for road transport efficiency, both for its uptake and 
its possible technology mix. Other scenarios considered include those by: IEA, 2011a; McKinsey, 2010; 
J.D. Power and Associates, 2010; Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2010; Boston Consulting Group, 
2011; Credit Suisse, 2009b; and CE Delft, 2011. A useful summary is provided by Pasaoglu et al. (2012). 
Further discussion and the modelling of these alternative scenarios are provided in Section 4.6.2. 
 
Figure 22: Uptake of low-carbon vehicles for the EU under the Deutsche Bank scenario 
 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research, 2009 
 
Using the Deutsche Bank forecasts, the material requirements for hybrid and electric vehicle batteries 
and drive motors are shown in Table 79. There are a number of important materials requirements for the 
implementation of the path for the decarbonisation of EU energy sector: 
 
• For drive motors, the focus is on three rare earth elements; dysprosium and neodymium-
praseodymium.14 The supply is notably tighter for the heavy rare earth element, dysprosi-
um, where around 25% of world supply is required. Demand for neodymium-praseodymium 
is lower, at 7% of expected world supply.   
 
• For batteries, there is a split between NiMH, which has been the battery of choice for many 
                                                             
14 In the report praseodymium and neodymium (didymium) are treated together, as they are often not separated from each other 
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hybrid vehicles; and the adoption of Li-ion. For 2011, in percentage terms, the materials re-
quirements for NiMH batteries (lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium and samarium) are 
comparable to those for Li-ion batteries (lithium, cobalt and graphite) at around 1-2% of 
current world supply. However, the uptake of electric vehicles to 2030 and the shift to ex-
clusively Li-ion batteries places the highest materials requirements on lithium (19%), graph-
ite (15%) and cobalt (2%). 
 
Table 79: Road transport efficiency materials requirements 
Technology Elements 
Annual EU Demand (tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand  
/ World Supply 
2011 2020 2030 2011 2020 2030 
(H)EV 
batteries 
and drive 
motors 
Dy 123 566 980 6.7% 22.7% 25.0% 
Li 314 2,214 6,939 1.5% 7.8% 19.0% 
Graphite 8,575 60,464 189,471 0.9% 5.1% 14.4% 
Nd-Pr 702 4,425 6,803 2.4% 7.0% 6.9% 
Co 1,196 4,412 7,390 0.9% 1.9% 2.2% 
La 894 2,279 707 2.5% 2.9% 0.6% 
Sm 59 150 47 1.9% 2.7% 0.5% 
Ni 5,966 18,931 22,327 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 
Cu 3,607 25,703 79,708 <0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 
Ce 597 1,522 472 1.2% 1.3% 0.3% 
Mn 987 6,961 21,814 <0.1% <0.1% 0.1% 
B 125 724 1,883 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Ti 57 879 2,205 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
 
4.3.11 Desalination 
Though large desalination plants are generally thermal plants operating with waste heat from a neigh-
bouring thermal power plant, reverse osmosis plants nowadays account for most of the new installed 
capacity, resulting in less stringent material specifications due to milder conditions (Khawaji et al., 2008; 
Frost & Sullivan, 2010a).  
 
The global capacity of operating desalination plants (drinking water) was estimated to be approximately 
52 million m3 per day in 2008 (ProDes Consortium, 2010). A total desalination capacity of 155- 220 million 
m3 per day in 2030 has been proposed (as a conservative projection) based on recent and projected rates 
of increase in installed capacity (Angerer et al., 2009). Assuming a doubling in the installed capacity by 
2016 compared to 2008 implies a yearly growth rate of 9% which, if extrapolated to 2030, leads to a total 
installed capacity of around 345 million m3 (Figure 23). 
 
In the most material-intensive case, the expansion in capacity would be covered by thermal facilities 
(MSF and MED). However, the current trend points to most of the additional capacity being due to RO 
facilities requiring less corrosion resistant materials. Over 90% of newly-built desalinisation plants are 
based on RO (Frost & Sullivan, 2010a). 
 
Nonetheless, this analysis highlights that the use of molybdenum, nickel and chromium within corrosive 
resistant alloys represents the greatest material requirements for implementing the path for decarbonis-
ing the EU energy sector. 
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Figure 23: Extrapolation of desalination capacity to 2030 based on three different growth assumptions 
 
Source: (RZT1 and RZT2 after Angerer et al., 2009 with an updated starting value; ProDes extrapolates from ProDes Consortium, 2010). 
 
 
Table 80: Desalination metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2011 2020 2030 2011 2020 2030 
Desalination 
Mo 0.0 7,561 9,470 <0.1% 1.6% 1.5% 
Ni 0.0 37,497 46,968 <0.1% 1.0% 0.9% 
Cr 0.0 52,397 65,631 <0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 
Ti 0.0 2,084 2,610 <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
 
4.3.12 Rescaling results of the first study 
For the SET-Plan technologies, the results from the first JRC study (Moss et al., 2011) are shown here and 
compared in order to provide an overall assessment of the supply chain bottlenecks risks for the decar-
bonisation of the EU energy sector. It should be noted that limited new analysis has been conducted 
here.   
 
However, there has been one major change in methodology, as the results have now been compared to 
expected supply figures rather than current supply estimates. In addition, some of the scenarios have 
been amended to take into account the latest projections in the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011b). 
Therefore the percentages of world supply shown in these tables may be very different to those in the 
first JRC study. 
Wind energy 
In Europe, the 2020 projections based on the National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPS) suggest 
that offshore installations will increase significantly more (from 2.6 to 44 GW, a 15-fold increase) than 
onshore (from 82 to 169 GW, a 2-fold increase). The industry expects 230 GW by 2020 of which 40 GW 
offshore, and 400 GW by 2030 of which 150 GW offshore, and track records show that in Europe the 
projections of the wind industry have proved more accurate. The scenario of electricity generation tech-
nologies that therefore results from those changes is shown in Table 81. 
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Table 81: Uptake and technologies mix modelled for wind energy 
Wind Turbine Type EMG-
geared 
EMG-DD HTS MS/HS-
PMG 
DD-PMG Installations 
per year (GW) 
Market share in 2020 33% 15% 1% 24% 27% 14 
Market share in 2030 0% 10% 18% 29% 43% 13 
Source: Personal communication, Roberto Lacal Arantegui, European Commission (EC), JRC IET, October 2012 
 
The results from the first JRC study, in terms of kg/MW for each of the separate sub-technologies have 
been remodelled, using the scenario above. The results are shown in Table 82. This analysis highlights the 
metals requirements associated with rare earth elements (dysprosium and neodymium-
praseodymium)15. These metals requirements have increased compared to the first JRC study, due to the 
change in the technology mix identified. Other metals representing significant usage to albeit to a lesser 
extent include molybdenum and nickel. 
 
Table 82: Wind energy metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Wind 
Dy 58 84 2.3% 2.2% 
Nd-Pr 845 1,222 1.3% 1.2% 
Mo 1,801 1,603 0.4% 0.2% 
Ni 8,711 7,726 0.2% 0.2% 
Cr 12,020 10,776 0.1% 0.1% 
Cu 16,000 14,857 0.1% 0.1% 
Mn 867 641 <0.1% <0.1% 
Solar energy 
The results have been rescaled against projection supply only, although the scenario presented here is 
the ‘high scenario’ from the first JRC study rather than that from the significance screening. That scenario 
was deemed to be more realistic as it gives a steady uptake of solar PV in both decades rather just within 
the second decade. The results highlight the metals requirements associated with tellurium, indium, 
gallium and tin and to a lesser extent silver, cadmium and selenium, as representing important materials 
requirements. 
 
Table 83: Solar energy metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Solar PV 
Te 150 126 12.0% 6.9% 
In 145 121 7.6% 4.9% 
Sn 14,913 12,505 3.6% 2.6% 
Ag 619 519 1.7% 1.2% 
Ga 4 3 0.8% 0.5% 
Se 15 13 0.4% 0.3% 
Cd 109 91 0.3% 0.2% 
Cu 70,650 59,241 0.3% 0.2% 
Pb 8,672 7,272 0.1% <0.1% 
CSP Ag 19 19 0.1% 0.1% 
                                                             
15 In the report praseodymium and neodymium (didymium) are treated together, as they are often not separated from each other 
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Carbon capture and storage 
The results for CCS from the first JRC study highlighted vanadium and niobium as representing important 
materials requirements. Here the results have been rescaled against projected supply only, although it is 
noted that the more recent EU Energy Roadmap 2050 scenarios (EC, 2011b), are significantly more pes-
simistic on the uptake of CCS before 2030. 
   
Table 84: Carbon capture and storage metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
CCS 
V 80 730 0.1% 0.8% 
Nb 80 730 0.1% 0.5% 
Ni 926 8,336 <0.1% 0.2% 
Mn 3,011 27,380 <0.1% 0.1% 
Cu 559 5,034 <0.1% <0.1% 
Co 6 55 <0.1% <0.1% 
Cr 261 2,373 <0.1% <0.1% 
Mo 6 55 <0.1% <0.1% 
 
Smart electricity grids 
The first JRC study modelled the metals requirements associated with ENSTO-E’s list of projects of Euro-
pean Significance to 2020 (ENTSO-E, 2010). No more up-to-date appropriate scenarios have been identi-
fied. The results highlight the metals requirements associated with copper and lead, as representing 
important materials requirements.  
 
Table 85: Smart electricity grids metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Smart Grids 
Cu 78,700  0.3%  
Pb 19,200  0.2%  
Biofuels 
The first JRC study identified that the same catalysts currently used for fossil fuels would be used and 
therefore there would not be any additional materials requirements. The results shown in Table 86 
should therefore be considered as illustrative; the use of ruthenium is of particular note. This modelling 
has rescaled the results against the reference scenario of the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011b) and 
also against projected supply figures.  
 
Table 86: Biofuels metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Biofuels 
Ru 0.4 0.4 0.4% 0.5% 
Co 18 21 <0.1% <0.1% 
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Nuclear energy 
Due to the major policy changes of some European countries, it is appropriate to model a scenario that 
assumes a significantly lower implementation of nuclear energy in Europe. The chosen scenario for this is 
the reference scenario of the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011b), which has fairly constant net capaci-
ty up to 2030. However the scenario implicitly assumes the opening of 51 GW of new capacity up to 2030 
to replace some plants, which here has been equally distributed over the period. The updated results are 
shown in Table 87, which are significantly lower than those from the first JRC study. Nonetheless the 
results still identify the metals requirements associated with hafnium and indium, as being important. 
 
Table 87: Nuclear energy metals requirements 
Technology Elements 
Annual EU Demand 
(tonnes) 
Annual EU Demand 
/ World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Nuclear 
Hf 1.1 1.4 1.0% 1.0% 
In 3.6 4.5 0.2% 0.2% 
Ag 19 24 0.1% 0.1% 
Mo 162 204 <0.1% <0.1% 
Ni 586 737 <0.1% <0.1% 
W 11 14 <0.1% <0.1% 
Cr 978 1,232 <0.1% <0.1% 
Y 1.1 1.4 <0.1% <0.1% 
Cd 1.2 1.5 <0.1% <0.1% 
Zr 70 88 <0.1% <0.1% 
Nb 4.6 5.8 <0.1% <0.1% 
Sn 10 13 <0.1% <0.1% 
V 1.4 1.7 <0.1% <0.1% 
Cu 137 172 <0.1% <0.1% 
Pb 10 12 <0.1% <0.1% 
Ti 3.4 4.3 <0.1% <0.1% 
Co 0.0 0.0 <0.1% <0.1% 
 
4.4 Sector studies 
 
In addition to the energy technologies, other technologies are considered that may be competing for the 
same resources and thus limit the availability of certain materials from use in low-carbon technologies in 
the EU.  The competing sectors of particular interest are the automotive and electronics/ICT sectors: 
 
• The automotive sector in Europe is estimated to employ 12.6 million people directly or indi-
rectly, producing a total of 15.1 million vehicles or 22% of worldwide motor vehicle sales in 
2010 (ACEA, 2011).   
 
• The electronics/ICT sector accounted for 8.5% of total business value added in the EU and 
3% of total business sector turnover (EC, 2012b). Europe’s share of worldwide electronics 
and ICT turnover is estimated at around 18% for 2010 (Deloitte, 2010). 
 
There is clearly some overlap with that for road transport efficiency. To avoid any double counting, 
therefore, the sector study does not include material requirements associated with hybrid and electric 
vehicle batteries or motors; nor with fuel cells. The analysis focuses predominantly on existing vehicle 
technologies such as catalytic convertors, lead acid batteries, and steel and aluminium alloys.  
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There is also potentially some overlap with respect to electronics and ICT, as many low-carbon technolo-
gies will contain circuit boards and batteries. As these have not been effectively quantified for specific 
technologies, there is, however, little risk of double counting here. 
 
The approach taken was to review the current applications for each of the metals identified. This high-
lights where other technologies currently compete for the same resources. This can consequently be 
considered as part of the screening process. Full details of the data sources and detailed information on 
other competing applications can be found in Appendix 2. Some further sources of information have 
been used to disaggregate uses of batteries, steel and alloys to these categories. 
 
The results of the sector study are shown in Table 88, providing both the worldwide share of demand and 
the EU’s estimated share. Metals highlighted in this analysis as being of particular importance to these 
sectors include antimony, beryllium, cadmium, copper, gallium, germanium, indium, lead, magnesium, 
platinum group metals, tantalum and tin. 
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Table 88: Results of the sector study, share of metal demand (%) - numbers rounded down 
Metal 
Worldwide EU Share EU 
Total Electronics/ICT Automotive Electronics/ICT Automotive 
PGM: Rhodium 1 79 0 17 17 
PGM: Palladium 14 62 3 13 16 
Indium 80 0 15 0 15 
Cadmium 76 0 14 0 14 
Lead 1 60 0 13 13 
Germanium 65 0 12 0 12 
PGM: Ruthenium 62 0 11 0 11 
Tantalum 60 0 11 0 11 
Magnesium 0 50 0 11 11 
Antimony 36 19 7 4 11 
Gallium 58 0 11 0 11 
PGM: Iridium 55 0 10 0 10 
Copper 41 10 7 2 10 
Tin 52 0 9 0 9 
Beryllium 40 10 7 2 9 
PGM: Platinum 3 41 1 9 9 
REE: Dysprosium 42 0 8 0 8 
REE: Neodymium 34 1 6 0 6 
REE: Praseodymium 32 2 6 0 6 
Chromium 17 14 3 3 6 
Niobium 0 28 0 6 6 
REE: Samarium 31 0 6 0 6 
Silver 30 0 5 0 5 
Tellurium 30 0 5 0 5 
REE: Gadolinium 29 0 5 0 5 
Nickel 16 11 3 2 5 
Cobalt 27 0 5 0 5 
Vanadium 0 20 0 4 4 
Zinc 0 20 0 4 4 
REE: Cerium 4 16 1 3 4 
Lithium 20 0 4 0 4 
Molybdenum 2 14 0 3 3 
Tungsten 17 0 3 0 3 
Graphite 16 0 3 0 3 
Manganese 2 10 0 2 3 
Barytes 3 6 1 1 2 
REE: Lanthanum 7 1 1 0 1 
Bismuth 7 0 1 0 1 
Gold 7 0 1 0 1 
Rhenium 0 5 0 1 1 
Selenium 5 0 1 0 1 
REE: Terbium 5 0 1 0 1 
Boron 0 0 0 0 0 
Hafnium 0 0 0 0 0 
REE: Europium 0 0 0 0 0 
REE: Yttrium 0 0 0 0 0 
Scandium 0 0 0 0 0 
Titanium 0 0 0 0 0 
Zirconium 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: see Appendix 2 
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4.5 Reduced list of metals 
The results of the previous sections have identified the materials that have significant usage in the path 
towards the decarbonisation of the EU energy sector, as well as the needs in the electronics/ICT and 
automotive sectors that might be competing for the same supply.   
 
The approach taken in the first JRC study to screen the list of metals was to impose a cut-off at 1% de-
mand within SET-Plan technologies as a percentage of current world supply estimates. However, as 
projected supply has been used in this analysis, it makes sense to apply a lower cut-off value. To ensure 
consistency with the first study this has been set at around 0.3% of projected supply, with the effect of 
including the 14 elements previously identified as significant retained in this analysis. 
 
On this basis 32 materials are identified as being significant and are retained on the reduced list of metals 
for further investigation with respect to supply chain risk (see Chapter 5). Table 89 summarises the 
reduced list of metals, identifying the key associated decarbonisation technology.   
 
It is apparent that the greatest magnitude and number of materials is associated with vehicles. Solar, 
wind, fuel cells and lighting are each associated with at least one of the materials with a requirement 
above 5% of world supply. Several of the metals identified (Table 83) within the sector study (e.g. indium, 
lead, tantalum, gallium, copper, tin and rare earth elements) are included on the reduced list. 
 
Table 89: Reduced list of 32 materials with the associated key decarbonisation technology 
1. Dysprosium (vehicles, wind) 17.  Silver (solar, lighting) 
2. Lithium (vehicles) 18.  Lanthanum (vehicles) 
3. Graphite (vehicles) 19.  Samarium (vehicles) 
4. Tellurium (solar) 20.  Copper (CHP, solar, vehicles, grids) 
5. Neodymium-Praseodymium (vehicles, wind) 21.  Hafnium (nuclear) 
6. Indium (solar, lighting, nuclear) 22.  Cerium (vehicles) 
7. Platinum (fuel cells) 23.  Gold (lighting) 
8. Terbium (lighting) 24.  Rhenium (fossil fuels) 
9. Tin (solar) 25.  Tantalum (geothermal, fossil fuels) 
10. Europium (lighting) 26.  Chromium (desalination) 
11. Gallium (lighting, solar) 27.  Vanadium (CCS) 
12. Cobalt (vehicles, fossil fuels) 28.  Niobium (CCS) 
13. Nickel (desalination, vehicles, geothermal) 29.  Selenium (solar) 
14. Germanium (lighting) 30.  Lead (grids, storage) 
15. Yttrium (lighting) 31.  Cadmium (solar) 
16. Molybdenum (desalination, wind) 32.  Gadolinium (lighting)  
 
The reduced list of metals are summarised in descending order in Table 90 and presented graphically in 
Figure 24. From these illustrations the following observations are clear: 
 
• Dysprosium represents by far the most significant material requirement, with the EU requir-
ing just over 25% of expected average supply for 2020-2030.   
• Lithium, graphite, tellurium, neodymium-praseodymium, indium, platinum and terbium all 
have materials requirements within the EU at around 6-10% for at least one period.   
• Tin, europium, gallium, cobalt, nickel, germanium, yttrium and molybdenum all have re-
quirements of the order 2-3%. 
• Silver, lanthanum, samarium, copper and hafnium all have requirements of the order 1-2%. 
• A further eleven metals have material requirements at or above 0.3% within the EU. 
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Figure 24: Annual EU metals demand from decarbonisation technologies, % of expected supply 2020-2030 
 
 
Table 90: EU metals demand from decarbonisation technologies as % of expected supply 
Material 
Annual EU SET Plan 
Demand / 
 World Supply 
Annual EU demand from 
other technologies  
 / World Supply 
Total Annual EU Demand /  
World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 Average 
Dy 2.3 2.2 22.7 25.0 25.1 27.2 26.4 
Li <0.1 <0.1 7.8 19.0 7.8 19.0 14.1 
Graphite <0.1 <0.1 5.1 14.4 5.1 14.4 10.1 
Te 12.0 6.9 <0.1 <0.1 12.0 6.9 9.0 
Nd-Pr 1.3 1.2 7.0 6.9 8.4 8.1 8.2 
In 7.8 5.0 <0.1 0.1 7.8 5.1 6.3 
Pt <0.1 <0.1 1.6 7.0 1.6 7.0 4.6 
Tb <0.1 <0.1 6.3 2.7 6.3 2.7 4.1 
Sn 3.6 2.6 0.1 0.1 3.7 2.7 3.1 
Eu <0.1 <0.1 4.5 2.0 4.5 2.0 2.9 
Ga 0.8 0.5 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.8 2.5 
Co <0.1 <0.1 1.9 2.8 1.9 2.8 2.5 
Ni 0.3 0.4 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.1 
Ge <0.1 <0.1 1.4 2.5 1.4 2.5 2.1 
Y <0.1 <0.1 3.1 1.3 3.1 1.4 2.0 
Mo 0.4 0.3 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Ag 1.8 1.3 0.2 0.4 2.0 1.7 1.8 
La <0.1 <0.1 3.0 0.6 3.0 0.6 1.5 
Sm <0.1 <0.1 2.7 0.5 2.7 0.5 1.4 
Cu 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.4 0.9 1.1 
Hf 1.0 1.0 <0.1 <0.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Ce <0.1 <0.1 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.3 0.7 
Au <0.1 <0.1 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.6 
Re <0.1 <0.1 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 
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Material 
Annual EU SET Plan 
Demand / 
 World Supply 
Annual EU demand from 
other technologies  
 / World Supply 
Total Annual EU Demand /  
World Supply 
2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 Average 
Ta <0.1 <0.1 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.6 
Cr 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
V 0.1 0.8 <0.1 <0.1 0.2 0.8 0.5 
Nb 0.1 0.5 <0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.37 
Se 0.4 0.3 <0.1 <0.1 0.4 0.3 0.32 
Pb 0.2 <0.1 <0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.30 
Cd 0.3 0.3 <0.1 <0.1 0.3 0.3 0.29 
Gd <0.1 <0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.20 
Sb <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.3 <0.1 0.3 0.16 
Mn <0.1 0.1 <0.1 0.1 <0.1 0.2 0.11 
W <0.1 <0.1 0.2 <0.1 0.2 <0.1 0.08 
Ru <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.1 <0.1 0.1 0.07 
Ti <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.1 <0.1 0.1 0.06 
B <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.03 
Sr <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.01 
Zr <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.01 
Mg <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.01 
Zn <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.01 
   
 
 
4.6 Market penetration and technology-mix scenarios 
 
4.6.1 Introduction 
In the above sections, future metal requirements for a range of low-carbon energy technologies have 
been identified under optimistic deployment scenarios. The metals with the highest risk for future sup-
ply-chain bottlenecks were identified. These bottleneck metals are further assessed here with a focus on 
the assumptions about the speed and extent of European market penetration and the technology mix.   
 
This is important because these assumptions are subject to considerable uncertainty and, as this section 
will demonstrate, in many cases have a large potential impact, both on the future demand for individual 
bottleneck metals and on the time for demand peaks to occur. This section focuses on two technologies 
in detail: electric vehicles and lighting. These two technologies have been chosen, firstly because this is 
where many of the bottleneck metals are extensively used (see Table 89), and secondly because of 
uncertainty associated with the future battery technology mix within the European electric vehicle mar-
ket and the lamp-type mix in the lighting sector.   
 
4.6.2 Electric vehicles 
4.6.2.1 Uptake 
In section 4.3.10, the future metals demand for electric vehicles was estimated using an uptake scenario 
from Deutsche Bank and an equal technology mix for the different Li-ion cathode chemistries. The DB 
Scenario was selected for its completeness and inclusion of the four different electric vehicle types in 
focus (Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research, 2009).  Selecting a suitable uptake scenario for electric 
vehicles in Europe was far from trivial.  
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There are a number of studies which focus on the deployment of alternative vehicles in Europe. However 
there is rarely any detail of assumptions and quantitative analyses. Moreover, the projections for market 
penetration are not always in agreement. Scenarios under consideration for this report include those by: 
IEA, 2011a; McKinsey, 2010; J.D. Power and Associates, 2010; Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2010; 
Boston Consulting Group, 2011; Credit Suisse, 2009b; Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research, 2009 and 
CE Delft, 2011. The market shares of different vehicle types for 2015 and 2020 for some of these scenari-
os are presented in Table 91. 
 
Table 91: Comparison of different market penetration scenarios for low-carbon vehicles for 2015 and 2020 
 Deutsche 
Bank 
Boston 
Consulting 
Group 
Roland 
Berger 
JD Power and 
Associates 
CE Delft - 
Reference 
CE Delft – EV 
breakthrough 
H
EV
 2015 7.0% n/a 1.0% 2.3% n/a n/a 
2020 15.0% 17.0% 1.0% 4.1% n/a n/a 
B
EV
 2015 1.0% n/a 2.0% 1.7% <0.1% <0.1% 
2020 3.0% 2.7% 15.0% 3.1% 1.0% 2.0% 
P
H
EV
 2015 2.0% n/a 2.0% n/a 1.0% 1.0% 
2020 2.0% 3.0% 15.0% n/a 3.0% 6.0% 
 
Due to the uncertainty of the European market for EVs, a different uptake scenario is used in order to 
identify any further potential bottlenecks. In this instance the EV breakthrough scenario from the CE Delft 
report "Impacts of Electric Vehicles" has been used as the alternative uptake scenario (ICF, Ecologic, 
2011). Unfortunately, not all the vehicle types studied in this report are featured in this scenario; accord-
ingly only the results for BEVs and PHEVs have been presented. The requirements of the bottleneck 
metals in both scenarios are presented in Tables 92 - 95.   
 
Table 92: Comparison of uptake scenarios for metal requirements of BEVs to 2020 
EU 2020  Metal Demand for BEVs (tonnes) 
 Deutsche Bank Scenario EV Breakthrough Scenario 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Li 1,688 6.0 957 3.4 
Co 1,626 0.7 922 0.4 
Graphite 46,089 3.9 26,138 2.2 
Nd-Pr 520 0.8 1,029 1.6 
Dy 77 3.1 62 2.5 
 
Table 93: Comparison of uptake scenarios for metal requirements of BEVs to 2030 
EU 2030  Metal Demand for BEVs (t) 
 Deutsche Bank Scenario EV Breakthrough Scenario 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Li 5,707 15.6 10,462 28.6 
Co 5,498 1.6 10,077 3.0 
Graphite 155,846 11.9 285,671 21.8 
Nd-Pr 1,255 1.3 4,601 4.7 
Dy 186 4.8 682 17.4 
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Table 94: Comparison of uptake scenarios for metal requirements of PHEVs to 2020 
EU 2020  Metal Demand for PHEVs (t) 
 Deutsche Bank Scenario EV Breakthrough Scenario 
 Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Li 318 1.1 600 2.1 
Co 306 0.1 578 0.3 
Graphite 8,682 0.7 16,373 1.4 
Nd-Pr 327 0.5 882 1.4 
Dy 49 2.0 131 5.3 
 
 
Table 95: Comparison of uptake scenarios for metal requirements of PHEVs to 2030 
EU 2030  Metal Demand for PHEVs (t) 
 Deutsche Bank Scenario EV Breakthrough Scenario 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Li 555 1.5 4,764 13.0 
Co 535 0.2 4,589 1.4 
Graphite 15,162 1.2 130,079 9.9 
Nd-Pr 408 0.4 7,008 7.1 
Dy 61 1.6 1,038 26.5 
 
4.6.2.2 Technology-mix scenarios 
Battery chemistries 
As identified in section 3.11.1, there are several competing Li-ion cathode chemistries for electric vehicle 
batteries, each of which has a different metals requirement associated with it. Li-ion battery technology 
is developing rapidly and it is not clear what the dominant cathode chemistry will be. In section 3.11.1, it 
was assumed that there would be equal uptake of each of the four sub-technologies chosen.   
 
In order to check the sensitivity of different market shares of the different cathode chemistries, two 
further technology mixes have been developed: a preference for lower cost batteries and the uptake of 
market trends from consumer electronic equipment (Committee on Climate Change, 2012).  
 
The market shares for the different Li-ion battery chemistries are shown in Figure 25. Lithium cobalt 
oxide (LCO) battery chemistries have been excluded, as these are not common for vehicle batteries due 
to cost. These technology mixes are shown in Tables 96-99, with their respective market shares and 
forecast volumes per annum for BEVs.   
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Figure 25: Li-ion battery chemistry market share for all applications in 2010
 
Source: Committee on Climate Change, 2012 
 
Table 96: Effect of technology mix in Li-ion batteries for BEVs on yearly demand up to 2020 
EU 2020 Lithium-ion batteries for BEVs Metal Demand 
Technology 
mix 
Equal share Low cost technologies 
Li-ion 
chemistry 
NCA LFP LMS NCM % of 
world 
supply 
NCA LFP LMS NCM % of 
world 
supply Market 
share (%) 
25 25 25 25 5 45 45 5 
Forecast 
‘000 BEVs 
per year  
72.7 72.7 72.7 72.7 14.5 131 131 14.5 
Li (t) 453 329 569 337 6.0 91 591 1,023 67 6.3 
Co (t) 614 - - 1,012 0.7 123 - - 202 0.1 
Graphite (t) 15,753 18,753 - 11,583 3.9 3,150 33,756 - 2,316 3.3 
 
 
 
Table 97: Effect of technology mix in Li-ion batteries for BEVs on yearly demand up to 2030 
EU 2030 Lithium-ion batteries for BEVs Metal Demand 
Technology 
mix 
Equal share Market trends from portable Li-ion 
batteries 
Li-ion 
chemistry 
NCA LFP LMS NCM % of 
world 
supply 
NCA LFP LMS NCM % of 
world 
supply Market 
share (%) 
25 25 25 25 5 45 45 5 
Forecast 
‘000 BEVs 
per year  
246 246 246 246 49.2 442.7 442.7 49.2 
Li (t) 1,533 1,111 1,923 1,141 15.6 91 591 1023 67 16.4 
Co (t) 2,076 - - 3,422 1.6 306 2,000 3,461 228 0.3 
Graphite (t) 53,267 63,413 - 39,167 11.9 415 - - 684 10.1 
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Table 98: Effect of Technology mix in Li-ion batteries for BEVs on yearly demand up to 2020 
EU 2020 Lithium-ion batteries for BEVs Metal Demand 
Technology 
mix 
Equal share Market trends from portable Li-ion 
batteries 
Li-ion 
chemistry 
NCA LFP LMS NCM % of 
world 
supply 
NCA LFP LMS NCM % of 
world 
supply Market 
share (%) 
25 25 25 25 5 10 25 60 
Forecast 
‘000 BEVs 
per year  
72.7 72.7 72.7 72.7 14.5 29.1 72.7 174.5 
Li (t) 453 329 569 337 6.0 90 131 569 810 5.7 
Co (t) 614 - - 1012 0.7 123 - - 2429 1.1 
Graphite (t) 15,753 18,753 - 11,583 3.9 3,151 7,501 - 27,799 3.3 
 
 
Table 99: Effect of technology mix in Li-ion batteries for BEVs on yearly demand up to 2030 
EU 2030 Lithium-ion batteries for BEVs Metal Demand 
Technology 
mix 
Equal share Market trends from portable Li-ion 
batteries 
Li-ion 
chemistry 
NCA LFP LMS NCM % of 
world 
supply 
NCA LFP LMS NCM % of 
world 
supply Market 
share (%) 
25 25 25 25 5 10 25 60 
Forecast 
‘000 BEVs 
per year  
246 246 246 246 49.2 98.4 
 
246 590.3 
Li (t) 1,533 1,111 1,923 1,141 15.6 307 444 1,923 2,737 14.8 
Co (t) 2,076 - - 3,422 1.6 415 - - 8,212 2.6 
Graphite (t) 53,267 63,413 - 39,167 11.9 10,653 25,365 - 93,999 9.9 
 
Motor technologies 
Although permanent magnet motors are the dominant technology for electric vehicle drive motors, they 
are not the only technology in use for this application. With increasing rare earth prices, some vehicle 
manufacturers are choosing to adopt rare earth free motors such as induction motors. In order to check 
the sensitivity of different market shares for motor technologies, it was decided to introduce two further 
technology mixes, as shown in Table 100. 
  
 
Table 100: Market share of rare earth permanent magnet motors in EVs 
 2012 2020 2030 
High substitution 95% 50% 30% 
Medium substitution 95% 70% 50% 
Low substitution 95% 90% 70% 
 
From conversations with industry experts, the medium scenario was taken as the most likely and thus 
was adopted in the previous chapters for determining the materials demand of electric vehicles.  
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Table 101: Effect of technology mix variation in drive motors for 2020 
2020 Drive Motors Metal Demand for all Electric Vehicle Types 
 High Substitution Medium Substitution Low Substitution 
 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Dy 404 16.2 566 22.7 727 29.2 
Nd-Pr 3,161 5.0 4,425 7.0 5,690 9.1 
 
 
Table 102: Effect of technology mix variation in drive motors for 2030 
2030 Drive Motors Metal Demand for all Electric Vehicle Types 
 High Substitution Medium Substitution Low Substitution 
 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Annual EU 
Demand 
(tonnes) 
% of world 
supply 
Dy 588 15.0 980 25.0 1,372 35.0 
Nd-Pr 4,082 4.1 6,803 6.9 9,525 9.6 
 
It is clear from the results that the materials demand is sensitive to the technology mix of drive motors 
employed. For a high rate of rare earth permanent magnet motor substitution, the demand for Dy and 
Nd-Pr are effectively halved when compared to the low substitution scenario. 
 
4.6.2.3 Summary 
For electric vehicles the results of the technology scenario modelling show that the demand for bottle-
neck metals varies considerably according to the technology mix and uptake. Overall the EV breakthrough 
scenario forecasts the most optimistic uptake of PHEVs and BEVs, however in comparison to the 
Deutsche Bank scenario, it predicts a slower uptake of BEVs up to 2020. The most significant differences 
can be seen for PHEVs, where the optimistic scenario predicts almost nine times the metals demand up 
to 2030. It is apparent that the technology mix has an impact on the materials demand; for instance, a 
greater uptake of LMS batteries could significantly decrease the demand for graphite and cobalt.   
 
 
4.6.3 Lighting 
4.6.3.1 Technology mix 
For lighting, the key sensitivity in determining the metal requirements is the penetration rate of LED 
lighting in place of fluorescent lighting. As a fairly mature market, the overall sales and installation of 
lighting is expected to grow steadily at 2% sales growth per year. In 2011, sales of bulbs, tubes and street-
lights in Europe totalled nearly 1 billion units, of which 630 million were bulbs and 350 million were tubes 
(Figure 26). 
 
In section 4.3.9, a relatively steady rate was assumed for the penetration of LEDs: 30% for 2020 and 60% 
for 2030. In this chapter an alternative and more rapid LED penetration scenario is modelled assuming 
LED penetration in lighting of 60% for 2020 and 90% for 2030 (see discussion in Section 4.3.9). Figure 26 
illustrates this difference. Table 103 provides a comparison of the relative materials requirements under 
both scenarios. The high scenario results in a significant increase in gallium and germanium use (up 50% 
for 2030) and a reduction in terbium, europium and yttrium use (of around 75% in 2030). 
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Figure 26: Scenarios for the installation of lighting and LED penetration 
 in Europe (millions per year) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 103: Metal requirements for lighting, high versus low LED penetration 
Technology Elements 
High EU LED Annual Demand 
/ World Supply 
Low EU LED Annual Demand 
/ World Supply 
2011 2020 2030 2011 2020 2030 
Lighting 
Ge 0.3% 2.9% 3.8% 0.3% 1.4% 2.5% 
Tb 10.4% 3.6% 0.7% 10.4% 6.3% 2.7% 
Ga 0.3% 2.6% 3.4% 0.3% 1.3% 2.3% 
Eu 9.6% 2.6% 0.5% 9.6% 4.5% 2.0% 
Au 0.1% 0.9% 1.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 
Y 4.8% 1.8% 0.3% 4.8% 3.1% 1.3% 
Ag 0.0% 0.4% 0.6% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 
Gd 0.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 
In 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
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5 Criticality Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The findings of Chapter 4 demonstrate that the decarbonisation technologies rely on a wide variety of 
metals. The results further show that a number of metals are required in significant quantities relative to 
projected production volumes.   
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the risk of supply disruptions to occur for each of 
these metals. This analysis includes both market and geopolitical factors. Based on the ranking and 
combination of risks, a reduced list of metals is derived and presented in section 5.4. The reduced list of 
metals shall be regarded as ‘critical’. A number of the metals identified in this study were assessed for 
their criticality in the previous JRC study (Moss et al., 2011). These criticalities are not reassessed within 
this report. Nevertheless the analyses are brought together to form one overall criticality ranking. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: 
• Review of the methodologies and criteria that have been used to assess the criticality of raw 
materials such as by the European Commission and United States Government. 
• Description of the indicators and assessment criteria to be used in this study. 
• Overall summary of the results of the criticality assessment. 
• Commentary on the market situation for each of the metals considered. 
 
5.2 Review of existing criticality studies 
There has been a range of criticality-type studies carried out in recent years (Congressional Budget Office, 
1983; Committee on Critical Mineral Impacts on the US Economy et al., 2008; Resource Efficiency 
Knowledge Transfer Network, 2008; DECC, 2010; EC, 2010a; Buijs and Sievers, 2011; Erdmann and Grae-
del, 2011; Hatch, 2011; Graedel et al., 2012); thereby revealing the considerable interest from policy 
makers, businesses and academics alike in the field of critical raw materials. However, as can be expected 
from the diversity in types of organisations, a wide variety of methodologies, criteria and data have been 
applied to assess critical raw materials. It is therefore not particularly surprising that differing results are 
sometimes obtained with respect to the same raw materials. This to a certain extent reflects a question 
of audience, namely: for whom are the raw materials considered to be critical? Nonetheless it is certainly 
reasonable that the raw material risks of different countries and companies could be quite different (as 
discussed e.g. in Graedel et al., 2012).  
 
Inspection of the studies at the national level to date reveals that the choice of indicators used to assess 
materials risks concerns more than just physical and geological scarcity. Commonly used indicators in-
clude production and consumption data, political risk associated with the concentration of production 
and a sense of the ‘importance of the materials’. A summary of indicators used in a selection of previous 
studies is shown in Table 104. Many of these indicators form part of the criticality assessment used in this 
study and that the ‘importance of the materials’ has largely been considered in the analysis of Chapter 4. 
From the list in Table 104, the studies on raw material needs for strategic and green energy technologies 
(Bauer et al., 2010; Moss et al., 2011) are of particular relevance and more details are given below. 
 
Unlike most criticality studies where the economic relevance of a raw material is derived from its overall 
importance for the target national economies, the analysis presented here and in similar studies (Bauer 
et al., 2010; Moss et al., 2011) is driven by interest in particular energy technologies (in this aspect, they 
are similar to the work of Angerer et al., 2009, which also includes technologies other than energy tech-
nologies). The technologies considered in the Bauer and Moss studies are presented in Table 105. Notice 
that there is overlap both between the two studies (wind and solar energy) and between the US DoE 
study and the technologies considered here (lighting).   
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Table 104: Selection of studies identifying critical non-energy raw materials 
Study Criteria Critical minerals 
Graedel et al., 2012 Depletion times (reserves) 
Companion metal fraction 
Policy potential index 
Human development index 
Worldwide governance indicators: Political stability 
Global supply concentration 
National economic importance 
Percentage of population utilizing 
Substitute performance & their availability 
Environmental impact ratio 
Net import reliance ratio 
Global innovation index 
LCA cradle-to-gate: ‘human health’ & ‘ecosystems’ 
Example ranking for the 
‘copper family’ to the 
USA:  
Arsenic = Gold (equal 
criticality) 
> Silver (less critical) 
> Selenium ≈ Copper  
> Tellurium 
Moss et al., 2011 Limitations to expanding world supply 
Concentration of supply (country level) 
Political risk related to major suppliers 
Likelihood of rapid demand growth 
Dysprosium, 
neodymium, tellurium, 
gallium, indium (high 
risk) 
EC, 2010a Concentration of supply 
Governance rating of producing countries 
(alternatively environmental performance) 
Substitutability 
Recycling rate 
Value added of end use sectors 
Antimony, beryllium, 
cobalt, fluorspar, 
gallium, germanium, 
graphite, indium, 
magnesium, niobium, 
platinum group metals, 
rare earths, tantalum, 
tungsten 
Bauer et al., 2010 Basic availability 
Competing technology demand 
Political, regulatory and social factors 
Co-dependence on other markets 
Producer diversity 
Demand for clean energy 
Substitutability 
Dysprosium, 
neodymium, terbium, 
europium, yttrium, 
indium 
Committee on 
Critical Mineral 
Impacts on the 
U.S.Economy et al., 
2008) 
US consumption (value) 
Substitutability 
Emerging uses 
US import dependence 
Ratio of world reserves to production 
Ratio of world reserve base to production 
World by-product production compared to total 
primary production 
US secondary production from old scrap compared 
to consumption 
Indium, manganese, 
niobium, platinum 
group metals, rare 
earths  
(Resource Efficiency 
Knowledge Transfer 
Network, 2008) 
Global consumption levels 
Lack of substitutability  
Global warming potential  
Total material/ environmental requirement 
Physical scarcity  
Monopoly supply  
Political instability 
Climate change vulnerability 
Gold, rhodium, 
platinum, strontium, 
silver, antimony, tin 
Source: from Buijs et al., 2012, with additions) 
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Further similarities between the Bauer and Moss studies, is their attempt to assess risks along the supply 
chain of the technologies considered and the use of scenarios to introduce a dynamic component into the 
analyses. The lack of dynamics in many criticality studies is a key weakness that has only been partially 
addressed to date (Buijs et al., 2012). The importance of considering changing market conditions may be 
illustrated by considering the changes in production and the concentration of production over the past 
decades, as shown in Figure 27 for the raw materials considered of high risk in both studies. 
 
 
Figure 27: Dynamics of the supply of high risk raw materials in the past decade 
 
REE = rare earth elements, In = indium, Te(R) = tellurium (refined production), Ga = gallium 
Note that average values are used for each decade to improve readability and REE are included as a group because of data limitations 
Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on data provided by German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, 2011 
 
 
 
Table 105: Technologies considered in recent criticality studies for energy technologies 
(Bauer et al., 2010) (Moss et al., 2011) 
 Nuclear energy (fission) 
Solar cells (PV films) Solar energy 
Wind turbines Wind energy 
 Bioenergy 
 Carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
 Electricity grids 
Vehicle (magnets and batteries)  
Lighting  
Source: (Bauer et al., 2010; Moss et al., 2011) 
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5.3 Description of assessment criteria 
 
A number of insights are apparent from the review of the various existing criticality studies. These are 
useful in forming the development and application of assessment criteria in this study. With respect to 
audience for this study, the focus is for European policymakers and the supply chain for low-carbon 
energy technologies. However it is noted that the research will also be of interest for technologies that 
compete for the same resources, as well as EU Member States and other national governments around 
the world. 
 
A key distinction that emerges between different types of criticality studies is whether the assessment is 
based upon current data or whether a more dynamic approach is taken. The danger of using solely cur-
rent data is that the results may lack predictive power. Studies of this nature therefore may accurately 
assess current risks, but may be considered as only providing a snapshot of the state of the market. The 
alternative approach utilises data across a number of years, with particular use of forecasts. The aim of 
this is to make the study more forward looking and help predict future rather than just current materials 
risks. This is challenging to do, due to the error and assumptions that are inherent in producing reliable 
forecasts, especially for volatile markets such as minor metals.   
 
For this study, which has a definite focus on predicting future material supply risks, a dynamic approach 
to assessing criticality is considered to be more suitable. The analysis conducted in Chapter 4 for the 
calculation of material requirements for low-carbon technologies is almost entirely forward looking, so it 
would seem to be sensible to take a similar approach for assessing criticality by using market forecasts. 
This is not to understate the role of different types of studies, nor to be unaware of the potential pitfalls 
of this approach. Rather it is to take a consistent approach and methodology throughout this study. 
 
The approach builds on that undertaken in the first study from 2011 (Moss et al., 2011). It considers both 
market and geopolitical factors: 
 
1. Market factors: 
• Limitations to expanding supply capacity  
• Likelihood of rapid global demand growth. 
2. Geopolitical factors: 
• Cross-country concentration of supply 
• Political risk related to major supplying countries. 
 
The analysis uses a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative data. Clearly it is important to use the 
quantitative data that exists for production and use of each of the metals. This data is summarised for 
each of the metals in turn in section 5.4, with further data available in the Appendices. The quantitative 
approach adds to the transparency and ability of others to replicate its findings. However its limitation is 
driven the availability of data and the extent to which the variables included capture all of the relevant 
dimensions that influence materials criticality. The benefit of a slightly more qualitative approach is that 
it allows a greater degree of judgement and consideration of information of factors that are not always 
well quantified, particularly with the range of metals being considered. 
 
For each metal, each of these risk factors is evaluated with a view on the next five to ten years and then 
scored as low, medium or high. The use of a simple ordinal risk scale, instead of a numeric composite 
indicator, avoids the misleading impression of a precise quantitative assessment of the future. This 
mirrors the difficulty involved in the complex set of dynamics, as well as the difficulty in measuring indi-
vidual factors and the high degree of uncertainty surrounding their future development. This risk profile 
is then combined into an overall low, medium or high risk assessment for each metal, in a manner that is 
described in greater detail below.   
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5.3.1 Market factors 
The interaction between supply and demand is a large determinant of the price of a given metal. The 
price of the key metals in turn affects its availability and suitability for use in the low-carbon energy 
technologies. Market factors are considered to be more important than political largely because the 
opportunity to implement political interventions hinges upon conditions that may exist in the market. 
 
On the supply side the key issue is the extent to which metals supply is able to respond to increases in 
market demand. Economists refer to this as the elasticity of supply. It is a simple concept to explain in 
theory, although in practice it is difficult to measure accurately. The approach that is used here, there-
fore, is to assess the relative limitations that exist for expanding global production capacity in the short-
to-medium-term. There are many dimensions that are relevant including utilisation rate of current capac-
ity, by-product metal dynamics, exploration pipeline for new production, secondary supply sources (i.e. 
recycling), and availability of geological reserves. On the demand side, where global demand for a metal 
is forecast to increase rapidly it creates upward pressure on prices, depletes inventories and stretches 
existing supplies. In the present study, the likelihood of rapid global demand growth over the coming 
decade is estimated for individual metals as low, medium or high, based on the extensive analysis of 
available demand forecasts by producers and industry experts. Certain aspects, such as the theoretical 
potential for substitutability, are not measured here directly; although demand forecasts do tend implic-
itly to consider these factors.   
 
By considering the interaction of these two risk criteria, an overall measure for the market risk can be 
obtained. Note that the study does not add or average the two criteria in some way, but rather considers 
their combination. This is because by themselves, either the likelihood of rapid global demand growth or 
limitations to rapidly expanding capacity may give only relatively minor risks for bottlenecks. For exam-
ple, demand might be forecast to expand rapidly but if supply is likely to keep pace then the potential risk 
is actually quite low. Similarly in the case where supply is judged to be slow to adjust, this would not 
represent a bottleneck if demand growth itself is also expected to be slow.  The market risks are there-
fore greatest where there is a rapid expansion of demand while the price elasticity of supply is low in the 
short-to-medium-term. A significant amount of uncertainty remains in the data, especially where the 
demand for a metal is driven by a few new applications with an uncertain future. However nonetheless 
clear differences emerge between metals for which global demand is projected to expand at rapid pace 
versus those for which relatively slow growth is expected. 
 
5.3.2 Political factors 
In addition to market dynamics, political factors can sometimes exacerbate risks for future supply-chain 
bottlenecks. The cross-country concentration of supply is a crucial indicator in this regard, because only 
where the structure of supply is monopolistic or dominated by only a few players, individual large suppli-
er countries have sufficient market power to affect global price levels and aggregate supply through 
policy decisions. If supply is diversified, other producers are easily able to expand their capacity in re-
sponse to an individual producer raising prices or reducing export or output.   
 
If supply is significantly concentrated, a range of political dynamics can potentially affect markets.  Evalu-
ating political risk related to major supplying countries is therefore important in evaluating risk for future 
supply-chain bottlenecks. Broader political instability or internal conflicts in a major supplying country 
may reduce or delay investments or disrupt production and can have significant impact on global produc-
tion capacity. Political disputes around the licensing, ownership or environmental permitting of large-
scale mining operations in major supplying countries might have a similar effect. Further, states can 
intervene in production and pricing decisions, for example, in an effort to maximise revenue over time or 
to gain a larger share of valuable downstream industries. Such interventions can take the form of trade 
restrictions that limit or tax exports of certain metals, perhaps to favour domestic processing industries 
or for international strategic bargaining. The approach taken here to measure political risk follows the 
criticality study of the European Commission, focusing on composite indicators measuring ‘good govern-
ance’ and political stability, such as the World Bank Governance Indicator (World Bank, 2011) and the 
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Failed State Index (Fund for Peace, n.d.). Details can be found in Appendix 6. These political risk ratings 
have been averaged and scaled between 0 and 100, with a higher score denoting a higher risk. 
 
5.3.3 Overall scores  
Table 106 provides an overview of each of the factors used to evaluate the risk for future supply chain 
bottlenecks for individual metals and the rationale for using the factor. The third and fourth column 
provide an overview of the type of data that has been used to evaluate the individual risk factors and 
short explanation on what basis the high, medium and low scores have been assigned to each metal. The 
overall bottleneck risk for each metal is assessed as low, medium or high on the basis of these data. 
Market risks are determined through the interaction of demand and supply forecasts in the short or 
medium term. As has been explained above, political interventions are only likely to impact bottleneck 
risks under tight market conditions. Therefore, market risks are considered as dominant in the evaluation 
of risks for supply chain bottlenecks, and political risks are given less weight in the overall assessment. In 
evaluating political risks, concentration of supply is considered to be dominant, with the political risk 
factor only contributing to overall bottleneck risk if concentration of supply is medium or high. 
 
Table 106: Bottleneck criteria used in this study 
Criterion Rationale Basis  Scoring criteria 
Likelihood 
of rapid 
global 
demand 
growth  
Greater risks persist if demand 
is expected to grow rapidly 
over the coming years. 
Analysis of 
demand struc-
ture and de-
mand forecasts 
High: Industry forecasts expect 
rapid demand growth from sev-
eral applications (e.g. close to 
double-digit growth) 
Medium: Industry forecasts expect 
moderate and steady demand 
growth  
Low: Industry forecasts expect 
slow or stable demand from ma-
ture applications 
Limitations 
to expand-
ing supply 
capacity  
Risk are higher if suppliers are 
unable to expand output 
relatively easily in the short-to-
medium term in response to 
demand and price increases  
Reserve esti-
mates, supply 
forecasts and 
evaluation by-
product de-
pendencies 
High: There is a strong by-product 
dependency with little oppor-
tunity to increase extraction 
rates or low reserves. 
Medium: There is a by-product 
dependency or severe underin-
vestment. 
Low: Sufficient reserves and mining 
as primary product. 
Concen-
tration of 
supply 
If supply is fairly concentrated 
within a few countries, the risk 
of possible supply disruptions 
increases, together with the 
ability of individual players to 
restrict access for political or 
economic advantage 
Production 
statistics 
 
High: Most of supply is concentrat-
ed in one country 
Medium: Most of supply is concen-
trated in two or three countries 
Low: Supply is dispersed among a 
number of countries 
Political 
risk of 
major 
supplying 
countries 
Greater political risk in the 
main supplying countries 
increases the likelihood of 
supply disruptions and the 
likelihood that individual 
suppliers will seek to restrict 
access. 
Political risk 
indicators 
(‘Failed States 
Index’ and 
‘Worldwide 
Governance 
Index’)  
High: The major producing coun-
tries have a high score for politi-
cal risk (>60) 
Medium: The main producing 
countries have mixed scores for 
political risks  
Low: The main producing countries 
have low political risk scores 
(<40) 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
97 
 
5.4 Assessment of risks for individual metals 
In this section, the supply risks are evaluated for each metal that is used in significant quantities in the 
decarbonisation technologies. Note that because projected supply has been considered, a lower cut-off 
value has been used versus the first JRC study (at around 0.3% of world supply rather than 1%). 
 
The methodology and assessment criteria that have been applied are consistent to those applied in the 
first JRC study. The three-step graduation used in the first study (high, medium and low) is refined further 
here into five categories (to now include medium-low and low-medium). 
 
A commentary of the market situation for each metal is provided, as well as the results of the assess-
ment. 
 
5.4.1 Cadmium 
Cadmium is a toxic metal and must be extracted as a by-product during the zinc refining process. World 
refinery production is estimated at around 22,000 tonnes per year (Table 107). However, industry esti-
mates suggest that the actual total could be significantly higher, as there are reports that cadmium is now 
being stored in bunkers rather than being sold to the market due to a lack of market demand (Interna-
tional Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012). China is the world’s leading producer of cadmium, with around 
a third of world refinery production; hence cadmium production is relatively dispersed, but has a moder-
ate political risk rating. 
 
Table 107: Cadmium production concentration and political risk 
Country Refinery production (2011) Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating tonnes Percentage 
China 7,500 34 92,000 65 
South Korea 2,500 11 — 24 
Japan 2,000 9 — 14 
Kazakhstan 1,800 8 35,000 60 
Mexico 1,500 7 48,000 57 
Canada 1,300 6 18,000 8 
India 660 3 130,000 61 
United States 600 3 39,000 16 
Netherlands 580 3 — 8 
Poland 550 2 16,000 26 
Germany 400 2 — 13 
Peru 400 2 45,000 57 
Russia 700 3 21,000 68 
Australia 380 2 61,000 8 
Other countries 1,300 6 130,000 48 
World total 21,500 — 640,000 53 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
Market supply for cadmium is not particularly restricted. Potential supply is expected to increase due the 
increases expected in world zinc production, and the necessity to recover cadmium due to its toxicity. As 
for demand, over the last decade global cadmium consumption experienced a slow but steady decline. 
Both in the US and in the EU, concerns over cadmium toxicity ushered in several rounds of increasingly 
restrictive regulations on cadmium use. The market share of NiCd batteries has also been visibly eroded 
by more advanced technologies such as NiMH and Li-Ion batteries. Overall, industry experts expect the 
decline in demand for cadmium to continue (Moss et al., 2011).  Overall the criticality risks for cadmium 
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are rated as low (Table 108). 
 
Table 108: Cadmium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Cadmium Low Low Low Medium Low 
 
5.4.2 Chromium 
Chromium is the hardest of all known metal elements in the periodic table. Its main use is in the metal-
lurgical industry for the production of ferrochromium for the steel industry. Chromite ore mine produc-
tion in 2011 totalled 24 million tonnes, of which 46% originated in South Africa (Table 109). Other im-
portant chromite mining countries include Kazakhstan, India and Turkey. All of these countries have 
moderate to high political ratings. 
 
World production of ferrochromium is dominated by four countries: South Africa, China, Kazakhstan and 
India. Between them these countries accounted for nearly 90% of world ferrochromium production in 
2010 (KPMG, 2012). China has very little domestic mined production of chromite ore and is hence de-
pendent on imports from the ore from South Africa for its own consumption. 
 
Table 109: Chromite ore production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating tonnes Percentage 
South Africa 11,000,000 46 200,000,000 46 
Kazakhstan 3,900,000 16 220,000,000 60 
India 3,800,000 16 54,000,000 61 
Turkey 1,700,000 7 — 54 
Other countries 3,600,000 15 NA 57 
World total  24,000,000 — >480,000,000 53 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
The demand profile for chromium is dominated by that for steel, and stainless steel grades in particular.  
Demand for stainless steel is expected to remain strong in China and other Asian markets, as infrastruc-
ture projects continue to be built. However, demand in other parts of the world is much more subdued. 
Overall a world growth rate comparable to that of nickel, at around 5% per year, might be considered 
reasonable (Moss et al., 2011).  
 
In terms of the supply of chromium, the industry is running at relatively low operating rates of 80-90%, 
meaning that there is scope to meet this increased consumption with existing capacity. Whilst there have 
not been many new mines that have opened over the past five years, there are now a considerable 
number of development and exploration projects in the pipeline (KPMG, 2012). KPMG identify more than 
20 major chrome projects underway, many of which are at an advanced stage in exploration or currently 
under construction. Consequently the supply constraints for chromium are judged to be relatively low. 
 
Overall the criticality risks for chromium are rated as medium (Table 110). 
 
Table 110: Chromium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Chromium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium 
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5.4.3 Cobalt 
 
Cobalt is mainly produced as a by-product metal, from both nickel and copper, with around 10% arising 
from primary cobalt operations. However cobalt is an important revenue stream for its producers, repre-
senting 15-30% of a miner’s revenues (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012).  
 
The major source of cobalt is Congo (Kinshasa), which has a high political risk rating. In 2011 Congo 
(Kinshasa) accounted for just over half of the world’s mined production, although other mine production 
was relatively dispersed (Table 111). It should be noted, however, that the geographic location of refined 
cobalt differs significantly to that of mine production, with Chinese and European refiners among the 
leading market players. 
 
Table 111: Cobalt production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 
Tonnes Percentage 
Congo (Kinshasa) 52,000 53 3,400,000 95 
Canada 7,200 7 130,000 8 
China 6,500 7 80,000 65 
Russia 6,300 6 250,000 68 
Zambia 5,700 6 270,000 65 
Australia 4,000 4 1,400,000 8 
Cuba 3,600 4 500,000 62 
Morocco 2,500 3 20,000 59 
New Caledonia 2,000 2 370,000 15 
Brazil 1,700 2 87,000 46 
United States — — 33,000 — 
Other countries 7,000 7 990,000 59 
World total  98,000 — 7,500,000 73 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
On the demand side, considerable growth is forecast by some commentators for cobalt’s use, at around 
7% between 2008 and 2013; the most significant growth is predicted for batteries, catalysts, super-alloys 
and carbide tooling applications (The Cobalt Development Institute, 2011). However, there is growing 
evidence that cobalt’s use in batteries is gradually being reduced and replaced by other cheaper materi-
als (Avicenne Development in Darton Commodities, 2010). On this basis the demand growth risk is rated 
as medium.   
 
On the supply side planned capacity expansions at existing or new mines is expected to double mine 
production capacity between 2010 (Bauer et al., 2011). Due to the oversupply that appears to be likely, 
supply constraints are rated as low.   
 
Overall risks for cobalt are therefore rated as medium (Table 112). 
 
Table 112: Cobalt criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Cobalt Low Medium Medium High Medium 
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5.4.4 Copper 
Copper has a large market with annual mined production of 16 million tonnes, with a further 3 million 
tonnes of originating from recycled scrap. Chile is the largest producing country with approximately a 
third of world mine production in 2011 (Table 113). Copper production in the rest of the world is highly 
dispersed with the next dozen countries between them accounting for around half of mined copper 
production. Some of these countries have medium-to-high political risk, however the political risk rating 
of Chile is adjudged to be very low. 
 
Table 113: Copper production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating tonnes Percentage 
Chile 5,420,000 34 35,000,000 19 
Peru 1,220,000 8 86,000,000 57 
China 1,190,000 7 7,000,000 65 
United States 1,120,000 7 190,000,000 16 
Australia 940,000 6 30,000,000 8 
Zambia 715,000 4 20,000,000 65 
Russia 710,000 4 28,000,000 68 
Indonesia 625,000 4 7,000,000 65 
Canada 550,000 3 38,000,000 8 
Congo (Kinshasa) 440,000 3 90,000,000 95 
Poland 425,000 3 26,000,000 26 
Mexico 365,000 2 30,000,000 57 
Kazakhstan 360,000 2 20,000,000 60 
Other countries 2,000,000 12 80,000,000 56 
World total  16,100,000 — 690,000,000 39 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
In terms of market dynamics, the size of the market and relative maturity of its end markets means that 
future demand growth will be steady, at a rate of around 4% per year to 2018. Some substitution of 
copper to aluminium within cables is also possible (CRU Presentation, 2012) so the demand growth risk is 
rated low. 
 
On the supply side, the small market deficit that currently exists in copper markets is expected to be 
closed by 2012. Long-term supply projections of supply do not anticipate a supply gap until at least 2020. 
This is based upon expected supply from scrap, existing mines, probable and possible projects, prospects 
and new exploration (CRU Presentation, 2012). Therefore the supply constraints are rated as low. 
 
Overall risks for copper are therefore rated as low (Table 114). 
 
Table 114: Copper criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Copper Low Low Low Low Low 
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5.4.5 Gallium 
Gallium is produced as a minor by-product metal from alumina. Primary production for gallium was 
estimated by the USGS at 216 tonnes in 2011, although data for its geographic breakdown was not pro-
vided. A further 94 tonnes of gallium is estimated to be produced from secondary (recycled) sources 
(USGS, 2012). Quantitative estimates of reserves are not published. 
 
USGS data is, however, available on primary production capacity for 2010, of which just over half was 
located in China (Table 115). Other important producers include a number of OECD and CIS countries.  
Comparison of this data with that provided by a commercial producer showed that it can be considered 
representative of actual primary production (Indium Corporation, 2010). Whilst the political risk rating for 
China and the CIS countries is moderately high, it is somewhat offset by production in the OECD coun-
tries. 
 
Table 115: Gallium production capacity concentration and political risk 
Country Primary production capacity, 2010 Political 
Risk Rating 
tonnes % 
China 141 54 65 
Germany 35 13 13 
Kazakhstan 25 10 60 
South 
Korea 
16 6 24 
Ukraine 15 6 61 
Japan 10 4 14 
Russia 10 4 68 
Hungary 8 3 29 
World total 260 — 51 
Source: USGS, 2010a & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
Due to its low concentration within bauxite, gallium can contribute only a small portion of revenue to 
alumina refineries. Gallium supply therefore depends on the willingness of these refineries to engage in 
what can appear to be a small and volatile market.  However there are significant opportunities to ex-
pand production should it be required. Industry estimates suggest that currently only 10% of alumina 
refineries extract gallium. On balance, based upon both of these aspects, the supply constraints are 
judged to be of medium risk. 
 
On the demand side, strong growth is expected for the use of gallium in two emerging energy-related 
applications: LED lighting and photovoltaic solar. Demand for gallium from these markets is expected to 
exceed 20% per year between 2011 and 2016. Growth in the other main market for gallium –
semiconductors - is in comparison relatively modest at around 6% per year (Indium Corporation, 2011). 
Nonetheless it is clear that the demand growth for gallium will be very high.   
 
Overall risks for gallium are therefore rated as high (Table 116). 
 
Table 116: Gallium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Gallium Medium High High Medium High 
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5.4.6 Germanium 
 
Germanium is produced mostly as a by-product of zinc refining, but can account for up to 3% of a refin-
er’s total revenues (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012). Approximately a quarter of world 
germanium is recovered from fly ash from coal-fired power stations in China. World virgin refinery pro-
duction totalled 120 tonnes in 2011, although it should be noted that recycling of secondary germanium 
added a further 80 tonnes to world supply.   
 
The USGS does not provide quantitative estimates for germanium reserves, except for the United States 
where estimated reserves contained in zinc amount to 450 tonnes. A study by the BGR estimates world-
wide germanium resources at 35,600 tonnes, of which 24,600 tonnes is from coal and the remainder 
from lead/zinc (BGR, 2012). 
 
In terms of the main producing countries, China accounts for around two thirds of world refinery produc-
tion (Table 117). However, China’s moderate-to-high political risk rating is somewhat offset by those for 
Canada, United States and Finland; the next three largest producers. Geographic concentration for ger-
manium is therefore rated as high, with moderate political risk. 
 
Table 117: Germanium production concentration and political risk 
Country Refinery production, 2011 Political 
Risk Rating 
tonnes % 
China 78 65 65 
Canada 18 15 8 
United States 14.4 12 16 
Finland 6 5 1 
Russia 3.6 3 68 
World total 120 — 47 
Source: Indium Corporation, 2011 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
In terms of germanium demand, stronger growth in the optical fibre, solar and electronics markets is 
offset by more modest market growth for germanium in other segments. Germanium’s use within PET 
catalysts in Japan has been in long-term decline, and its use within infrared products can now be consid-
ered a relatively mature market for germanium (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012).  
 
On the supply side, considerable opportunity exists among zinc refiners to improve their recovery of 
germanium, both in terms of the recovery efficiency and for other zinc refiners to install new equipment. 
There therefore seems to be reasonable potential for suppliers to respond to higher prices if required 
(International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012). In the light of this evidence, both market risks are 
rated as medium.  Significant reserves of germanium within coal deposits also exist. 
 
Overall risks for germanium are therefore rated as medium to high (Table 118). 
 
Table 118: Germanium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Germanium Medium Medium High Medium Med-High 
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5.4.7 Gold 
 
Gold is produced from a wide range of sources including alluvial deposits, hard-rock mines and as a by-
product of base metal production. The structure of world gold production is therefore very fragmented 
with around one hundred separate producing countries listed by the USGS. In 2011 the largest world 
producer, China, had a market share of 13%. The top ten world gold producers account for only around 
two thirds of world mine production, although the political risk of some of them is moderate to high 
(Table 119). In addition to mined production it is worth noting that a significant proportion of world 
supply originates from recycled sources. 
 
Table 119: Gold production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 
tonnes Percentage 
China 355 13 1,900 65 
Australia 270 10 7,400 8 
United States 237 9 3,000 16 
Russia 200 7 5,000 68 
South Africa 190 7 6,000 46 
Peru 150 6 2,000 57 
Canada 110 4 920 8 
Ghana 100 4 1,400 48 
Indonesia 100 4 3,000 65 
Uzbekistan 90 3 1,700 81 
Mexico 85 3 1,400 57 
Papua New Guinea 70 3 1,200 71 
Brazil 55 2 2,400 46 
Chile 45 2 3,400 19 
Other countries 630 23 10,000 60 
World total  2,700 — 51,000 48 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
The demand for gold has two main market segments: fabrication (mostly jewellery) and investment. Data 
from the World Gold Survey highlights a long term downward trend in fabrication demand, which has 
continued since the late 1990s. Demand for physical bar investment has, however, risen considerably 
since 2007 amid the financial and economic uncertainty affecting many countries (Thomson Reuters 
GFMS, 2012).   
 
On the supply side the current price of gold has stimulated a raft of exploration activity.  Intierra, in their 
review of pipeline projects, identified 16 Moz (435 tonnes) of mine capacity due to come on stream 
between 2011 and 2014 (Objective Capital Conferences, 2011a), which suggests the supply risks are 
relatively low.   
 
Overall risks for gold are therefore rated as low (Table 120). 
 
Table 120: Gold criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Gold Low Low Low Medium Low 
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5.4.8 Graphite 
Graphite is an industrial mineral, an allotrope of the element carbon and has properties of both metal 
and non-metals such as electrical and thermal conductivity. The majority of graphite originates from 
natural sources, although technologies do exist to synthetically produce graphite from oil-based feed 
stocks.   
 
Natural graphite exists in three varieties: vein graphite (1% market share), flake graphite (38% market 
share) and microcrystalline or amorphous graphite (61% market share). For industrial purposes flake 
graphite is the most prized, due to the large volumes required in the metallurgical industry (EPOW, 2011). 
 
China is the world’s largest producer of natural graphite, with 65% of world production in 2011. China has 
a high political risk rating, as does India - the world’s second largest producer (Table 121). 
 
Table 121: Graphite production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 
Tonnes Percentage 
China 600,000 65 55,000,000 65 
India 140,000 15 11,000,000 61 
Brazil 76,000 8 360,000 46 
North Korea 30,000 3 30,000 87 
Canada 25,000 3 # 8 
Romania 20,000 2 # 42 
Sri Lanka 8,000 1 8 69 
Mexico 7,000 1 3,100,000 57 
Ukraine 6,000 1 # 61 
Madagascar 5,000 1 940,000 70 
Norway 2,000 0 # 2 
Other countries 6,000 1 6,400,000 — 
World total 925,000 — 77,000,000 61 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d.  for Political Risk Scores 
#indicates included within other countries 
 
There has been some concern regarding the possible growth rate in demand for graphite with Li-ion 
batteries, which could reach 1 million tonnes per year by 2035 (Industrial Minerals, 2010). This equates to 
an annual growth rate for this market of 12.6% per year; albeit from a relatively small base. However 
given the diversity of uses for natural graphite in mature markets, overall demand growth may be rela-
tively steady at 3% per year.   
 
On the supply side, due to the differing types of natural graphite deposits, there could be some supply 
constraints for the flake graphite required for lithium ion batteries.   
 
Overall the risks for graphite are rated as medium to high (Table 122). 
 
Table 122: Graphite criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply Con-
straints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Graphite Medium Low High High Med-High 
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5.4.9 Hafnium 
Hafnium is a rare metal, which is found along with zirconium in the mineral zircon and to a smaller de-
gree in baddeleyite. Commercial production of hafnium arose from the need to produce hafnium-free 
zirconium metal for use in nuclear reactors. As hafnium is chemically very similar to zirconium, separating 
the two elements from each other is very difficult. Most zircon (and, therefore, hafnium) is mined from 
titanium-rich, heavy-mineral sand deposits, notably in Australia and South Africa. Quantitative reserve 
estimates for hafnium are not available. 
 
The majority of world hafnium production comes from the hafnium-free zirconium production for nucle-
ar-reactor applications. Two companies dominate world production: Cezsus in France and Wah Chang in 
the United States, who together produce 60 tonnes out of a total of 64 tonnes, which represents the 
majority of world production (Table 105). Other producers are known to exist in India and China (for 
domestic use only). Westinghouse in the United States does not produce added-value hafnium by-
products during zirconium sponge production (Lipmann Walton & Co, 2012). Hafnium production is 
therefore highly concentrated, although within countries of low political risk (Table 123). 
 
Table 123: Hafnium production concentration and political risk 
Country Refinery production, 
2011 
Political 
Risk Rating 
tonnes Percentage 
France 30 47 15 
United States 30 47 16 
Ukraine 2 3 61 
Russia 2 3 68 
World total 64 — 19 
Source: Lipmann Walton & Co, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
Supply for refined hafnium is highly constrained, as it is limited by the demand for high purity zirconium 
in the nuclear industry. As indicated in Section 4.3.12, a number of countries are reconsidering their 
nuclear programmes, which will affect future hafnium availability for other industries. A further complica-
tion relates to the hafnium production process and the purity of the output. Approximately half of world 
supply is of high purity, produced from the Van Arkel process, which is used in the superalloy industry.   
 
On the demand side, market statistics currently indicate a market imbalance, with demand exceeding 
supply by perhaps 10 tonnes per year. As the nuclear industry is both the producer and also a consumer 
of hafnium, it is likely to be shielded from this deficit. For high-purity hafnium for superalloys the market 
is approximately in balance, but is relatively volatile. Over the longer term, demand growth is expected to 
be relatively modest, at perhaps 4% per year (Moss et al., 2011). 
 
Overall the risks for hafnium are rated as medium to high (Table 124). 
 
Table 124: Hafnium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Hafnium High Low High Low Med-High 
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5.4.10 Indium 
Although indium is produced as a by-product of zinc refining, it can account for up to 3% of a refiner’s 
total revenues (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012). World virgin refinery production to-
talled 640 tonnes in 2011, while reclaimed indium added a further 900 tonnes to world supply. The USGS 
does not provide quantitative estimates for indium reserves, although a study by a commercial producer 
estimates 50,000 tonnes of reserves within zinc and copper concentrates at existing mines (Indium 
Corporation, 2012). 
 
In terms of the main producing countries, China accounts for around half of world refinery production 
(Table 125). However, China’s moderate-to-high political risk rating is somewhat offset by those for South 
Korea, Japan and Canada; the next three largest producers. It is worth noting however that relatively 
higher risk Peru and Bolivia are sources of the mined concentrates from which indium is refined.  None-
theless, political risk is rated on balance as being medium. 
 
Table 125: Indium production concentration and political risk 
Country Refinery production, 2011 Political 
Risk Rating 
tonnes % 
China 340 53 65 
South Korea 100 16 24 
Japan 70 11 14 
Canada 65 10 8 
Belgium 30 5 14 
Brazil 5 1 46 
Russia NA NA — 
Other countries 30 5 19 
World total  640 — 42 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
NA indicates not available 
 
In terms of indium demand, the largest market - flat panel displays - is now relatively mature, with slow-
to-steady growth expected. More rapid expansions for indium use are expected in the photovoltaic solar 
industry and LEDs, although both are growing fast from a relatively slow base. An overall rate of demand 
growth close to around 5% per year is anticipated (Indium Corporation, 2011). 
 
On the supply side, considerable opportunity exists among zinc refiners to improve their recovery of 
indium, both in terms of recovery efficiency and for other zinc refiners to install new equipment. There 
therefore seems to be reasonable potential for suppliers to respond to higher prices if required (Interna-
tional Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012). In the light of this evidence, both market risks are rated as 
medium. 
 
Overall risks for indium are therefore rated as medium to high (Table 126). 
 
Table 126: Indium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Indium Medium Medium High Medium Med-High 
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5.4.11 Lead 
Lead as a base metal has an annual mined production of 4.5 million tonnes. Global production of refined 
lead is much higher than this, however, at an estimated 10.4 million tonnes (ILZSG, 2012a). This in part 
represents the importance of recycling lead acid batteries to world supply of lead. China is the largest 
lead-producing country, with almost half of world mine production in 2011 (Table 113).   
 
Estimates for refined lead indicate a similar degree of dominance by China. Other important producing 
countries include Australia, the United States, Latin American countries, India and Russia. As with a 
number of other metals the high political risk rating of the dominant producer China is important. How-
ever, this is to some extent offset by lower political risk in Australia and the United States, giving an 
overall political risk rating of medium. 
 
Table 127: Lead production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating Tonnes Percentage 
China 2,200,000 49 14,000,000 65 
Australia 560,000 12 29,000,000 8 
United States 345,000 8 6,100,000 16 
Peru 240,000 5 7,900,000 57 
Mexico 225,000 5 5,600,000 57 
India 120,000 3 2,600,000 61 
Russia 115,000 3 9,200,000 68 
Bolivia 85,000 2 1,600,000 68 
Canada 75,000 2 450,000 8 
Sweden 70,000 2 1,100,000 3 
South Africa 55,000 1 300,000 46 
Ireland 50,000 1 600,000 8 
Poland 40,000 1 1,700,000 26 
Other countries 340,000 8 5,000,000 57 
World total 4,500,000 - 85,000,000 49 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
Recent statistics indicate a growing market surplus for lead. World lead mine production is expected to 
rise by more than 10% in 2012, driven by further mine expansions in China, as well as the re-opening of 
facilities such as La Oroya in Peru.   
 
Demand growth, however, is steadier at 3.3%-3.4% forecast for 2012-13, with stronger growth in China 
offset by more modest growth elsewhere. Market surpluses are expected to be108,000 tonnes for 2012, 
increasing to 174,000 tonnes in 2013 (ILZSG, 2012b), and it is noteworthy that metal stocks of lead were 
reported to be 622,000 tonnes at the end of 2011. Market risks for lead therefore appear low. 
 
The overall risks for lead are therefore rated as low (Table 128). 
 
Table 128: Lead criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Lead Low Low Medium Medium Low 
 
 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
108 
 
5.4.12 Lithium 
 
Lithium is an industrial mineral that can be produced from a variety of sources including brines, and hard 
and soft rock deposits. Currently the brine operations in Chile, Argentina and China dominate world 
lithium supply due to their lower operating cost compared to the hard rock deposits of Australia. Collec-
tively these four countries accounted for 96% of the world supply of lithium in 2011 (Table 129). 
 
The political risk rating for with lithium is relatively low. This is due to the low risk associated with pro-
duction in Chile and Australia, the world’s two largest producers which currently supply 70% of the world 
market. 
 
Table 129: Lithium production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 
Tonnes Percentage 
Chile 12,600 37% 970,000 19 
Australia 11,300 33% 64,000 8 
China 5,200 15% 7,500,000 65 
Argentina 3,200 9% 3,500,000 44 
Portugal 820 2% 10,000 17 
Zimbabwe 470 1% 38,000 95 
Brazil 160 0% 23,000 46 
United States W W 850,000 — 
World total  34,000 — 13,000,000 26 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
W indicates withheld to avoid disclosing company proprietary data 
 
Demand forecasts for lithium do vary significantly according to the rate of uptake and penetration as-
sumed for electric vehicles. The International Lithium Institute in their review of market forecasts consid-
ers the following to be reasonable. It estimates world demand at 190,500 tonnes per year of lithium 
carbonate equivalent (LCE) for 2015, rising to 254,300 tonnes by 2020 (Objective Capital Conferences, 
2011b). This compares to USGS’s estimates of current production of 150,000 tonnes of LCE in 2010 
(Bauer et al., 2011).  This therefore implies a demand growth rate of around 5% per year for the coming 
decade. 
 
On the supply side there are a large number of projects underway, which are expected to comfortably 
meet these increases in lithium demand. These include expansions of existing projects by the world’s big 
four lithium producers of the order 75,000-80,000 tonnes per year of LCE by 2015. Pipeline projects could 
add a further 220,000 tonnes per year LCE production by 2015 (Objective Capital Conferences, 2011b), 
although it can probably be assumed that not all will be successful. Nonetheless the risk for lithium 
appears to be that of excess production capacity rather than insufficient. 
 
The overall risks for lithium are therefore rated to be medium to low (Table 130). 
 
Table 130: Lithium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Lithium Low Medium Medium Low Low-Med 
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5.4.13 Molybdenum 
Molybdenum production occurs from two main sources: as a by-product of copper and through primary 
molybdenum mining. The world mine production of molybdenum of some 250,000 tonnes per year is 
split almost equally between these two sources (Roskill, 2010a).   
 
The three most important producing countries are China, United States and Chile, which collectively 
accounted for nearly 80% of world mine production in 2011 (Table 131). Overall the political risk rating of 
these countries is rated as medium; with the higher political risk rating of China offset by lower ratings for 
the United States and Chile. 
 
Table 131: Molybdenum production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating Tonnes Percentage 
China 94,000 38 4,300,000 65 
United States 64,000 26 2,700,000 16 
Chile 38,000 15 1,200,000 19 
Peru 18,000 7 450,000 57 
Mexico 12,000 5 130,000 57 
Canada 8,300 3 220,000 8 
Armenia 4,200 2 200,000 57 
Russia 3,800 2 250,000 68 
Iran 3,700 1 50,000 80 
Mongolia 2,000 1 160,000 50 
Uzbekistan 550 0 60,000 81 
Kazakhstan 360 0 130,000 60 
Kyrgyzstan 250 0 100,000 77 
World total 250,000 — 10,000,000 43 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
The major markets for the molybdenum are as an alloying element in steel alloys (e.g. stainless steel, full 
alloy steel), which collectively account for three quarters of its usage. However, this end-use is split 
across several industries, with none accounting for more than 20% of total use. Strong demand growth in 
emerging markets, such as in power generation, is expected to be offset by weak demand in developed 
markets, giving an overall annual growth rate of 3.6% per year to 2020 (IMOA, 2011). 
 
On the supply side, an analysis of some 120,000 tonnes of molybdenum exploration and expansion 
projects between 2010 and 2014 is expected to increase the current slight market surplus (Roskill, 
2010a).  Overall the criticality of molybdenum is rated to be medium to low (Table 132). 
 
Table 132: Molybdenum criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Molybdenum Low Low Medium Medium Low-Med 
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5.4.14 Nickel 
Nickel is a base metal with mine production at 1.8 million tonnes in 2011. The largest market for nickel is 
in stainless steel, which accounts for 70% of the annual use of nickel. The recycling of stainless steel scrap 
contributes additional supply to the market. World supply of nickel is well diversified with the top five 
producing countries accounting for just under two thirds of world mine production.   
 
The political risk associated with the top three countries (Russia, Indonesia and Philippines) is rated as 
high, although that for Canada and Australia is much lower. 
 
Table 133: Nickel production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 
tonnes percentage 
Russia 280,000 16 6,000,000 68 
Indonesia 230,000 13 3,900,000 65 
Philippines 230,000 13 1,100,000 68 
Canada 200,000 11 3,300,000 8 
Australia 180,000 10 24,000,000 8 
New Caledonia 140,000 8 12,000,000 15 
Brazil 83,000 5 8,700,000 46 
China 80,000 4 3,000,000 65 
Cuba 74,000 4 5,500,000 62 
Colombia 72,000 4 720,000 64 
South Africa 42,000 2 3,700,000 46 
Botswana 32,000 2 490,000 41 
Madagascar 25,000 1 1,600,000 70 
Dominican Republic 14,000 1 1,000,000 62 
Other countries 100,000 6 4,600,000 51 
World total  1,800,000 — 80,000,000 47 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
Demand growth for nickel is expected to be reasonably strong, estimated at around 5% per year between 
2010 and 2020. This will primarily be driven by demand growth in the largest market - stainless steel 
consumption in China (Moss et al., 2011). 
 
On the supply side, the nickel market currently indicates a market surplus, and there are a large number 
of additional mid-large size nickel projects in the pipeline. The surplus is expected to continue until at 
least 2015, and thereafter the market should remain approximately in balance (Moss et al., 2011).   
 
Overall the criticality of nickel is rated to be low (Table 134). 
 
Table 134: Nickel criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Nickel Low Medium Low Medium Low 
 
 
  
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
111 
 
5.4.15 Niobium 
Niobium is a non-ferrous metal mainly used as an alloying element within the steel industry, as ferro-
niobium. Niobium is found in the minerals pyrochlore (the main commercial source for niobium) and 
columbite. Estimates of world reserves are large at 3 million tonnes. 
 
World production of niobium is highly concentrated (Table 135), with a single company (CBMM in Brazil 
located near Araxá), accounting for over 80% of world production. Anglo American is a second, if signifi-
cantly smaller, Brazilian niobium producer. Most of the remaining 8% comes from the third biggest 
niobium mine located in Canada, with a number of other small African producers. Brazil, the dominant 
niobium producer, has a moderate political risk rating. In summary, niobium is given a high geographic 
concentration and a medium political risk rating. 
 
Table 135: Niobium production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating tonnes percentage 
Brazil 58,000 92 2,900,000 46 
Canada 4,400 7 200,000 8 
Other countries 600 1 NA 81 
World total 63,000 — 3,000,000 44 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
NA indicates not available 
 
Future niobium demand will be driven by the growing consumption of ferro-niobium (FeNb) in advanced 
metallurgical applications, notably high strength alloy steel (HSLA) for construction and large infrastruc-
ture projects. Forecasts for the demand of high strength steel vary somewhat, but a long term compound 
annual growth rate of 8% per year is considered to be reasonable (Moss et al., 2011).  Demand growth is 
therefore rated as high. 
 
To meet such increasing demand, existing niobium producers – most importantly the Brazilian company 
CBMM – have declared they will be able to gradually expand their production capacity. The niobium 
industry already has some excess capacity, and increasing niobium prices are likely to make new projects 
economical (Moss et al., 2011). It is therefore expected that production capacity will be able to keep pace 
with demand growth, and it is noted that world reserves are very large compared to annual production. 
 
Overall the criticality of niobium is rated as medium (Table 136). 
 
Table 136: Niobium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Niobium Low High High Medium Medium 
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5.4.16 Platinum 
Platinum is a precious metal, the main source of which is production from low concentration primary 
deposits in South Africa, Zimbabwe and elsewhere. Approximately three quarters of platinum world mine 
production comes from the Bushveld complex in South Africa from these PGM-dominant deposits (Table 
137). The other main source of platinum mine production is as a by-product of nickel-copper production, 
notably in Russia. However, in contrast to the South African deposits, the content of those in Russia are 
palladium-rich rather than platinum-rich (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012).   
 
A considerable proportion of world platinum supply originates from recycled sources, notably autocata-
lysts and jewellery. The political risk of the dominant platinum producing country, South Africa, is rated as 
moderate. For the other main countries, the higher risk associated with production from is offset by that 
from Canada and the United States. 
 
Table 137: Platinum production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2010 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 
tonnes Percentage 
South Africa 139 73 63,000 46 
Russia 26 14 1,100 68 
Canada 10 5 310 8 
Zimbabwe 9 5 # 95 
United States 3.7 2 900 16 
Colombia 1 1 # 64 
Other countries 2.5 1 800 — 
World total  192 — 63,000 49 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
#indicates included within other countries 
 
In terms of demand, the two main uses of platinum are for autocatalysts and jewellery, which represent 
75% of total usage. The remainder is split between various industrial applications. Platinum demand 
within autocatalysts will to some extent track global (diesel) vehicle sales, although some substitution 
towards cheaper palladium is on-going. Strong growth in vehicle sales in emerging markets are being 
offset by weaker growth in developed markets. GFMS notes that the platinum market is still in recovery, 
with usage in 2011 still 25% below 2007 levels (Thomson Reuters, 2012). Investment demand arising due 
to uncertainties in the world economy, however, continues to provide support for the platinum price.  
Steady long-term demand growth for platinum, at 2-3% per year, may therefore be considered reasona-
ble. 
 
On the supply side the platinum market is estimated to be currently in surplus, by around 9% of annual 
supply (Thomson Reuters, 2012). However historical trends highlight the slow growth in supply growth 
that has been witnessed over the past decades. 
 
Overall the risks for platinum are rated as medium to high (Table 138). 
 
Table 138: Platinum criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Platinum Medium Low High Medium Med-High 
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5.4.17 Rare earths 
 
As is now widely known, rare earth production is highly concentrated in China. In 2011 China had over 
95% of the world’s mine production (Table 139). The political risk for China is considered to be high. 
 
Table 139: Rare earths production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 
tonnes Percentage 
China 130,000 97 55,000,000 65 
India 3,000 2 3,100,000 61 
Brazil 550 0 48,000 46 
Malaysia 30 0 30,000 46 
CIS NA NA 19,000,000 — 
Australia — — 1,600,000 — 
United States — — 13,000,000 — 
Other countries NA NA 22,000,000 — 
World total 130,000 — 110,000,000 64 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
NA indicates not available 
 
In terms of the outlook for rare earth elements, a key distinction can be made between the more abun-
dant light rare earth elements and the scarcer heavy rare earth elements (Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2010): 
 
• Of the major expansions in world rare earth capacity, both Mountain Pass in California and 
Mount Weld in Western Australia are dominant in the light rare earths, lanthanum and cerium.   
• Of current rare earth supply, many of the heavy rare earth rich mines in Southern China are hav-
ing their supply severely restricted due to environmental reasons. 
 
In terms of market demand, the strongest growth is forecast for magnet materials (praseodymium and 
neodymium) and phosphor materials (heavy rare earth elements). Some substitution and demand reduc-
tion strategies may be possible, but market supply is expected to remain tight till at least 2016. For the 
light rare earth elements oversupply is expected as some of the distortionary effects to the Chinese 
export quotas unwind and surplus stocks are sold (Kingsnorth, IMCOA, 2012). Based on this analysis the 
supply and demand constraints for the light rare earths are considered to be relatively low, whereas for 
the heavy rare earths the constraints are much higher. 
 
The overall risks for rare earths are therefore broken down into three categories (Table 140): 
 
• the heavy rare earth elements have the highest risk profile 
• praseodymium and neodymium have a slightly lower risk profile, but are still rated as high overall 
• other light rare earth elements plus gadolinium are judged to have a medium overall risk profile. 
 
Table 140: Rare earths criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Dy, Eu, Tb, Y High High High High High 
Pr, Nd Medium High High High High 
La, Ce, Sm, Gd Low Medium High High Medium 
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5.4.18 Rhenium 
Rhenium is a rare metal with world mine production of approximately 50 tonnes per year, the majority of 
which is produced as a by-product of copper-molybdenum deposits. It is this status as a by-product of 
another by-product that drives the market dynamics for rhenium – sales of rhenium may represent only 
0.3% of a copper refinery’s total revenues (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012).   
 
Molymet in Chile dominates world rhenium supply with around half of world mine production, due to the 
molybdenum concentrates and roasts produced on behalf of other companies. However, the political risk 
for Chile is rated as low (Table 141). 
 
Table 141: Rhenium production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 
tonnes Percentage 
Chile 26 53 1,300 19 
United States 6.3 13 390 16 
Peru 5 10 45 57 
Poland 4.7 10 NA 26 
Kazakhstan 3 6 190 60 
Canada 1.2 2 32 8 
Armenia 0.6 1 95 57 
Russia 0.5 1 310 68 
Other countries 1.5 3 91  
World total  49 — 2,500 27 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
NA indicates not available 
 
Roskill, in their market forecast for rhenium demand, predict annual growth of around 5% per year 
(Roskill, 2010b). This rate of growth is attributed to strong annual sales growth for airline engines at 4% 
per year, and a rise in the rhenium content of the superalloys in their turbine blades between the first 
and second generation. With approximately 60% of world rhenium demand in aerospace superalloys and 
an additional 20% in other applications of superalloys, this market is key to understanding rhenium 
demand prospects. 
 
On the supply side, rhenium is highly supply constrained. Mine production has remained at around 
50 tonnes per year since 2005. There are relatively few projects in the pipeline, although several molyb-
denum roasters are considering installing rhenium recovery circuits. To meet this growing demand recy-
cling has become considerably more efficient. Nonetheless engine manufacturers are in the process of 
developing superalloys with lower rhenium content in response to perceived supply constraints (Interna-
tional Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012).   
 
The overall risks for rhenium are considered to be medium to high (Table 142). 
 
Table 142: Rhenium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Rhenium High Medium High Low Med-High 
 
 
  
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
115 
 
5.4.19 Selenium 
Selenium is a metalloid, mostly produced as a by-product from refining copper sulphide ores and to a 
lesser extent from lead ores. World reserves within copper deposits are estimated at 93,000 tonnes in 
countries such as Russia, Peru, Chile and the United States (USGS, 2012). 
 
A range of estimates exist for total world production of selenium such as from the US Geological Survey, 
International Copper Study Group (ICSG) and other industry sources. Here the ICSG estimates are quoted 
(Table 143) as they are the most detailed and complete, although  at 2,600-2,700 tonnes per year they 
are more conservative than the 3,000-3,500 tonnes quoted by the USGS (USGS, 2008). The location of 
production is relatively diverse: the world’s leading producers, China and Japan, are each attributed to 
approximately 20% of world production. Overall the political risk for selenium is moderate. 
 
Table 143: Selenium production concentration and political risk 
Country Refinery production, 2011 Political 
Risk Rating tonnes Percentage 
China 500 19 65 
Japan 480 19 14 
Germany 250 10 13 
United States 170 7 16 
Russia 160 6 68 
Belgium 150 6 14 
India 140 5 61 
Canada 120 5 8 
Norway 100 4 2 
South Korea 100 4 24 
Other countries 500 15 58 
World total 2,670 — 44 
Source: International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012 & World Bank, 2011,  
Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
All selenium is produced as a by-product of the mining and processing of base metals, and selenium 
revenues comprise a negligible share of a refiner’s overall revenue (International Study Group for Nickel 
et al., 2012). Supply can therefore be relatively constrained and unresponsive to market demand and 
price movements. 
 
The consensus is that the market for selenium is broadly in balance, and the diversity of applications for 
selenium has helped to provide stability to prices. In the major markets - manganese production, glass 
and feed - no major demand increases are expected and, in the short term, industry observers hope that 
demand will remain level (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012). However, there is some 
discussion in the industry regarding the long-term substitutability or reduction of selenium in its main 
market - electrolytic manganese in China.   
 
The overall risks for selenium are considered to be medium to low (Table 144). 
 
Table 144: Selenium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political 
Risk 
Overall 
Selenium Medium Low Low Medium Low-Med 
 
 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
116 
 
5.4.20 Silver 
 
Silver is a precious metal produced in at least 50 different countries worldwide, and from a diverse range 
of sources. The main source is currently as a by-product of lead and zinc ores (37%), with 21% produced 
as a by-product of copper and 13% produced as a by-product of gold. Approximately 30% is produced 
from primary silver mines (Silver Institute & GFMS, 2012). World reserves for silver exceed 500,000 
tonnes. 
 
World mine production of silver for 2011 is estimated at 23,800 tonnes, with the three largest producers 
accounting for just over 50% of world production (Table 145). Although Mexico, China and Peru all have 
moderate to high political risk ratings, the overall political risk for silver is somewhat offset by Australia 
and Chile as significant producers. This results in a medium political risk for silver. 
 
Table 145: Silver production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 2011 pecentage 
Mexico 4,500 19 25,000 57 
China 4,000 17 69,000 65 
Peru 4,000 17 22,000 57 
Australia 1,900 8 7,000 8 
Chile 1,400 6 70,000 19 
Russia 1,400 6 43,000 68 
Bolivia 1,350 6 37,000 68 
Poland 1,200 5 120,000 26 
United States 1,160 5 85,000 16 
Canada 700 3 NA 8 
Other countries 2,200 9 50,000 50 
World total  23,800 — 530,000 48 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
NA indicates not available 
 
Silver has a variety of key applications including jewellery, silverware, electronics, photography, mirrors 
and catalysts. The market is forecast to remain roughly in balance, despite strong growth in new applica-
tions (solar, food hygiene and wound care) because of the stability of demand in traditional applications 
such as photography and jewellery (Moss et al., 2011). The likelihood of rapid demand growth over the 
coming decade is therefore assessed as low.   
 
Reserve levels for silver are large relative to current production, although most of this is not in primary 
silver ores. Due to these by-product dependencies, the overall limitations to expanding supply are scored 
as medium. However, should silver supply from co-product and by-product sources (gold, lead/zinc and 
copper) track the forecast production for these minerals, supply is expected to keep pace with demand. 
 
The overall risks for silver are considered to be medium to low (Table 146). 
 
Table 146: Silver criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Silver Medium Low Low Medium Low-Med 
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5.4.21 Tantalum 
 
Tantalum is a minor metal generally produced as a by-product or co-product of tin and/or tungsten 
(Brazil and Africa) or lithium (Australia). World production statistics do also highlight considerable volatili-
ty year-on-year in world tantalum mine production.   
 
World mine production for tantalum was estimated at 790 tonnes for 2011. This was split between Brazil, 
Australia and four different countries in Africa (Table 147). However while the geographic concentration 
is relatively low, the political risk of five of these top six countries is considered to be moderate to high. 
 
Table 147: Tantalum production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 
tonnes Percentage 
Brazil 180 23 65,000 46 
Congo (Kinshasa) 140 18 NA 95 
Mozambique 120 15 3,200 62 
Rwanda 110 14 NA 65 
Ethiopia 95 12 NA 81 
Australia 80 10 51,000 8 
Canada 25 3 NA 8 
Nigeria 20 3 NA 85 
Burundi 16.4 2 NA 86 
World total 790 — 120,000 61 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
NA indicates not available 
 
The main market driver for tantalum demand is electronics, with some 60% of world tantalum consump-
tion estimated to be for capacitors. Other important markets include cemented carbides and aerospace 
superalloys. Whilst the growth for electronics is expected to continue, it is growth realising that tantalum 
capacitors do compete with ceramic, aluminium and other types of capacitors (AVX Presentation, 2011). 
Trend growth for tantalum demand is approximately 5% per year, although some other estimates are 
more conservative and some more optimistic (EPOW, 2011). 
 
On the supply side for tantalum, it is clear that some excess capacity exists. In a matter of months in 
2008, 40% of world capacity was put onto ‘care and maintenance’ in response to low prices (Roskill, 
2009). It is not clear whether and when this will return to production. In addition to the currently moth-
balled mine capacity there are also large development projects in Mozambique and Egypt. There are 
some risks of shortages in the short run, but sufficient supply should be available in the medium-to-long 
run.   
 
Overall the risk evaluation for tantalum is rated as medium (Table 148). 
 
Table 148: Tantalum criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Tantalum Low Medium Low High Medium 
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5.4.22 Tellurium 
Tellurium is a metalloid, mostly produced as a by-product from the refining of copper sulphide ores, and 
to a lesser extent from lead ores. World reserves within copper deposits are estimated at 24,000 tonnes 
in countries such as United States, Peru and Canada (USGS, 2012). 
 
A range of estimates exist for total world production of tellurium such as from the USGS, International 
Copper Study Group (ICSG) and other industry sources. Here the ICSG estimates are quoted (Table 149) 
as they are the most detailed and complete, although  at 450-470 tonnes per year they are more con-
servative than the 500-550 tonnes quoted by the USGS (USGS, 2008). The location of production is rela-
tively diverse, with China, Japan and Belgium the world’s leading producers each reckoned to have 15-
20% of world production. Overall the political risk for tellurium is moderate. 
 
Table 149: Tellurium production concentration and political risk 
Country Refinery production, 2011 Political 
Risk Rating tonnes Percentage 
China 80-100 19 65 
Japan 65 15 14 
Belgium 60 14 14 
Germany 30-35 8 13 
Canada 25 6 8 
Russia 25 6 68 
Kazakhstan 20 5 60 
Philippines 20 5 68 
South Korea 20 5 24 
Sweden/Finland 20 5 3 
Indonesia 15 4 65 
India 10-12 3 61 
Other countries 50 5 45 
World total 450-477 — 45 
Source: International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012 & World Bank, 2011,  
Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
 
All tellurium is produced as a by-product of the mining and processing of base metals, and revenues 
comprise a negligible share of a refiner’s overall revenue (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 
2012). This means that supply can be relatively constrained and unresponsive to market demand and 
price movements. There is also some concern regarding the shift towards SX-EW copper refining, which 
may affect tellurium recovery in the future. 
 
Demand in tellurium is expected to increase rapidly over the coming decade, especially due to solar PV 
applications, which is now the main market for tellurium. Likelihood of rapid demand growth over the 
coming decade is therefore scored as high. 
 
Overall the risk evaluation for tellurium is rated as high (Table 150). 
Table 150: Tellurium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Tellurium High High Low Medium High 
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5.4.23 Tin 
 
Tin is a base metal, and has a relatively large market at 270,000 tonnes of mine production. Secondary tin 
accounts for around 20% of world supply, putting tin smelter production at nearer 350,000 tonnes per 
year. Global tin reserves are estimated at 4.8 million tonnes. 
 
China is the world’s leading tin producer with 42% of world production, with Indonesia and Peru repre-
senting important tin producing countries. All of these countries, as well as a number of other leading tin 
producing countries, have high political risk ratings. The geographical concentration of production is 
designated as moderate. 
Table 151: Tin production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating tonnes Percentage 
China 110,000 42 1,500,000 65 
Indonesia 51,000 19 800,000 65 
Peru 34,600 13 310,000 57 
Bolivia 20,700 8 400,000 68 
Australia 19,500 7 180,000 8 
Brazil 12,000 5 590,000 46 
Vietnam 6,000 2 NA 63 
Congo (Kinshasa) 5,700 2 NA 95 
Malaysia 2,000 1 250,000 46 
Russia 1,000 0 350,000 68 
Portugal 100 0 70,000 17 
Thailand 100 0 170,000 60 
Other countries 2,000 1 180,000 79 
World total  270,000 — 4,800,000 61 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
NA indicates not available 
 
Tin demand is dominated by solder and tinplate and is likely to keep growing at a slow but steady pace 
driven mainly by applications in the electronics industry (Moss et al., 2011). The likelihood of rapid de-
mand growth over the coming decade is therefore scored as low.   
 
Reserves for tin are large relative to current production. However, while new supply is expected to come 
on the market in several years, global tin output is currently constrained by years of under-investment 
(Moss et al., 2011). Supply constraints in the short-to-medium term are therefore scored as medium.   
 
Overall the risk evaluation for tin is rated as medium (Table 152). 
Table 152: Tin criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Tin Medium Low Medium High Medium 
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5.4.24 Vanadium 
Vanadium is a non-ferrous metal mainly used as an alloying element within the steel industry. It comes 
from a range of different sources including ores, concentrates and vanadiferous slags. Vanadium is usual-
ly recovered as a by- or co-product. Approximately 56% of vanadium is obtained from slag processing, 
with another 43% of vanadium production from vanadium containing minerals.  
 
Vanadium production is dominated by China, South Africa and Russia. Together they produced over 95% 
of global vanadium supply in 2011 (Table 153). All of these countries have moderate or high political risk 
ratings, resulting in a high score for political risk. World reserves are relatively abundant at 14 million 
tonnes, although the majority is located within the same three countries. 
Table 153: Vanadium production concentration and political risk 
Country Mine production, 2011 Reserves 
(tonnes) 
Political 
Risk Rating 2011 percentage 
China 23,000 38 5,100,000 65 
South Africa 20,000 33 3,500,000 46 
Russia 15,000 25 5,000,000 68 
Kazakhstan 1,000 2 NA 60 
United States 500 1 45,000 16 
Japan 500 1 NA 14 
World total 60,000 — 14,000,000 58 
Source: USGS, 2012 & World Bank, 2011, Fund for Peace, n.d. for Political Risk Scores 
NA indicates not available 
 
Vanadium demand is expected to experience robust growth based on growing steel production and an 
increasing share of high-strength steels. Long term demand projections are put at 6% average annual 
growth for steel and 8% average annual growth for high-strength steel (Moss et al, 2011). New applica-
tions for vanadium have been recently discovered, such as batteries, and non-metallurgical usage of 
vanadium is now rising at the same rate as GDP. Therefore the demand growth rates are rated as high. 
 
Considerable reserves are available and supply is expected to grow substantially over the next few years, 
driven by expanding capacity of existing suppliers as well as new market entrants. There is a number of 
promising vanadium development projects in progress and, should these come on-stream, supply is 
expected to keep pace with increasing demand (Moss et al., 2011). However, history suggests that tem-
porary spikes are possible, as witnessed in early 2005 and again in 2008, and might occur if demand and 
supply do not match up smoothly. 
 
Overall the risk evaluation for vanadium is rated as medium (Table 154). 
Table 154: Vanadium criticality evaluation 
Metal 
Supply 
Constraints 
Demand 
Growth 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Political Risk Overall 
Vanadium Low High Medium High Medium 
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5.5 Overview of the bottleneck screening  
Eight metals have been given a high criticality rating and are therefore classified as ‘critical’. These in-
clude six rare earth elements (dysprosium, europium, terbium, yttrium, praseodymium and neodymium), 
gallium and tellurium. Available mitigation strategies to alleviate potential supply chain bottleneck risks 
from these eight metals are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Six materials have been given a medium-to-high rating and therefore could be considered to be ‘near 
critical’. It is suggested that the market conditions should be monitored for graphite, rhenium, hafnium, 
germanium, indium and platinum in case the markets for these metals deteriorates with the effect of 
posing supply chain bottleneck risks. A further ten metals have a medium risk rating. 
 
 
Table 155: Summary of the high-, medium-high- and medium-rated metals 
with their associated technology 
 
Element Rating 
Associated  
Technology 
Rare Earths: Dy, Pr, Nd High vehicles, wind 
Rare Earths: Eu, Tb, Y High lighting 
Gallium High lighting, solar 
Tellurium High solar 
Graphite Medium-High vehicles 
Rhenium Medium-High fossil fuels 
Hafnium Medium-High nuclear 
Germanium Medium-High lighting 
Platinum Medium-High fuel cells 
Indium Medium-High solar, lighting, nuclear 
Rare Earths: La, Ce, Sm Medium vehicles 
Rare Earth: Gd Medium lighting 
Cobalt Medium vehicles, fossil fuels 
Tantalum Medium geothermal, fossil fuels 
Niobium Medium CCS 
Vanadium Medium CCS 
Tin Medium solar 
Chromium Medium desalination 
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6 Mitigation Strategies 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The first part of this report has focused on the metals which are of importance and critical for a wide 
range of key technologies for the decarbonisation of the EU energy sector. The analysis of Chapters 3 and 
4 identified which metals, and how much of them, are required within the different technologies. These 
estimates were then modelled against 2020 and 2030 uptake scenarios (largely drawn from the EU 2050 
energy roadmaps) and compared to projected world supply. As a result, a reduced list of some thirty 
metals of interest was compiled for further investigation. 
 
Chapter 5 sought to trim down this list further to identify specific risks associated with particular materi-
als. To achieve this, analysis of market and political risk factors was conducted in order to identify those 
materials with the greatest supply chain risks. The results of the first JRC study were taken into account in 
this study to provide an overall assessment of the supply chain bottlenecks risks for the decarbonisation 
of the EU energy sector.   
 
Eight metals have been given a high criticality rating and are classified as ‘critical’. These are: 
 
• six rare earth elements (dysprosium, europium, terbium, yttrium, praseodymium and neodymium) 
• gallium 
• tellurium. 
 
The following sections investigate what can be done to mitigate the supply chain risks for the critical 
metals within the EU. The following three principal mitigation strategies are considered: 
 
• increasing primary supply 
• encouraging reuse, recycling and waste reduction 
• considering substitution options. 
 
All relevant technical aspects are considered, including: data availability, geological, processing, refining, 
collection, technological, cost. 
 
6.2 Primary supply 
Increasing the primary supply of the critical metals is important to mitigating supply-chain bottlenecks. In 
principle, expanding global supplies helps to alleviate risks for supply chain bottlenecks for all users of the 
metals, including those in the EU path to the decarbonisation of the energy sector. However, this section 
focuses on expanding European output for the bottleneck metals as this would give added benefits of 
security of supply. In addition, European policymakers can obviously more easily influence European than 
global developments. 
 
7.2.1 Rare earths 
 
Following the decision of the Chinese government to reduce its export quotas for rare earth elements in 
2009 and 2010 and the large subsequent price rises, there has been a race amongst junior mining com-
panies to open rare earth mines outside China; notably in the US, Australia and Canada.   
 
While the European rare earths industry is currently small it is by no means non-existent. In fact, most 
steps in the rare earths supply chain are either currently performed in Europe or have been taken place 
there in the recent past (Schuler et al., 2011). This includes: 
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• separation of rare earths (by Silmet in Estonia, previously also by Rhodia in France)  
• production of alloys (LCM in the UK)  
• production of bonded as well as sintered permanent magnets, e.g. Vacuumschmelze in Germany, 
Magnet Applications in the UK or Goudsmit in the Netherlands 
• production of phosphors and catalysts (by Rhodia in France and Treibacher in Austria).  
 
There are currently no active rare earth mines in Europe, although several deposits have potential. It 
should also be noted that, compared to production of light rare earths (such as neodymium), there are 
additional challenges facing the establishment of European production of heavy rare earths (such as 
dysprosium, yttrium, terbium and europium). First, not all rare earth deposits contain significant amounts 
of dysprosium. More importantly, however, dysprosium and heavy rare earths require their own complex 
separation procedure and would require additional investments.   
New rare earth mines 
While the European geology is generally not very rich in rare earths, they are known to exist in Scandina-
via and Greenland (which has a special relationship with the EU through its links with Denmark). Figure 28 
shows the work of the geological mapping FP7 PROMINE for rare earths, and shows  that there are signif-
icant rare earth deposits in Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Russian Kola Peninsula. Rare earths were 
actually discovered in Sweden and were mined in relatively small quantities during the 1960s in Finland 
as by-products of lead.16 Other smaller deposits are shown in various countries across Europe. 
 
Several deposits are currently being explored by junior mining companies. Two of the most promising 
projects are the Kvanefjeld deposit in Greenland and the Norra Kärr project in Sweden, which are cur-
rently being developed by Greenland Energy and Minerals and Tasman Metals respectively. The resource 
estimates for the advanced rare earth projects17 in Europe and Greenland are shown in Table 156, along-
side that of Mountain Pass in the United States by way of comparison.   
 
All of these projects can be considered relatively low grade rare earths deposits: Sarfartoq owned by 
Hudson Resources has the highest grade at 1.72%, with the three Greenland Minerals and Energy Pro-
jects at a grade of 1.0-1.2% and Norra Kärr in Sweden owned by Tasman metals with a grade of 0.59% 
(for comparison, Mountain Pass has a grade of 6.57%.) In terms of total rare earth oxides contained, the 
three Greenland Minerals and Energy resources are very large, approaching 10 million tonnes between 
the three deposits. 
 
 
Table 156: Resource estimates for advanced rare earth projects in Europe, Greenland vs Mountain Pass 
Project Cut-off 
Grade (wt%) 
Resource Size (t) TREO Grade 
(wt%) 
TREO 
Contained (t) 
Norra Kärr (SWE) 0.17% 58,100,000 0.59 342,720 
Kvanefjeld (GRL) 0.015% U3O8 619,000,000 1.06 6,546,900 
Sørensen (GRL) 0.015% U3O8 242,000,000 1.10 2,662,000 
Zone 3 (GRL) 0.015% U3O8 95,300,000 1.16 1,106,338 
Sarfartoq (GRL) 1.0% 8,343,000 1.72 143,245 
Mountain Pass (USA) 3.0-5.0 31,552,000 6.57 2,072,037 
Source: Technology Metals Research, n.d. [Accessed 18
th
 September 2012] 
 
                                                             
16 Cassard, Daniel.  BRGM PROMINE database , personal communication (September 2012) 
17 Advanced projects are defined as where either the mineral resource or reserves have been formally defined or where the project has 
been subject to past mining campaigns for which reliable historic data is available 
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Figure 28: Rare Earths geological mineral resource potential modelling across Europe 
  
 
Legend Very Large Large Medium Small 
Rare Earths >1,000,000t >100,000t >10,000t >1,000t 
Source: PROMINE Database 
 
The composition of rare earths contained in these deposits is shown in Figure 29. The rare earth composi-
tion of the Greenland deposits is similar to that of Mountain Pass, with only slight differences. The three 
deposits owned by Greenland Minerals and Energy contain 8-9% yttrium, and the Sarfartoq deposit has 
higher neodymium content at 19%. Norra Kärr in Sweden, however, has a very different composition of 
rare earths, which may compensate for its relatively low grade. Lanthanum and cerium represent only 
one third of the deposit, which is significantly enriched in heavy rare earths with 4.3% dysprosium, 35% 
yttrium, as well as elevated europium and terbium content. 
 
Figure 29: Composition estimates for rare earth projects in Europe and Greenland vs Mountain Pass
 
Source: Technology Metals Research, n.d. [Accessed 18
th
 September 2012] 
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Exploration is more advanced at Kvanefjeld, Sarfartoq and Norra Kärr, where approximately 70% of the 
resources are ‘indicated’ rather than just ‘inferred’, offering greater certainty to the resource estimate 
due to the number of holes drilled. However none of these resources have the ‘measured’ status applied 
to projects such as Mountain Pass. 
 
A particular challenge for the Greenland Minerals and Energy Projects, such as Kvanefjeld, is their envi-
ronmental management due to the presence of radionuclides in some mine tailings (El-Dine et al., 2011). 
A recent report by the German Öko-Institute, for example, raises the concern that obtaining the neces-
sary environmental permits would pose a significant hurdle for realizing a European rare earth mining 
project (Schuler et al., 2011). As shown in Table 156 all of these resources are estimated against a cut-off 
grade with respect to uranium rather than rare earths, so these deposits should be considered to be 
uranium mines, with rare earths produced as a valuable by-product. Their fate is dependent on the 
uranium market and therefore upon that of nuclear power generation. An unfavourable location in 
Greenland, with comparably more difficult more logistics and a harsher environment, is also worth con-
sidering. 
 
The development time from resource to bankable feasibility study and ultimately production can be 5-12 
years (Kingsnorth, IMCOA, 2012). As each ore-body is different, the processing routes are project-specific. 
IMCOA suggest that there are ten key steps involved on the road to commercial production of rare 
earths:   
1. Prove resource/reserve. 
2. Define process. 
3. Pre-feasibility study. 
4. Beneficiation pilot plant. 
5. Extraction of rare earths pilot plant. 
6. Separation of individual rare earths pilot plant. 
7. Obtain environmental approval. 
8. Letters of intent. 
9. Bankable feasibility study. 
10. Construction and start-up. 
 
Kvanefjeld has recently completed step 3: pre-feasibility study (Greenland Minerals and Energy Ltd., 
2012). Norra Kärr is slightly further behind having recently completed its preliminary economic assess-
ment - step 1 (Pincock, Allen & Holt, 2012). Tech Metals Research, in their projections of rare earth 
production, estimates that Kvanefjeld may realise 44,000 tonnes of rare earths production from 2016, 
and Norra Kärr 5,000 tonnes from 2017 (Kingsnorth, IMCOA, 2012), although these may prove optimistic 
if the projects should encounter particular challenges and experience delays. Significant investments - in 
the range of several hundred million euros - would be necessary to bring these mines into production and 
to concentrate the ores. Costs for constructing a separation facility from scratch are considerably above 
the costs of the actual mining and concentration facilities: for example the budgeted capital costs of the 
Lynas Phase 1 separation plant (for 11,000 tonnes per year of rare earths) is around €200 million, or over 
three times the cost of the concentration plant (Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2011). IMCOA estimates that in 
terms of capital intensity, costs greater than $50,000 per tonne of annual capacity can be considered 
reasonable.   
 
However, unlike rare earth projects currently being developed in Canada or Australia, such projects could 
benefit from the modification of existing European separation capacities instead of having to rely on 
extremely costly greenfield investments. It is not known what the costs would be to re-open the Europe-
an separation facilities, and the complexity of modifying them to deal with the specificities of different 
ore bodies is likely to be significant but nonetheless below those of constructing a new facility. Norra 
Kärr’s strategy appears to be to sell rare earth concentrate, rather than to separate individual rare earth 
oxides. The preliminary economic assessment suggests that this may result in a 38% reduction in sales 
prices compared to the pure oxides; nonetheless capital costs are estimated at $290 million and total 
operating costs at nearly $11,000 per tonne of rare earth concentrate (Pincock, Allen & Holt, 2012). 
However, other junior mining companies, such as Great Western Minerals and Molycorp, have rejected 
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this strategy arguing that the greatest value added in the rare earths supply chain is in magnet produc-
tion, and that intermediate rare earth products such as concentrates and chlorides are hardly saleable. 
 
As a mitigation measure, the European rare earths potential certainly merits further exploration, even if 
the ultimate commercial viability of these deposits still needs to be established. However, it is clear that 
there may not be significant production until at least five years hence, and alternative options need to be 
considered in the short term at least. These might include processing rare earths from tailings (e.g. of tin 
and titanium) or from by-product sources; or to import rare earth concentrates from another mine 
opened outside Europe for further processing in Europe. 
Rare earths processing 
There are three main rare earths processing operations in Europe that are noteworthy: Silmet (Estonia), 
Less Common Metals (UK) and Rhodia (France). 
 
For many years Silmet in Estonia has been the only operating European rare earths separation facility, 
with an annual production capacity of around 3,000 tonnes of rare earth oxide (around 2% of world 
annual production). Historically Silmet has been fed from the Russian rare earth mines in the Kola Penin-
sula. However it has been unable to produce at capacity in the recent past due to limited access to rare 
earth concentrates on international markets.   
 
In April 2011 Molycorp acquired a controlling stake (90%) in Silmet at a cost of $89 million (Reuters, 
2011). Molycorp commented that it offers the company a European base of operations as well as a larger 
global customer base (Molycorp, 2011). Effectively the purchase doubled the company’s rare earth 
production capacity, and it would immediately begin sourcing rare earth feedstocks for production of its 
products from Molycorp’s rare earth mine and processing facility in Mountain Pass, California. Silmet’s 
products will include rare earth oxides and metals, including didymium metal (used in the manufacture of 
neodymium-iron-boron permanent rare earth magnets). 
 
Confronted by similar problems regarding the access of rare earth materials, the British alloy producer 
Less Common Metals (LCM) has sought to vertically integrate with Canadian junior rare earths mining 
company, Great Western Minerals Group (GWMG). Although GWMG owns several rare earths deposits, it 
has focused its attention on re-opening the high-grade (16.85%) - if small (28,000 tonne) - 
Steenkampskraal mine in South Africa. Production may commence from 2013, initially at 2,700 tonnes 
per year of rare earth oxide, rising to 5,000 tonnes once fully operational (Great Western Minerals Group 
Ltd., 2012).  
 
Hypothetical projections from a recent investor presentation indicate that nearly all of the magnet mate-
rials (praseodymium, neodymium and dysprosium) may be sent to LCM for magnet production (1,034 
tonnes in total). GWMG reports that 60% of LCM’s sales are within the EU, such as Vacuumschmelze in 
Germany. The facility is currently undergoing significant expansion with the addition two new ‘flake’-type 
furnaces to double the capacity from 1,100 tonnes to just over 2,000 tonnes per year (Great Western 
Minerals Group Ltd., n.d.). Other rare earths, such as yttrium, are likely to be sold to off-takes (Table 
157). 
 
The French company Rhodia has operated a heavy rare earths separation facility in the past, with similar 
processes to those currently used only in China. It is noted that even new separation facilities currently 
under construction in Australia and the US will be unable to separate heavy rare earths. They might be 
used to process heavy rare earths such as those that could be mined from Norra Kärr in Sweden, or from 
recycled sources such as rare earth phosphors from lighting (see Section 7.3.2). Rhodia reports that up to 
the end of 2011, only 4 of its 18 separation units (SX batteries) were operational. However, the company 
plans to progressively reopen all 18 units by January 2013 (Rhodia, 2012).  
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Table 157: Hypothetical consumption of REO from GWMG’s Steenkampskraal mine in South Africa 
Rare Earth  
Oxides 
Production 
(Tonnes) 
To LCM 
(Tonnes) 
To off-takes 
(Tonnes) 
Lanthanum 1,084 77 1,007 
Cerium 2,334 2 2,332 
Praseodymium 250 166 84 
Neodymium 834 834 0 
Samarium 125 74 51 
Dysprosium 34 34 0 
Yttrium 250 0 250 
Others 105 0 105 
Total 5,016 1,185 3,831 
Source: Great Western Minerals Group Ltd., n.d. 
Summary 
Apart from the mine stage, potentially all the building blocks for a rare earths supply chain exist in Eu-
rope, although it is noted that these are owned by different companies and would require collaboration 
and the complexities of re-opening separation facilities could be high.   
 
Rare earth deposits in Europe do exist and although their development is still in the early stages, they do 
merit further exploration. However, like many other rare earth projects around the world they must 
overcome significant challenges before they can go into production, including demonstrating commercial 
viability and obtaining the relevant environmental permitting. European mining of REEs could help pro-
vide a long-term perspective and supply security to European downstream processors of REEs, and 
reduce risks for the rare earths industry in Europe.   
 
European policy-makers and member country authorities should explore ways to support companies in 
fast-tracking exploration activities and regulatory procedures. An alternative mitigation option, especially 
in the short term, would be to process rare earth concentrates from tailings, by-product sources or mines 
opened outside Europe. This could help to stimulate European rare earths knowledge, expertise and 
production capacity. 
 
6.2.2 Gallium and tellurium 
 
Increasing the supply of gallium and tellurium poses a very different type of challenge from increasing 
rare earths production, because they are by-products. Possibilities to expand the European output for all 
three metals are discussed here, because the main issues involved are very similar. However there is 
considerably more information available on tellurium, due to a detailed market study having been con-
ducted (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012).  
 
The key issue here is not to open new mines, but to increase by-product recovery from base metal refin-
ing, most notably from copper (for tellurium) and aluminium (for gallium) refining. Geological mapping 
work by PROMINE (Figure 30 and Figure 31) identified only relatively small deposits (under 20 tonnes) in 
Europe. However, further analysis may be necessary as geological mapping techniques have not histori-
cally looked for these metals, which have only recently seen a growing number of new and important 
applications. Despite the results of the geological mapping, significant reserves for both gallium and 
tellurium do exist within Europe. The first JRC study, for example, estimated European gallium reserves 
within bauxite of 21,400 tonnes and tellurium reserves (in copper) of 1,900 tonnes (Moss et al., 2011).   
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Figure 30: Gallium geological mineral resource potential modelling across Europe 
  
Source: PROMINE Database 
 
 
Legend Very Large Large Medium Small 
Gallium >100t >50t >10t >1t 
 
 
 
A sizable refining industry already exists in Europe for both of these host metals and several large Euro-
pean refiners already have by-product extraction equipment in use at their facilities.   
 
• For tellurium, the ICSG estimated that Europe produces approximately 30% of world tellurium 
supply (120-125 tonnes, International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012). This previously un-
known data considerably closes the evidence gaps existing for tellurium, and suggests that Eu-
rope has the potential to be relatively self-sufficient with respect to its estimated needs for the 
EU (150 tonnes in 2020, 126 tonnes in 2030). 
• For gallium, the data for current and future production is not as complete. However, Europe’s 
share of primary gallium production capacity is estimated at 17% of world capacity (USGS, 
2010a), with production at around 30 tonnes per year (Moss et al., 2011). Nonetheless, these 
compare favourably to the EU estimates (18 tonnes in 2020 and 37 tonnes in 2030). 
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Figure 31: Tellurium geological mineral resource potential modelling across Europe 
 
 
Source: PROMINE Database 
 
Legend Very Large Large Medium Small 
Tellurium >500t >100t >20t >5t 
 
 
Significant opportunities remain for expanding and optimising existing by-product recovery in the Euro-
pean refining industry. In principle, this challenge can be conceptualized to consist of four parts (Moss et 
al., 2011):  
 
1. The presence in the ores that refiners process. Depending on the origin of the ore, the concen-
trations of the by-product can vary considerably. The choice of ores depends not only on by-
product content, but also on the ease of purification, long-term supply contracts and supply se-
curity considerations as well as transport costs. Most bauxite and copper ores do contain gallium 
or tellurium, but are not necessarily capable of economic extraction. 
2. The technical capability of refiners to extract the by-product.  Depending on the technology 
used, recovery rates can differ considerably. In the case of tellurium, state of the art extraction 
equipment allows for recovery rates that approach 90%, but many European copper refineries 
use technologies and processes recovering only 30-40% of the tellurium content.  Downstream 
industries with vested interest in reliable and affordable supply have invested in the develop-
ment of proprietary technologies for optimal extraction, and market these actively to base metal 
refiners. Some of these companies are even willing to assist in the installation or upgrading of 
the extraction equipment and guarantee off-take in order to increase the incentives to invest in 
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by-product extraction. 
3. Financing. Industry experts estimate the costs for installing a gallium extraction unit at roughly 
€20 million, and tellurium extraction equipment can already be installed for as little as less than 
€1 million. The production capacity of such installations depends on the amount of host metal 
that is being refined and the concentrations of the by-product and recovery rates.   
4. Willingness of refiners to get involved in production. Many refiners regard the small by-product 
markets as a distraction from their core business and are reluctant to invest time, money and ef-
fort to get involved in volatile niche markets that lack scale and transparency, even if price levels 
are currently attractive. In many cases, companies are also concerned that switching to by-
product recovery will adversely affect the delicate and carefully calibrated processes for the re-
fining of the main-product. The training and turnover of staff may also be an issue for some re-
finers. 
 
Taken together, these various obstacles lead to suboptimal by-product extraction. The first JRC study 
documented refineries recovering by-products; however, not all the companies were willing to publicly 
disclose their recovery capacities. Table 158 attempts to provide a non-exhaustive overview of major 
European refining and by-product recovery, compiled through a series of enquiries with companies and 
industry experts. It is indicative of the current extent of tellurium and gallium recovery in European 
refining industries. It demonstrates that while there is some by-product recovery taking place in Europe, 
it is a relatively limited activity in the European refining industry for copper and aluminium.   
 
In terms of the obstacles to by-product recovery, discussed above, the reasons for this limited recovery 
differ for tellurium and gallium. For tellurium, there is scope for additional extraction as well as significant 
increases in recovery rates. As well as variations in by-product concentration, a lack of interest by major 
refiners plays a significant role. The same holds true for gallium, for which there is probably the largest 
potential to increase European output by installing additional extraction units, as most bauxite ores 
contain economically extractable concentrations of gallium. Estimates suggest that only around 30-40% 
of the world’s mined tellurium is actually being refined into tellurium (International Study Group for 
Nickel et al., 2012), with only 10% of the world’s alumina producers extracting gallium (Indium Corpora-
tion, 2010).  
 
As an illustration of their estimated revenues, the following examples are helpful: 
• For tellurium: Boliden operates two copper smelters, where tellurium might be recovered.  Rev-
enues are estimated to account for only 0.2% of Boliden’s total copper smelter revenues (circa 
$20 million, International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012) which therefore represents a very 
minor by-product. For KGHM in Poland and Norilsk in Russia the tellurium revenues are much 
smaller, at only $2 million per year. 
• For gallium: AOS Ingal’s Stade plant in Germany may make around $15 million from gallium sales, 
around 4% of total revenues from the alumina refinery. For MAL Magyar in Hungary the contri-
bution to revenues is much smaller at approximately 2% of total sales.   
 
For gallium, such revenues appear to have become attractive to some alumina refineries. For example 
5N Plus announced in October 2011 that it had begun discussions with Rio Tinto Alcan regarding the 
development a new primary gallium source in Quebec, Canada (5N Plus, 2011). A memorandum of un-
derstanding has been signed, allowing the two companies to pursue further discussions. It seems that the 
process might involve 5N Plus operating a gallium recovery facility adjacent to the Vaudreuil alumina 
facility. Different opportunities exist for tellurium where it is possible to transport the copper anode 
slimes to an operator at another location. However, given that the anode slimes also contain the majority 
of the precious metals (gold, silver, PGMs), many refiners prefer to keep this in-house. 
 
Favourable prices for tellurium and gallium may also result in increasing recovery from sources other 
than copper and aluminium refining. For example, fly ash and urban coal ash, in which gallium has been 
found at a concentration of 200 times that of primary refinery production, might also develop into viable 
economic sources for gallium (Moskalyk, 2004).   
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Table 158: European alumina and copper refineries and their by-product extraction (2010) 
Type Facility Estimated 
annual 
capacity (kt) 
Country Company Extraction by-
product 
A
lu
m
in
a
 r
e
fi
n
e
ri
e
s 
Gardanne 700 France Rio Tinto Alcan  
Aughinish 1,900 Ireland Rusal  
San Ciprian 1,600 Spain Alcoa  
Distomon 800 Greece Mytilineos  
Ajka 300 Hungary MAL Magyar Aluminum ca. 4t Ga p.a. 
Stade 900 Germany AOS (Ingal)  ca. 25-30t Ga p.a. 
Tulcea 400 Romania Vimetco  
Total 6,600   ca. 29-34t Ga p.a. 
C
o
p
p
e
r 
re
fi
n
e
ri
e
s 
Huelva 320 Spain Atlantic Copper S.A. ca. 2t  Te p.a. 
Olen 345 Belgium Aurubis Aurubis is estimated 
to produce ca. 20t Te 
p.a. 
Pirdop 180 Bulgaria Aurubis 
Hamburg 395 Germany Aurubis 
Lunen 220 Germany Aurubis 
Harjavalta 
(Pori) 
153 Finland Boliden Boliden is estimated 
to produce ca.15-20t 
Te p.a. Ronnskar 250 Sweden Boliden  
Baia Mare 40 Romania Cuprom  
Las Cruces 72 Spain Inmet  
Glogow 480 Poland KGHM KGHM is estimated 
to produce ca. 5t Te 
p.a.   
Legnica 100 Poland KGHM 
Osnabruck 160 Germany KME  
Barcelona 80 Spain La Farga  
Bersee 35 Belgium La Metallo Chimique   
Brixlegg 110 Austria Montanwerke Brixlegg  
Hoboken 28 Belgium Umicore ca. 20t Te p.a. 
Nikkelverk 40 Norway Xstrata plc  
Total 3,008   ca. 62-67t Te p.a. 
Sources: Moss et al., 2011 
 
 
Owing to growing concerns over tellurium supply, some companies are also investigating the possibility 
to recover tellurium from other ore types such as gold-telluride and lead-zinc (USGS, 2012).  These in-
clude Boliden, which is planning to extract tellurium from a new gold-telluride mine from 2012 onwards. 
At their gold-telluride Kankberg mine in Northern Sweden, Boliden anticipates average annual production 
of tellurium concentrate of 41 tonnes for the life of the mine (2012-2020) (Boliden, 2011). However, gold-
telluride projects might be viable as gold mines, given the high price of gold, but a higher tellurium price 
is required to support tellurium recovery (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012).   
 
With respect to tellurium, however, there has been considerable recent comment on the shift of copper 
refining towards new processes that are more suitable for extracting copper from lower grade ores: the 
hydro-metallurgic process Solvent Extraction Electro-Winning (SX-EW) makes the recovery of tellurium 
much more difficult, for example. There is concern that this could affect future tellurium supply as the 
higher grades of copper ore are exhausted (Lifton, 2009).  Meanwhile the USGS comment that increased 
use of SX-EW has limited implications for future supply of tellurium supply, and fears may have been 
somewhat exaggerated. This is because the copper sulphide ores that generally contain the higher tellu-
rium content cannot actually be refined using the SX-EW process because of the sulphur content. There-
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fore the actual tellurium being lost to the market as a result of SX-EW is probably quite low (International 
Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012). 
 
In summary, there is considerable potential to increase the scope and effectiveness of by-product recov-
ery in Europe, although data on current production highlights a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency 
already having been achieved. To decrease risks for supply chain bottlenecks for these metals, an active 
dialogue with refiners - as well as possible incentive schemes to promote optimal by-product recovery in 
the European refining industries – should be investigated. New sources for gallium and tellurium should 
also be explored. EU-funded research, as well as measures such as support for the financing of pilot 
plants, could help accelerate the access to such new sources of supply. 
 
6.3 Reuse, recycling and waste reduction 
 
6.3.1 Introduction 
 
Policy measures to increase the reuse, recycling and waste reduction of the critical metals are important 
in alleviating future risks of supply. In essence, increased reuse and recycling expands the supply of these 
metals, albeit not from primary sources. Waste reduction is a demand side measure. If less material is 
wasted, then the same level of manufacturing demand can be achieved using less material, resulting in 
less pressure on limited supplies.   
 
This section starts, however, by giving some definitions that are commonly used for recycling, as well as 
discussing the role and limitations of recycling. Recycling is the reprocessing of waste materials to pro-
duce materials with the same or similar properties which can then be used in products. Recycling is a 
cornerstone in ensuring resource efficiency and moving towards a circular economy by recovering 
valuable resources. Recycling reduces the demand for raw materials, and can also help reduce waste 
sent to landfill, lower energy demands for processing, and decrease pollution. Typically, recycling is 
associated with an end-of-life treatment (i.e. post-consumer), and can be viewed as reclaiming useful 
materials from end-of-life waste. Metals may also be recovered during processing and manufacturing, as 
waste may be produced at these stages. This recovery is clearly important, but it can be viewed as a 
different process to end-of-life recycling, as it is commonly incorporated within manufacturing processes 
for efficiency purposes, particularly when the materials used are expensive.   
 
The distinction between these two forms of recycling is noted within the report. In this section the oppor-
tunities for recovery of both pre- and post-consumer waste are explored. In general, material in pre-
consumer waste is easier to exploit as it is typically much less dispersed and contaminated and therefore 
much easier to collect and process. Additionally the long lifetimes of many of the products in which the 
bottleneck metals are contained, many of which have only recently been launched, mean that post-
consumer recycling will only be possible in the medium to long term. Where recycling rates are discussed 
in this report the terms refer to the end-of-life recycling rate or the recycled content: 
 
EOL	Recycling	Rate = 	
Metal	Recycled	(from	EOL	scrap)
Metal	Available	for	Recycling	(EOL	scrap)
 
 
Recycled	Content = 	
Metal	Recycled
Metal	Produced
 
 
Note also that some processes which are considered to be ‘recycling’ recover materials but do not retain 
their primary properties. In these circumstances, recycling does not displace virgin production as the 
function of the materials is not retained. An example is the use of furnace slags in concrete. 
 
The recent UNEP report summarised the current status of metals recycling across the world for 60 
metals.  The end-of-life or post-consumer recycling rates for rare earths, gallium and tellurium have all 
been estimated to be less than 1% (Figure 32). These compare to rates above 50% for many base and 
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precious metals. However, these recycling rates are often application specific with high recycling rates 
for precious metals in jewellery and medical applications offset by lower recycling rates from WEEE. 
 
For rare earths and gallium, the recycled content rates - which include post-industrial recycling - are 
significantly higher than they are for end-of-life recycling (Figure 33). Neodymium, praseodymium and 
dysprosium (used for rare earth magnets) have a recycled content of between 1% and 10%; gallium has a 
global recycled content of 10-25%. However, recycled content rates for yttrium, europium and terbium 
(used for lighting phosphors) are all less than 1%. 
 
The following sections explore possibilities to expand recycling and reuse and to minimise waste for the 
rare earths generally, as well as for tellurium and gallium individually. 
 
6.3.2 Rare earths 
 
Since 2011 rare earth recycling has received considerable attention due to high prices of raw materials 
and materials shortages experienced by a number of end-user manufacturers. Several high profile an-
nouncements and projects have been launched in this area, as well as improved data on its feasibility 
having become available. A recent study on the feasibility of recovering the EU’s critical raw materials 
identified rare earths as target metals for which greater recovery would be feasible (EPOW, 2011). 
 
In general the following aspects are recognised to be important for the implementation of a successful 
end-of-life (rare earths) recycling system (Umicore, 2012): 
• Database of product sales, inventories and expected waste. 
• Product information of components. 
• Collection and sorting logistics. 
• Material flow tracking. 
• Pre-processing technologies. 
• Design: for disassembly, reuse and recycling. 
• Pilot plants and scale-up of recycling technologies. 
Data availability 
On the first two points, above, the data available is improving. For NdFeB permanent magnets, Du & 
Graedel (2011) estimated global in-use stocks at 97,000 tonnes for 2007 (Table 159). Computers, audio 
systems, wind turbines and automobiles account for 90% of the global in-use stocks.  As for stocks of rare 
earths within other products, these total a further 350,000 tonnes, although much of this is lanthanum 
and cerium (Table 160). It is worth remembering however that these are stocks in society rather than 
end-of-life flows. Du & Graedel (2011) estimate globally that in 2007 between 1,000 and 3,000 tonnes of 
praseodymium, neodymium and yttrium went to landfill. 
 
Table 159: Global rare earth in-use stocks in NdFeB Permanent magnets, 2007 (000’s tonnes) 
Application Nd Pr Dy Tb Total 
Computers 21.2 5.3 5.3 1.1 32.8 
Audio systems 13.1 3.8 3.8 0.8 23.4 
Wind turbines 10.1 2.5 2.5 0.5 15.7 
Automobiles 9.8 2.5 2.5 0.5 15.2 
Household appliances 3.3 0.8 0.8 0.2 5.1 
MRI 3.0 0.8 0.8 0.2 4.7 
Total 62.6 15.7 15.7 3.1 97.0 
Source: Du & Graedel, 2011 
 
Table 160: Global rare earth in-use stocks excluding NdFeB Permanent magnets, 2007 (000’s tonnes) 
Rare Earth La Ce Nd Pr Sm Eu Y Total 
Stock 86.0 143.6 73.4 34.3 3.3 0.4 6.9 347.9 
Source: Du & Graedel, 2011 
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Figure 32: End-of-life recycling rates for 60 metals 
 
Source: UNEP, 2011 
 
Figure 33: Recycled content for 60 metals 
 
Source: UNEP, 2011 
 
 
More detailed information is available for selective countries that have conducted materials flow anal-
yses. For example Japan, a major manufacturer of NdFeB permanent magnets, has completed a detailed 
materials flow for both neodymium and dysprosium (Figure 34). The results show that Japan imported 
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4,655 tonnes of these rare earths in 2007 to make permanent magnets. Approximately one third of these 
rare earths went into new scraps, i.e. post-industrial waste streams.  The study estimated that half of the 
magnet scrap was recycled domestically with the other 50% recycled overseas. Pre-consumer waste is an 
issue for NdFeB magnets as they are brittle and fracture easily, leading to breakages as well as waste 
cuttings. The scrap rate reported here is higher than the 20-30% estimated by Akai (Akai, 2008). Howev-
er, this new evidence shows significant progress on recycling where previously the scrap materials ended 
up in generic scrap metal waste streams, as it was cheaper to buy newly manufactured magnets than to 
reprocess the scrap material. 
 
Figure 34: Material flows of Nd and Dy for magnets in Japan, 2007 (tonnes) 
 
 
Source: University of Tokyo, 2012 
 
 
As for other countries, a detailed German study has been completed which estimated that the rare earth 
content of sales of selected electronics products amounted to 22 tonnes for 2010 (Table 161). Most of 
this is rare earth magnets within notebooks, which contained an estimated 15 tonnes of neodymium, 2 
tonnes of praseodymium and 0.4 tonnes of dysprosium. The report indicated that no rare earths from 
these products were currently being recovered in Germany. Similar studies are underway in the UK and 
at an EU level. 
Collection and pre-processing 
A key aspect for a post-consumer rare earths recycling system is the collection and pre-processing of rare 
earths containing waste streams at the end of their functional life. Many of the products that contain 
permanent magnets have long lifetimes and are not expected to reach end of life in the near future. For 
example, the low number of end-of-life hybrid and electric vehicles mean that it is not yet viable or cost-
effective to implement systems for the recovery and recycling of rare earth magnets, although it may 
become attractive in the second half of this decade (EPOW, 2011). Similar dynamics apply to the magnets 
used in wind turbines, though on a longer time scale, as permanent magnet wind installations have only 
begun and a lifespan of at least 20 years is likely.   
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Table 161: Rare earth content of sales for selected electronic products in Germany, 2010 (kg) 
Rare Earth Flat 
screens 
Note-
books 
Smart-
phones 
LED 
lighting* 
Total 
Cerium 30 1  120 151 
Dysprosium  430   430 
Europium 50 <1  40 90 
Gadolinium 10 5  910 925 
Lanthanum 40 <1   40 
Neodymium  15,160 385  15,545 
Praseodymium <1 1,950 80  2,030 
Terbium 14 <1   14 
Yttrium 680 12  1,950 2,642 
Total 824 17,558 465 3,020 21,867 
* Assumes 70% replacement of light bulbs with LED lighting 
Source: Oeko Institute, 2012 
 
The permanent magnets used in small electrical items, however, are already reaching waste streams.  
These applications have a relatively high turnover rate, but are dispersed into the waste stream at end of 
life. Recovery of these magnets is a challenge due to their small size and because they are often glued to 
other components making separation impossible. When processed as WEEE, the metal in magnets enters 
light iron processing routes where it is diluted beyond recovery. TNO estimates that there are approxi-
mately 2 million tonnes of WEEE containing permanent magnets (out of 12 million tonnes arising), with a 
rare earth content <0.1% (TNO, 2012). Smelting could provide another avenue for recycling except that 
the rare earth metals oxidise easily and they are dispersed amongst the low grade slag, which makes 
further recovery impossible (Hagelüken & Meskers, 2009a). 
 
There is therefore a need for greater disassembly and pre-processing of post-consumer WEEE at around 
100-1000 sites across Europe to allow the recovery of rare earths for the relevant product categories. 
Encouragingly, awareness of rare earths at WEEE treatment centres appears to be rising. For example, a 
UK survey found that 56% of the respondents had heard of rare earths and some were considering 
whether it might be possible to recover them (WRAP, 2012). However, it is noted that the survey re-
sponse rate was quite poor at just 7% of the industry. Nonetheless awareness of rare earths in the study 
compares favourably to that of other critical raw materials, about which less than 50% of the respond-
ents had heard. A considerable amount of manual disassembly already occurs within the industry, with 
80% of the treatment centres already carrying out manual disassembly processes on one or more differ-
ent component streams, such as printed circuit boards. 
 
On the costs of implementing an EU collection and treatment for the recovery of NdFeB, TNO estimates 
the total cost of such a system might be of the order €1 billion (Table 162). This estimate includes the 
collection, transport, pre-processing and recovery of the rare earths. Approximately 50% of these costs 
are additional to a conventional WEEE treatment operation.   
 
For the metal recycling step, this might be carried out at a few dedicated facilities for rare earths, or as 
part of an integrated secondary smelter recovering a number of metals. In both cases the rare earths are 
likely to be recovered in mixed form, with further separation to individual elements required.  The yield, 
in terms of rare earths recovered, might be just under 2 tonnes of rare earths (1.4 tonnes Nd and 0.4 
tonnes Dy). Their analysis of the rare earth prices necessary to justifies their recovery shows that, unless 
the collection and pre-treatment occurs for other reasons, continued high prices are necessary (of the 
order $45/t Nd and $2,500/t Dy). 
 
However, permanent magnets contained within hard disc drives represent a notable exception to this. 
The potential risk of sensitive data loss for companies has led to targeted services for data destruction 
from old hard disc drives. Several different practices are used, but the consumer-driven separation and 
identification of these components should help in collecting the neodymium magnets. Most collection 
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and separation techniques for hard disc drives result in the drive being shredded; this serves the dual 
purpose of enabling extraction of materials for sale and ensuring that sensitive data is destroyed, sug-
gesting that access to these magnets should be relatively easy. There is no evidence that the magnets are 
recovered for recycling.   
 
Table 162: Potential EU collection and treatment costs 
 for recovery of NdFeB magnets from WEEE 
Step Cost (€m) % 
Collection and transport 250-300 28 
Additional pre-processing 150 17 
Basic treatment 200 20 
Additional recovery treatment 300-400 34 
Total cost ≈1,000  
Source: TNO, 2012 
 
There is evidence that novel research is on-going, such as that by Hitachi in Japan (Baba et al., 2010). 
Manual trials by Hitachi found it takes a worker 5 minutes to get a magnet out of the hard drive, i.e. 12 
units per hour. In 2010 Hitachi announced that it has developed a machine for the dismantling of neo-
dymium magnets from hard discs and compressors. The machine has a capacity of 100 magnets per hour, 
about eight times faster than manual labour. The developed dismantling process will commence opera-
tion in 2013. The separation of the magnets is done using a drum type unit that shakes the HDDs until 
they disintegrate at which points the magnets can be manually removed. Birmingham University’s Mag-
netic Materials Group has developed a similar process for removing permanent magnets from HDDs 
(Williams, 2010). Reuse is another potential option, as these magnets do not lose much strength over 
their lifetime. However, as the specification of the magnets is often tailored to the original purpose, and 
the processes to change the properties of the magnets are complex and expensive, reuse does not occur. 
 
As for rare earth phosphors, good collection and processing systems are already in place, because of the 
hazardous waste (mercury) content. Estimates suggest that 1,000-1,500 tonnes of phosphor powder are 
available for recycling each year in Europe, of which 100-300 tonnes might contain rare earths (REcon-
serve, 2012a). In addition, unknown but significant quantities have been stored awaiting further pro-
cessing. REConserve claims that its recovery process would be highly profitable, with payback of less than 
one year for a €7 million investment at current rare earth prices.  An internal rate of return (IRR) of 
around 35% is expected should europium and yttrium prices fall to €60/kg. 
 
An alternative business model for phosphors recycling has been proposed by the HydroWEEE FP7 consor-
tium. To get around the issue of low volumes of rare earths that are widely dispersed, HydroWEEE has 
developed a mobile hydrometallurgical plant that can be transported site-to-site inside a lorry container 
to treat batches of waste that have been built up over a period of time at WEEE treatment centres. The 
effect is to reduce the minimum quantities for economic operation by sharing the mobile plant: several 
SMEs can benefit from the same plant. Table 163 shows the input streams that the HydroWEEE process 
would take for recovery.  
 
Table 163: Input streams and target metals for the HydroWEEE process 
Input stream  Target metals for recovery  
Fluorescent powders from lamps  Y  
Fluorescent powders from CRTs  Y, Zn  
Liquid Crystal Displays  In  
Lithium ion batteries  Li, Co  
Circuit boards  Ag, Au, Fe, Ni, Zn (Pb, Sn, Pd 
with further processing)  
Source: Kopacek, n.d. 
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Of particular interest here is the recovery of yttrium from lamps and CRTs; however the processing of the 
other waste streams will presumably be very important for making the collection and recovery economics 
more viable for each visit. 
Recycling technologies 
Several rare earths recycling technologies have been proposed or announced, with varying levels of 
technical information available for them. 
 
For rare earth magnet recycling the key aspect to ensure is that the quality of magnets made from recy-
cled rare earths match those made from virgin materials, as the magnetic powder can be susceptible to 
corrosion and degradation of its magnetic properties. The two m ain strategies for this are to blend 
recycled powders with virgin in the production of sintered magnets, or to manufacture lower strength 
bonded magnets. Several technologies for recycling REE magnets have been described in the literature 
(Oakdene Hollins, 2010; Schuler et al., 2011). The material may be recycled as an alloy to form new 
magnets, or may be returned to its constituent metals for processing into new magnets. The technologies 
include hydrogenation disproportionation desorption recombination (HDDR) (Williams, 2010), dissolution 
in molten magnesium (Takeda et al., 2005) and acid leaching (Saito et al., 2006). Materials from these can 
be used in new magnets, but often with a loss of performance. Various Chinese studies indicated that 
recovery yields from recycling exceed 80% of the contained rare earth, and can be greater than 95% 
(Schuler et al., 2011). 
 
The Birmingham University process is based on hydrogen decrepitation, in which the magnetic material is 
broken down into a hydrided powder losing its permanent magnetic properties and enabling the material 
to be removed from the metallic shell of the motor by a simple sieving process (Zakotnik et al., 2009). 
Where the magnet is nickel coated, hydrogen decrepitation is done at elevated pressure and heat (170oC 
and 0.7 MPa) so that the hydrogen passes through the coating and the magnet disintegrates. The nickel 
can be removed as flakes during the sieving process. The rare earths can subsequently be removed from 
the NdFeB alloy by using solvent extraction techniques. A pilot plant has been built capable of extracting 
10-40kg of NdFeB per run, and the next stage is the use of pre-processed HDDs as feedstock (Walton & 
Williams, 2011). 
 
Hitachi uses a dry, rather than wet, process to recover the rare earths from magnets. Heat is applied to 
the magnets to distil the excess extraction material and a rare earth alloy remains (Waste Management 
World, n.d.). Toyota (2012) and Rhodia (2012a) both report that they are developing or opening recycling 
facilities for rare magnets. Rhodia reports that in May 2012 they restarted three of their 18 SX batteries 
for separating the individual rare earths from magnets. Both companies, as well as Umicore, have inter-
ests recycling rare earths from NiMH batteries (Rhodia, 2011). 
 
Three companies report that they have developed a process for recycling rare earth phosphors. In May 
2012, Rhodia reopened 4 SX batteries for separating the individual rare earths from recycled phosphors 
(REconserve, 2012b). The recycling process takes places at two sites: “phosphor attack” at their site in 
Lyon where phosphor powders are removed from lamps, and rare earth separating and finishing at La 
Rochelle. REConserve’s process has been tested at a pilot scale (kg scale) and separates yttrium and 
europium oxides, as well as glass and halophosphate streams (REconserve, 2012b). The HydroWEEE pilot 
process in Romania focuses on yttrium recovery. Yields of 80-90% recovery at the leaching stage and over 
90% during precipitation have been achieved in its initial results (Kopacek, n.d.).  
 
6.3.3 Gallium 
 
The major use of gallium is in semiconductors, which require that the refined material has a very low 
concentration of impurities. Sophisticated processing routes are required to ensure that this purity is 
produced. Only 15% of a GaAs ingot is actually used during electronics manufacture, and the remaining 
85% can be recycled (Kopacek, n.d.). This yield may improve over time, however, as the industry matures.  
For example, larger substrates are increasingly being used, so that there are fewer edge exclusions and 
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therefore higher semiconductor yields. World gallium recycling capacity in 2011 was estimated at 
198 tonnes (compared to 270 tonnes of refining capacity), with recycling plants for new scrap located in 
Canada, Germany, Japan, the UK and USA (USGS, 2012). 
 
At the height of the gallium price boom in 2001, GaAs substrate maker Sumitomo Electric estimated that 
it was internally recycling 40% of the gallium used for crystal growth. A further 20% was retrieved from 
GaAs device makers in the form of broken wafers, sludge from wafer thinning and waste from epitaxial 
source material (Compound Semiconductor Magazine, 2003). It is thought that the recycling of this 
internal scrap has been largely optimised, at over 90% recovery due to the prices and maturity of the 
technology; in addition, the processing for LEDs has become much more efficient due to changes in 
processing techniques resulting in less waste (Moss et al., 2011). A number of other companies and 
manufacturers have plants to recycle new gallium scrap in Japan such as Dowa Mining and Asahi Hold-
ings. Lower quality LEDs can be also reused rather than discarded, e.g. as Christmas tree lights.18 
 
The processes involved in the recycling of gallium arsenide are shown in Figure 35. Processed residues 
from the production and processing of compound semiconductor, including lumpy scrap and slurry 
waste, are collected from the manufacturing process. As a minimum limit for recycling, gallium content of 
4-5% is required (PPM PureMetals, 2012). The recovery of gallium begins with the crushing of the scrap, 
release of the crushed products and sludge by means of nitric acid (HNO3) and sodium hydroxide (NaOH). 
From the resulting solution and the addition of lime, arsenic is precipitated. Metallic gallium is obtained 
by electrolysis at a purity of approximately 4N (99.99%), so further purification is then required. 
 
Figure 35: Simplified process flow for gallium arsenide recycling 
 
Source: PPM PureMetals, 2012 
 
However no recovery of gallium from post-consumer scrap is known to take place (Buchert et al., 2009). 
This is because the gallium contained within the semiconductors is highly dispersed due to their use in 
printed circuit boards (PCBs). The recovery of metals from circuit boards tends to take place at one of the 
main European integrated metal smelters or outside the EU. Various material separation technologies are 
used to concentrate saleable quantities of material into the manufacturing supply chain. For example, 
Umicore (Belgium) has developed a processing technology to separate 17 different elements from circuit 
board scrap. For electronic waste, PGMs, indium and antimony are refined for re-use (Umicore, 2007).  
Other elements contained within the circuit board, including gallium, are generally disposed of as slag.   
 
Research is on-going for new technologies to extract further value from the scrap; however, there is 
doubt that the current smelting methods of recycling could effectively recycle gallium. The relative con-
centration is very low, making extraction of commercially significant quantities difficult and this situation 
may get worse because of the drive to use less material within each component with the effect of further 
reducing the concentration of valuable materials within electronics.   
 
An exception to this trend may be the nascent growth in the use of LEDs in consumer lighting, which 
could lead to more attractive concentrations of gallium and indium within the waste stream (EPOW, 
2011). A recently launched FP7 project, CycLED (January 2012-June 2015) specifically focused on optimis-
ing the resource flows for LED products, including the recycling of scarce key metals in LED production, 
optimising the reliability and lifetime of LED products and opportunities for reduced resource losses in 
production, use and recycling.  Its expected results include (cycLED, n.d.): 
 
• reduction of environmental impacts 
• increase of the resource efficiency 
• reduction of production costs 
                                                             
18 Michael Heuken, Aixtron, personal communication, July 2012 
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• closed-loop resource management 
• separate collection of LEDs and LED products 
• overcoming legal, trade and geopolitical barriers for eco-innovative LED products 
• Increased competitiveness and capacity building. 
 
Recycling of pre-consumer production waste of CIGS already occurs at Umicore in Belgium, which recov-
ers metals from high grade solar PV residues. These are typically production scrap residues from CIGS thin 
film solar cells, which are processed to recover the copper, indium, selenium and gallium. This process is 
viable because the waste feed is concentrated. For post-consumer waste, arisings are almost non-
existent, although it is noted that, at present, the indium and gallium concentrations in general PV waste 
are too low to make the Umicore’s process for PV manufacturing residues sufficiently economic on a 
large scale, even with complete separation (Hagelüken & Meskers, 2009b). The similarities between the 
materials composition and films used for LCD flat screens and thin film PV mean that LCD and PV recy-
clers are looking at the possibility of tying the recycling of these products together, particularly for the 
recycling of indium. This would help generate a larger waste stream to process, making it more viable in 
the short term while the quantities of end-of-life LCDs and PVs grow.   
 
Collection routes for end-of-life solar PV have been established through a voluntary take-back scheme, 
established by the PV industry in 2007 (PV CYCLE). In addition end-of-life PV is included within the revised 
WEEE directive, meaning that manufacturers will have to ensure the collection and recovery of their 
products. However, the volumes collected were very low at 80 tonnes of end-of-life PVs in Europe in 
2010 (despite estimating 6,000 tonnes) with the share of CIGS being almost non-existent owing to its 
recent introduction (Moss et al., 2011). In addition to the PV CYCLE scheme, initiatives by the German 
companies Saperatec and Loserchemie are expected to have begun recovering end of life PVs from 2011. 
An alternative approach to recycling would be to remanufacture post-consumer PV. This would avoid the 
complexities of developing a recycling process, whilst still reducing a reliance on virgin raw material. 
 
6.3.4 Tellurium 
 
Each of the major applications has its own practices regarding recycling tellurium. However, since the first 
JRC report, relatively little progress appears to have been made, although some quantitative estimates 
are now available on the volume of tellurium that is being recycled from manufacturing scrap from PV 
solar and thermoelectric modules. These recycled sources are estimated to provide 65 tonnes of supply, 
which is expected to rise to 111 tonnes by 2020 (First Solar, 2012). 
 
For metallurgy, additions of 0.04% tellurium are made to improve its machinability, i.e. to make the metal 
easier to work with in terms of bending, cutting, shaping, finishing etc. (Chemistry Explained, n.d.). The 
dispersed nature of this application means that the tellurium will be diluted amongst a very much larger 
pool of ferrous scrap, so that although the tellurium will be ‘recycled’ it will not be available to replace 
virgin raw material. Tellurium in copier drums has largely been substituted by other materials, which has 
led to a fall in the amount of tellurium available for recovery from scrap tellurium-based copier drums 
(USGS, 2008). 
 
Some recycling opportunities do exist for the recovery of tellurium from electronic scrap where the scrap 
is processed at appropriate smelting plants. For example, there are recycling capacities for tellurium from 
electronic scrap at Dowa in Japan and at Umicore (Belgium) where tellurium is one of 17 metals that can 
be refined and is separated within its special metals refinery (UNEP, 2009). These facilities are available 
for use to recover any tellurium contained, such as within flash memory (Buchert et al., 2009), although 
actual production levels from recycling feed are currently low and improvements in collection rates are 
needed. 
 
The use of tellurium in CdTe solar cells would appear to offer the most potential for tellurium recycling in 
the future, due to the rapid growth predicted. Recycling of industrial waste already occurs where solar 
panels are fabricated on a large scale, to increase the efficiency of the manufacturing process. Estimates 
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of the material use rates range from 35% to 90%. The material losses are collected by filter systems with 
the recycling of the filter residues both feasible and economic for large scale production (Fthenakis, 
2004). To that end, the world’s largest producer of CdTe solar PV, First Solar, has implemented its own 
recycling scheme for both pre-consumer scrap and of complete solar cells collected free-of-charge from 
consumers (First Solar, n.d.a). 
  
The process operates in the US and Germany and involves shredding, removing the films using acid and 
hydrogen peroxide and separated the metal rich liquid for further processing (Figure 36) (First Solar, 
n.d.b). Although it is a lengthy process, it is highly efficient and can recover 95% of the semiconductor 
materials for use in new solar modules, as well as 90% of the glass (Larsen, 2009). The recycling of CdTe 
solar cells is therefore able to produce very high purity tellurium available for use within the production 
of new solar cells. However it is worth remembering that an end-of-life panel will be at least 25-30 years 
old before it is available for recycling.   
Figure 36: First Solar CdTe Recycling Process 
 
Source: First Solar, n.d.b 
 
6.4 Substitution 
The substitution of a higher risk material with a lower risk material has the potential to significantly 
reduce materials requirements for certain materials, and possibly within a shorter time frame than 
recovering materials from end-of-life products. Some existing EU legislation such as REACH and the ELV 
directive, already mandate the substitution of certain materials, although largely due to environmental 
rather than raw materials risks. 
 
Substitution needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis: For some materials it may be possible to 
reduce the use of a particular metal or replace it completely. However, the use of a particular critical 
material can confer exceptional performance that may justify the associated supply risks and additional 
cost incurred. System substitution is also possible, such as by replacing permanent magnet-based motors 
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with superconductor motors, geared systems or alternative magnetic materials.   
 
6.4.1 Electric drive motors for EVs 
Rare-earth based permanent magnets are the most commonly used technology for electric vehicle mo-
tors. They offer several benefits such as allowing for the smallest size and weight for equivalent perfor-
mance. However, the need for a replacement to these technologies is becoming increasingly important as 
rare earths are expensive and in limited supply. The motor industry has responded to this problem by 
acting to secure supplies of rare earth metals and by investing heavily in research towards alternative 
motor technologies.   
 
Substitution and reduction of the bottleneck metals, in this case neodymium and dysprosium, are effec-
tive solutions to mitigating the risk from future bottlenecks in the metal supply-chain of electric vehicles. 
Substitution can be either by using rare earth-free permanent magnet motors or by employing different 
motor technologies such as induction motors. There is also the potential to reduce the usage of rare 
earth in the existing drive motors by using new manufacturing techniques. The following section discuss-
es the potential for each of these strategies, categorised by the different motor technologies.   
 
Permanent magnet motors 
Reduction of neodymium and dysprosium usage in existing permanent magnet motors 
To date, NdFeB-based materials remain the strongest permanent magnets discovered, by a large margin.  
A vast amount of research has been targeted at improving the magnetic strength of this material and 
tuning its performance for different applications. For instance, neodymium is commonly substituted with 
dysprosium or terbium, in order to withstand high thermal loads. Temperature performance is improved 
by increasing the level of doping; however, the baseline magnetic strength decreases. Consequently, 
many different grades of magnet materials with different substitution levels are available. The main 
advantages of NdFeB permanent magnet motors compared to other motor types is that they have high 
power density coupled with low volume and weight - as well as being relatively robust. 
 
For electric vehicle motors, neodymium is typically substituted with dysprosium (not terbium) due to 
price considerations. The amount of substitution will vary depending on the exact application for the 
motor; for instance, hybrid electric vehicles have higher doping levels of dysprosium due to the increased 
temperatures they experience from the ICE motor, compared to fully electric vehicles.   
 
In China, TDK have developed the High-Anistropy Field Layer (HAL) production process which reduces the 
dysprosium requirements by 20-50% without sacrificing magnetic properties. This is achieved by dispers-
ing the dysprosium on the surface of the magnet instead of using it as a neodymium alloy (TDK, n.d.). 
During the process dysprosium uniformly gathers at the periphery of the crystallizing particles; this 
minimises the amount of dysprosium diffusion, which is commonly encountered during conventional 
processes and leads to a reduction in flux density. New production techniques are also being developed 
to minimise the amount of neodymium required whilst providing equivalent levels of temperature re-
sistance. Techniques such as grain boundary diffusion alloying, focus on using dysprosium more effective-
ly within the materials chemical structure. Currently, Japanese companies and research bodies appear to 
be at the forefront of this research and have heavily invested in it. 
Alternative magnet materials 
The closest magnetic materials to neodymium in terms of performance are samarium-cobalt magnets.  
SmCo magnets are the first generation in the family of rare earth magnets and were used for high-
performance applications before the development of NdFeB magnet motors. NdFeB magnets were in fact 
developed to alleviate supply issues associated with cobalt for SmCo magnets. SmCo magnets have 
superior resistance to high temperatures; unfortunately they have about half the magnetic strength of 
neodymium-based magnets (Hatch, 2010). As a consequence, for EV applications a far heavier magnet 
would be required to achieve the same power.   
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The high cost of SmCo has restricted the number of applications they are used in, however with increas-
ing neodymium and dysprosium prices they might become competitive (Figure 37), particularly for higher 
temperature applications such as hybrid vehicles. However SmCo magnets are typically more brittle than 
NdFeB magnets, which can make them more difficult to work with. Figure 38 shows the relative volumes 
of NdFeB, SmCo, ceramic and aluminium-nickel-cobalt (AlNiCo) magnets required to achieve the same 
strength, thus further emphasizing the relative strength of NdFeB magnets. 
 
Figure 37: Relative cost of NdFeB and SmCo magnets ($/kg) 
 
Source: Calculated using Metal Pages, n.d. 
 
 
Other known permanent magnet materials, such as ferrite-based or AlNiCo magnets, are simply not 
powerful enough to be used as drive motors in electric vehicles. In the short term, the replacement of 
neodymium based magnets with ‘yet-to-be-discovered’ magnetic materials should not be relied on. On-
going research in Japan has identified new ferrite materials for potential use in electric vehicle motor; 
however, the likelihood and timescales involved are unclear.   
 
Figure 38: Volume of different magnets needed to generate 1000 gauss at 5mm from pole face of magnet 
 
Source: Arnold Magnetic Technologies, 2011 
Alternative motor technologies 
As mentioned previously, technology choice can be another way of mitigating possible metals bottle-
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necks. Permanent magnet motors are a relatively new technology and there are many other types of 
motor, which do not require permanent magnets and therefore rare earths. Deployment of these alter-
native technologies will reduce the demand for neodymium and dysprosium. Different motor designs and 
their suitability for electric vehicles are discussed below. These range from mature established technolo-
gies to novel technologies, which are still under development: 
Induction motors (asynchronous) 
Induction motors are a mature and well established technology and are widely used in industrial ap-
pliances of all types. Several electric vehicle manufacturers, including Tesla Motors, use induction 
motors in their fully electric BEVs and they are currently the most viable alternative to rare earth 
motors for EVs. Induction motors do not require permanent magnets; instead a magnetic field is 
produced from copper coils. They have good efficiency at nominal load, but have low efficiency at 
some operations (Schuler et al., 2011).In comparison to NdFeB motors, induction motors are rela-
tively cheap to manufacture due to the high volumes which are produced. The amount of copper 
required depends on the size of the motor, which for an EV typically varies from 1.5 to 9kg (General 
Motors, 2011). A disadvantage is their relative size; for instance, the induction motors used by Audi 
are 20-30% larger and heavier than an NdFeB magnet motor of the same power (Fraunhofer, 2010). 
Switch reluctance 
The advantages of reluctance motors are that they have a simple and robust construction and are 
relatively cheap. However, the major disadvantage is that this type of motor is particularly noisy.  
This has been a deterrent for their use in electric vehicles. Despite this, research effort has been di-
rected at designing switch reluctance motors suitable for use in electric vehicles (Andrada et al., 
2003; Takau and Round, 2003).  
Wound rotor synchronous motors 
Wound rotor synchronous motors are used in the Renault Fluence Z.E. They do not require rare 
earths but have a high copper demand for their copper coils. In comparison to neodymium-based 
magnet motors they are large and heavy and require additional electronics (ExpertVE, n.d.).  
Hybrid motors 
These are a combination of permanent magnet and reluctance motors; they are currently under de-
velopment but have high potential for the future (General Motors, 2011). An advantage of hybrid 
motors is that they use fewer rare earth metals compared to NdFeB magnet motors.   
 
6.4.2 Lighting 
Trends towards larger display technologies and energy efficient lighting have increased demand for 
phosphors. Subsequently, demand for rare earth elements - in particular terbium, yttrium and europium - 
are also on the increase. Substitution and reduction of rare earth elements can offer effective solutions 
to mitigating the risk from future supply-chain bottlenecks. Light emitting diodes (LEDs) are expected to 
gain increased market share; compared to fluorescent lighting, LEDs are more efficient and have lower 
rare earth content.   
 
Rare earth elements have been selected for use in lighting applications because of their optical proper-
ties, which arise due to localised electrons in the f-orbitals. It seems unlikely that the performance in 
terms of colour quality and energy efficiency will be achieved without the use of rare earth elements. 
Consequently, research has been focused on reducing the use of rare earth elements in phosphor as 
supposed to substitution. Strategies for both reduction and substitution of rare earth elements in phos-
phor, as well as alternative lighting technologies are discussed below.   
Rare earth reduction and substitution in solid-state lighting 
The phosphor powder found in fluorescent lights has a rare earth oxide content of 18%, or 0.54% of the 
total weight of the lamp. The rare earth compositions vary, as discussed in section 3.10.3, but typically 
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contain lanthanum, cerium, europium, terbium, yttrium and gadolinium. Shortages in global supplies of 
rare earth elements have already affected the price of fluorescent lighting, for instance Philips have 
reported a price increase of 300% as of July 2011 (Phillips Lighting North America, 2011).  
 
White light LEDs contain a range of different metals, such as nickel, gallium, arsenic, indium, antimony, 
cerium, europium and yttrium. The amount of rare earth metals found will depend on the method em-
ployed to produce white light, either by using a blue or near UV LED chip and a phosphor coating or by 
mixing light from red, green and blue LED chips.   
Strategies for rare earth reduction in phosphor powder 
There are several different approaches currently under investigation for reducing the amount of rare 
earth elements - in particular terbium and europium - required in phosphor powders. One is the use 
of new phosphor compositions which require less europium and terbium, such as cerium-based 
phosphors (Tomoko Akai National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, 2012). In 
classical phosphors, a dramatic loss of brightness is experienced when the terbium or europium con-
tent is reduced. Therefore new phosphor designs are required in order to reduce the rare earth con-
tent without loss of efficiency. Rhodia’s research in this area has shown that significant REE savings 
can be achieved by redesigning phosphors. They have developed a new design for green phosphor 
(LAP) which uses 30% less terbium than previous designs, without sacrificing performance (Rollat, 
2012).  
 
Another is the use of alternative methods for producing phosphors which consume reduced 
amounts of rare earth elements. One method under investigation is a new synthesis route which 
aims to increase doping efficiency, and thereby reduce the use of rare earth elements, by precise 
control of the placement of REE dopants in the host material. Reducing the amount of phosphors 
required in lights by increasing the efficiency of lamps may also provide a method for reducing the 
amount of rare earth elements required. One method under investigation employs luminescent sili-
ca materials and UV light in the lamp.  Another strategy is to increase the extraction efficiency of the 
light by patterning of nanostructures on the glass surface.  
Strategies for rare earth substitution in phosphor powder 
Manganese-based phosphors, such as Zn2SiO4:Mn and MgGa2O4:Mn, are currently being explored as 
alternatives to rare earth-based phosphors. A project sponsored by the US Department of Energy 
Office of Science is exploring the use of manganese in its various oxidation states as a replacement 
for rare earth element activators in phosphor (IMCOA in US DOE, 2011). However, these technolo-
gies are still in the early stages of development and, so far, stability issues have been reported to be 
a major issue.   
Organic light emitting diodes (OLEDs) 
OLEDs were developed in the 1980s as an alternative technology to the more commonly used LEDs, and 
they have the potential to become a viable rare earth-free alternative to other low energy lighting tech-
nologies such as LEDs and fluorescents. In OLEDs the electroluminescent layer is a film of organic com-
pound - either small molecules or polymers - instead of the inorganic semiconductors. OLEDs are com-
prised of a series of thin organic layers, each around 100-200nm thick, placed between an anode and a 
cathode. The organic materials are selected for their conductive properties and are considered organic 
semiconductors. The most commonly used anode material for OLEDs is indium tin oxide (ITO) and the 
cathode is typically made from barium or calcium with a capping layer or aluminium.   
 
The high cost of manufacture has prevented OLEDs from being commercially widespread. Despite this 
they are beginning to appear in a range of consumer electronics. Successful commercial applications of 
OLEDs include displays for mobile phones and digital cameras and televisions. Due to their high manufac-
turing cost, OLEDs are more commonly found in consumer electronics than in lighting applications. Many 
challenges still remain before the technology can be successfully used in lighting applications. OLED 
lighting panels are currently available as prototypes for niche applications at very high prices.   
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In contrast to LEDs and incandescent light bulbs, OLED lighting is produced as light panes and not as light 
points. The major difference between OLEDs and LEDs is that OLEDs produce light at low intensity spread 
over large areas whereas LEDs are more compact sources. An advantage of OLEDs over other light 
sources is that there is no glare emitted and as a result they do not require reflectors. The efficiency of 
OLED lighting is yet to match that of LED lighting. However, research has shown that the efficiencies of 
OLEDs can be significantly increased through doping with transition metal complexes such as rhenium, 
osmium or iridium based phosphorescent dyes (Thorseth, 2007). Rare earth metals can also be used as 
dopants in OLED applications.   
 
The lifespans of OLED systems are currently lower than that of LEDs; current state of the art is around 
5000 operating hours. However, due to increased research in this field the lifespan is constantly increas-
ing and it is expected that they will be similar to those of LEDs in the near future. While there is great 
potential for OLEDs in architectural and niche decorative applications, it remains to be seen whether or 
not the technology can contribute to energy savings in general lighting applications.   
Quantum dots 
Quantum dots are a promising technology for lighting applications, as well as in electronic displays and 
automotive markets. The first commercial lighting applications of quantum dots used them as a coating 
on blue LEDs to help create a warmer white light; this is known as quantum dot LEDs (QD-LED). The 
advantage of this approach is that blue LEDs are the most efficient; in addition fewer LED chips are re-
quired when a quantum dot coating is required, thus leading to further increases in efficiency.  
 
The first commercially available light bulb with this technology was delivered in 2010 (Nexxus Lighting, 
2010). The Nexxus Array Quantum LED™ R30 is reported to use up to 80% less energy and last up to 25 
times longer than an equivalent incandescent light bulb. The technology for quantum dot LEDs is still in 
its infancy; however, it is a viable alternative to traditional white LED lights with a lower demand for rare 
earth elements such as europium.   
 
To obtain white light in fluorescent lights, red, green and blue phosphors are blended. Semiconductor 
nanocrystals, or quantum dots are being investigated as an alternative to phosphors for the generation of 
white light (SAND, 2004).By using quantum dots it is possible to create white light directly, thus eliminat-
ing the need for a range of phosphors. The range of visible photoluminescence emitted by quantum dots 
can be tuned by altering their size and surface chemistry. Zinc sulphide quantum dots have shown poten-
tial as an alternative to rare earth phosphors for both white LED and fluorescent lighting applications (The 
Economist, 2010). 
 
6.4.3 Tellurium 
There has been noticeable activity in the past year with regards to the minimisation of the thickness of 
CdTe thin films, and substitution away from traditional applications. 
Thin film solar 
Historically, the thickness of CdTe thin films is commonly quoted as being 2-8 microns, with a mid-value 
of 5 microns (Figure 39). Research undertaken for the first JRC study highlighted the developmental 
nature of the technology in terms of uptake, technology mix and material composition. In that study, 
based upon interviews conducted with leading manufacturers and review of additional data, a thickness 
of CdTe films of 2.5-3 microns was modelled. Furthermore indium tin oxide was declared as not being the 
TCO of choice for First Solar, the dominant player in CdTe with a market share of near 90% for this tech-
nology. However some of the smaller CdTe manufacturers are known to use indium-based TCOs. 
 
In its recent materials roadmap for photovoltaic technology, the EC JRC has set targets for the thickness 
of CdTe thin films, as well as various other parameters for efficiency and material usage (Table 164). For 
2012 the KPI is for a CdTe layer thickness of 1.8 microns. If this is achieved, this will reduce the tellurium 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
148 
 
usage by a third compared to the estimates contained in this study. The long-term KPI is for a thickness of 
1 micron from 2020 using graded absorbers and the minimisation of cadmium and mercury. This indi-
cates the effect that resource efficiency and material substitution can have upon metal demand.   
 
Figure 39: CdTe cell configuration and manufacturing value chain 
 
Source: EC, 2011f 
 
Table 164: Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the EU CdTe Material Usage 
 KPI Unit 2012 2015 2020 2030-2050 
Industrial manufactured 
module efficiency 
%  13 15 18 
Industrial manufacturing cost €/Wp  <1 0.5 0.3 
CdTe layer thickness μm 1.8 1.5 1.0 graded absorbers and 
minimisation of Cd / Hg 
CdS layer thickness μm 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Al layer thickness μm 0.3 Alternative back contact 
Deposition temperatures °C 450 400 =/< 350 Non vacuum prin-
table deposition processes 
Source: EC, 2011f 
Other applications 
Traditional applications for tellurium include: metallurgy, in which tellurium is included as an alloying 
additive to improve machining characteristics; as a vulcanising accelerator in the rubber industry; and 
some other uses in the chemicals and pharmaceutical industries. Substitution is possible in these uses; 
indeed Jaffe (2010) suggests that it is likely to be more economic than mining primary tellurium ores or 
recovery from zinc or lead sulphide ores. However, increasing tellurium recovery from electrolytic copper 
refining remains the priority in his opinion. Policy measures to encourage substitution of tellurium in 
these lower value applications may involve raising the profile and awareness of these alternative materi-
als within the relevant industries. 
 
Selenium can replace tellurium in free-machining low-carbon steels, as can bismuth, calcium, lead, phos-
phorus and sulphur (USGS, 2008). Tellurium can be replaced by selenium and sulphur in rubber com-
pound applications and selenium, germanium and organic compounds in electronic applications. Seleni-
um can also replace tellurium in chromium-tellurium magnetic alloys. However, the replacement of 
tellurium with selenium can have problems, as selenium is considerably more toxic than tellurium so 
additional precautions need to be taken in the work place. Indeed the USGS expects consumption of 
tellurium within these low-value products to decrease as the cost of tellurium rises due to demand from 
solar PV (USGS, 2008). 
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It is noticeable that in earlier sources metallurgy is commonly quoted as the most significant application 
for tellurium (42% of usage), followed by solar PV (26%) and chemicals and pharmaceuticals (21%) (EC, 
2010a). This situation seems to have now been reversed with solar now accounting for 40% of tellurium 
usage, compared to 15% for metallurgy (see Appendix 6, Figure A6.15). This is expected to continue - 
although is more for the long term, as it requires formulation changes in steel (International Study Group 
for Nickel et al., 2012).  As for other tellurium applications, substitution has already been largely com-
pleted within the photoreceptors of copiers and printers. The STDA comments that use of tellurium in the 
rubber industry is price-sensitive, and that much of tellurium use in thermoelectric modules is also price-
sensitive. However, at the high end (for example mobile devices, laptops and phase change memory) 
price sensitivity is lower.   
 
6.5 Summary 
The evidence reviewed in this chapter has identified numerous initiatives that are underway to mitigate 
raw materials risks associated with rare earths, gallium and tellurium. These are largely driven by the 
costs of these materials, but also to some extent by concerns regarding their availability. 
 
In terms of increasing primary supply, possibilities exist for a rare earths mine within Europe, although 
development is still in the early stages. The Norra Kärr deposit in Sweden is relatively attractive given its 
high proportion of heavy rare earths. An alternative mitigation option, particularly in the short term, is to 
process rare earth concentrates from tailings, by-product sources or open another mine outside Europe. 
This could help to stimulate European rare earths knowledge, expertise and production capacity and use 
the processing and separation facilities that already exist in Europe. The data indicate that Europe already 
has a degree of self-sufficiency for gallium and tellurium; however, opportunities may exist to create 
further refineries to boost recovery of these materials. 
 
For reuse, recycling and waste reduction, the data indicate that significant improvements have already 
been made in recent years regarding the recycling of post-industrial waste streams. The evidence shows 
that wastes from magnet, semi-conductor and photovoltaic manufacture are now commonly being 
recycled. The recycling of post-consumer waste streams is more of a problem owing to the issues associ-
ated with collecting, sorting and pre-processing the relevant waste streams. The long lifetimes of certain 
product groups - notably hybrid and electric vehicles, wind turbines and photovoltaic cells – are a further 
limitation due to the low volumes available for recycling. Nevertheless, near term opportunities and 
initiatives do exist for the recovery of rare earth magnets from hard disc drives and rare earth phosphors 
from lighting. 
 
For substitution, the cost implication of these materials has already resulted in significant reduction in 
materials intensity for some applications. This includes the reduction of dysprosium and neodymium in 
rare earth magnets, of terbium and europium within rare earth phosphors and the minimisation of the 
thickness of tellurium within thin film photovoltaic solar. Systemic approaches to materials substitution 
are also being widely considered including alternative motors technologies e.g. asynchronous or switch 
reluctance; and alternative lighting technologies e.g. LEDs, OLEDs and quantum dots. Opportunities also 
exist to substitute current use of the critical materials from traditional applications where other materials 
are suitable e.g. eliminate tellurium from steel alloys. 
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7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Summary 
The last two years have seen much debate on how to categorise the resources of ‘critical’ importance to 
a particular business or country. However, in a world of diverse interests and timescale considerations, a 
broad consensus seems to have emerged on which resources are critical, including rare earth elements 
from China and various other ‘minor’ metals. This study contributes to this policy debate by identifying 
important materials for particular low-carbon technologies, and assessing the market and geopolitical 
risks associated. 
 
This study has built on the existing research conducted in the first JRC study (Moss et al, 2011) and by 
modelling the uptake and material intensity of key low-carbon technologies within the EU, mostly using 
scenarios from the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011b). The top 32 metals identified within the current 
study in terms of the estimated requirements within the EU versus projected supply are shown in Figure 
40. 
 
 
Figure 40: Annual EU metals demand from decarbonisation technologies, % of expected supply 2020-2030 
 
 
 
 
The results identified dysprosium as having the most significant demand compared to projected supply, 
with the EU requiring over 25% of expected world supply to meet EU demand for hybrid and electric 
vehicles and wind turbines. Other materials of significance include: lithium, graphite, neodymium and 
praseodymium (for hybrid and electric vehicles, and wind); tellurium, indium and tin (for solar energy); 
platinum (for fuel cells); and terbium, europium, yttrium, germanium and gallium (for lighting). The full 
list of the 32 metals with their associated technology(ies), shown in brackets, is given in Table 165. 
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Table 165: Reduced list of 32 materials with the associated key decarbonisation technology 
1. Dysprosium (vehicles, wind) 
2. Lithium (vehicles) 
17.  Silver (solar, lighting) 
18.  Lanthanum (vehicles) 
3. Graphite (vehicles) 19.  Samarium (vehicles) 
4. Tellurium (solar) 20.  Copper (CHP, solar, vehicles, grids) 
5. Neodymium-Praseodymium (vehicles, wind) 21.  Hafnium (nuclear) 
6. Indium (solar, lighting, nuclear) 22.  Cerium (vehicles) 
7. Platinum (fuel cells) 23.  Gold (lighting) 
8. Terbium (lighting) 24.  Rhenium (fossil fuels) 
9. Tin (solar) 25.  Tantalum (geothermal, fossil fuels) 
10. Europium (lighting) 26.  Chromium (desalination) 
11. Gallium (lighting, solar) 27.  Vanadium (CCS) 
12. Cobalt (vehicles, fossil fuels) 28.  Niobium (CCS) 
13. Nickel (desalination, vehicles, geothermal) 29.  Selenium (solar) 
14. Germanium (lighting) 30.  Lead (grids, storage) 
15. Yttrium (lighting) 31.  Cadmium (solar) 
16. Molybdenum (desalination, wind) 32.  Gadolinium (lighting)  
 
 
These 32 metals were further analysed according to market and geopolitical factors to assess their criti-
cality. Based on the combination of supply chain risks, a reduced list of metals was derived (see Table 
166): 
 
• Eight metals were given a high criticality rating and are therefore classified as ‘critical’. These are 
the six rare earth elements: dysprosium, europium, terbium, yttrium, praseodymium and neo-
dymium; and the two elements gallium and tellurium. 
   
• Six metals were given a medium-to-high rating and are classified as ‘near critical’. It is suggested 
that the market conditions for graphite, rhenium, hafnium, germanium, platinum and indium are 
monitored in case these metals markets deteriorate with the effect of posing supply chain bot-
tleneck risks.   
 
 
 
Table 166: Criticality ratings of shortlisted raw materials with their associated technology 
 
Element Rating 
Associated  
Technology 
Rare Earths: Dy, Pr, Nd High vehicles, wind 
Rare Earths: Eu, Tb, Y High lighting 
Gallium High lighting, solar 
Tellurium High solar 
Graphite Medium-High vehicles 
Rhenium Medium-High fossil fuels 
Hafnium Medium-High nuclear 
Germanium Medium-High lighting 
Platinum Medium-High fuel cells 
Indium Medium-High solar, lighting, nuclear 
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7.2 Mitigation strategies for the high-critical group of metals  
 
Numerous initiatives are underway to mitigate raw materials risks associated with rare earths, gallium 
and tellurium. These are largely driven by the costs of these materials, but also to some extent by con-
cerns regarding their availability. A more detailed review of the mitigation possibilities for these metals 
was presented in Chapter 5. To summarise: 
 
• In terms of increasing primary supply, possibilities exist for a rare earths mine within Europe, alt-
hough development is still in the early stages. The Norra Kärr deposit in Sweden is relatively at-
tractive given its high proportion of heavy rare earths. An alternative mitigation option, particu-
larly in the short term, is to process rare earth concentrates from tailings, by-product sources or 
open another mine outside Europe. This could help to stimulate European rare earths 
knowledge, expertise and production capacity and use the processing and separation facilities 
that already exist in Europe. The data indicate that Europe already has a degree of self-
sufficiency for gallium and tellurium; however, opportunities may exist to create further refiner-
ies to boost recovery of these materials. 
 
• For reuse, recycling and waste reduction, the data indicate that significant improvements have 
already been made in recent years regarding the recycling of post-industrial waste streams. The 
evidence shows that wastes from magnet, semi-conductor and photovoltaic manufacture are 
now commonly being recycled. The recycling of post-consumer waste streams is more of a prob-
lem owing to the issues associated with collecting, sorting and pre-processing the relevant waste 
streams. The long lifetimes of certain product groups - notably hybrid and electric vehicles, wind 
turbines and photovoltaic cells – are a further limitation due to the low volumes available for re-
cycling. Nevertheless, near term opportunities and initiatives do exist for the recovery of rare 
earth magnets from hard disc drives and rare earth phosphors from lighting. 
 
• For substitution, the cost implication of these materials has already resulted in significant reduc-
tion in materials intensity for some applications. This includes the reduction of dysprosium and 
neodymium in rare earth magnets, of terbium and europium within rare earth phosphors and 
the minimisation of the thickness of tellurium within thin film photovoltaic solar. Systemic ap-
proaches to materials substitution are also being widely considered including alternative motors 
technologies e.g. asynchronous or switch reluctance; and alternative lighting technologies e.g. 
LEDs, OLEDs and quantum dots. Opportunities also exist to substitute current use of the critical 
materials from traditional applications where other materials are suitable e.g. eliminate telluri-
um from steel alloys. 
 
It should be noted that considerable uncertainty affects the results of this study in at least the following 
areas: 
 
• the uptake of particular low-carbon technologies 
• the technology mix between competing sub-technologies 
• the materials composition and associated quantities of some components 
• the substitutability of key materials in certain technologies  
• the projected supply of various metals to 2020 and 2030. 
 
7.3 What can be done in response to supply risks for critical raw materials? 
Many governments and companies are pursuing policies to mitigate their materials risks. Six main areas 
are important, aimed at addressing different concerns: 
 
1. Data collection and dissemination. 
2. Primary production. 
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3. Resource efficiency strategies (includes recycling). 
4. Design and innovation (includes substitution). 
5. Trade and international co-operation. 
6. Procurement and stockpiling. 
 
Numerous mitigation options available to reduce the supply-chain risks for the critical metals have been 
considered. Numerous initiatives were reviewed that are underway, largely driven by the costs of these 
materials, but also to some extent by concerns regarding their availability. These included increasing 
primary supply; encouraging reuse, recycling and waste reduction, and considering materials substitution 
opportunities. 
 
7.3.1 Data collection and dissemination 
For some metals there are surprisingly large evidence gaps regarding production, trade, use and even 
pricing. Without accurate and reliable information, it is almost impossible for governments and business-
es to make appropriate decisions: 
• For example with tellurium, an important material for thin film solar PV, official data only identi-
fies the origin of around a quarter of world production. To fill this data gap, a recent study con-
ducted on behalf of the International Copper Study Group undertook a survey of copper refiner-
ies to assess their tellurium production.   
• Other materials remain unquantified and regular supply-demand studies are useful. The for-
mation of International forums, organisations akin to the International Metals Study Groups 
might be encouraged for this purpose, or existing organisations such as the European Aluminium 
Association or Eurometaux should be requested to undertake similar studies, such as for gallium. 
• The research also identified a relative lack of reliable or historic estimates of the contribution to 
world production from recycled sources. Further research in this area may be considered to be 
desirable in the near future. 
• To support decision-making on recycling, data is required on the volumes of critical raw materials 
available for recycling. Some of this data has been, or is in the process of being, collected – such 
as for the flows of critical raw materials within electronics products in the German and UK econ-
omies. Other product categories should be considered for research e.g. aerospace, defence and 
automotive. 
• Small- and medium-sized enterprises in particular may be unaware of materials risks or of possi-
ble actions to mitigate them. Action is needed to target SMEs and point them to useful infor-
mation. 
 
7.3.2 Primary production 
Investors have been quick to spot the need for and potential profit of new mines, with numerous explo-
ration and development projects underway. There is a growing demand for base metals - for infrastruc-
ture in emerging markets and minor metals in electronics and clean technologies - but longevity of prod-
ucts means that these metals will not be available for recycling until far in the future. Thus new demand 
is likely to continue to drive commodities markets for many years.   
 
Some stakeholders view new primary production to be an “elephant in the room”, because of potential 
environmental and land-use impacts. There is a recognised need to ensure that the highest environmen-
tal and social standards are upheld in order to minimise the consequences of mining and refining. China 
has started closing down many of its small, illegal and highly polluting mines; however the environmental 
impact of mining is an issue throughout the whole world.  Further research, development, demonstration 
and implementation are necessary for suitable technologies that can alleviate stakeholder concerns with 
respect to new and existing facilities. Greater transparency and traceability of raw materials should also 
be encouraged as a means to this end. 
 
However opportunities are not limited purely to new mining projects. Existing reserves, mines, facilities, 
urban mines and spoils offer significant potential. For example, our research has shown that, across the 
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world, there are major base metal smelting and refining operations ignoring the potential to recover 
valuable by-product metals such as gallium, germanium and indium. More speculative opportunities 
include revisiting old mines and refining sites, which might now be considered to be high grade deposits 
by conventional standards, or contain valuable by-products.   
 
Contrary to popular belief, the world is not running out of critical materials, however better geological 
mapping appears necessary for some of these metals, which have only recently seen a growing number 
of new and important applications. However, a word of caution should be noted about attempts that 
may specifically allocate EU funding to projects on the basis of raw materials criticality. 
 
7.3.3 Resource efficiency strategies 
 
Resource efficiency has been widely touted as a solution to Europe’s combined challenges of resource 
security, environmental protection and business competitiveness. These are legitimate and lofty aims, 
but lack specific focus on practical actions that avoid blind alleys: 
 
• Quick-wins often lie in post-industrial waste streams such as scrap from photovoltaic solar panel 
manufacture or superalloy turnings from aircraft engine production. Companies such as Rolls 
Royce can attest to the role that better resource management control has made to conservation 
of scarce materials such as rhenium (Benton and Hazell, 2012). 
• For products such as electronics, appropriate solutions are still needed. The very low recycling 
rate of metals such as beryllium, tantalum and rare earths continue to pose a challenge. New in-
novative technologies for electronics dismantling, separation and recycling need to be devel-
oped.   
• The benefits of reuse, remanufacture and repair should be promoted as they offer the potential 
to considerably extend the lifetimes of products and conserve raw materials that are often cur-
rently difficult to recover. Standards, such as PAS141, can underwrite and reward legitimate op-
erators. Reuse, remanufacturing and repair are poorly understood at a policy level. 
 
The appropriate policy mechanisms and scale of critical metals recycling is an important issue to be 
addressed by the EU in the near future. This concerns the collection and recovering of raw materials from 
end-of-life products and the current practice of exporting significant quantities of waste overseas. There 
are two main sides to this policy debate. The first is the preference by some actors to let market forces be 
the determining factor. The second relates to the wish to recover critical raw materials within the EU for 
strategic reasons. 
 
A debate is necessary about which is desirable. However, this issue is only addressed to a relatively 
limited extent within this study. This is because the focus is on which and how much raw materials are 
required, and not the stage of the value chain at which they are incorporated within the decarbonisation 
technologies. For some technologies the decarbonisation technologies may be manufactured overseas, 
and then imported into Europe, already containing the critical raw materials.  
 
7.3.4 Design and innovation  
Design and innovation, whether by eco-design to better enable disassembly, recycling and remanufac-
ture, or the substitution of one insecure material with another material or compound, offer significant 
scope to mitigate resource risks to business. Reductions in the quantities of key materials used in energy 
technologies, such as through nanotechnology could have significant implications to the estimates pre-
sented in this report. 
 
Innovation is an important lever in the mid-to-long term in order to ease that balance particularly where 
genuine supply limitations have been identified, such as heavy rare earth elements for automotive or 
rhenium for the aerospace industry. For rare earth elements, considerable activity is underway in the 
automotive industry to replace permanent magnet-based motors within hybrid and electric vehicles. This 
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motivation is based on both a combination of security of supply and cost. The relative cost compared to 
vehicles with internal combustion engines, is key for their successful uptake on the mass-market.   
 
Substitution needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis: for some materials it may be possible to 
reduce the use of a particular metal or replace it completely. However, the use of a particular critical 
material can confer exceptional performance that may justify the associated supply risks and additional 
cost incurred. System substitution is also possible, such as by replacing permanent magnet-based motors 
with superconductor motors, geared systems or alternative magnetic materials. Continued, but targeted, 
investment in basic and applied sciences, and support for the development to market is needed to meet 
these challenges.   
 
7.3.5 Trade and international co-operation  
 
With resource nationalism on the rise, strategic alliances are now on the agenda of many foreign minis-
tries. The role of international partnerships has been exemplified by transatlantic and trilateral confer-
ences on raw materials involving the governments and companies of the European Union, United States 
and Japan. This has helped facilitate collaborative discussion and exchange of knowledge on the subject 
of raw materials. The role of International Metals Study Groups has already facilitated considerable 
international dialogue on the topic of by-product metals.   
 
However, following the lodging of raw materials disputes at the World Trade Organisation, the opposite 
approach seems to have been taken against China. It remains to be seen if these appeals will be success-
ful and what impact they might have on international relations. 
 
7.3.6 Procurement and stockpiling  
Western governments have not pursued stockpiling as a resource policy, the notable exception being the 
small US Defense Strategic Stockpile. Good reasons for this include the prominence of free market eco-
nomic ideologies, but also the difficulty of timing sales and purchases without distorting world markets.   
 
On the other hand, Japan has long been a proponent of materials stockpiling for specific metals, but it is 
worth noting that the onus does not all fall on the Japanese government. Private stockpiling by major 
companies constitutes 18 days’ worth of domestic demand of the total 60 day stockpiling target, illustrat-
ing that a mixed approach may offer benefits. 
 
Action on raw materials risks has traditionally taken a back seat to short-term cost savings. Like govern-
ments, private businesses can stockpile, but an alternative is to secure their supply chain through off-take 
agreements and joint ventures with junior mining projects. These strategies have been successfully 
pursued by Toyota and Sumitomo amongst others.   
 
7.3.7 Possible further research 
A number of topics were identified as possibly meriting further research, but could not be considered 
within the immediate scope of this study. Some have been discussed above, but the full list includes: 
 
• A meta-study of the raw materials requirements for hybrid and electric vehicles considering a 
wider range of technology uptake and penetration scenarios than considered within this project. 
• The implications on raw materials of missing or exceeding targets for the uptake of certain de-
carbonisation technologies. 
• Research into the implications for raw materials of continued improvements of internal combus-
tion engines, including advanced lead acid batteries and catalytic convertors. 
• Development of new and more detailed scenarios for the uptake and technology mix of options 
for stationary energy storage in particular. 
• Similar studies could be undertaken for other sectors such as defence and aerospace. 
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• An investigation on the location of production of the decarbonisation technologies and the stage 
of the value chain conducted within Europe. 
• Improving statistics on the contribution of recycling to world production for a number of metals. 
• An assessment of the appropriate scale and location of recycling technologies. 
• The purity of the raw materials required for different decarbonisation technologies. 
• Contribution of greater traceability and transparency to reducing raw materials supply risk. 
7.3.8 Recommended actions 
To conclude, there are numerous risk mitigation strategies available, but ultimately a combination of 
actions is required by both governments and businesses. Table 167 summarises a list of possible policy 
actions to mitigate raw materials risk.  It is noted that some of these are already underway. 
 
However, it is important not to overstate the risks of raw materials bottlenecks for key decarbonisation 
technologies. This is because there are still many years before the large uptake of some technologies and 
there are numerous options available to mitigate the risks identified. 
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Table 167: Possible policy actions to mitigate raw materials risks for the EU path to decarbonisation 
Type Recommended action 
Data collec-
tion & dissem-
ination 
• Collect better data on the production, use, trade and prices of minor metals 
including gallium and other by-product metals 
• Conduct research on product, material flows in the economy, and supply chains 
such as for the aerospace and defence sectors 
• Publish regular studies on supply, demand, prices and outlook for critical metals 
for materials designated as being critical or near critical for EU decarbonisation 
• Conduct further research on the contribution of recycling to world metal produc-
tion 
• Improve the traceability and transparency of raw materials supply chains 
• Disseminate information on material risks and mitigation solutions to SMEs 
Primary 
production 
• Encourage the development of new mines and refineries in Europe, in particular 
for heavy rare earth elements, tellurium and gallium 
• Build greater public acceptance of mining and refining, including the enforcement 
of appropriate environmental and social standards  
• Support RD&D to lower the environmental impact of mining and refining 
• Raise awareness of valuable by-product metals in mining/refining waste streams, 
among major mining companies in particular 
• Improve geological mapping for critical metals, including revisiting the geological 
potential of old mines and refineries, urban mines and spoils 
Resource 
efficiency 
• Investigate recycling potentials for post-industrial waste streams, including im-
proving resource management control procedures within companies 
• Improve collection rates of WEEE and other end-of-life products in order to indi-
rectly increase the availability of scrap in supply chains 
• Develop new mechanical pre-processing techniques for WEEE to effectively dis-
mantle end-of-life products and to minimise/capture fines for recycling 
• Promote the benefits of reuse and remanufacturing at a EU policy and company  
level such as by supporting the uptake and certification of reuse standards 
• Increase the product lifetimes of key products and components including wind 
turbines, engineering components and photovoltaic solar 
Design & 
innovation 
• Promote eco-design practices to better allow disassembly, recycling and reuse 
• Support RD&D for the development of recycling technologies for CRMs in WEEE, 
including pre-processing  and metallurgical recover techniques 
• Continue RD&D for substitution of supply constrained materials such as for heavy 
rare earths within magnets and lighting phosphors or tellurium within steel alloys 
• Support research in technologies such as nanotechnologies, with the potential to 
reduce materials requirements of key technologies such as photovoltaic solar 
International  
co-operation 
• Continue to collaborate internationally to exchange knowledge 
• Consider the formation of additional International Metals Study Groups 
Stockpiling & 
procurement 
• Consider long-term incentives and risk in procurement decisions 
• Explore possibilities to secure materials supply chain 
 
  
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
159 
 
References 
5N Plus, 2011. 5N Plus and Rio Tinto Alcan in Discussions Regarding Development of New Primary Gallium 
Source. 
Aaberg, R.J., 2003. Osmotic Power. Refocus 4, 48–50. 
aalco, 2012. Stainless Steel 1.4571-316Ti. www.aalco.co.uk_ _. 
ACEA, 2011. The Automobile Industry Pocket Guide. 
ACEA, n.d. ACEA Members. [WWW Document]. http://www.acea.be/collection/about_us 
_acea_members/ 
Advances in Materials Technology for Fossil Power Plants, 2010. , in: 6th International Conference Pro-
ceedings. 
Aixtron, 2012. Aixtron Investor Presentation Q1/2012. 
Akai, 2008. Recycling Rare Earth Elements. AIST Today 29, 8–9. 
Alstom Thermal Power, 2012. Gas Turbine Materials with Focus on Re and RE Utilization and Trends. 
Andrada et al., 2003. Switched reluctance drives for electric vehicle applications. Renewable Energy and 
Power Quality Journal April 2003, 373–1–373–7. 
Angerer, G., Marscheider-Weidemann, F., Lüllmann, A., Erdmann, L., Scharp, M., Handke, V., Marwede, 
M., 2009. Rohstoffe für Zukunftstechnologien. Fraunhofer Institut für System- und Innovationsfor-
schung ISI, Karlsruhe. 
Argonne National Laboratory, 2010. Life-Cycle Analysis Results of Geothermal  Systems in Comparison to 
Other Power Systems ( No. ANL/ESD/10-5). U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Systems Division. 
Arnold Magnetic Technologies, 2011. Arnold Magnetic Technologies Presentation. 
Ataei, A., Iranmanesh, A., Rashidi, Z., 2012. Life Cycle Assessment of Advanced Zero Emission Combined 
Cycle Power Plants. International Journal of Environmental Research 6, 801–814. 
Au-Schönenberg hydro power plant, undated. Au-Schönenberg hydro power plant [WWW Document]. 
The International EPDsystem. URL http://gryphon.environdec.com/data/files/6/7871/epd262.pdf 
Avicenne Development in Darton Commodities, 2010. Cobalt Market Review 2009. 
AVX Presentation, 2011. Recent advances in tantalum and niobium capacitor technologies. 
Axeon, undated. Our Guide To Batteries [WWW Document]. URL http://www.axeon.com/Technology 
/Our-Guide-To-Batteries.aspx 
Axpo Hydro Energy, 2009. EPD certification of the Wildegg-Brugg run-of-river power plant and the 
Löntsch high-pressure pumped-storage power plant [WWW Document]. Hydro energy. URL 
http://www.axpo.ch/content/axpo/en/hydroenergie/verantwortung/nachhaltigkeit/oekobilanzen/wil
degg-brugg.html 
Axpo Hydro Energy, 2012. Environmental product declaration: Löntsch high head storage power plant. 
Baden. 
Baba et al., 2010. Hitachi’s Involvement in Material Resource Recycling. 
BatteryUniversity.com, 2012. Die Nickel-Kadmium-Batterie, ihre Dominanz und Zukunft. 
Bauer, D., Diamond, D., Li, J., Sandalow, D., Telleen, P., Wanner, B., 2010. Critical Materials Strategy, 
Department of Energy, USA. Available at: /http://www.energy.gov/news/ documents/ criticalmateri-
alsstrategy.pdf 
Bauer, D., Diamond, D., Li, J., McKittrick, M., Sandalow, D., Telleen, P., 2011. Critical Materials Strategy, 
Department of Energy, USA. 
Beacon Power, 2012. About Flywheel Energy Storage [WWW Document]. 
http://www.beaconpower.com/products/about-flywheels.asp. 
BEAMA, 2010. European Smart Metering Alliance (ESMA) Final Report (SAVE). 
Benton, D., Hazell, H., Resource resilient UK, Circular Economy Task Force, Green Alliance, July 2013 
Berndt, D., Spahrbier, D., 2001. Batteries, in: Ullmann’s Encyclopedia of Industrial Chemistry. Wiley-VCH, 
Weinheim. 
BGR, 2012, Current and future germanium availability from primary sources; MMTA conference Presenta-
tion; April 2012 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
160 
 
Bhangu, H., Ford, D., 2011. Effect of design and materials defects on gas turbine blade failures. 
bio Intelligence Service, ERA Technology, 2011. Preparatory Studies for Ecodesign Requirements of EuPs. 
Lot 22: Domestic and commercial ovens included when incorporated in cookers. European Commis-
sion. 
Bloomberg, 2012. Utilities Plan $79 Billion of Power Plants in Germany, BDEW Says [WWW Document]. 
URL http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-23/utilities-plan-79-billion-of-power-plants-in-
germany-bdew-says.html 
Bloomquist, G., 2009. Factors critical to economic feasibility. Presented at the GeoFund - IGA geothermal 
workshop, Istanbul, Turkey. 
Blunden, L.S., Bahaj, A.S., 2006. Initial evaluation of tidal stream energy resources at Portland Bill, UK. 
Renewable Energy 31, 121–132. 
Boliden, 2011. Kankberg- a new Boliden gold mine. 
Borsani, R., Rebagliati, S., 2005. Fundamentals and costing of MSF desalination plants and comparison 
with other technologies. Desalination 182, 29–37. 
BOSCH, 2012. Greening the Economy - The Role of Industry. Presentation; Brussels 
Boston Consulting Group, 2011. Powering Autos to 2020: The Era of the Electric Car? 
British Geological Survey (BGS), 2012a. World Mineral Production 2006-2010. 
British Geological Survey (BGS), 2012b. World Mineral Statistics Archive [WWW Document]. URL 
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/worldStatistics.html 
Buchert et al., 2009. Critical Metals For Future Sustainable Technologies And Their Recycling Potential. 
UNEP. 
Buijs, B., Sievers, H., 2011. Critical Thinking about Critical Minerals - Assessing risks related to resource 
security. Clingendael International Energy Programme and Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und 
Rohstoffe, pp. 1–19. 
Buijs, B., Sievers, H., Tercero Espinoza, L.A., 2012. Limits to the critical raw materials approach. Proceed-
ings of the ICE - Waste and Resource Management 165, accepted_ _. 
Capros, P., Matzos, L., Tasios, N., De Vita, A., Kouvaritakis, N., 2009. EU energy trends to 2030 - Update 
2009. European Comission, Directorate General for Energy. 
Caron, P., Lavigne, O., 2011. Recent Studies at Onera on Superalloys for Single Crystal Turbine Blades. 
Journal Aerospace Lab 1–14. 
CE Delft, 2011. Impacts of Electric Vehicles – Deliverable 5: Impact analysis for market uptake scenarios 
and policy implications, CE Delft, ICF International, Ecologic Institute 
CEMBUREAU, 2009. Sustainable cement production: co-processing of alternative fuels and raw materials 
in the European cement industry. Brussels, Belgium. 
CEPI, 2011. CEPI Sustainability Report 2011. 
Chemistry Explained, n.d. Tellurium. [WWW Document]. URL http://www.chemistryexplained.com 
/elements/P-T/Tellurium.html 
Chen, H., Cong, T.N., Yang, W., Tan, C., Li, Y., Ding, Y., 2009. Progress in electrical energy storage system: a 
critical review. Elsevier 19. 
COGEN Europe website, knowledge centre, 2012. COGEN Europe [WWW Document]. URL 
http://www.cogeneurope.eu/knowledge-centre_36.html 
Committee on Climate Change, 2012. Cost and performance of EV batteries. Cambridge. 
Committee on Critical Mineral Impacts on the U.S.Economy, Committee on Earth Resources, National 
Research Council, 2008. Minerals, critical minerals and the U.S. economy. The National Academies 
Press, Washington. 
Compound Semiconductor Magazine, 2003. Growth Predicted for Gallium Market. Compound Semicon-
ductor Magazine. 
Congressional Budget Office, 1983. Strategic and Critical Nonfuel Minerals: Problems and Policy Alterna-
tives. The Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, Washington. 
CreditSuisse, 2009a. The Choice Between Hybrid and Electric Cars [WWW Document]. Global Trends. URL 
https://infocus.credit-
suisse.com/app/article/index.cfm?fuseaction=OpenArticle&aoid=287312&coid=118&lang=EN 
CreditSuisse, 2009b. Electric Vehicles. 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
161 
 
CRU Presentation, 2012. ICSG Economics and Environment Committee Regular Meeting. 
Cuenca, R.M., Gaines, L.L., Vyas, A.D., 2009. Evaluation of Electric Vehicle Production and Operating 
Costs. Argonne National Laboratory. 
cycLED, n.d. CycLED About. [WWW Document]. URL http://www.cyc-led.eu/About.html 
Daewoo E&C, 2009. Sihwa Tidal Power Plant Project. 
Darby, J.B., 1984. Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion - Materials Issues. J.MATERIALS FOR ENERGY SYS-
TEMS 6, 130–137. 
Deloitte, 2010. Turkish Home Appliances and Electronics Industry Report. 
Delyannis, E., Belessiotis, V., 2010. Desalination: The recent development path. Desalination 264, 206–
213. 
Denny, E., 2009. The economics of tidal energy. Energy Policy 37, 1914–1924. 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 2010. Severn Tidal Power - Feasibility Study Conclu-
sions and Summary Report. 
Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research, 2008. Electric Cars: Plugged In – Batteries must be included 
Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research, 2009. Electric Cars:  Plugged In 2. North America, United States. 
Deutsche Bank Research, 2010. Hydropower in Europe. The Alps, Scandinavia and South-eastern Europe – 
rich in opportunities. 
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V., 2012. Feststoffspeicher für den Temperaturbereich 100 
- 600˚C [WWW Document]. URL _http://www.dlr.de/tt/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-4727/7819_read-
12192/_ 
DeVries et al., 2004. Cold Storage: Battery energy storage system for Golden Valley Electric Association. 
ABB. 
DiChristina, M., 1995. Sea Power. Popular Science 246, 70–73. 
Döring, H., 2008. Zentrum für Sonnenenergie und Wasserstoff-Forschung. Personal Communication, 
19.3.2008. Stuttgart 2008. 
Douglas, C.A., Harrison, G.P., Chick, J.P., 2008. Life cycle assessment of the Seagen marine current turbi-
ne. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part M: Journal of Engineering for the 
Maritime Environment 222. 
Du & Graedel, 2011. Uncovering the Global Life Cycles of the Rare Earth Elements. Scientific Reports 1. 
Egré, D., Milewski, J.C., 2002. The diversity of hydropower projects. Energy Policy 30, 1225–1230. 
El-Dine et al., 2011. Natural radioactivity and rare earth elements in feldspar samples, central eastern 
desert, Egypt. Applied Radiation and Isotopes 5, 803–7. 
Electric Drive Transportation Association, n.d. . 
Enerdata, 2011. Energy efficiency trends for household in the EU. 
Enghag, 2004. Gallium, Indium and Thallium. Encyclopedia of the Elements: Technical Data - History - 
Processing - Applications.  
ENTSO-E, 2010. Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2010-2020. 
EPOW, 2011. Study into the feasibility of  protecting and recovering critical  raw materials through  
infrastructure development in  the south east of England. ( No. LIFE08). 
EPRI, US Department of Energy (DOE), 2003. EPRI-DOE Handbook of Energy Storage for Transmission & 
Distribution Applications. 
Erdmann, L., Graedel, T.E., 2011. Criticality of Non-Fuel Minerals: A Review of Major Approaches and 
Analyses. Environmental Science and Technology 45, 7620–7630. 
Ernst & Young, 2011. Technology Minerals: The rare earths race is on! 
EUROFER, 2012. European Steel in Figures. Brussels. 
European Commission (EC), 2007a. European Council conclusions adopted on the basis of the Commis-
sion’s Energy Package, e.g. the Communications: An Energy Policy for Europe COM(2007)1, Limiting 
Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius—The way ahead for 2020 and beyond, COM(2007)2, Brus-
sels 
European Commission (EC), 2007b. A European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan), Towards a 
low carbon future, COM(2007)723, Brussels. 
European Commission (EC), 2007c. Preparatory studies for Eco-design requirements of EuPs: Public street 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
162 
 
lighting final report ( No. 2007/ETE/R/021). 
European Commission (EC), 2008a. The raw materials initiative - meeting our critical needs for growth 
and jobs in Europe, COM(2008)699, Brussels. 
European Commission (EC), 2008b. Preparatory study on the environmental performance of residential 
room conditioning appliances (airco and ventilation). Draft report of Task 5, definition of base case. 
European Commission (EC), 2009. Study on the Energy Savings Potentials in EU Member States, Candi-
date Countries and EEA Countries (No. TREN/D1/239-2006/S07.66640). 
European Commission (EC), 2010a. Critical Raw Materials for the EU. Report of the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on defining critical raw materials, July 2010, Brussels. 
European Commission (EC), 2010b. Energy Efficiency and CO2 Emissions: Prospective Scenarios for the 
Cement Industry, EUR 24592, Joint Research Centre, Brussels 
European Commission (EC), 2010c. IPPC BAT Reference document: cement, lime and magnesium oxide 
manufacturing industries, Joint Research Centre, Brussels  
European Commission (EC), 2010d. Annex V to the Report of the Ad-hoc Working Group on defining 
critical raw materials, Brussels. 
European Commission (EC), 2011a. A roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050, 
COM(2011)112, Brussels. 
European Commission (EC), 2011b. Energy Roadmap 2050, COM(2011)885/2, Brussels. 
European Commission (EC), 2011c. 2011 Technology Map of the European Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan (SET-Plan), EUR 24979, Joint Research Centre, Brussels. 
European Commission (EC), 2011d. Road transport efficiency [WWW Document]. URL 
http://setis.ec.europa.eu/technologies/Road-transport-efficiency/info 
European Commission (EC), 2011e. Technical background study in support of the development of the EU 
Ecolabel and GPP criteria for office buildings ( No. 151935-2010-A08-ES). 
European Commission (EC), 2011f. Scientific Assessment in support of the Materials Roadmap enabling 
Low Carbon Energy Technologies. Photovoltaic Technology, EUR 25172, Joint Research Centre, Brus-
sels. 
European Commission (EC), 2012a. Prospective Scenarios on energy efficiency and CO2 emissions in the 
EU Iron & Steel Industry, EUR 25543, Joint Research Centre, Brussels 
European Commission, (EC), 2012b. ICT Competitiveness [WWW Document]. Information and communi-
cation technologies, Brussels. URL http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ict/competitiveness 
/index_en.htm 
European Commission (EC), 2012c. Ocean Wave Energy: Technology Information Sheet [WWW Docu-
ment]. URL http://setis.ec.europa.eu/newsroom-items-folder/ocean-wave-energy-technology-
information-sheet, Joint Research Centre, Brussels 
European Commission (EC), Eurostat, 2012. Energy Statistics- Quantities (nrg_100a). 
European Lamp Companies Federation, 2012. Lamps and lighting, material composition [WWW Docu-
ment]. URL http://www.elcfed.org/2_lighting_composition.html 
European Lamp Companies Federation, n.d. ELCFED Members. [WWW Document]. URL 
http://www.elcfed.org/2_about_members.html?3e3ea140 
European Ocean Energy Association (EOEA), 2010. Oceans of energy - European Ocean Energy Roadmap 
2010-2050. 
Evans, A., Strezov, V., Evans, T.J., 2012. Assessment of utility energy storage options for increased renew-
able energy penetration. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 16, 4141–4147. 
ExpertVE, n.d. Powertain: AC Motor and inverter. 
Fernandes, D., Piti‚, F., c ceres, G., Baeyens, J., 2012. Thermal energy storage: “How previous findings 
determine current research priorities”. Energy 39, 246–257. 
First Solar, 2012. The long-term supply of tellurium and the anatomy of the immediate market decline. 
First Solar, n.d.a Module Collection and Recycling Program. [WWW Document]. URL 
http://www.firstsolar.com/en/Sustainability/Environmental/Recycling-Service 
First Solar, n.d.b Product Life Cycle Management. [WWW Document]. URL http://www.firstsolar.com/en/ 
Sustainability/Environmental/Product-life-cycle-management/Recycling-Process 
FirstEnergy, 2011. Alternative & Renewable Energy [WWW Document]. https://www.firstenergycorp.com 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
163 
 
/content/fecorp/environmental/environmental_stewardship/alternative_renewableenergy.html. 
Fisher, K., Wall‚n, E., Laenen, P.P., Collins, M., 2006. Battery Waste Life Cycle Assessment. DEFRA. 
Flint, D., 2011. A Mishap At The Beacon Power Frequency Flywheel Plant. The Eastwick Press. 
Fraunhofer, 2010. Kupfer für Zukunftstechnologien. 
Friedrich, K.A., 2012. Wasserstoff als chemischer Speicher: Erzeugung, Verteilung und Speicherung. 
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. 
Frost & Sullivan, 2008. An Assessment of Current Technologies in Ocean Energy (No. D128). 
Frost & Sullivan, 2009a. Energy Storage - Current Scenario and Future Trends. 
Frost & Sullivan, 2009b. Global Desalination Plant Market ( No. M493-15). 
Frost & Sullivan, 2010a. Desalination - Technology Benchmarking and Stakeholder Analysis. 
Frost & Sullivan, 2010b. Hydro, Wave, and Tidal Power - Market Penetration and Roadmapping. 
Frost & Sullivan, 2011a. Reuse and Recycling to ensure the completion of the “green car.” 
Frost & Sullivan, 2011b. Electricity Storage Technologies: Market Penetration and Roadmapping ( No. 
D2D8-TI). 
Frost & Sullivan, 2011c. Global materials market for alternative energy storage mechanisms ( No. 9833-
39). 
Frost & Sullivan, 2011d. Global Stationary Lead Acid Battery Market. 
Frost & Sullivan, 2012a. Global Prospects for Coal-Fired Power Generation. 
Frost & Sullivan, 2012b. European Wave Energy Market Assessment. 
Fthenakis, 2004. Life cycle impact analysis of cadmium in CdTePV production. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Review 303–334. 
Fujita, R., Markham, A.C., Diaz Diaz, J.E., Martinez Garcia, J.R., Scarborough, C., Greenfield, P., Black, P., 
Aguilera, S.E., 2012. Revisiting ocean thermal energy conversion. Marine Policy 36, 463–465. 
Fund for Peace, n.d. . [WWW Document]. URL  http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2011-sortable 
Gaines, L., Sullivan, J., Burnham, A., Belharouak, I., 2010. Life-Cycle Analysis for Lithium-Ion Battery Pro-
duction and Recycling. 
Gazis, E., Harrison, G.P., 2011. Life cycle energy and carbon analysis of domestic Combined Heat and 
Power generators, in: PowerTech, 2011 IEEE Trondheim. Presented at the PowerTech, 2011 IEEE 
Trondheim, pp. 1 –6. 
General Motors, 2011. Electric Motors 101: Understanding the Basics of Electric Motor Technology. 
Genoese, F., Wietschel, M., 2011. Groátechnische Stromspeicheroptionen im Vergleich. Energiewirt-
schaftliche Tagesfragen 61, 26–31. 
Georgi-Maschler, T., Friedrich, B., Weyhe, R., Heegn, H., Rutz, M., 2012. Development of a recycling 
process for Li-ion batteries. Journal of Power Sources 207, 173–182. 
Gil, A., Medrano, M., Martorell, I., L zabo, A., Dolado, P., Zalba, B., Cabeza, L.F., 2010. State of the art on 
high temperature thermal energy storage for power generation. Part 1 - Concepts, materials and 
modellization. Renewable and sustainable Energy Reviews 14, 31–55. 
Graedel, T.E., Barr, R., Chandler, C., Chase, T., Choi, J., Christofferson, L., Friedlander, E., Henly, C., Jun, C., 
Nassar, N.T., Schechner, D., Warren, S., Yang, M., Zhu, C., 2012. Methodology of metal criticality de-
termination. Environmental Science and Technology 46_ _, 1063–1070. 
Great Western Minerals Group Ltd., 2012. Investor Presentation. 
Great Western Minerals Group Ltd., n.d. Less Common Metals. 
Greber, 2012. Ullmann’s Encyclopedia of Industrial Chemistry: Gallium and Gallium Compounds. Wiley-
VCH Verlag, Weinheim. 
Greenland Minerals and Energy Ltd., 2012. Kvanefjeld Prefeasibility Study Confirms a Long-life, Cost 
Competitive Rare Earth Element-Uranium Project. 
Greenspec, 2012. Solar hot water collectors [WWW Document]. URL http://www.greenspec.co.uk/solar-
collectors.php 
Hagelüken & Meskers, 2009a. Complex Life Cycle of Precious & Special Metals., in: Gradel & Voet Eds. 
Linkages of Sustainability. 
Hagelüken & Meskers, 2009b. Technology Challenges to Recover Precious and Special Metals from Com-
plex Products. 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
164 
 
Halper, M.S., Ellenbogen, J.C., 2006. Supercapacitors: A brief overview. MITRE Nanosystems Group. 
Hamed, O.A., Al-Sofi, M.A.K., Mustafa, G.M., Barmardouf, K., Al Washmi, H., 2001. Overview of design 
features and performance characteristics of saline water conversion corporation (SWCC) MSF plants. 
5th Gulf Water Conference, Doha. 
Hartikainen, T., 2005. Environmental Impacts of Superconducting Power Applications. 
Hatch, G.P., 2010. Earth, wind & fire. Industrial Minerals. 
Hatch, G.P., 2011. Critical Rare Earths - Global supply & demand projections and the leading contenders 
for new sources of supply. Technology Metals Research, Carpentersville. 
Heath, G., Turchi, C., Burkhardt, J., Kutscher, C., Decker, T., 2009. Life Cycle Assessment of Thermal Ener-
gy Storage: Two-Tank Indirect and Thermocline. National Renewable Energy Laboratory. 
Höflich, B., Kreutzkamp, P., Peinl, H., Völker, J., Kühne, M., Kuhn, P., Tzescheutschler, P., Hermes, R., 
Krahl, S., Meisa, K., 2010. Analyse der Notwendigkeit des Ausbaus von Pumpspeicherwerken und an-
deren Stromspeichern zur Integration der erneuerbaren Energien. Berlin. 
HyFLEET:CUTE, 2009. A Report on the Achievements  and Learnings from  The HyFLEET:CUTE Project 2006 
– 2009. 
Ibrahim, H., Ilinca, A., Perron, J., 2008. Energy storage systems - Characteristics and comparisons. Renew-
able and sustainable Energy Reviews 12, 1221–1250. 
ICT, 2007. Lithium-Ion System - Product information. 
ILZSG, 2012a. Review of Trends in 2011: Lead. [WWW Document]. URL http://www.ilzsg.org 
/static/statistics.aspx 
ILZSG, 2012b. Press Release 12th October 2012 ILZSG Session/Forecasts 
ILZSG, 2012c . End uses of Lead [WWW Document]. URL http://www.ilzsg.org/static 
/enduses.aspx?from=1 
IMCOA in US Department of Energy (DOE), 2011. US Department of Energy: Critical Metals Strategy 
(March 2011). 
IMOA, 2011, End Use of Molybdenum 2010; Steel & Metals Market Research 
in.RET Institut für Regenerative Energietechnik, 2009. Thermische Energiespeicher. Freistaat Thüringen - 
Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Technologie, LEG Thüringen. 
Indium Corporation, 2010. Indium, Gallium & Germanium. Supply & Price Outlook. 
Indium Corporation, 2011. Sustainability of Indium and Gallium In the Face of Emerging Markets. 
Indium Corporation, 2012. Indium Sources and Applications. 
Industrial Minerals, 2010. Concern over battery grade graphite supplies. 
Industrial Minerals, 2012. Supply Situation Report: China widens its graphite sphere of influence. 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2010a. Phase out of incandescent lamps. Implications for international 
supply and demand for regulatory compliant lamps. Paris. 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2010b. Energy Technology Perspectives, Scenarios and Strategies to 
2050. 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2010c. Gas-Fired Power, Technology Brief. 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2011a. Technology Roadmap. Electric and plug-in hybrid electric 
vehicles. 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2011b. Technology Roadmap: Concentrating Solar Power. 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2011c. Technology Roadmap: Solar Voltaic Energy. 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2011d. Technology Roadmap. Geothermal Heat and Power. 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2011e. Power Generation from Coal: Ongoing Developments and 
Outlook. 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2012. Ocean energy [WWW Document]. URL _http://www.iea.org 
/topics/oceanenergy/_ 
International Energy Agency (IEA), Clean Coal Centre, 2011. Coal power generation technology status and 
future requirements. 
International Study Group for Nickel, International Study Group for Lead & Zinc, International Study 
Group for Copper, 2012. Study of By-Products of Copper, Lead, Zinc and Nickel. 
International Thermoelectric Society, n.d. Module Manufacturers: Website. 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
165 
 
ISIS, 2007. Preparatory Studies for Eco-design Requirements of EuPs. Lot 13, Domestic Refrigerators and 
Freezers. 
IVF Industrial Research and Development Corporation, 2005. Preparatory studies for Eco-design Re-
quirements of EuPs. Lot 3. Personal Computers (desktops and laptops) and Computer Monitors ( No. 
07004). European Commission DG TREN. 
J. Thijssen, LLC, 2011. Solid Oxide Fuel Cells and Critical Materials: A Review of Implications ( No. R102 06 
04D1). National Energy Technology Laboratory. 
J.D. Power and Associates, 2010. Drive Green 2020: More Hope than Reality? 
Jaffe, 2010. Critical Elements for New Energy Technologies. 
Johnson Matthey, 2012. Platinum 2012. 
Kapranos, P., Priestner, R., 1987. Overview of metallic materials for heat exchangers for ocean thermal 
energy conversion systems. Journal of Materials Science 22, 1141–1149. 
Kelly, K.A., McManus, M.C., Hammonda, G.P., 2012. An energy and carbon life cycle assessment of tidal 
power case study: The proposed CardiffeWeston severn barrage scheme. Energy. 
Khawaji, A.D., Kutubkhanah, I.K., Wie, J.-M., 2008. Advances in seawater desalination technologies. 
Desalination 221, 47–69. 
Kingsnorth, D.J., IMCOA, 2012. The Global Rare Earths Industry: the Supply Chain Challenges. 
Klobasa, M., Marscheider-Weidemann, F., Oberschmid, J., Radgen, P., 2008. Indikatoren zur Bewertung 
der Umweltauswirkungen der Speichertechnologien. MAVO “Advanced Energy Storage”_ _, Karlsruhe. 
Kopacek, n.d. E-waste management presentation 
KPMG, 2012. Commodity Insights Bulletin - Chrome and Ferrochrome Apr12 | KPMG | GLOBAL [WWW 
Document]. URL http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/commodity-
insights-bulletin/pages/chrome-ferrochrome-april-2012.aspx 
Lankey, R., McMichael, F., 1999. Rechargeable Battery Management and Recycling: A Green Design 
Educational Module. Carnegie Mellon University. 
Larsen, 2009. End of Life PV: then what? Recycling solar PV panels. 
Lazarewicz, M., Judson, J., 2011. Performance of First 20 MW Commercial Flywheel Frequency Regulation 
Plant [WWW Document]. http://www.beaconpower.com/files/Beacon_Power_presentation 
_ESA%206_7_11_FINAL.pdf. 
Lehner, T.F., 2011. Development of 2G HTS wire for demanding electric power applications [WWW Doc-
ument]. 
Lifton, 2009. The Tellurium Supply Conjecture. Resource Investor. 
Lim, S.-R., Kang, D., Ogunseitan, O.A., Schoenung, J.M., 2011. Potential Environmental Impacts of Light-
Emitting Diodes (LEDs): Metallic Resources, Toxicity, and Hazardous Waste Classification. Environ. Sci. 
Technol. 45, 320–327. 
Lipmann Walton & Co, 2012, Hafnium Supply-Demand – MMTA – Brief Metal Statistics 
http://www.lipmann.co.uk/articles/metal-matters/hafnium-supply-demand-mmta-brief-metal-
statistics/ [accessed December 2012] 
Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2010. Will There Be Sufficient Rare Earths To Meet Demand From Clean Energy 
Technology? 
Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2011. . Investor Presentation March 2011 Available at http://www.lynascorp.com 
/content/upload/files/Presentations/Investor_Presentation_March_2011_950850.pdf.  [Accessed 
04/05/2011] 
Malik, A.U., Andijani, I., 2005. Corrosion behavior of materials in RO water containing 250-350 ppm 
chloride. International Desalination Association, Singapore. 
Malik, A.U., Kutty, P.C.M., 1992. Corrosion and material selection in desalination plants. SWCC O & M 
Seminar, Al Jubail. 
Mantuano, D.P., Dorella, G., Elias, R.C.A., Mansur, M.B., 2006. Analysis of a hydrometallurgical route to 
recover base metals from spent rechargeable batteries by liquid-liquid extraction with Cyanex 272. 
Journal of Power Sources 159, 1510–1518. 
Market Transformation Programme, 2007. Insulation industry, product and market overview. 
Martinsson, Å., 2006. Ageing Influence on Nickel-based Superalloys at Intermediate Temperatures (400-
600°C) (Master’s Thesis, Luleå University of Technology). 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
166 
 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 2008. On the Road in 2035: Reducing Transportation’s 
Petroleum Consumption and GHG Emissions ( No. LFEE 2008-05 RP). MIT Laboratory for Energy and 
the Environment, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
McKinsey, 2010. A portfolio of power-trains for Europe:  a fact-based analysis. 
McKinsey, 2012, Lighting the way: Perspectives on the global lighting market 
Metal Pages, 2012. The rare earth market: a monthly analysis for the rare earth industry [WWW Docu-
ment]. URL http://www.metal-pages.com/reports/ 
Metal Pages, n.d. Prices. [WWW Document]. URL https://www.metal-pages.com/metalprices/ 
Metso, 2012. Process Optimizer [WWW Document]. URL http://www.metso.com/pulpandpaper 
/MPwFiber.nsf/WebWID/WTB-110407-2256F-
E2235?OpenDocument&mid=5A2A6330CB7E52F9C225786C003E5DFC 
Millera, A., Rosarioa, T., Ascarib, M., 2012. Selection and validation of a minimum-cost cold water pipe 
material, configuration, and fabrication method for ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) systems. 
Society for the Advancement of Material and Process Engineering. 
Minerals Management Service, 2012. Ocean Wave Energy [WWW Document]. URL _http://ocsenergy. 
anl.gov/guide/wave/index.cfm_ 
Moats et al, 2007. Electrolytic Copper Refining, World Tankhouse Operating Data. 
Molycorp, 2011. Molycorp Acquires Controlling Stake in AS Silmet, Expands Operations to Europe, Dou-
bles Near-Term Rare Earth Oxide Production Capacity. 
Moskalyk, 2004. Review of Germanium Processing Worldwide. Minerals Engineering 17, 393–402. 
Moss, R., Tzimas, E., Kara, H., Willis, P., Kooroshy, J., 2011. Critical Metals in Strategic Energy Technolo-
gies. Assessing Rare Metals as Supply-Chain Bottlenecks in Low-Carbon Energy Technologies, EUR 
24884, European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Energy and Transport, Petten, The 
Netherlands 
Moss, R., Tzimas, E., Kara, H., Willis, P., Kooroshy, J., 2013. The potential risks from metals bottlenecks to 
the deployment of Strategic Energy Technologies. Energy Policy, 55(2013) 556-564 
Naumov, 2010. Selenium and tellurium: state of the markets, the crisis, and its consequences. Metallur-
gist 54. 
NEEDS, 2008. Final report on technical data, costs and life cycle inventories of fuel cells, Sixth framework 
programme (No. 502687). 
Nexxus Lighting, 2010. Nexxus Lighting delivers first commercially-available quantum dot/led replace-
ment light bulbs. 
Noll, H., Siebenhofer, M., 2012. Recycling von Metallionen aus Lithiumionenbatterien durch Flüssig-
membranpermeation mit gestützten Membranen. 
NREL, 2007. Thin Film CIGS and CdTe Photovoltaic Technologies Commercialization, Critical Issues, and 
Applications. 
Oakdene Hollins, 2010. Lanthanide Resources and Alternatives (No. For Department of Transport). 
Oakdene Hollins, 2012. Resource Security Strategies. 
Objective Capital Conferences, 2011a. Global gold overview. 
Objective Capital Conferences, 2011b. The changing face of lithium availability. 
Oeko Institute, 2012. Recycling critical raw materials from waste electronic equipment. 
Oertel, D., 2008. Energiespeicher - Stand und Perspektiven ( No. 123). Büro für Technikfolgen-
Abschätzung beim Deutschen Bundestag. 
Oldfield, J.W., Todd, B., 1986. Reverse osmosis - which stainless steel to use? ( No. 10003). Nickel Devel-
opment Institute, Birmingham. 
Oliver, T., 2008. Clean fossil-fuelled power generation. Energy Policy 36, 4310–4316. 
Oliver-Solà, J., Gabarrell, X., Rieradevall, J., 2009. Environmental impacts of the infrastructure for district 
heating in urban neighbourhoods. Energy Policy 37, 4711–4719. 
Oró, E., Gil, A., de Gracia, A., Boer, D., Cabeza, L.F., 2012. Comparative life cycle assessment of thermal 
energy storage systems for solar power plants. Renewable Energy 44, 166–173. 
Outokumpu, 2010. Outokumpu Duplex Stainless Steels [WWW Document]. http://www.outokumpu.com 
/SiteCollectionDocuments/Duplex_Stainless_Brochure.pdf. 
Outokumpu, 2012a. The right package for desalination [WWW Document]. http://www.outokumpu.com/ 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
167 
 
en/CustomerIndustries/CaseStudies/Pages/SIDEM-partners-with-Outokumpu.aspx. 
Outokumpu, 2012b. Multiple duplex stainless concept for water project [WWW Document]. 
http://www.outokumpu.com/en/CustomerIndustries/CaseStudies/Pages/Multiple-duplex-concept-
aids-independent-water-project.aspx. 
Parker, R.P.M., Harrison, G.P., Chick, J.P., 2007. Energy and carbon audit of an offshore wave energy 
converter. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part A: Journal of Power and Ener-
gy. 
Pasaoglu et al., 2012. Potential vehicle fleet CO2 reductions and cost implications for various vehicle 
technology deployment scenarios in Europe. Energy Policy 40, 404–421. 
Pfluger, B., 2012. Interim results from the FP7 Project Responses. 
Phillips Lighting North America, 2011. Phosphor- a critical component in fluorescent lamps navigating 
through market fluctuations. 
Pincock, Allen & Holt, 2012. Preliminary Economic Assessment NI 43-101 Technical Report for the Norra 
Karr REE Zirconium Deposit, Granna, Sweden. 
Post, J.W., Veerman, J., Hamelers, H.V.M., Euverink, G.J.W., Metz, S.J., Nymeijer, K., Buisman, C.J.N., 
2007. Salinity-gradient power: Evaluation of pressure-retarded osmosis and reverse electrodialysis. 
Journal of Membrane Science 288, 218–230. 
PPM PureMetals, 2012. Recycling von Gallium, Germanium und Indium. 
ProDes Consortium, 2010. Roadmap for the development of desalination powered by renewable energy. 
Fraunhofer Verlag. 
Prudent Energy, 2011. MW-Class Systems [WWW Document]. http://www.pdenergy.com/ prod-
ucts_mwclasssystems.html. 
Rachwal, T., Judd, S., 2006. A synopsis of membrane technologies in UK municipal potable water treat-
ment: history, status and prospects. Water and Environment Journal 20, 110–113. 
Rautenbach, 2011. Water, 5. Treatment by Membrane Separation Processes, in: Encyclopaedia of Indus-
trial Chemistry. Wienheim: Wiley-VCH, pp. 83–100. 
REconserve, 2012a. Rare Earths from Urban Mining. Tokyo. 
REconserve, 2012b. Second Trilateral EU-Japan-US Workshop. 
Resource Efficiency Knowledge Transfer Network, 2008. Material security: Ensuring resource availability 
for the UK economy. C-Tech Innovation, Chester. 
Reuters, 2011. Molycorp forays into Europe with $89mln AS Silment buy. 
Rhodia, 2011. Umicore and Rhodia develop unique rare earth recycling process for rechargeable batteries 
(Press Release). 
Rhodia, 2012a. Rhodia rare earth systems initiatives. Presentation June 2012, French Embassy in London 
Richaud-Minier, H.V., 2008. Seawater desalination: Comparative performance of titanium and other 
materials for heat exchanger tubing. Desalination and Corrosion Workshop, Brest. 
Richaud-Minier, H.V., G‚rard, P., Marchebois, H., 2007. Use of a new alternative solution for MED and 
MSF heat exchanger tubing. IDA World Congress, Gran Canaria. 
Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2010. Powertrain 2020: Li-Ion Batteries- the next bubble ahead? 
Rollat, 2012. How to satisfy the rare earths demand Rhodia rare earth systems initiatives. 
Rolls Royce, 2008. UK Energy Materials – Materials Developments for Energy Generating Gas Turbines. 
Roskill, 2007. The Economics of Zirconium, 12th ed. Roskill Information Services, London 
Roskill, 2009. The Economics of Tantalum. 10th ed. Roskill Information Services, London 
Roskill, 2010a, Global molybdenum market outlook, Presentation, Roskill Information Services, London 
Roskill, 2010b. Economics of Rhenium, 8th ed. Roskill Information Services, London 
Roskill, 2011. Gallium- Global industry markets & outlook. 8th ed. Roskill Information Services, London 
Roskill, 2012. Global drivers for rare earth demand. Presentation, Roskill Information Services, London 
Rudnik, E., Nikiel, M., 2007. Hydrometallurgical recovery of cadmium and nickel from spent Ni-Cd batter-
ies. Hydrometallurgy 89, 61–71. 
RWE Power, 2010. ADELE - Der adiabate Druckluftspeicher für die Elektrizitätsversorgung. Essen/Cologne. 
RWE, 2008. Age Structure of Power Plants in Europe in 2007 [WWW Document]. URL 
http://rwecom.online-report.eu/factbook/en/marketdata/electricity/generation/agestructure.html 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
168 
 
RWTH Aachen University, 2012. Batterietechnologie und Speichersysteme - Nickel-Cadmium-Batterien. 
Rydh, C.J., Karlström, M., 2002. Life cycle inventory of recycling portable nickel-cadmium batteries. 
Resources, Conservation and Recycling 34, 289–309. 
Rydh, C.J., Svärd, B., 2003. Impact on global metal flows arising from the use of portable rechargeable 
batteries. Science of The Total Environment 302, 167–184. 
Saft Groupe SA, 2009. Batteries and supercapacitors cells for the fully electric vehicle. 
Saito et al., 2006. Recovery of rare earths from sludges containing rare-earth elements. Journal of Alloys 
and Compounds. 
SAND, 2004. Final Report on Grand Challenge LDRD Project. 
Saravia, F., 2012. Reverse osmosis. 
Sauter, S., 2011. Tapping Invisible Rivers. Pictures of the Future. 
Schneuwly, A., Gallay, R., 2000. Properties and applications of superconductors: From the state-of-the-art 
to future trends, in: Proceeding PCIM 2000. 
Scholz, Y., Heide, D., 2012. Stromerzeugung, Lastdeckung und Speicherbedarf im Energiesystem der 
Zukunft. Deutsches Institut für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. 
Schuler et al., 2011. Study on Rare Earths and Their Recycling. 
SDE, 2012. Sea Wave Power Plants [WWW Document]. URL _http://www.sde-energy.com/_ 
Selvamanickam, V., 2011. Coated conductors: From R&D to manufacturing to commercial applications 
[WWW Document]. 
Sharma, A., Tyagi, V.V., Chen, C.R., Buddhi, D., 2009. Review on thermal energy storage with phase 
change materials and applications. Renewable and sustainable Energy Reviews 13, 318–345. 
Silver Institute & GFMS, 2012, World Silver Survey 2012 
Skilhagen, S.E., Dugstad, J.E., Aaberg, R.J., 2007. Osmotic power - power production based on the osmotic 
pressure difference between waters with varying salt gradients. Desalination 220, 476–482. 
Soerensen, H.C., Naef, S., 2008. Report on technical specification of reference technologies (wave and 
tidal power plant). 
Soerensen, H.C., Naef, S., Anderberg, S., Hauschild, M.Z., 2012. Life Cycle Assessment of the Wave Energy 
Converter: Wave Dragon. Technical University of Denmark. 
Statkraft, 2012. The world’s first osmotic power plant opened! [WWW Document]. URL 
_http://www.statkraft.com/presscentre/news/2009/the-worlds-first-osmotic-power-plant-
opened.aspx_ 
Stichlmair, J., 2010. Distillation, 3. Processes, in: Ullmann’s Encyclopedia of Industrial Chemistry. Wiley-
VCH, Weinheim, pp. 477–494. 
Sullivan, J.L., Gaines, L., 2010. A Review of Battery Life-Cycle Analysis: State of Knowledge and Critical 
Needs (2010). Argonne National Laboratory. 
Sullivan, J.L., Gaines, L., 2012. Status of life cycle inventories for batteries. Energy Conversion and Man-
agement 58, 134–148. 
Sustainable Development Commission, Black & Veatch, 2007. Tidal power in the UK: Research Report 3 - 
Review of Severn Barrage Proposals. 
Takau and Round, 2003. Design of a switched reluctance motor for an electric vehicle. Department of 
Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Canterbury. 
Takeda et al., 2005. Recovery of neodymium from a mixture of magnet scrap and other scrap. University 
of Tokyo, Tokyo. 
Tamme, R., Laing, D., Steinmann, W.-D., 2006. Wenn Wärme weg will... DLR Nachrichten. 
Tamme, R., Nunez, T., Göttsche, J., 2005. Speicherung für Hochtemperaturwärme. Themen 2005: Wärme 
und Kälte - Energie aus Sonne und Erde 126–130. 
TDK, n.d. HAL Production Process. 
Technology Metals Research, n.d. Advanced Rare-Earth Projects Index. [WWW Document]. URL 
http://www.techmetalsresearch.com/metrics-indices/tmr-advanced-rare-earth-projects-index/ 
The Australian Institute of Energy, 1999. Fact Sheet 10: Tidal Energy. 
The Cobalt Development Institute, 2011. Cobalt News,. Presented at the CDI Annual Conference, Hong 
Kong, pp. 1–16. 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
169 
 
The Economist, 2010. Quantum Dots: A quantum leap for lighting. 
The European Marine Energy Centre Ltd, 2012. Wave Devices [WWW Document]. URL 
_http://www.emec.org.uk/wave_energy_devices.asp_ 
The Iowa Stored Energy Park, 2011. Press Release: Iowa Stored Energy Park Project Terminated. 
Thielmann, A., Isenmann, R., Wietschel, M., 2010. Technologie-Roadmap Lithium-Ionen-Batterie 2030. 
Fraunhofer ISI, Karlsruhe. 
Thomson Reuters GFMS, 2012. World Gold Survey 2012. 
Thomson Reuters, 2012. Platinum and Palladium Survey 2012. 
Thorpe, T.W., 1999. A Brief Review of Wave Energy. The UK Department of Trade and Industry. 
Thorseth, 2007. Improving OLEDs by Doping With Phosphorescent Organometallic Complexes. 
TNO, 2012. Second Trilateral EU-Japan-US Workshop. 
Tomoko Akai National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, 2012. Reducing Tb, Eu in 
phosphors. 
Toyota, 2012. Sustainability in Manufacturing – Towards Zero Emissions, Toyota Presentation June 2012, 
French Embassy in London 
Trapp, V., 2012. .Fraunhofer ISC, personal communication  
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 2012. Life-cycle assessment of energy and environmental impacts of 
LED lighting products. 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2008. 2008 Minerals Yearbook: Selenium & Tellurium. 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2010a. USGS Minerals Yearbook: Gallium. 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2010b. The Principal Rare Earth Elements Deposits of the United States- A 
Summary of Domestic Deposits and a Global Perspective ( No. Scientific Investigations Report 2010-
5220). 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2011a. Historical Statistics for Mineral and Material Commodities in the 
United States (Online Only). 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2011b. Platinum-Group Metals in 2010 Minerals Yearbook. 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2011c. Rare Earth Elements—End Use and Recyclability. Scientific Investi-
gations Report 2011 ( No. 5094). U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations. 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2012. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2012: U.S. Geological Survey. 
Umicore, 2007. Electronic Scrap Recycling at Umicore. 
Umicore, 2012. second trilateral EU-Japan-US workshop presentation; adapted 
UNEP, 2009. Recycling - From E-Waste to Resources. 
UNEP, 2011. Recycling Rates of Metals: A Status Report. 
University of Tokyo, 2012. Current recycling status of REE in Japan: From Social Systems and Materials 
Flow; Murakami S. presentation at Second EU-Japan-US Workshop on Critical Raw Materials 
Varta, 2012. Development of the battery. 
Vassura, I., Morselli, L., Bernardi, E., Passarini, F., 2009. Chemical characterisation of spent rechargeable 
batteries. Waste Management 29, 2332–2335. 
Vattenfall AB, 2011. Vattenfall’s Nordic hydropower stations: Certified Environmental Product Declara-
tion. 
VGB PowerTech, 2005. Further Initiatives related to the AD700 Technology. 
VHK for European Commission, 2007. Preparatory Study on Eco-design of Boilers. Task 5, Base case. 
Brussels, Belgium. 
Voith, 2012. Wave power plants [WWW Document]. URL _http://voith.com/en/products-services/hydro-
power/ocean-energies/wave-power-plants-590.html_ 
Vulcan, 2009. Gallium: A Slippery Metal. 
Walton & Williams, 2011. Rare earth recovery. Materials World. 
Wang, G., Zhang, L., Zhang, J., 2012. A review of electrode materials for electrochemical supercapacitors. 
Chem.Soc.Rev. 41, 797–828. 
Waste Management World, n.d. Recycling: Rarely so critical. Waste Management World 12. 
Wietschel, M., Ball, M., 2009. The Hydrogen Economy - Opportunities and Challenges. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
170 
 
Wietschel, M., Arens, M., Dötsch, C., Herkel, S., Krewitt, W., Markewitz, P., Möst, D., Scheufen, M., 2010. 
Energietechnologien 2050 - Schwerpunkte für Forschung und Entwicklung, ISI-Schriftenreihe “Innova-
tionspotenziale”. Fraunhofer Verlag, Karlsruhe. 
Williams, 2010. Recycling of NdFeB - Turning Scrap into New Magnets. 
World Bank, 2011. Worldwide Governance Indicators 2011. 
World Nuclear Association, 2012. Policy Responses to the Fukushima Accident. 
World Steel Association, 2012. Sustainable Steel: At the core of a green economy. 
WRAP, 2012. Strategic Raw Materials, Recovery Capacity and Technologies ( No. IMT002-001). 
Xstrata, n.d. . [WWW Document]. URL  http://archive.xstrata.com/falconbridge/www.falconbridge.com 
/our_business/copper/operations/ccr.htm 
Zakotnik et al., 2009. Multiple recycling of NdFeB-type sintered magnets. Journal of Alloys and Com-
pounds. 
 
  
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
171 
 
Appendix 1: Technology Descriptions  
The technology descriptions considered in this report are taken primarily (apart from road transport 
efficiency and desalination) from the JRC's 2011 Technology Map (EC, 2011c), which provides a concise 
and authoritative assessment of the state of the art of each technology, their current and estimated 
future market penetration and the barriers to their large-scale deployment, as well as the on-going and 
planned R&D and demonstration efforts to overcome technological barriers. Other sources (with refer-
ences) have been used to supplement the descriptions. The following sections provide an overview of the 
salient features of each the technology, as used to develop the assessments for material needs and 
consequent demand-to-supply figures.  
 
A1.1 Hydropower 
 
A1.1.1 Background 
Hydropower plants exploit the kinetic energy in flowing water or potential energy in stored water to 
generate electricity. Turbines are placed within the flow of the water to extract the energy and convert it 
to electrical energy by use of a generator. There are several different types of hydropower plants, includ-
ing those with storage reservoirs which can generate electricity as and when needed, thus providing a 
reliable form of large-scale energy storage. Compared to other renewable energy technologies, hydro-
power is a mature technology and is currently the most widely used form of renewable energy for elec-
tricity production, accounting for almost 12% of gross electricity generation in Europe (EC, 2011c).   
 
However, reliance on geographical location and the high capital costs arising from the construction of 
dams present limitations for hydropower in Europe. Currently 64% of economically viable hydropower 
potential is being exploited in Europe; this suggests that Europe’s potential for hydropower is not yet 
exhausted (Deutsche Bank Research, 2010). Areas such as Scandinavia and the Alps, where hydropower 
has long been part of the energy mix, have potential for new hydropower plants; in particular pumped-
storage generating plants as they can be used to match supply from variable renewable sources. There is 
also scope to improve the energy efficiency of older hydropower plants by retrofitting them with new 
turbines and generators.   
 
A1.1.2 Sub-technologies 
Hydropower technology can be split into three main systems. These are:  
• reservoir-based hydropower 
• run-of-the-river (ROR) hydropower 
• pumped hydro energy storage (PHES).   
 
Another commonly used categorisation is to define hydroelectric power plants by their generating capac-
ity. Although there is no internationally accepted standard for size categories (Egré and Milewski, 2002) 
the classification system suggested by the JRC (EC, 2011c) offers some general guidelines: large (> 10 
MW), medium (1 - 10 MW), small (100 kW – 1 MW), micro (5 – 100 kW) and pico (< 5 kW). 
 
Reservoir-based hydropower 
The most commonly used form of hydropower uses dams to create storage reservoirs. These reservoirs 
enable electricity generation with rapid response to load changes. Small dams allow for short term stor-
age, while larger dams enable a consistency of energy supply over seasonal changes. Water from the 
reservoir is delivered to the turbines via a large pipe called a penstock. The three largest hydroelectric 
plants in the world also have the largest generating capacity of any type of power station. These are the 
Three Gorges Dam in China (22.5 GW), Itaipu on the Brazil-Paraguay border (14 GW) and Guri Dam in 
Venezuela (10.2 GW). 
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Run-of-the-river (ROR) 
ROR systems have either no reservoir or only a small reservoir, leaving such systems vulnerable to sea-
sonal water flow. ROR hydropower is therefore most appropriate for streams or rivers with little seasonal 
change, or those that have a reservoir further upstream regulating water flow. A small dam may be used 
to ensure that there is enough water channelled into the penstock to deliver to the turbines further 
downstream. These small dams do not result in large flooded areas of land characteristic of the reservoirs 
used in conventional systems and do not significantly alter the normal course of the river.   
Pumped hydro energy storage (PHES) 
PHES systems provide a means of storing energy and are used to assist power plants in balancing the load 
across periods of low and high demand. PHES systems consist of two or more reservoirs sited at different 
elevations and connected to each other by a penstock, pump and turbine equipment. The energy to 
pump water to the upper reservoir must come from the grid, and therefore pumping usually takes place 
during periods of low energy demand when there is excess generating capacity and the cost of supply is 
low. The water in the upper reservoir is then released during periods of high demand. Both pumping and 
electricity generation are carried out by reversible Francis turbines or by separate pumps and turbines. 
Systems that consist entirely of artificial reservoirs and which do not include any natural waterways are 
usually referred to as ‘closed loop’.   
 
PHES is currently the best available method for large scale energy storage and can be used to regulate the 
supply of electricity when used in conjunction with renewable sources of energy, especially where the 
supply is variable – such as occurs with wind power. Reservoir-based hydropower systems may be also 
outfitted to pump water from a lower to a higher level (essentially reversing its normal function) in order 
to store energy in times of excess power generation, such as during off-peak periods. The water can then 
be allowed to flow down again to recover the energy. 
 
A1.2 Geothermal energy 
A1.2.1 Background 
Geothermal energy sources consist of thermal energy from beneath the earth’s crust, stored in liquid 
water, and trapped steam and rock. The utilisation of geothermal energy sources can be grouped into the 
following applications: electrical power generation, direct use (for heating applications), indirect use (e.g. 
heat pumps) and co-generation applications (combined heat and power, CHP). The temperature and 
enthalpy of the geothermal source is characterised by the geological environment. For instance, high-
temperature geothermal sources (above 180°C) are often associated with recent volcanic activity and are 
found near tectonic plate boundaries. In these locations the crust is often highly fractured owing to 
seismic activity, and is thus permeable to vapour and fluids. 
 
Geothermal power plants often require high capital expenditure arising from the need to drill deep wells 
to reach high-temperature geothermal sources. It has been reported that the European geothermal 
potential is 3.5 GW for hydrothermal electricity and approximately 70 GW from enhanced geothermal 
systems (EC, 2011b). The piping used in geothermal systems may employ corrosion resistant alloys that 
contain metals such as titanium and molybdenum, which are of interest to this study. There are several 
different methods used to obtain energy from geothermal sources. The choice of technological approach 
is determined by the temperature and pressure of the geothermal fluid.   
 
A1.2.2 Sub-technologies 
The technologies which will be explored for geothermal energy are: 
• flash steam plants 
• dry steam plants  
• binary cycle plants  
• combined cycle plants  
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• co-generation plants 
• enhanced geothermal systems (EGS). 
 
Flash steam plants 
Flash steam is the most common system in use today and is chosen when the geothermal fluid is at a 
temperature greater than 180°C. Hot high pressure fluid from an underground reservoir is pumped to the 
surface through a production well and is injected into a tank held at a much lower pressure. The resulting 
mix of brine and steam are then separated and the steam is expanded in a turbine (EC, 2011c). The 
remaining unvaporised fluid can be flashed twice or three times more at progressively lower pressures 
and temperatures. The waste hot water is then pumped back into the underground reservoir. 
 
Dry steam plants 
Dry steam plants use high-temperature geothermal steam and were the earliest power plants for gener-
ating electricity from geothermal resources and have the lowest power plant costs (Bloomquist, 2009). 
The steam is piped from underground wells to the surface where it is used to drive a turbine. However, 
the expansion of this type of system is limited by the rare natural occurrence of geothermal steam. 
 
Binary cycle plants 
In binary cycle geothermal power plants the geothermal fluid never comes into contact with the turbines. 
Water or brine from geothermal sources is pumped to the surface where it passes through a heat ex-
changer containing an organic fluid such as butane or pentane. These secondary fluids have a much lower 
boiling point than water and so the heat transferred from the water causes the secondary fluid to vapor-
ise. This vapour is then used to drive a turbine. 
 
Combined cycle plants 
A combined cycle plant is composed of a flash steam plant and a binary cycle plant. First flash steam is 
used to power a turbine and then the remaining geothermal fluid is used to heat a secondary fluid with a 
lower boiling point, which in turn is vaporised and used to power a turbine. 
 
Co-generation plants 
Co-generation plants combine electricity generation with direct use of the waste heat released from the 
generating units or excess heat from the geothermal source. This heat may be directed towards a variety 
of uses, such as district heating systems, heating greenhouses for agriculture or providing warm water for 
swimming pools.   
 
Enhanced geothermal systems 
A long-researched development in geothermal power involves drilling an injection well and pumping 
water under high pressure to fracture hot rocks several kilometres below the Earth’s surface, increasing 
their permeability to water. Water injected under pressure into these rocks is heated and returns to the 
surface via another borehole called a production well. When the hot fluid reaches the surface it is used to 
generate electricity using one of the previously described techniques such as flash steam or binary cycle.   
 
The method, termed enhanced geothermal systems (EGS), allows the extraction of heat from deep 
sources that lack adequate water and/or where the rocks are insufficiently permeable. Such systems 
would allow geothermal energy to be extracted from many more locations than are possible using con-
ventional systems. Currently the EGS research facility at Soultz-sous-Forêt is at the most advanced stage 
of development and has commissioned the first working power plant, which will provide 1.5 MWe of 
power. By 2011, 20 EGS projects were under development in Europe (IEA, 2011d). 
 
A1.3 Marine energy 
A1.3.1 Background 
Although different estimates exist regarding the global potential for electric power generation from 
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ocean energy, there is significant potential from this source that has not been developed as yet. Com-
pared to wind and solar, ocean energy has the advantage of being more predictable and having a reduced 
visual impact. However, unlike wind and solar, most concepts for the generation of electric power from 
ocean energy have yet to demonstrate both their operational performance and their robustness in the 
marine environment to move from pilot scale to larger-scale pre-commercial installations (Frost & Sulli-
van, 2008; European Ocean Energy Association (EOEA), 2010). 
 
A1.3.2 Sub-technologies 
According to the IEA, the topic ‘Ocean energy’ can be divided into the following sub-technologies (IEA, 
2012): 
• tidal barrage and tidal current energy 
• wave energy (largest potential both in Europe and worldwide) 
• salinity gradient (osmotic) energy and 
• temperature gradient (thermal) energy. 
Tidal barrage and tidal current energy 
Tides are a result of the gravitational pull of both sun and moon on the world’s oceans. Depending on the 
relative positions of the sun, the moon and the earth, the sea level rises and falls twice a day, leading to 
both horizontal and vertical movements of the seawater, containing a large amount of kinetic and poten-
tial energy. Different approaches for the generation of electricity are possible based on these two forms 
of energy (Frost & Sullivan, 2008). 
 
To use the potential energy of the tidal range (difference in sea level between high and low tide), barrag-
es can be built in estuaries or other suitable coastal sections with a large tidal range. With this method, a 
difference is created in the water level either side of the barrage. The water comes in through sluices 
with the high tide and is released back to the ocean in times of low tide (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC), 2010). As with conventional hydropower, the water drives a turbine to generate 
electricity (EOEA, 2010). One of the most famous examples for this kind of power generation is the La 
Rance barrage near Saint-Malo in northern France, which has been in operation since 1964. With a 
capacity of 240 MW it was the biggest tidal power plant until 2011, when the 254 MW Sihwa plant in 
South Korea was completed. There are smaller barrages (with capacities of less than 20 MW) in Canada, 
China and Russia (Daewoo E&C, 2009)   
 
Compared to the construction of tidal barrages, using the kinetic energy of maritime currents is a newer 
form of power production (Blunden and Bahaj, 2006). The technology is comparable to wind power even 
though the construction has to be adapted to underwater conditions and the turbines are driven by 
water instead of air (DECC, 2010). According to Frost & Sullivan (2008), the most promising designs are 
reciprocating tidal stream devices, Venturi-effect devices and open hydro devices. The first commercial 
tidal current plant is named SeaGen and started electricity production in 2008 at Strangford Lough in 
Northern Ireland. It has a capacity of 1.2 MW and is able to supply electricity to 1,500 households (Sauter, 
2011). 
 
In general, using maritime currents is a very efficient way to generate electricity because of the specific 
properties of seawater: its density is more than 830 times higher than that of air, so that the energy of a 
5 knot current is sufficient to deliver the same amount of energy as wind blowing with 350 km/h (Frost & 
Sullivan, 2010b). Moreover, unlike other renewable energy sources, tidal energy is very reliable and 
predictable far into the future, which has positive implications for the installation and maintenance of 
facilities. Due to its predictability, there are also fewer problems to integrating tidal-based energy pro-
duction into an existing power grid (Denny, 2009; Frost & Sullivan, 2010b). Barriers to the implementa-
tion of tidal power plants are the high installation costs and their potential environmental impact: Several 
billions of dollars are required for the construction of a barrage, and further research is needed into the 
effect of barrages on the habitats of fish and bird populations (DECC, 2010; The Australian Institute of 
Energy, 1999). 
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Wave energy 
Waves are created as wind blows over the surface of the oceans due to differential heating of the earth 
by solar radiation (Thorpe, 1999). The energy content of the waves, which can reach 100 kW per metre of 
wave front, depends largely on the wind speed and the distance covered (Frost & Sullivan, 2010b). 
 
Existing systems to produce energy from waves can be divided into the three categories (Frost & Sullivan, 
2012b): 
 
• Onshore devices.  For onshore power generation, overtopping devices can be used, which are 
‘awashed’ by waves and hold back the water. When the water is released back to the sea, it 
turns the blades of a turbine (Frost & Sullivan, 2012b). A further approach to extract wave energy 
onshore is the use of oscillating water column (OWC) devices. Seawater flows into a chamber 
through a sub-surface opening. The vertical movement of the water column caused by the 
waves, forces trapped air to stream through an opening where it drives a turbine (Thorpe, 1999). 
• Near-shore devices. These devices are deployed in water depths of 20-25 metres, up to 500 me-
tres away from the shore (EC, 2012c). Point absorbers consist of two connected floating ele-
ments moved relative to each other by the waves. The kinetic energy of the relative movement is 
then converted to electricity (Frost & Sullivan, 2008). 
• Offshore devices. These are positioned in depths greater than 25 metres with the advantage that 
more powerful waves can be used than by onshore or near shore devices (EC, 2012c). Examples 
for offshore devices are attenuators: long structures consisting of several connected floating el-
ements which are arranged parallel to the direction of the waves. The relative movement be-
tween the attenuators’ different sections is then transformed into electrical power (Minerals 
Management Service, 2012; The European Marine Energy Centre Ltd, 2012). 
 
Compared to tidal energy the installed capacity of wave power is still at a low level. In 2000 a 500 kW 
wave power station commenced working on the Scottish island of Islay. Other wave power plants are 
located in Spain and Israel with capacities of 300 kW and 40 kW respectively (SDE, 2012; Voith, 2012).   
Salinity gradient (osmotic) energy 
Osmosis is the natural phenomenon of water molecules moving between two solutions with differing salt 
concentrations through a semi-permeable membrane due to a difference in chemical potential (Post et 
al., 2007). While water is able to pass the membrane, the salt ions are held back. With water flowing from 
the solution of low salt concentration to the one with the higher salt concentration, the volume of the 
latter increases, leading to a corresponding pressure increase if the volume is constrained.19  In an osmot-
ic power plant, freshwater and seawater are brought into contact through a semi-permeable membrane. 
The freshwater migrates through the membrane into the seawater where the pressure rises up to 27 bar 
(2.7 MPa).  This pressurized water can be used for power production in a turbine (Aaberg, 2003; Skilha-
gen et al., 2007). 
 
Suitable locations for osmotic energy are places that can provide a sufficient reservoir of seawater and 
freshwater, e.g. near estuaries (Post et al., 2007). The first (experimental) osmotic power plant was 
started in Norway in 2009 (Statkraft, 2012). 
Temperature gradient (thermal) energy 
Using the ocean’s natural thermal gradient for the production of electrical energy is commonly known as 
ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC). The thermal gradient in this case is the temperature difference 
between the warm surface of the ocean and the cold sub-surface water (Frost & Sullivan, 2008).   
 
In a closed-cycle OTEC, a low boiling working fluid, such as ammonia, is evaporated by the warm surface 
water in a heat exchanger. The ammonia vapour drives a turbine and electricity is generated. The vapour 
is re-condensed using cold water which is pumped up from the deep in intake pipes (Fujita et al., 2012). 
                                                             
19 The reverse process (reverse osmosis) is used for seawater desalination by applying pressure to the high-salt side of the semi-permeable 
membrane and driving the water to the low-salt side of the membrane against the osmotic pressure. 
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An open-cycle OTEC uses the surface water itself as a working fluid. The warm water is evaporated in a 
vacuum and the steam drives a turbine before it is condensed back to liquid in a heat exchanger by cold 
deep-ocean water (DiChristina, 1995).   
 
The highest efficiencies of OTECs are reached when the thermal difference between the warm and the 
cold waters is at least 20°C, which limits their deployment to tropical areas. Moreover, high installation 
costs - due to the large pipes required – make OTEC technology uncompetitive compared to other re-
newable forms of energy production (Frost & Sullivan, 2008). 
 
A1.4 Co-generation or combined heat and power 
A1.4.1 Background 
Modern fossil-fuel power plants have a maximum efficiency of around 50%, with the remainder of the 
energy being converted to ‘waste’ heat and lost through cooling circuits. Co-generation plants generate 
electricity and use the residual heat generated in the process for applications requiring steam or hot 
water, such as district heating. Consequently, the use of co-generation leads to a significant reduction in 
total fuel consumption. Co-generation of heat and power is a mature technology and various fuels and 
power generation methods can be used. Fossil, nuclear, waste and renewable fuels such as biomass can 
all be used to power CHP plants. In Europe, co-generation currently prevents the emission of around 
200 million tonnes of CO2 per year and there is potential for at least 25% of total electricity production to 
come from CHP (COGEN Europe website, knowledge centre, 2012). Cogeneration systems are at their 
most efficient when there is a need for hot water close to the power station. Efficiency is reduced when 
the waste heat must be transported over long distances. 
 
A1.4.2 Sub-technologies 
Combined heat and power (CHP) generation is often used as an addition to existing power generation 
methods. The piping used to deliver the hot water to its destination does not require unusual alloys. 
However, smaller CHP systems may use other technologies such as fuel cells (dealt with in separate 
section), which include rare earth metals in their design.   
 
The co-generation technologies which will be considered in this report are (EC, 2011c):  
• combined heat and power plants 
• combined cycle gas/steam turbine 
• micro-combined heat and power. 
 
Combined heat and power plants 
Co-generation can be combined with a number of different existing power plants to increase their effi-
ciency. Conventional power plants are typically only around 35-45% efficient, but using the waste heat 
for other applications, such as district heating systems, has the potential to increase efficiency to values 
of around 85% . 
Combined cycle gas/steam turbine 
Combined cycle power stations employ several power generating engines that work in tandem to pro-
duce electricity. The waste exhaust from one engine is used as the power source for the next engine, thus 
resulting in efficiencies of up to 60% (EC, 2011c). When these power stations are used for CHP, further 
efficiencies can be realised by using the final waste heat for district heating systems or other applications 
requiring heating such as greenhouses or swimming pools. 
 
Micro-combined heat and power  
Micro-CHP systems can be used for single family homes or small offices and are essentially small power 
plants that are used to provide both electricity and heating. Again, these systems are used to extract 
more energy from fuel than would be possible from the generation of electricity alone. A micro-CHP unit 
typically produces around 1 kW of electricity and may be powered using a gas engine or a Stirling engine. 
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Micro-CHP systems using fuel cells have also undergone trials and are considered to be close to commer-
cialisation. Of these approaches, fuel cells have the potential to offer the greatest efficiencies, with an 
electrical efficiency of around 60% (EC, 2011c). In comparison, the electrical efficiency of Stirling engines 
is only around 10%. Micro-CHP also has the advantage to the user that surplus electricity may be sold to 
an electrical utility company. 
 
A1.5 Advanced fossil fuel power generation 
A1.5.1 Background 
Europe relies on fossil fuels for the majority of its electricity generating capacity (53% in 2010), and fossil 
fuels will remain a major source of energy for the foreseeable future (EC, 2011c). As a consequence, it is 
essential to reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuel power plants: the two main ways of doing this are by 
using carbon capture and storage (CCS) and by increasing the efficiency of the power plant.   
 
The majority of Europe’s fossil fuel power plants are now over 20 years old and are not benefitting from 
the emission reductions through increased efficiency which the current best available technologies offer 
(RWE, 2008). However, retrofitting older power plants with new technologies, such as advanced boilers 
and turbines, allows increased efficiency and fuel flexibility as well as lowered emissions. It has been 
estimated that, for the same amount of power produced, 23.6% of CO2 emissions could be saved by 
retrofitting sub-critical power plants with supercritical steam cycles or retiring old power plants and 
replacing them with new ones (EC, 2011c). 
 
Technologies for electricity generation from fossil fuels can be categorised by the type of fuel used, the 
technology used for the conversion of the fuel’s chemical energy to thermal energy, and the type of 
turbine used and the generated steam conditions. Pulverised coal combustion (PCC) is the main fossil fuel 
electricity generation technology, both worldwide and in the EU. However, the use of natural gas has 
become increasingly popular and in 2008 represented a 23% share of fuel used in power stations. The 
primary motive for switching to gas has been economic, and was a result of the low gas prices for much 
of the 1990s compared with coal.   
 
A1.5.2 Sub-technologies 
The technologies which will be explored for advanced fossil fuel generation are listed below: 
• ultra-supercritical and advanced ultra-supercritical PCC (USC and A-USC)  
• combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT)  
• integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC)   
• circulating fluidised bed combustion (CFB). 
 
The current status of the technologies is summarised in Table A1.1. 
Ultra-supercritical and advanced ultra-supercritical PCC power plants 
From 2015 the output from subcritical pulverised coal combustion power plants will begin to subside, and 
consequently the role of supercritical and ultra-supercritical coal power plants will become significant 
(IEA, 2010b). Supercritical plants have been in commercial operation for decades and typically have 
steam conditions of 540°C and 25 MPa. More recently ultra-supercritical plants have been introduced; 
these operate at steam conditions of 600°C and 30 MPa. Currently, the most efficient pulverised coal 
power plant is NordJyllandsvæket in Denmark, which achieves efficiencies of up to 47%. However, the 
global share of power generation for ultra-supercritical steam plants is currently under 1% (IEA, 2011e).   
 
The coming years will see the introduction of 700°C ultra-supercritical power plants, with efficiencies of 
over 50%. In order to achieve these efficiencies the use of stronger and more corrosion resistant steels 
will be required. To date there has been a range of demonstration projects with the aim of testing and 
developing Ni-based superalloys for use at the high temperatures, which these power plants will require.  
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Table A1.1: Current status of technologies for advanced fossil fuel power generation 
Technology Status Efficiency Issues Current installed 
capacity 
Ultra-supercritical 
(USC) 
Commercial 43-47% Requires major 
retrofit of existing 
power plants 
>15 GWe (Europe) 
Advanced ultra-
supercritical (A-USC) 
R&D – first test 
plant 2014 
Over 50% Requires Ni-based 
superalloys 
0 
Combined cycle gas 
turbines (CCGT) 
Commercial, 
well established 
technology 
55-61% High capital costs 160 GWe (Europe), 
(IEA, 2010c) 
Integrated gasifica-
tion combined cycle 
(IGCC) 
Commercial 
demonstrations 
43-46% High Capital costs, 
complex  
(Oliver, 2008) 
1 GWe (coal, 
Europe),  
(NEEDS, 2008) 
Circulating fluidised 
bed (CFB) 
Commercial 41-43% Flue gas carries a 
high dust load 
20 GW (Global) 
Combined cycle gas power plants 
Combined cycle power plants have been the dominant technology for power generation from gas since 
the early 1990s. Currently, efficiencies of 52-60% can be achieved, however by 2020 it is expected to 
increase to around 64% with further improvements in turbine technology (IEA, 2010b). CCGT plants 
contain two turbines which both generate electricity. The first turbine is driven by combusting gas; the 
exhaust gases are used to produce steam which then rotates a second turbine to drive an electrical 
generator (IEA, 2010c). This process allows more useful energy to be extracted from heat which increases 
the overall efficiency and reduces fuel consumption.   
Integrated gasification combined cycle 
Integrated gasification combined cycle power plants operate on the same principles as CCGT plants but 
have added functionalities. As well as generating energy, the gasification process can also produce chem-
ical products such as hydrogen and synthetic oil. An IGCC process can be divided into four steps: gasifica-
tion, gas cleaning, power generation and air separation. IGCC plants use gasification to achieve efficiency 
improvements; the fossil fuel is combined with oxygen and steam to produce syngas. The syngas then 
passes through a gas cleaning process where air pollutants and particles are removed. The cleaned syn-
gas passes through a combined power cycle and is converted into electricity. The gas then passes through 
an air separation unit and is re-used in the gasification process.   
 
IGCC plants are not limited to gas; coal can also be used, provided that a gasification process is included. 
However, there are only six IGCC plants globally which are coal-based, of which two are in Europe 
(NEEDS, 2008). There are several barriers which need to be addressed before IGCC plants can be more 
widely deployed, most of which are economic. There is little certainty over operation and maintenance 
costs, and the capital costs are currently higher that other types of fossil fuel fired power stations.   
Circulating fluidised bed 
Fluidised bed combustion was developed in the 1980s as a method for controlling and reducing emissions 
from fossil fuel power stations. Fluidised bed combustion can be divided into atmospheric systems, 
pressurised systems, bubbling and circulating fluidised bed (CFB). Fluidised bed firing is best suited for 
biomass fuels and plants which require fuel flexibility. CFB technology provides a unique ability to burn in 
a given boiler a large range of fuels, including difficult fuels such as biomass. During the combustion 
process solid fuels are suspended in upward air jets, allowing for lower combustion temperatures and 
consequently lower NOX emissions and more effective heat transfer. Total global CFB capacity is currently 
at around 20 GW; however, this has been steadily growing over the past decade (IEA, 2011e).   
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A1.6 Fuel cells and hydrogen 
A1.6.1 Background 
Fuel cells are devices which use electrochemical processes to generate electricity from various feed-
stocks, typically with water and heat as the only by-products. The most commonly used feedstock for fuel 
cells is hydrogen gas. Fuel cells operating on hydrogen emit zero emissions at source and are very effi-
cient.  Hydrogen is a non-toxic gas, which can be produced from a range of feedstocks including natural 
gas, coal, water and biogas. In the transport and energy sectors it can be used as a fuel, as energy storage 
and in conjunction with fuel cells. Fuel cell technologies are beginning to progress from R&D programmes 
to commercial activity. For example, the HyFLEET:CUTE project has already demonstrated the feasibility 
of fuel cell buses in nine European cities (HyFLEET:CUTE, 2009). The fuel cell and hydrogen applications 
under consideration are: transport including re-fuelling infrastructure, hydrogen storage and production, 
and stationary fuel cells.   
 
A generic fuel cell consists of a layered structure composed of a cathode and an anode between which 
are sandwiched a cathode catalyst layer, an electrolyte layer and an anode catalyst layer. The reactants 
are transported by diffusion and/or convection along channels in the cathode and anode to the catalyst 
layer. Here electrochemical reactions take place, which - in the case of hydrogen as fuel - separate the 
hydrogen nucleus from its electron, leaving a proton and an electron. The positively charged protons are 
then drawn across the electrolyte from the anode layer to the cathode layer where they combine with 
oxygen to form water. The free electrons, however, are drawn from the anode to the cathode through an 
external circuit, resulting in direct current (DC) electricity.   
 
Since each individual fuel cell generates less than 1 V it is necessary to arrange fuel cells in stacks to 
produce higher voltages. To achieve the voltages necessary for automotive purposes, as many as 200 fuel 
cells may be arranged into a single stack. Fuel cells are generally classified by the kind of electrolyte they 
employ, but they can also be divided into those that operate at high temperatures and those that oper-
ate at low temperatures. In low temperature fuel cells, to increase chemical reaction rates, noble metal 
catalysts are employed; principally platinum, which is one of the metals of interest to this study.   
 
A1.6.2 Sub-technologies 
The sub-technologies which will be explored for this area include different types of fuel cells spanning 
transport and stationary applications, as well as hydrogen production and storage (EC, 2011c):  
 
• solid oxide fuel cells (SOFC) 
• polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cells (PEMFC) 
• molten carbonate fuel cells (MCFC) 
• direct methanol fuel cells (DMFC) 
• alkaline fuel cells (AFC) 
• phosphoric acid fuel cells (PAFC) 
• hydrogen production 
• hydrogen storage 
• refuelling infrastructure 
 
Solid oxide fuel cells  
In solid oxide fuel cells (SOFC) the term solid oxide refers to the electrolyte material used, which is typi-
cally made of zirconium oxide stabilised with yttria. The fuel cells belong to the group that operates at 
high temperatures, in this instance between 500˚C and 1,000˚C (EC, 2011c). The high temperatures used 
in SOFCs promote increased reaction rates, which negate the need for noble metal catalysts such as 
platinum. SOFCs can use natural gas, propane or liquid petroleum gas as their fuel, increasing the flexibil-
ity of their use. They have a range of possible applications in power units for automotive vehicles, sta-
tionary power generators and combined heat and power units. 
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Polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cells 
PEMFCs, also known as proton exchange membrane fuel cells, have the distinguishing characteristic of an 
electrolyte layer made of a polymer membrane, most commonly Nafion, which is made by DuPont. They 
operate at temperatures below 100˚C and consequently require noble metal catalysts to accelerate 
electrochemical reactions. Platinum is most commonly used, and is required for both the anode and 
cathode catalysts.   
 
Molten carbonate fuel cells  
As their name implies, molten carbonate fuel cells (MCFC) operate at high temperatures; between 600˚C 
and 700˚C. They can be fuelled with coal-derived fuel gas, methane or natural gas. The molten carbonate 
is generally either a combination of lithium carbonate with potassium carbonate, or lithium carbonate 
with sodium carbonate. When molten, these carbonates are highly corrosive and so MCFCs face technical 
difficulties providing a working lifetime of 40,000 hours (EC, 2011c). The anode is typically made of a low 
surface area porous nickel doped with chromium; the cathode may be made of lithiated nickel oxide. 
Since these fuel cells operate at high temperature, there is no requirement for noble metal catalysts. 
 
Direct methanol fuel cells  
The design of a direct methanol fuel cell (DMFC) is similar to that of a PEMFC except that the fuel is a 
liquid solution of methanol and water, rather than hydrogen gas. DMFCs operate at low temperature and 
so have catalysts made of platinum. The anode catalyst often also includes ruthenium, which belongs to 
the platinum group metals and is of interest to this study. 
 
Alkaline fuel cells 
Alkaline fuel cells (AFCs) have been in use since the 1960s when they served as auxiliary power units on 
the Apollo missions and later on the space shuttle. These fuel cells use an alkaline electrolyte such as 
potassium hydroxide (KOH) in water. Hydrogen oxidation in these fuel cells occurs at the anode, rather 
than at the cathode as occurs in PEFC fuel cells. 
 
Phosphoric acid fuel cells 
As its name suggests, the electrolyte used in PAFCs is phosphoric acid. They are used for stationary and 
residential power applications and have also been used in buses, but their automotive application has 
largely been superseded by lighter PEMFCs. A PAFC - the PC25 developed by ONSI - was the first com-
mercially available fuel cell for stationary applications and was introduced in 1992. Such fuel cells’ power 
units are more expensive per kW than other sources of power generation, but they have applications 
where low noise level operation is essential. PAFCs operate at temperatures between 160˚C and 210˚C 
but still require the use of platinum as their catalysts, and may also employ chromium, vanadium or 
cobalt (EC, 2011c).   
 
Hydrogen storage 
Hydrogen storage covers many different technological approaches appropriate to different applications. 
For light duty vehicles using hydrogen fuel cells, between 5 kg and 13 kg of hydrogen are needed to 
achieve a driving range of around 480 km. To fulfil this requirement, hydrogen can be stored either in 
cryogenic liquid hydrogen tanks or in compressed gas tanks, both of which require energy to achieve 
these states from the gaseous state. Liquid hydrogen tanks can store more hydrogen than compression 
tanks for the same volume. However, large amounts of energy - approximately 30% of the heating value 
of hydrogen - are required for hydrogen liquefaction (EC, 2011c). Additionally, hydrogen may be lost as a 
consequence of boil off, so storage methods must employ efficient insulation to minimise this effect.   
 
Compression tanks have been certified that contain hydrogen at pressures 350 (35) and 700 (70) bar 
(MPa), which requires materials and design that can safely hold hydrogen at these pressures (EC, 2011c). 
Currently under development are hydrogen tanks that use carbon-fibre as a reinforcement. Such tanks 
have an inner liner made of a high molecular weight polymer, a second layer made of a carbon fibre / 
epoxy resin composite shell, and an outer shell to protect against impact.   
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Hydrogen may also be stored in a number of chemical forms including as metal hydrides or carbohy-
drates, in ammonia and in methanol. Portable fuel cells that use metal hydride refillable storage cartridg-
es are already commercially available. For non-mobile purposes, hydrogen can be stored in caverns, 
depleted oil and gas fields, or in salt domes - in either liquid or gaseous form. Hydrogen can also be 
transported along networks of pipelines. 
 
Hydrogen production and refuelling infrastructure 
The production of hydrogen and the infrastructure necessary for a hydrogen economy were examined 
but detailed information on scenarios, technology requirements and material requirements was not 
found. However, in the case of an infrastructure using pipelines available data suggests that such pipe-
lines are unlikely to operate under high pressure and so will not require unusual alloys. 
 
A1.7 Electricity storage in the power sector 
A1.7.1 Background 
Balancing supply and demand of electricity at all times is a key goal of electricity systems. With conven-
tional (largely fossil fuel-based) energy generation, this is generally done by adjusting the energy supply 
(i.e. increasing or reducing the power delivered by one or more power plants). This balancing act be-
comes more difficult with a more extensive uptake of renewable energy sources, leading to an increased 
need for the extensive deployment of reliable energy storage technologies to help achieve this balance20.  
  
There is a variety of energy storage technologies currently available which, in principle, allows the fore-
seeable needs for energy storage to be satisfied. However, there is no single universal solution to energy 
storage. Furthermore, the storage of energy is generally done indirectly and is thus tied to a transforma-
tive energy loss (e.g. from electrical to thermal and chemical energy) which reduces the overall efficiency 
in the supply of electrical energy (Oertel, 2008; Wietschel et al., 2010; EC, 2011c). 
 
A1.7.2 Sub-technologies 
The different stationary energy storage sub-technologies may be grouped into four types according to 
their function (Oertel, 2008): 
• mechanical storage – in the form of kinetic or potential energy; this includes compressed air en-
ergy storage, hydro-pump storage, flywheels 
• chemical storage – including hydrogen storage and batteries in all their forms (conventional, ad-
vanced, and flow batteries) 
• electrical or electromagnetic storage – including super-capacitors and superconducting coils 
• thermal storage – used mostly for storing heat but with certain applications for the electricity 
sector, e.g. in solar thermal power plant (molten salt). 
 
In addition, there is the possibility of virtual energy storage: in this case it is the energy demand which is 
controlled rather than the supply. Virtual energy storage will not be considered in this work.   
 
Currently only pumped hydro is able to provide grid storage at competitive costs, although compressed 
air storage has also been demonstrated for this purpose. None of the other storage technologies are 
widely applied for grid scale storage apart from some demonstrators but rather to ensure power quality 
or stabilise distribution grids. Also, it is not yet clear what needs for storage will actually emerge from 
renewables deployment as storage is just one of several options to integrate renewable energy systems.   
 
Of the technology groups listed above, the raw material content of individual technologies will be consid-
ered in as much as they (a) have direct relevance to the power sector, and (b) have a credible potential 
for extensive deployment in the short to medium term. 
                                                             
20 Other possible measures are demand side management, enhanced interconnection, flexible generation and curtailment of regenerative 
energy production. 
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Mechanical storage 
Pumped storage hydropower station 
Pumped storage hydropower stations are hydropower stations equipped to pump water from the low 
level into the high level reservoir (potential energy) using surplus energy. The overall efficiency of 
pumped storage hydropower station is around 70-80% (Oertel, 2008). A more complete description of 
PHES is given in Section A1.1. 
Compressed air energy storage (CAES) 
In CAES systems, electricity is used to compress air and store it under pressure. The energy is recovered 
when the air is allowed to expand again, thereby driving a turbine. As compression of the air leads to a 
temperature increase, the air must be cooled during this step to prevent damage to the reservoir. The 
reverse process, expansion of compressed air, leads to a temperature drop which is compensated by 
burning natural gas with the compressed air to prevent icing of the turbine blades. The efficiency of CAES 
is, therefore, comparatively low at around 50-55% (Oertel, 2008). 
 
The type of facility used to store the compressed air depends on the desired amount of energy stored.  
Underground storage is preferred for power plants with storage capacities above 100 MWh or five hours 
of storage. Therefore, such CAES facilities can only be built at sites exhibiting the required geological 
formations or which can be suitably prepared (e.g. salt caverns created by solution or dry mining, aban-
doned hard-rock mines, purpose-built hard-rock caverns, and naturally occurring porous rock formations 
from porous rock aquifers or depleted gas or oilfields).21 Storage above ground in gas pipes or pressure 
vessels is generally practical and economical for storage capacities below five hours (EPRI, US Department 
of Energy (DOE), 2003).   
 
Currently, there are two CAES facilities operating, one in Germany (290 MWe) and one in the USA 
(110 MWe). Efficiency improvements are expected by storing heat from the compression step and using 
this - instead of burning natural gas - in the expansion step. This process, termed advanced adiabatic 
CAES (AA-CAES) is expected to reach an efficiency of around 70%. A demonstration plant is planned in 
Germany but will not be ready before 2016 at the earliest (RWE Power, 2010). 
 
CAES has several notable advantages (EPRI, US DOE, 2003): 
• it is a proven technology (e.g. the CAES plants in Germany and USA) 
• it can provide significant energy storage, flexibility and load management at relatively low cost 
• it is capable of ‘black start’ 
• CAES facilities come on-line very fast (normally 10-12 min; 5 min in emergencies) 
• CAES facilities are more efficient at part load than oil, gas and coal power plants. 
 
Despite these advantages and immense potential, there are only two commercial-scale facilities operat-
ing today, although these have now been operating for a number of years now. Given that these two 
installations are still successfully working is a strong sign that this technology may be seen as proven 
though not widely implemented. Relevant new information will only come from new installations possi-
bly working under different conditions which may lead to a more differentiated experience. Some 
planned facilities have been delayed or abandoned (FirstEnergy, 2011; The Iowa Stored Energy Park, 
2011). 
Flywheels 
Flywheels store energy in the form of kinetic (rotational) energy. Electricity is used to drive an electric 
motor/generator which accelerates a mass (rotor). To retrieve the energy, the motor/generator is driven 
by the rotor to produce electricity, decelerating the rotor (Frost & Sullivan, 2011b). Therefore it is neces-
sary to match the decreasing speed of the flywheel during discharge and the acceleration when re-
charged with a fixed frequency electrical system (EPRI, US DOE, 2003). Over short time frames, storing 
                                                             
21 Suitable sites are dependent on the local geology but not necessarily scarce.  For example, 80% of the US territory has suitable CAES 
sites (EPRI, US Department of Energy, 2003).   
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and recovering energy in flywheels can reach an efficiency of 90-95%; however, the stand-by losses are 
large and amount to up to 20% per hour. To reduce frictional losses, mechanical or magnetic bearings are 
used and the rotating mass is placed within an evacuated enclosure. The enclosure also serves a safety 
purpose, namely to contain the rotor in case of an accident (Oertel, 2008; Wietschel et al., 2010; Flint, 
2011). 
 
The amount of energy stored in a rotating body depends on both the mass of the body and on the speed 
at which it is rotating. Therefore, two possibilities exist for constructing flywheels with large storage 
capacities: using heavier rotors or having the rotors rotate at a higher velocity. The first strategy leads to 
systems generally rotating at 1,000-7,000 rpm (low-speed flywheels). Low-speed flywheel systems are 
usually designed for high-power output. The second strategy leads to high-speed flywheels: systems with 
lighter rotors spinning with velocities typically between 25,000 rpm and 36,000 rpm, in which either 
power output or energy storage can be maximized (EPRI, US DOE, 2003; Frost & Sullivan, 2008). Interme-
diate rotational speeds are also possible (e.g. 8,000-16,000 rpm; Beacon Power, 2012). 
 
Due to the underlying physics, increasing rotational speed is a more effective way to increasing storage 
capacity. In practice, this is limited by the maximum rotational stress that the rotor material can with-
stand (EPRI, US DOE, 2003).   
 
A key role of flywheels in the power sector is expected to be the rapid reaction to grid imbalances (fre-
quency regulation), thus increasing grid reliability and electric energy quality (Wietschel et al., 2010; Frost 
& Sullivan, 2011b). Flywheels are compact, have a very low environmental impact, their energy storage 
capacity does not degrade over time, can operate in a wide temperature range, exhibit very fast response 
times both for charging and discharging, and have a high cycle and calendar life (EPRI, US DOE, 2003; 
Frost & Sullivan, 2009a). The first grid scale flywheel storage facility with 20 MW / 5 MWh capacity and 
around 85% round-trip efficiency was commissioned in 2011 (Lazarewicz and Judson, 2011).   
Chemical and electrochemical storage 
Hydrogen  
Energy storage in chemical bonds is a key component of life in our planet: Through photosynthesis, plants 
capture energy in the form of light and store it in chemical bonds by reducing CO2. The same idea may be 
used to store excess electrical energy in the form of hydrogen (produced through the electrolysis of 
water) to be used later to generate electricity again (see Section A1.6). However, the efficiency of this 
process is low, at around 30-40% for a round trip (Friedrich, 2012; Scholz and Heide, 2012). 
 
There is substantial experience in the operation of hydrogen storage caves: the facility in Teeside (UK) 
with a capacity of 25 GWh (4.5 MPa) has been in operation for around 30 years, and the facilities in Lake 
Jackson (Texas, USA; 7.0-13.5 MPa; operating since 1986) and Liberty County (Texas, USA; 7.6-13.4 MPa; 
operating since 2007) hold a combined 192 GWh. In addition to in caves, H2 may be stored in and distrib-
uted through the natural gas distribution network (Friedrich, 2012). 
Lead-acid batteries 
Lead–acid batteries, invented in 1859 by the French physicist Gaston Planté, are the oldest type of re-
chargeable battery. In comparison with newer battery concepts such as lithium-ion batteries, lead-acid 
batteries have a low energy-to-weight ratio and energy-to-volume ratio. However, their ability to supply 
high surge currents means that the cells maintain a relatively large power-to-weight ratio. Also because 
of their low cost, they are optimised to be used in motor vehicles to provide the high current required by 
automobile starter motors (Oertel, 2008; Wietschel et al., 2010). In addition, lead-acid batteries are 
currently the chemistry of choice to provide reliable, robust, and cost-efficient stand-by energy storage 
(backup power and power quality) for applications such as uninterruptible power supply, telecommunica-
tions and broadcasting, emergency lighting, security and signalling systems, oil and gas exploration, and 
renewable energy integration (Frost & Sullivan, 2011c). 
 
As indicated by the name, lead and acid are two key components in a lead-acid battery. Energy is stored 
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by reducing Pb(II) ions to metallic lead at the negative electrode, at the same time oxidising Pb(II) ions to 
Pb(IV) ions at the positive electrode in an acidic electrolyte (dilute sulphuric acid). Energy is retrieved by 
allowing metallic lead to be oxidised to Pb(II) ions at the negative electrode while reducing Pb(IV) ions to 
Pb(II) ions at the positive electrode (the same process as above but in the opposite direction). The rele-
vant equations are (Berndt and Spahrbier, 2001): 
 
 (negative electrode) 
 (positive electrode) 
 
The reactions proceed from left to right while charging, and from right to left while discharging. Based on 
this chemistry, there are a large number of different designs of lead-acid batteries (materials, geometry 
and production of the electrodes) that have been optimised for different purposes.   
Nickel-cadmium (NiCd) batteries 
NiCd batteries have traditionally been the alternative to lead-acid batteries. NiCd batteries show good 
low-temperature performance, suffer only little corrosion, and can be sealed completely so that the 
electrolyte cannot be spilled and gases and fumes do not escape from the battery. This combination of 
advantages enabled NiCd batteries to gain significant importance in cordless power supply and for elec-
tric or electronic devices (Berndt and Spahrbier, 2001). However, due to operational and especially 
environmental issues related to cadmium, the industry is gradually moving away from NiCd batteries, 
particularly for portable applications.   
 
For energy storage, one plant operates worldwide (Fairbanks, Alaska, USA) with NiCd batteries, providing 
27 MW of electricity for 15 minutes (DeVries et al., 2004). The main purpose of this plant is grid stabiliza-
tion (Frost & Sullivan 2011c).   
Redox-flow batteries 
Redox-flow batteries are electrochemical electricity storage devices in which the energy-containing 
materials are stored outside the reaction cell in two separate storage tanks. The electrochemical reac-
tions take place within a cell - referred to as the ‘stack’ - consisting of two half-cells with graphite elec-
trodes. The two half cells are separated by a membrane permeable to protons (H+). The purpose of the 
membrane is to prevent the mixing of the electrolyte, although in practice this goal is not achieved 
completely. The positive (catolyte) and the negative electrolyte (anolyte) are pumped through the re-
spective half-cells (on either side of the membrane) and react at the electrodes, consuming and generat-
ing electrons (Angerer et al., 2009).   
 
Different electrolyte systems are used in redox-flow batteries, with the vanadium (V) system being the 
most technically mature. The chemistry of the V system is given by (Berndt and Spahrbier, 2001): 
 
  (cathode) 
  (anode) 
 
The reactions proceed from left to right during charging and from right to left during discharging. Other 
systems are the vanadium bromide and the zinc bromide redox-flow battery (Angerer et al., 2009). 
 
The performance of a redox-flow battery is determined by the size of the stack and the size (energy 
content) of the storage tanks for the electrolyte (Angerer et al., 2009). A key advantage of redox-flow 
systems is that the electrode reactions do not involve solid phase changes or precipitation mechanisms. 
As a consequence, a large number of cycles can be reached, and deep discharges are not critical (Berndt 
and Spahrbier, 2001). In addition, because the energy is stored separately, the power output and energy 
storage capacity are variable independently. The most striking disadvantages of these systems are the 
comparatively low values of specific energy (Wh/kg) and energy density (Wh/L). They are caused by the 
4 2 4Pb(II)SO 2H 2e Pb(0) H SO
+ −+ + ↔ +
4 2 2 2 42Pb(II)SO 2H O Pb(IV)O H SO 2H 2e
+ −+ ↔ + + +
2
2 2VO 2H e VO H O
+ + − ++ + ↔ +
2 3V V e+ + −↔ +
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low concentration of the reacting species on account of limited solubility. The specific power (W/kg) is 
limited for the same reason (Berndt and Spahrbier, 2001). 
 
Redox-flow plants are used for ‘peak shaving’, for the storage of excess power from wind turbines and for 
uninterruptible power supply. The plants are small, with systems ranging from 200 kW to 1.5 MW and 
capacitances from 800 kWh to 12 MWh. However, because of their modular nature, individual batteries 
may be combined into larger facilities (e.g. 10 MW; Prudent Energy, 2011). 
Lithium-ion battery 
The battery system which currently best meets automotive requirements is the lithium-ion cell (Thiel-
mann et al., 2010). Lithium-ion batteries may also be used for a range of applications in distributed 
energy generation (e.g. small scale integration of renewable energy, for frequency regulation and grid 
support; (Frost & Sullivan, 2011b). One example of this is the on-going Sol-Ion project, which provides 
electricity storage for decentralised on-grid, residential solar photovoltaic systems.   
 
In lithium-ion batteries, the positive electrode (cathode) is made of a metal oxide in which lithium ions 
can be stored reversibly. For the negative electrode (anode) graphite is used, which can also store lithium 
ions. Six carbon atoms can be incorporated per lithium atom (LiC6) (Angerer et al., 2009). When discharg-
ing, the graphite releases lithium ions, which then migrate through a water-free lithium-conducting 
organic electrolyte to the positive electrode, where they are stored reversibly in the lattice of the metal 
oxide. The process is reversed when the battery is charged. At each charging and discharging process, 50-
90% of the lithium is exchanged, depending on the cathode (ICT, 2007; Döring, 2008). 
 
Depending on the required capacity or current strength, different metal oxides can be used. For high 
capacity, cobalt cathodes in the form of LiCoO2 are preferred. Manganese (LiMn2O4) and iron phosphate 
(LiFePO4) cathodes can achieve high operating currents. R&D is ongoing with nickel oxides and mixtures 
of different metal oxides containing cobalt, manganese and nickel. The performance of lithium-ion sys-
tems is not yet exhausted, and research and technology development is still strong; which system will 
prevail is not yet foreseeable. The cobalt system has higher energy density, but cobalt cells have a large 
internal resistance and the charge current must be limited in order to avoid excessive heat development 
which would lead to cell destruction. The manganese and phosphate systems have a lower internal 
resistance, but a lower energy density (Angerer et al., 2009).   
 
Chemical and electrochemical storage 
Double-layer capacitors
22
 
Capacitors are able to store electrical energy directly in the form of an electric field. In conventional 
capacitors, this is achieved across two parallel plates separated by a dielectric material. However, the low 
energy density of conventional capacitors makes them uneconomic for stationary power storage applica-
tions (Chen et al., 2009). Supercapacitors store energy in the form of an electric field between two oppos-
ing surfaces separated by a liquid electrolyte (instead of a dielectric material). The electrodes are made of 
a porous material leading to very high surface areas (e.g. up to 2,000 m2/g for activated carbon) and the 
electrodes can be placed very close to each other (< 1 nm) leading to very high capacitances and stored 
energy (around 100 times larger than conventional capacitors), (EPRI, US DOE, 2003).   
 
Double-layer capacitors can withstand a very large number of charge/discharge cycles with high efficien-
cy (around 95%). Though stand-by losses are lower than for flywheels, they are much higher than for 
batteries, reaching 15% after one week and 23% after four weeks – also depending on the charge state 
and quality of the capacitor. In practice, however, double-layer capacitors are mainly used for power 
quality applications (e.g. 1 MW, 0.0023 MWh in Cologne/Germany) with storage times ranging from 
seconds to minutes. Although it is possible to modularly extend the capacity of capacitor-based storage, 
they are generally not suitable for storing large amounts of energy (Wietschel et al., 2010).   
                                                             
22 Also called electric double-layer capacitors, supercapacitors, supercaps, ultracapacitors, ultracaps. 
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Superconducting magnetic energy storage (SMES) 
Superconducting coils make it possible to store electrical energy in the form of an indefinitely circulating 
current. This has the advantage that no conversion losses other than AC-DC power conversion are pre-
sent and, due to the superconductive properties of the coils, essentially no stand-by losses occur. This 
leads to very high storage efficiencies (around 97%). In practice, superconductivity only occurs at low 
temperatures such that the unit requires external cooling typically using liquid helium (4.2 K). This cooling 
requirement is essentially a stand-by loss. This loss becomes smaller the larger the SMES unit is because 
of the lower surface-to-volume ratio results in reduced specific cooling requirements (EPRI, US DOE, 
2003; Chen et al., 2009; Wietschel et al., 2010). 
 
The response times of superconducting coils are of the order of a few milliseconds, and their high effi-
ciency for short-term storage makes them suitable for power quality applications. The typical rating for 
superconducting coil units is in the range of 1-10 MW, with storage times of seconds. Over 100 MW of 
SMES units were reported to be in operation by 2009 worldwide after rapid introduction through several 
companies. On-going research aims to extend the specifications of SMES units to the range of 10-100 
MW and storage times of minutes (Chen et al., 2009).   
Thermal storage 
 
Thermal energy storage (TES) in the electricity sector is mainly relevant for solar thermal power plants 
which should be able to produce electricity even when the sun is not shining. Therefore, it is necessary to 
store some of the solar energy collected during the day and convert it into electricity at night (Gil et al., 
2010). There are several ways to classify the diverse TES technologies, such as by temperature, duration 
of storage, state of aggregation or thermodynamic processes (in.RET Institut für Regenerative Energie-
technik, 2009). In this report, the three thermodynamic categories ‘sensible load’, ‘latent load’ and ‘bond 
energy’ are used. 
Sensible heat storage (SHS) 
SHS systems are characterised by their temperature change; for electricity generation, high temperature 
thermal storage (HTTS) is particularly relevant. SHS consists of a solid or liquid medium which is heated by 
an energy source (e.g. solar radiation). As the temperature of the medium is increased it leads to a tem-
perature difference (ΔT) to the surroundings. This ΔT can later be used to generate electricity, for exam-
ple by vaporising water in a heat exchanger to turn a turbine (Ibrahim et al., 2008). Another characteristic 
of SHS is that there is no phase change in the utilized medium. The amount of energy that can be stored 
depends on the specific thermal capacity of the material, on its mass and on the temperature difference 
ΔT (in.RET Institut für Regenerative Energietechnik, 2009).   
 
Liquid media for thermal energy storage are molten salt, mineral and synthetic oils (Gil et al., 2010). Salt - 
consisting mostly of a mixture of sodium nitrate and potassium nitrate - is used in solar power plants as 
well as in the chemical and metals industry for heat transfer purposes, due to its favourable thermo-
physical properties. Moreover, salt has the advantageous characteristics of being non-flammable, non-
toxic, inexpensive and relatively efficient (Frost & Sullivan, 2011b). To store solar energy it is heated up to 
temperatures of several hundred degrees Celsius and then stored in insulated tanks (Fernandes et al., 
2012). As well as from liquid storage, there are several solid storage media available ranging from rocks 
and pebbles to concrete, ceramics and different kinds of salt (Frost & Sullivan, 2011b; Fernandes et al., 
2012). The use of concrete blocks as thermal storage devices is a particular focus of further research; its 
advantage over molten salt storage technologies include lower costs as a carrier medium and its insensi-
tivity towards low temperatures (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V., 2012). 
 
The growth potential for SHS in the context of solar electricity production is expected to be high, espe-
cially in Mediterranean countries such as Spain and Italy. There, early power plants are already using 
molten salt-based SHS for solar energy storage (Frost & Sullivan, 2011d). 
Latent heat storage 
The underlying principle of latent heat storage is the absorption or release of energy at nearly constant 
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temperatures during the phase change (e.g. from solid to liquid) of a storage medium (Fernandes et al., 
2012). This is familiar from hand warmers for outdoor applications, which function in the same way 
although on a much smaller scale (Tamme et al., 2006). 
 
For latent heat storage processes suitable materials, called phase change materials (PCMs), are needed. 
According to (Sharma et al., 2009) there are different kinds of PCMs available, including paraffin com-
pounds, salt hydrates and metallics. There are also eutectic PCMs, which consist of a mix of two or more 
components. Both solid/liquid and liquid/vapour transitions can be exploited to charge and discharge the 
phase change materials, though solid/liquid systems are the most common (Oertel, 2008; Gil et al., 2010). 
Compared to the more conventional SHS, latent heat storage has the advantage that large amounts of 
energy can be stored in a small temperature range inside relatively compact containers (Tamme et al., 
2005; Frost & Sullivan, 2011b). Furthermore, the prices for phase change materials are moderate and 
their availability is ‘non-critical’ (Fernandes et al., 2012), so that the main problems of latent heat storage 
are caused by insufficient heat transfer between the working fluid and storage materials (Tamme et al., 
2005).   
Thermo-chemical storage 
Thermo-chemical energy storage, in which the energy is reactively bound as internal chemical energy, has 
the highest theoretical energy density of all thermal storage possibilities. Its basis is the use of two differ-
ent substances that interact with each other. In a first step heat is used to excite a reversible endother-
mic chemical reaction. Later, the energy used for this procedure can be recovered by the corresponding 
exothermic reaction (Gil et al., 2010). Materials of particular interest for thermal energy storage are 
SOx/Sn and ammonia systems as well as zeolite and silica gel (in.RET Institut für Regenerative Energie-
technik, 2009; Fernandes et al., 2012).   
 
In general, thermo-chemical processes are a very effective way to store energy in the form of heat due to 
the high energy densities and the long storage duration at ambient temperature. Nevertheless, this 
technology is still at an early stage of development (Gil et al., 2010). It seems that there is a large poten-
tial for future use, but high costs remain a barrier to commercial deployment (Fernandes et al., 2012): 
currently, only pilot plants for experimental research are in operation (in.RET Institut für Regenerative 
Energietechnik, 2009). 
 
A1.8 Energy-intensive industries 
A1.8.1 Background 
The EU is aiming for a 20% cut in Europe's annual primary energy consumption by 2020. In 2010, 25% 
(292 Mtoe) of final energy consumption in the EU-27 was by industrial users (EC Eurostat, 2012). The 
work of the EU Technology Map to energy efficiency and CO2 reduction in industry to date has focused 
specifically on three energy-intensive industries:  
 
• cement 
• iron and steel 
• pulp and paper. 
 
These industries accounted for almost 43% of the final energy consumption within industry for the EU-27 
in 2010 (Figure A1.1). Note that cement is included within non-metallic minerals. It is these three indus-
tries that are covered within this project.   
 
A1.8.2 Sub-technologies 
For the cement industry, the main sub-technologies identified include: 
• decrease of the proportion of clinker in cement 
• use of alternative fuels 
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• site-specific energy efficiency measures 
• deployment of CCS (covered in Section A1.5) 
• fluidised bed technologies. 
 
For the iron and steel industry, the main sub-technologies identified include: 
• integrated production – dissemination of BAT 
• electric arc furnaces 
• direct-reduced iron 
• smelting reduction 
• ultra-low CO2 steelmaking (ULCOS): 
o top gas recycling blast furnace 
o Hlsarna technology 
o ULCORED (advanced direct reduction with CCS) 
o ULCOWIN and ULCOSYS (electrolysis). 
 
For the pulp and paper industry, the main sub-technologies identified include: 
• CHP generation (covered in Section A1.4) 
• use of recycled fibres in integrated paper production 
• bio-route: integrated bio-refinery complexes 
• innovative drying technologies 
• mechanical pulping optimisation. 
 
Figure A1.1: Final energy consumption in the EU-27 by industry, 2010 (ktoe) 
 
Source: EC Eurostat, 2012 
 
Scenarios for the implementation of these technologies will be developed in accordance with industry 
experts, the relevant trade associations (Cembureau, Eurofer and CEPI respectively) and other stakehold-
ers as appropriate.  Two comments are of note for these sub-technologies: 
1. Research for several is at an early stage: e.g. fluidised bed technologies (cement), ULCOS (iron 
and steel) and bio-route (pulp and paper).   
2. The role of critical metals may be limited; e.g. in the use of alternative materials or fuels. 
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A1.9 Energy efficiency in buildings 
A1.9.1 Background 
Energy consumption in buildings (residential and services) accounted for 40% of the EU-27 total final 
energy consumption in 2010 (Figure A1.2). Within this, approximately two thirds of energy consumption 
is used for space conditioning (temperature and ventilation) and one third for installations and appliances 
(EC, 2011c). Three main areas determine the energy performance of buildings (of which the first two are 
of most relevance for this project): 
1. building energy needs (savings) 
2. building systems energy (efficiency) 
3. occupancy energy consumption (behavioural). 
 
A1.9.2 Sub-technologies 
There are numerous sub-technologies that could be considered, including: 
• high-efficiency boilers & efficient heat exchange ventilation 
• insulation materials: walls, roof, floor, windows 
• solar thermal & aero-thermal energy (geothermal energy is covered in Section 2.3) 
• lighting: phosphors, LEDs, halogen etc. 
• energy efficient appliances 
• smart meters. 
 
Further details on each of these are described in Section 3.10. 
 
Figure A1.2: Final energy consumption in the EU-27 by sector, 2010 (ktoe) 
 
 
Source: EC Eurostat, 2012 
 
Scenarios for the implementation of these technologies will be developed in accordance with industry 
experts, the relevant trade associations and other stakeholders as appropriate. Two comments are of 
note for these sub-technologies: 
 
1. The role of critical metals may be limited; e.g. in building insulation. 
2. Critical metals may not be the enabling factor for the technology. For example, electrical ap-
pliances may use various metals in the electronics or circuit boards, but their use does not 
specifically contribute towards energy efficiency. Where this is the case, the sector study will 
make note of these metals. 
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3. Many scenarios exist which model the consumption of energy within the residential and ser-
vices sectors; however, most do not give a breakdown of the contribution of the different 
sub-technologies for energy efficiency. 
 
A1.10 Road transport efficiency 
 
A1.10.1 Background 
In Europe, road transport accounts for over 70% of transport-related emissions, and passenger cars 
contribute approximately 60% to this total (EC, 2011d). With both passenger transport and freight haul-
age set to increase significantly over the coming years, there is a need for new technologies which reduce 
CO2 emissions (EC, 2011d). At present, internal combustion engines (ICEs) are the drive train of choice for 
road vehicles in Europe. The use of fuel additives and advanced catalytic converters, light-weighting of 
components and advanced engine designs all offer opportunities for improved efficiency of ICEs. Howev-
er, their efficiency cannot match that of electric motors; this has been proved by well-to-wheel analyses 
over a broad range of primary energy sources (McKinsey, 2010). 
 
A combination of electric vehicles (EVs) and more efficient ICEs will be needed to ensure that Europe 
meets its targets for reductions in vehicle CO2 emissions. The motor industry is investing heavily in both 
these areas, with an ever-increasing number of EVs being launched and fuel efficiency technologies such 
as direct injection petrol engines and stop-start mechanisms being introduced on a wider range of mod-
els. EVs have yet to penetrate the European market, and market share remains low compared to that in 
Japan and the US where EVs are more prevalent. Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) are limited by the energy 
density of their batteries, as this determines the distance they can travel between charging.  Weight, size 
and cost are other limitations which new battery technologies must overcome. In the medium to long 
term, fuel cell and hydrogen vehicles are likely to achieve a significant market share; these technologies 
are reviewed separately in Section 2.7, but they will be included in the passenger vehicle mix where 
relevant. 
 
A1.10.2 Sub-technologies 
Advanced combustion engines 
Reducing losses across propulsion and non-propulsion systems leads to a reduction in vehicle fuel con-
sumption. From the representation of vehicle energy flows in Figure A1.3 it is clear that energy lost 
through engine inefficiency accounts for the majority of energy lost. 
 
Improvements to design of combustion engines include (Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
2008): 
• lean burn injection petrol engines 
• friction reduction through use of advanced materials 
• smart cooling systems 
• cylinder deactivation 
• variable compression ratio engines 
• petrol direct-injection 
• turbocharged engines 
• higher pressure fuel injections for diesel engines 
• homogenous charge compression ignition 
• camless valve trains. 
 
Materials requirements for advanced combustion engines will be assessed in the sector studies.   
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Figure A1.3: Vehicle energy flows in an urban driving cycle 
 
Source: MIT, 2008 
Catalytic converters 
Catalytic converters reduce harmful emissions from engines and use platinum group metals and cerium 
to convert post-combustion gases such as carbon monoxide and nitrous oxides to more environmentally 
benign chemicals such as carbon dioxide, nitrogen and water. They are not a new technology (they were 
introduced in the 1970s) and are now a requirement for all new vehicles due to engine emissions regula-
tions. The ratio of different metals used in catalytic converters varies depending on the engine type: for 
example, catalytic converters for petrol engines typically have a higher proportion of palladium than 
those for diesel engines (EPOW, 2011). Materials requirements for catalytic converters will be assessed in 
the sector studies.   
Light-weighting of vehicles through use of advanced materials 
Reduction in vehicle weight is an effective way of increasing fuel efficiency; every 10% of weight reduced 
from the average new car can cut fuel consumption by around 7% (MIT, 2008).  There are three general 
strategies for reducing vehicle weight: 
• lightweight materials substitution 
• vehicle redesign to minimise weight 
• down-sizing the vehicle fleet by shifting sales away from larger heavier vehicles. 
 
Candidates for lightweight materials substitution include, but are not limited to: aluminium, high strength 
steels, magnesium, glass-fibre reinforced polymer composites and carbon-fibre polymer composites. 
These materials requirements will be further discussed in the sector studies.   
Electric vehicles 
There are five different types of electric vehicle (EV) which will be considered:  
• battery electric vehicles (BEV)  
• hybrid electric vehicles (HEV)  
• plug-in electric vehicles (PHEV)  
• mild hybrids   
• fuel cell vehicles (FCV). 
 
BEVs are purely electrical vehicles, which are powered exclusively from the electricity from on-board 
batteries which are charged from the grid; they currently have a range of 125-160 km. HEVs employ both 
an internal combustion engine and an electric motor for propulsion, and they use regenerative braking to 
recharge the batteries. PHEVs are similar to HEV, except that they can charge from the grid to extend the 
electric range. They are classified by how far they can travel on electricity; for example, a PHEV-50 can 
travel 50 km. PHEVs come in two varieties: parallel or series, the difference being that parallel PHEVs use 
the ICE to provide range extension by directly powering the wheels, whereas series PHEVs use the ICE to 
recharge the batteries and only the electric motor drives the wheels (CreditSuisse, 2009a). Mild hybrids 
are ICE vehicles which are equipped with electric motors for regenerative braking and/or start/stop 
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systems. FCVs convert energy from a fuel (usually hydrogen) into electricity by using a fuel cell; the 
electricity is then used to power an electric motor and can also be stored in a battery or a capacitor 
(Electric Drive Transportation Association, n.d.). 
 
A1.11 Desalination 
A1.11.1 Background 
Desalination in its many forms is a water treatment technology that can be used to produce both drinking 
water and high-purity water from seawater or brackish water. The raw water is separated into two 
streams: a fresh water stream and a remaining brine solution that needs to be disposed of. Interest in 
desalination emerged in arid areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the southwest States of the 
USA. The first major desalination plants were erected in Kuwait between 1950 and 1955, making Kuwait 
almost independent for its water needs (Delyannis and Belessiotis, 2010). Today, seawater desalination 
plants are also a vital source of fresh water for other Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates. Outside of the Middle East, the largest market worldwide, (Frost & Sullivan, 2009b, 
2010b) significant desalination capacities also exist in the USA and Spain (Khawaji et al., 2008). 
 
With energy consumption being one of the key concerns in desalination R&D efforts, extensive research 
has been devoted to increasing the efficiency of the process itself, leading to significant cost reductions 
(Rachwal and Judd, 2006). In addition, concepts for the coupling of desalination for drinking water treat-
ment to non-renewable (Angerer et al., 2009) and renewable energy (e.g. ProDes Consortium, 2010) 
sources have been explored and implemented. 
 
A1.11.2 Sub-technologies 
Desalination technologies can be classified as either:  
• thermal (multi-stage flash evaporation, multi-effect distillation, vapour compression), or  
• membrane (mainly reverse osmosis) processes. 
 
Currently, the three most widely used technologies for the desalination of seawater and brackish water 
are multi-stage flash (MSF) distillation, multi-effect distillation (MED) and reverse osmosis (RO). Typical 
capacities for desalination plants are up to 40,000 m3/day for reverse osmosis, greater than 35,000 
m3/day for MED and greater than 75,000 m3/day for MSF (Frost & Sullivan, 2009b). Whilst the original 
desalination plants all operated thermally, reverse osmosis - a membrane process - has become an 
important source of desalinated water in recent years. Whereas MSF and MED plants still hold the major-
ity share of installed desalination capacity, well over 90% of newly-built desalination plants are based on 
RO (Khawaji et al., 2008; Frost & Sullivan, 2010a). 
Thermal processes 
Thermal desalination processes use thermal energy to obtain fresh water out of seawater and brackish 
water by means of evaporation. To reduce energy demand, thermal processes operate at low pressures 
and reuse substantial amounts of heat. The three main thermal processes are: 
• MSF distillation. Flash distillation is based on the rapid evaporation of water by suddenly reduc-
ing the surrounding pressure. In MSF, pressure is reduced in multiple steps (e.g. from 0.6 bar 
(0.06 MPa) to 0.07 bar (0.007 MPa) in 18 steps) and heat is recovered after each step by con-
densing against the fresh seawater. The thermal coupling of the individual flash stages with the 
heating of seawater reduces external heat input to one seventh of the total process heat re-
quired (Stichlmair, 2010). External heating is generally provided by low pressure steam from a 
co-generation power plant. The top brine temperature in modern large MSF plants is usually in 
the range 90-120°C, with 19-28 flash stages. More stages increase both the capacity and efficien-
cy of an MSF plant but imply higher capital costs (Khawaji et al., 2008). The costs of water pro-
duced via MSF distillation are higher than those for MED plants (Frost & Sullivan, 2009b). How-
ever, MSF distillation has historically been the preferred desalination technology due to its sim-
plicity, ease of operation, very high reliability, and very low performance degradation over time 
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(Borsani and Rebagliati, 2005). 
• In addition to the current coupling with conventional power plants, MSF distillation may be com-
bined with other (renewable) heat sources including concentrating solar power and geothermal 
(ProDes Consortium, 2010). 
• MED is a distillation process carried out in multiple evaporators (called effects). A fraction of the 
water is allowed to evaporate in each effect and heating is provided over evaporation tubes (hor-
izontal, vertical or submerged). For the first effect, heating is provided by steam flowing inside 
the evaporation tubes, normally generated using heat from a co-generation power plant. The 
remaining liquid is then transferred to the next effect where it encounters a lower pressure, re-
ducing the amount of heat needed for evaporation. The heat in the evaporation tubes for all ef-
fects but the first is provided by the condensation of the water vapour from the previous effect. 
Thus, external input of heat is only required in the first effect. MED is the oldest desalination 
process and is more efficient than MSF from both a thermodynamic and heat transfer (capacity) 
point of view, and requires little electrical power compared to MSF. Seawater treated by MED 
does not require any pre-treatment and, because it can operate at low temperatures (e.g. with a 
top brine temperature of 70 °C), corrosion, scaling are limited (Khawaji et al., 2008; Frost & Sulli-
van, 2010a). 
• In principle, MED may be combined with other (renewable) heat sources including solar thermal 
collectors, concentrating solar power and geothermal energy and ocean thermal energy in addi-
tion to the current coupling with conventional power plants (ProDes Consortium, 2010). 
• Vapour compression distillation (VCD) is a simple and reliable process that runs on electrical 
power (i.e. it does not need an external heat source). It is therefore mostly used for small-scale 
desalination units. In VCD, vapour is extracted from the evaporation chamber and fed to the 
condenser, thus generating a vacuum in the evaporation chamber, facilitating evaporation. The 
extracted vapour is condensed by compression inside a tube bundle, onto which seawater is 
sprayed and evaporated (Khawaji et al., 2008). The coupling of VCD to renewable energy occurs 
via the electricity mix. 
Membrane processes 
The introduction of RO into the desalination market led to a drastic decrease in desalination (Frost & 
Sullivan, 2009b). The process itself is fundamentally different from MSF and MED. Instead of evaporating 
and condensing fresh water from seawater, the separation occurs by forcing fresh water through a 
membrane which prevents the passage of salts. This is the opposite of osmosis - the spontaneous process 
in which water flows across a membrane from the side with lower salt concentration to the side with 
higher salt concentration until the concentrations are equal – hence the term ‘reverse osmosis’. RO is 
achieved by applying sufficient pressure (enough to overcome the osmotic pressure) to the side with the 
higher salt concentration. Therefore, unlike MSF and MED, RO plants do not have to be built close to a 
power plant but need only a connection to the power grid.   
 
A salient feature of RO desalination plants is the effort invested in pre-treatment of the incoming sea-
water. To protect the polymer membrane from suspended solids as well as from fouling and scaling, 
mechanical and chemical pre-treatment of the water is necessary (Khawaji et al., 2008; Rautenbach, 
2011). Despite these efforts, periodic maintenance of the RO membranes is a requirement and a major 
issue in the design and operation of RO plants (Frost & Sullivan, 2010a). In addition to electrical power 
from renewable sources, it is possible to couple RO with mechanical power obtained from the ocean. The 
combination photovoltaic-RO was recently identified as the most common renewable energy/ desalina-
tion coupling (ProDes Consortium, 2010). 
Other technologies 
MSF, MED and RO combined account for more than 95% of the desalination market worldwide. The 
remaining 5% is shared between VCD and other technologies; some proven, some still in development. 
These include freezing, ‘dewvaporation’, electro-dialysis, membrane distillation, ion exchange and capaci-
tive deionization (Frost & Sullivan, 2010a). 
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Appendix 2: Metal Uses 
 
Aim 
The study focuses on resources used in technologies which are part of the EU path to the decarbonisation 
of the energy sector; however, it is important to realise that there are other sectors that may be compet-
ing for the same resources. As a consequence, activity in these other sectors may limit the availability of 
certain materials for use for low-carbon energy technologies. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the competing sectors of particular interest are the automotive and elec-
tronics/ICT sectors: 
 
• In 2010, 12.6 million people were employed directly or indirectly by the automotive sec-
tor in the EU, producing a total of 15.1 million vehicles or 22% of worldwide motor vehicle 
sales (ACEA, 2011).   
• The electronics/ICT sector accounted for 8.5% of total business value added in the EU and 
3% of total business sector turnover (EC, 2012b). Europe’s share of worldwide electronics 
and ICT turnover is estimated at around 30% (Deloitte, 2010); however, this estimate in-
cludes sales from non-EU countries such as Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Apportioning the 
EU’s share of European population using 2010 UN Population statistics puts the EU share 
of the worldwide electronics market at 18%. 
 
Methodology 
There are potentially 60 materials of relevance to analyse in total, so it is not practical to produce a 
detailed forecast for each of them nor to collect primary data on their end-use. The approach therefore 
needs to be relatively generic and to apply largely a common data source and methodology.   
 
Data 
The main source of data is end-use statistics compiled by the EU Raw Materials Initiative for its assess-
ment of critical raw materials for the EU (EC, 2010d). That study compiled data for 41 metals and miner-
als. For gallium, a stakeholder commented that the data provided by EU Raw Materials Initiative report 
was actually for gallium use in the United States, rather than for worldwide gallium use. Alternative data 
was therefore sourced. 
 
A recent report by the International Study Groups for Nickel, Lead & Zinc and Copper compiled data for 
11 metals produced as by-products of these principal metals (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 
2012). As this report is a recent and in-depth study on these metals, this data has been used for the 
relevant metals. 
 
Detailed end-use data for individual platinum group metals and rare earth elements is courtesy of John-
son Matthey and the United States Geological Survey respectively. A few metals are not covered by these 
references, including cadmium, gold, hafnium, lead and zirconium. For these metals the reference for the 
data is clearly stated underneath the figure. 
 
For some metals further data sources have been used to attribute a share of a particular use (e.g. batter-
ies and steel alloys) to electronics and ICT or automotive, for example (EPOW, 2011). 
 
The following pages provide end-use statistics for each of the metals.  
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Figure A2.1: Worldwide uses of antimony, barytes, beryllium and bismuth 
 
 
 
Sources: All EC, 2010d, except Bismuth: International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012 (USA only) 
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Figure A2.2: Worldwide uses of boron, cadmium, chromium and cobalt 
 
 
 
Sources (top to bottom):  EC, 2010d; Moss et al., 2011; EC 2010e; and International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012  
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Figure A2.3: Worldwide uses of copper, gallium, germanium and gold 
 
 
Sources: (top to bottom) EC, 2010d; Indium Corporation, 2010;  
 International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012; Thomson Reuters GFMS, 2012  
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Figure A2.4: Worldwide uses of graphite, hafnium, indium and lead 
 
 
Sources: (top to bottom) EC, 2010d;Moss et al., 2011; 
 International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012; ILZSG 2012c 
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Figure A2.5: Worldwide uses of lithium, magnesium, manganese and molybdenum 
 
 
 
 
Sources: (top to bottom) EC, 2010d; EC, 2011e; EC 2010b;  
International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012 
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Figure A2.6: Worldwide uses of nickel, niobium, PGMs and iridium(PGM) 
 
 
 
Sources: All EC, 2010d; except Iridium: Johnson Matthey, 2012 
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Figure A2.7: Worldwide uses of PGMs: palladium, platinum, rhodium and ruthenium 
 
 
Sources (All):  Johnson Matthey, 2012 
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Figure A2.8: Worldwide uses of REOs: in general, cerium, dysprosium and europium 
 
Sources: (top) EC, 2010d; rest: USGS, 2011c 
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Figure A2.9: Worldwide uses of REOs: gadolinium, lanthanum, neodymium and praseodymium 
 
 
Sources: (all) USGS, 2011c 
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Figure A2.10: Worldwide uses of the REOs (samarium, terbium, yttrium) and rhenium 
 
Sources: REOs:  USGS, 2011c; Rh:  International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012 
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Figure A2.11: Worldwide uses of scandium, selenium, silver and tantalum 
 
Sources:  (Sc, Se) International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012; (Ag, Ta) EC, 2010d 
 
 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
207 
 
Figure A2.12: Worldwide uses of tellurium, tin, titanium and tungsten 
 
 
 
Sources:  (Te) International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012; (rest) EC, 2010d 
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Figure A2.13: Worldwide uses of vanadium, zinc and zirconium 
 
 
 
 
Sources: (Va, Zn) EC, 2010d; (Zr) Roskill, 2007 
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Appendix 3: Long Term Metal Supply Projections  
Expected supply of metals 
To get a sense of scale of the material demand estimates of the EU path to the decarbonisation of the 
energy sector, it is important to provide the context of metals supply estimates. The latest available data 
for metals supply estimates is for 2011. The EU materials demand estimates can also be compared 
against long term supply projections for 2020 and 2030. This provides a more dynamic measure of mate-
rials availability.   
Scope 
There are potentially 60 materials of relevance to analyse in total (see Table 64), so it is not practical to 
produce a detailed forecast for each of them. The approach therefore needs to be relatively generic and 
apply largely a common data source and methodology. The length of the projections is around 20 years – 
2011 to 2030. Due to the volatility that is inherent in many commodity markets, particularly those for 
many minor metals, a long term forecast cannot be considered reliable. Indeed, even for the base metals 
(i.e. copper, lead, nickel, steel, tin and zinc) for which the markets are much more transparent and less 
volatile than the minor metals, most forecasts are only for a period of around 2-5 years. It is therefore 
clear that the data here should not be understood to be forecasts. 
Data 
The main source of data used for the long term supply projections is historical supply data collated by the 
United States Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Specialists for around 90 mineral commodities 
(USGS, 2011a). This data has then been augmented with 2011 production estimates (USGS, 2012). Long 
term supply trends have then been linearly extrapolated to form the supply projections to 2030. For 
some metals (cobalt, gallium, indium, lithium, nickel and tellurium) the USGS provides estimates of 
reclaim and projected capacity for 2015 (Bauer et al., 2010).  This data has been taken into account in the 
supply projections. 
 
Some supplementary data has been included for particular metals where additional data was felt to be 
useful in providing further details or was missing from USGS data. These include: 
 
• JRC data on hafnium supply, which the USGS does not provide recent supply data (Moss et al., 
2011).  
• INSG/ILZSG/ICSG supply data for 11 metals produced as by-products from these base metals. 
This was of particular use for selenium, tellurium and scandium (International Study Group for 
Nickel et al., 2012). 
• BGS data of lithium and titanium dioxide content of the host ores (BGS, 2012a). 
• Johnson Matthey data on the supply and demand of the minor platinum group metals (John-
son Matthey, 2012). 
• Lynas and IMCOA data on the composition of rare earth supply, both current and forecast, of 
each of the individual rare earth elements (Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2010; IMCOA in US DOE, 
2011). 
Results 
The supply projections are summarised in Table 64, providing 2011 production estimates and projections 
for 2020 and 2030, and the implied compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for the 20 year period. For the 
metals where reliable historical production data is available these are shown graphically in Figures A3.1 
to A3.5, along with the supply projections. These projections should be considered as illustrative rather 
than definitive, as they are reliant upon the continuation of current trends. Nevertheless they do allow 
comparison against estimated demand within EU decarbonisation technologies and enable a comparison 
to be made between different metals, and thus help identify specific risks and priorities. Data for recycled 
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production has been added to the overall supply estimates contained in Table 58. See Appendix 5 on the 
data sources and methodology that has been applied for this. 
 
Figure A3.1: Metals production trends for antimony, barytes, beryllium, bismuth, boron & cadmium 
(tonnes) 
 
 
Source: USGS, 2011a; projections thereafter. 
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Figure A3.2: Metals production trends for chromium, cobalt, copper, germanium, gold & graphite (tonnes) 
 
 
 
 
Source: USGS, 2011a; projections thereafter. 
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Figure A3.3: Metal production trends for lead, lithium, magnesium, manganese, molybdenum & nickel 
(tonnes) 
 
 
Source: USGS, 2011a, except lithium; BGS, 2012b; projections thereafter.  
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Figure A3.4: Metals production trends for niobium, PGMs, rhenium, rare earths, silver & tantalum (tonnes) 
 
 
 
Source: USGS, 2011a; projections thereafter. 
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Figure A3.5: Metals production trends for tin, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, zinc & zirconium (tonnes) 
 
 
  
Source: USGS, 2011a, except titanium; BGS, 2012b; projections thereafter. 
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Appendix 4: Recycled Metals Statistics 
 
Purpose 
 
In addition to the virgin or primary supply of raw materials, for some metals secondary or recycled 
sources represent a significant proportion of world production. It is important that the world supply 
estimates within the report reflect this in order to present an adequate comparison to EU demand for the 
decarbonisation technologies. 
 
The recent study by the United Nations Environment Programme reviewed data on the recycling rates for 
metals, including old scrap ratios, recycled content and end-of-life recycling rates (UNEP, 2011). The 
study investigated 60 metals in total, and is the first comprehensive study of this nature. The results of 
the study gave indicative ranges of the recycling rates for the metals where data of sufficient quality was 
available. Some of the references identified differing recycling rates for the same metal, or were based 
upon a US or EU reference rather than a world estimate. 
 
In light of these issues, it was deemed appropriate to search for additional data, rather than simply use 
the recycling rate percentages suggested by (UNEP, 2011), and apply these to primary production to get a 
world supply estimate that include production from recycled sources. Nonetheless, the study does help 
identify the metals with the highest recycling rates. These include: aluminium, chromium, cobalt, copper, 
gold, iron, lead, magnesium, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, niobium, platinum group metals, rhenium, 
silver, tin, titanium, tungsten and zinc. In addition, metals such as gallium, germanium and indium have 
high recycled content rates but not high end-of-life recycling rates (UNEP, 2011). 
 
Methodology and data 
 
This study therefore searched for historical time-series data for recycled supply of these metals. This data 
can then be projected and added to the long-term supply projections shown in Appendix 3:   
 
• For base metals such as cobalt, copper, lead, tin and zinc; the USGS provides statistics for refined 
production, as well as mine production (USGS, 2011a). In the case of lead, refined production is 
approximately twice that of mine production, owing to the very high recycling rate of lead acid 
batteries (Figure A4.1). In the cases of copper and tin, refinery production is approximately 20-
30% higher than mined production (Figure A4.2 and Figure A4.3). For zinc the difference is rela-
tively small, and refined production of cobalt is actually lower than its mined production. 
• For precious metals such as gold, silver and PGMs; data is publicly available and collected by a 
reputable source. For gold and silver, GFMS began collecting data on recycled supply from 2002 
on behalf of the World Gold Council and Silver Institute respectively. Recycled sources represent 
around a quarter to a third of annual production for these metals (Figure A4.4 and Figure A4.5). 
For the platinum group metals, data on recycled supply is collected by Johnson Matthey for plat-
inum, palladium and rhodium of which platinum is of the greatest interest for this study (Figure 
A4.6). Again, recycled supply represents around a quarter to a third of annual platinum produc-
tion. 
• For the other metals data is much less readily available. For some metals such as gallium and in-
dium, data published by the US Department of Energy includes estimates of reclaim or secondary 
production (Bauer et al., 2011). Some estimates are available for metals such as germanium, 
rhenium and tellurium but not typically from an independent source (International Study Group 
for Nickel et al., 2012). Allowance has been made for this data, given the importance of these 
metals in this report. For other metals no similar data was identified, other than that listed in 
(UNEP, 2011), so recycled content estimates have been conservatively applied where the data 
was deemed to be sufficiently robust (Table A4.1). This may reflect the use of these metals as al-
loying elements, where recovery is often of the alloy rather than the metal. Further research in 
this area may therefore be considered to be appropriate. 
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Figure A4.1: Statistics for world mine and refinery production of lead (tonnes)
 
Source: USGS, 2011a 
 
Figure A4.2: Statistics for world mine and refinery production of tin (tonnes)
 
Source: USGS, 2011a 
 
 
Figure A4.3: Statistics for world mine and refinery production of copper (tonnes)
 
Source: USGS, 2011a 
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Figure A4.4: Statistics for world mine and recycled gold production
 
Source: Thomson Reuters GFMS, 2012 
 
 
Figure A4.5: Statistics for world mine and recycled silver production
 
Source: Silver Institute & GFMS, 2012 
 
 
Figure A4.6: Statistics for world mine and recycled platinum production
 
Source: Johnson Matthey, 2012  
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Table A4.1: Metals for which recycled production has been included, 2011 production (tonnes) 
Metal Primary 
Production 
Secondary 
Production 
Total 
Production 
Recycled 
Sources (%) 
Key Reference 
Antimony Sb 169,000 29,800 198,800 15 (UNEP, 2011) 
Beryllium Be 240 60 300 20 (UNEP, 2011) 
Cadmium Cd 21,500 9,200 30,700 30 (UNEP, 2011) 
Chromium Cr 7,320,000 1,825,000 9,145,000 20 (UNEP, 2011) 
Cobalt Co 98,000 32,700 130,700 25 (UNEP, 2011) 
Copper Cu 16,100,000 3,677,000 19,777,000 19 (USGS, 2011a) 
Gallium Ga 216 72 288 25 
(International Study Group 
for Nickel et al., 2012) 
Germanium Ge 118 79 197 40 
(International Study Group 
for Nickel et al., 2012) 
Gold Au 2,700 1,610 4,310 37 
(Thomson Reuters GFMS, 
2012) 
Indium In 640 720 1,360 53 
(International Study Group 
for Nickel et al., 2012) 
Lead Pb 4,500,000 5,156,000 9,656,000 53 (USGS, 2011a) 
Magnesium Mg 780,000 334,300 1,114,300 30 (UNEP, 2011) 
Manganese Mn 14,000,000 6,895,500 20,895,500 33 (UNEP, 2011) 
Molybdenum Mo 250,000 83,300 333,300 25 (UNEP, 2011) 
Nickel Ni 1,800,000 886,500 2,686,500 33 (UNEP, 2011) 
Niobium Nb 63,000 15,750 78,750 20 (UNEP, 2011) 
Rhenium Re 49 16 65 25 
(International Study Group 
for Nickel et al., 2012) 
Silver Ag 23,800 8,250 32,050 26 
(Silver Institute & GFMS, 
2012) 
Tantalum Ta 790 198 988 20 (UNEP, 2011) 
Tellurium Te 683 59 742 8 
(International Study Group 
for Nickel et al., 2012) 
Tin Sn 253,000 81,150 334,150 24 (USGS, 2011a) 
Titanium# Ti 6,000,000 0 6,000,000 0 (UNEP, 2011) 
Tungsten W 72,000 48,000 120,000 40 (UNEP, 2011) 
Zinc Zn 12,400,000 3,100,000 15,500,000 20 (UNEP, 2011) 
      
 
Platinum Pt 195 64 259 25 (Johnson Matthey, 2012) 
Palladium Pd 204 73 277 26 (Johnson Matthey, 2012) 
Rhodium Rh 31 9 40 22 (Johnson Matthey, 2012) 
Ruthenium Ru 34 34 67 50 (UNEP, 2011) 
Iridium Ir 8 1 9 15 (UNEP, 2011) 
 
Lanthanum La 33,896 1,784 35,680 5 (UNEP, 2011) 
Cerium Ce 45,923 2,417 48,340 5 (UNEP, 2011) 
Praseodymium Pr 6,451 340 6,790 5 (UNEP, 2011) 
Neodymium Nd 21,869 1,151 23,020 5 (UNEP, 2011) 
Dysprosium Dy 1,748 92 1,840 5 (UNEP, 2011) 
# Estimate for titanium recycled content from (UNEP, 2011) was not applied, as primary production is for TiO2 content not titanium 
Sources:  See references in Chapter 4 and Appendix 4 for data referring to primary production  
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Appendix 5: Political Risk Ratings 
 
This appendix provides the political risk ratings that have been derived from Fund for Peace Failed States 
Index and World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator for 2011. The original scores have been rescaled 
to ensure that they are between 0 and 100, with a high score corresponding to a high risk. 
 
Table A5.1: Failed States Index (FSI), 2011
Country FSI 
Somalia 100.0 
Chad 96.6 
Sudan 95.0 
Congo (Kinshasa) 94.4 
Haiti 94.2 
Zimbabwe 94.1 
Afghanistan 93.7 
Central African Republic 91.0 
Iraq 90.8 
Côte d'Ivoire 88.6 
Guinea 88.3 
Pakistan 88.1 
Yemen 86.0 
Nigeria 85.5 
Niger 84.7 
Kenya 84.2 
Burundi 84.2 
Myanmar 83.8 
Guinea Bissau 83.8 
Ethiopia 83.7 
Uganda 81.7 
North Korea 81.0 
Timor-Leste 80.3 
Cameroon 79.9 
Bangladesh 79.7 
Liberia 79.2 
Nepal 78.9 
Eritrea 78.8 
Sri Lanka 78.3 
Sierra Leone 77.2 
Kyrgyzstan 77.0 
Congo (Republic) 76.5 
Malawi 76.2 
Rwanda 76.1 
Iran 75.2 
Togo 74.3 
Burkina Faso 73.5 
Cambodia 73.4 
Tajikistan 73.2 
Uzbekistan 73.1 
Equatorial Guinea 72.9 
Mauritania 72.8 
Lebanon 72.6 
Colombia 71.8 
Country FSI 
Egypt 71.6 
Laos 71.5 
Georgia 71.1 
Syria 70.6 
Solomon Islands 70.6 
Bhutan 69.7 
Philippines 69.7 
Angola 69.3 
Israel 69.1 
Papua New Guinea 68.8 
Zambia 68.4 
Comoros 68.4 
Mozambique 68.2 
Madagascar 67.8 
Bolivia 67.4 
Djibouti 67.1 
Swaziland 67.0 
Ecuador 66.7 
Azerbaijan 66.4 
Indonesia 66.0 
Tanzania 65.7 
Moldova 65.6 
Nicaragua 65.6 
Fiji 65.5 
Gambia 65.3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 65.3 
Lesotho 64.7 
China 64.4 
Guatemala 64.4 
Benin 64.4 
Turkmenistan 64.0 
India 63.6 
Mali 63.5 
Honduras 62.6 
Thailand 62.5 
Venezuela 62.4 
Algeria 62.2 
Russia 61.9 
Belarus 61.8 
Dominican Republic 61.0 
Senegal 60.9 
Cuba 60.7 
Morocco 60.3 
Vietnam 60.1 
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Country FSI 
El Salvador 60.1 
Cape Verde 59.9 
Maldives 59.7 
Gabon 59.3 
Saudi Arabia 59.2 
Mexico 59.1 
Turkey 58.9 
Jordan 58.5 
Sao Tome 58.5 
Serbia 58.3 
Peru 57.5 
Guyana 56.4 
Paraguay 56.2 
Armenia 56.1 
Micronesia 55.7 
Namibia 55.5 
Suriname 54.8 
Macedonia 54.7 
Kazakhstan 53.9 
Tunisia 53.8 
Samoa 53.1 
Ukraine 52.6 
Libya 52.3 
Malaysia 52.3 
Botswana 51.4 
Belize 51.2 
Ghana 51.2 
Cyprus 51.1 
South Africa 51.1 
Jamaica 50.6 
Seychelles 50.4 
Grenada 49.8 
Albania 49.5 
Brunei 49.2 
Brazil 48.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 46.9 
Antigua & Barbuda 42.8 
Romania 42.8 
Mongolia 42.6 
Kuwait 42.5 
Bahrain 41.9 
Bulgaria 41.9 
Panama 40.6 
Croatia 40.1 
Bahamas 39.3 
Montenegro 39.0 
Latvia 36.8 
Barbados 35.3 
Costa Rica 33.0 
United Arab Emirates 32.7 
Qatar 31.8 
Country FSI 
Estonia 31.6 
Oman 31.5 
Hungary 30.9 
Greece 29.6 
Slovakia 29.3 
Argentina 28.9 
Poland 28.9 
Italy 27.8 
Malta 27.5 
Lithuania 27.3 
Mauritius 26.1 
Spain 25.0 
Czech Republic 24.2 
Chile 22.4 
Uruguay 22.1 
South Korea 20.4 
Slovenia 16.9 
Singapore 16.4 
United States 16.1 
United Kingdom 15.3 
Belgium 15.3 
France* 15.3 
Germany 15.2 
Portugal 13.5 
Japan 12.0 
Iceland 11.1 
Netherlands 9.2 
Australia 9.0 
Canada 8.5 
Austria 8.1 
Luxembourg 6.8 
Ireland 6.0 
New Zealand 5.5 
Denmark 4.4 
Switzerland 3.7 
Sweden 3.3 
Norway 0.8 
Finland 0.0 
*New Caledonia as overseas territory 
Source: (Fund for Peace, n.d.) 
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Table A5.2: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2011
Country WGI 
Somalia 99.5 
Myanmar 96.8 
Afghanistan 96.6 
Congo (Kinshasa) 96.4 
Sudan 95.1 
Zimbabwe 94.9 
North Korea 93.1 
Chad 92.6 
Iraq 91.7 
Venezuela 89.9 
Uzbekistan 89.5 
Guinea 89.4 
Central African Republic 88.9 
Turkmenistan 88.8 
Côte d'Ivoire 88.6 
Eritrea 87.5 
Equatorial Guinea 87.4 
Haiti 87.3 
Burundi 87.3 
Tajikistan 86.4 
Yemen 86.1 
Libya 85.2 
Nigeria 84.8 
Iran 84.6 
Congo (Republic) 84.3 
Angola 84.3 
Guinea-Bissau 84.2 
Belarus 82.1 
Laos 81.4 
Comoros 81.3 
Cameroon 80.0 
Togo 79.9 
Pakistan 79.8 
Mauritania 78.9 
Cambodia 78.5 
Timor-Leste 78.4 
Syria 78.3 
Nepal 78.2 
Kyrgyzstan 77.8 
Bangladesh 77.6 
Ecuador 77.4 
Ethiopia 77.3 
Azerbaijan 77.3 
Algeria 76.7 
Liberia 75.3 
Fiji 74.7 
Russia 73.6 
Sierra Leone 73.6 
Papua New Guinea 73.1 
Nicaragua 72.8 
Paraguay 72.2 
Madagascar 71.6 
Niger 71.5 
Kenya 71.1 
Honduras 69.9 
Country WGI 
Gabon 69.4 
Guatemala 69.4 
Ukraine 69.0 
Djibouti 68.6 
Cook islands 67.9 
Lebanon 67.9 
Bolivia 67.9 
Uganda 67.5 
Kosovo 66.1 
Gambia 66.0 
Egypt 65.9 
Philippines 65.6 
Vietnam 65.5 
Solomon Islands 65.3 
Kazakhstan 65.1 
Swaziland 64.9 
China 64.8 
Indonesia 64.4 
Mali 64.0 
Cuba 63.6 
Senegal 63.2 
Dominican Republic 63.0 
West bank Gaza 62.3 
Moldova 61.9 
Zambia 61.2 
Sao tome and Principe 61.2 
Guyana 60.7 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 59.9 
Sri Lanka 59.8 
Tanzania 59.8 
Niue 59.6 
Benin 59.5 
Argentina 58.5 
Maldives 58.1 
Armenia 58.0 
Thailand 57.6 
India 57.5 
Burkina Faso 57.4 
Mongolia 57.1 
Morocco 57.0 
Malawi 56.9 
Colombia 56.9 
Mozambique 56.5 
Peru 55.6 
Saudi Arabia 55.1 
Rwanda 54.8 
Mexico 54.4 
Albania 54.0 
Suriname 52.8 
Lesotho 52.6 
Serbia 52.2 
Belize 51.9 
El Salvador 51.7 
Tunisia 51.4 
Macedonia 51.2 
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Country WGI 
Marshall Islands 50.8 
Jordan 50.7 
Jamaica 50.5 
Turkey 49.6 
Georgia 49.2 
Kiribati 48.7 
Tonga 47.9 
Bhutan 47.0 
Micronesia 46.4 
Panama 45.0 
Bahrain 44.7 
Montenegro 44.7 
Ghana 44.2 
Trinidad and Tobago 44.2 
Palau 43.6 
Brazil 43.4 
Kuwait 43.3 
Seychelles 42.7 
Tuvalu 42.0 
Romania 41.6 
Nauru 41.3 
Bulgaria 41.1 
South Africa 40.7 
Vanuatu 40.5 
Oman 39.7 
Malaysia 39.4 
Namibia 38.5 
Samoa 38.4 
Greece 37.0 
United Arab Emirates 36.4 
Croatia 35.3 
Cape Verde 34.6 
Grenada 34.6 
Israel 33.8 
Italy 32.8 
Puerto Rico 30.0 
Costa Rica 30.0 
Botswana 29.9 
Qatar 29.8 
Guam 29.6 
Latvia 29.3 
South Korea 27.9 
Brunei 27.7 
Lithuania 27.4 
Mauritius 27.4 
Martinique 27.2 
Hungary 26.8 
Dominica 26.3 
American Samoa 26.1 
Macao 25.5 
Slovakia 25.3 
Virgin islands 24.6 
Antigua and Barbuda 24.6 
Netherlands Antilles 24.3 
Uruguay 24.1 
Spain 24.0 
Country WGI 
Poland 24.0 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 22.9 
Bahamas 22.8 
St. Kitts and Nevis 22.6 
St. Lucia 22.3 
Slovenia 22.0 
Reunion 21.6 
Taiwan 21.6 
Czech Republic 21.3 
French Guiana 20.7 
Portugal 20.5 
Cayman Islands 18.7 
Cyprus 18.2 
Estonia 17.8 
United States 16.4 
Chile 16.1 
Bermuda 16.1 
Barbados 15.9 
Japan 15.2 
France* 14.0 
Singapore 13.7 
Malta 13.3 
Hong Kong 12.6 
United Kingdom 12.6 
Belgium 12.3 
Aruba 12.1 
Anguilla 10.9 
Greenland 10.8 
Iceland 10.3 
Germany 10.3 
Andorra 9.4 
Ireland 9.2 
Australia 7.9 
Canada 6.6 
Netherlands 6.2 
Austria 5.9 
Liechtenstein 4.8 
Switzerland 4.3 
Luxembourg 4.1 
Norway 3.7 
New Zealand 3.4 
Denmark 3.2 
Sweden 3.2 
Finland 2.0 
*New Caledonia as overseas territory 
Source: (World Bank, 2011)
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Appendix 6: Summaries of High-Rated Critical Metals 
A.6.1 Rare earth elements 
Supply 
Common sources 
Rare earth elements are a group of metallic elements, which include lanthanum and the 14 lanthanides. 
Due to some chemical and physical properties, scandium and yttrium are often considered as rare earth 
elements as well, with yttrium generally classed as a heavy rare earth element. Rare earth elements are 
all metallic in nature and are typically discussed together due to their similar chemical and physical 
properties, and because they are often obtained from the same ore deposits, although the ratios do 
differ considerably between different deposit types. See for example the comparison between the rare 
earth composition of the Mountain Pass deposit in the United States to that of the heavy rare earth 
enriched Chinese ionic clays deposits (Figure A6.1). 
 
Despite their name, rare earth elements are not particularly uncommon, just relatively widely distributed 
in the earth’s crust. Rare earth reserves are estimated at 110 million tonnes (Table A6.1), with world 
resources of over 160 million tonnes (USGS, 2010b). 
 
The major ore types from which rare earths are currently produced are bastnäsite, ionic clays and mona-
zite. Rare earth elements are sometimes produced as a by-product from other metals. The world’s largest 
rare earth mine, Bayan Obo in Inner Mongolia, China, produces rare earths as a by-product of iron ore 
mining. Bayan Obo represented around 45% of world supply of rare earths in 2010, with the remaining 
55% of world rare earth production obtained from primary production (Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2010). A 
number of potential rare earth producers would also be from various poly-metallic or by-product sources 
including zirconium-hafnium, niobium-tantalum, phosphates, tin and titanium. 
 
Within this Appendix the focus will be on six specific rare earth elements, namely: praseodymium, neo-
dymium, europium, terbium, dysprosium and yttrium, which were identified as being the critical for the 
implementation of the EU path to the decarbonisation of the energy sector. 
 
 
Figure A6.1: Rare earth compositions of Mountain Pass versus Chinese Ionic Clays 
 
 
 
Source: USGS, 2011c; Rare Earths 2009 Minerals Yearbook; HREE =Heavy Rare Earth Elements  
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World production 
Mine production of rare earths was estimated by the USGS at 133,000 tonnes in 2010, of which over 95% 
originated in China (Table A6.1). Other producing countries include India, Brazil and Malaysia. The esti-
mated elemental composition of world rare earth supply is shown in Figure A6.2, based upon a world 
production of 125,000 tonnes as estimated by Lynas. For the rare earth elements of interest estimated 
world production is the following: 
 
• Neodymium and praseodymium represent 25% of world rare earths supply or 31,400 tonnes. 
• Yttrium supply is estimated at 13,500 tonnes or 11% of world rare earth supply. 
• Europium, terbium and dysprosium supply totals only around 3,000 tonnes per year. 
 
 
Table A6.1: Worldwide rare earth mine production and reserves, 2010 & 2011 (tonnes) 
Country Mine Production Reserves 
2010 2011e 
Australia — — 1,830,000 
Brazil 550 550 48,000 
China 130,000 130,000 55,000,000 
CIS NA NA 19,000,000 
India 2,800 3,000 3,100,000 
Malaysia 30 30 30,000 
Other countries NA NA 22,000,000 
United States — — 13,000,000 
World total 133,000 133,000 110,000,000 
Source: USGS, 2012 
 
Figure A6.2: Rare earth supply by element, 2010 (tonnes)
 
Source: Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2010 
 
In terms of the supply outlook, some expansions in capacity are expected at the Chinese mines in Inner 
Mongolia (Baotou) and Sichuan, although considerable uncertainty exists regarding production in the 
Ionic clays regions of Southern China. Currently a considerable proportion of this production comes from 
small or illegal mines, which are coming under regulation and may lead to a large reduction in supply 
from these sources (Table A6.2). As might be expected given the recent high prices in rare earth ele-
ments, there is considerable exploration activity underway with dozens of prospects currently being 
explored. World supply is forecast to expected increase to at least 175,000 tonnes by 2014 (Table A6.3), 
although some other forecasters are more optimistic (Hatch, 2011).    
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Table A6.2: Outlook for rare earths supply 2010 to 2014 (tonnes) 
Mine 2010 2014 Comments 
Baotou 55,000 60,000 Tailing facilities near capacity, 
limited by iron ore mining 
Sichuan 10,000 15,000 Target to increase separation follow-
ing refurbishment 
Ionic clay 
regions 
45,000 40,000 Large amount of illegal mining – but 
could be reduced to 20,000t 
Mountain Pass 3,000 20,000 Molycorp, United States, expansion 
and reopening of the mine 
Mount Weld  22,000 New mine under construction and 
near start-up by Lynas, Australia 
Recycling 5,000 6,000  
Russia 4,000 4,000  
India 3,000 4,000 Indian Rare Earths Ltd. 
Vietnam  4,000 Toyota led Joint Venture 
Total 125,000 175,000  
Source: Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2010 
Leading companies 
The two largest producers of rare earths in China are Baotou Rare Earth Group in Inner Mongolia, with an 
estimated production of 55,000 tonnes for 2010, and Hanglong Group in Sichuan at 10,000 tonnes (Table 
A6.2). Rare earth production in the Ionic clays regions of Southern China in highly fragmented, with at 
least 30 other companies listed within official production or export quotas, and further illegal production 
widely reported. The leading current rare earths producers outside of China are Lovozersky Mining 
Company (Russia), Indian Rare Earths and Industrias Nucleares do Brasil. 
 
Given the level of exploration and mine development activity underway for rare earths, it is useful to 
provide commentary regarding the major future suppliers. There are dozens of prospects currently being 
explored, although in reality, given the size of the rare earths market and the economic viability of each 
of these, only a limited number can be expected to reach commercialisation. A complete list of the most 
advanced rare earth projects23 is provided by Technology Metals Research, and consists of 43 advanced 
rare earth projects by 40 different companies in 13 different countries (Technology Metals Research, 
n.d.). In addition, at least four different joint venture projects involving major Japanese corporations are 
known to be in the pipeline (Ernst & Young, 2011). Norra Kärr, owned by Tasman Metals, is of note as the 
only advanced rare earths project located within the EU. 
 
In an assessment of the most likely commercial mines, IMCOA identify Mountain Pass owned by 
Molycorp (United States) and Mount Weld owned by Lynas (Australia), as representing the most im-
portant new suppliers (Kingsnorth, IMCOA, 2012). Table A6.2 includes these tonnages in projected 2014 
world supply estimates, alongside a Toyota-led joint venture in Vietnam. Other projects that are deemed 
to be closest to commercial production or more near-to-market prospects include: Steenkampskraal 
owned by Great Western Minerals Group (South Africa); a Sumitomo led joint venture in Kazakhstan; and 
Dubbo owned by Alkane Resources (Australia). Dubbo is noted as being the only project from these with 
a significant proportion of heavy rare earth elements within its composition. 
Processing routes  
Extraction and refining of rare earths from ore is complex due to the similar properties of the metals. This 
processing for each ore body requires specific technology unique for that particular deposit to be devel-
oped in order to extract and separate the individual rare earth elements. Once the rare earth-containing 
                                                             
23 Advanced projects are defined as where either the mineral resource or reserves have been formally defined or where the project has 
been subject to past mining campaigns for which reliable historic data is available 
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ore is obtained, a complex multistage process is required, which uses small differences in solubility to 
isolate each metal as its oxide; rare earths are typically supplied as an oxide. Bastnäsite (RE-CO3F) is the 
most important mineral source of Rare Earth oxide (REO) production, representing the majority of Rare 
Earth resources worldwide. Extraction can occur through typical mining processes, however other tech-
niques are also used which employ acid leeching to extract the rare earth ores in situ, causing environ-
mental concern over the production of these metals.   
 
For the bastnäsite, the process of mining and beneficiating of REO consists of the following steps: 
• mining of the ore 
• mineral concentration by froth floatation 
• extraction of Rare Earth into concentrate subgroups (cracking) 
• separation of individual Rare Earth by solvent extraction. 
 
The most important rare earth deposits in hard rock are mined as open-pit operations by drilling, blast-
ing, loading and hauling to the mill. Steam is used to condition the ore before flotation for bastnäsite 
recovery. The flotation concentrate contains typically 60% REO. This is leached by 10% hydrochloric acid 
(HCl) to remove the calcite, which raises the REO content to 68-73%. Various process routes may be used 
for cracking and separating individual Rare Earths from the concentrate. For bastnäsite, roasting at 500°C 
in concentrated sulphuric acid is use to remove fluoride and CO2. Chloride solutions are also used in 
further purification processes. In other processes, nitric acid solutions might also be used. The end-
product mixture from the mineral cracking process is further processed to separate the individual ele-
ments. A solvent extraction process is used for the initial stages of the separation and results in materials 
up to 99.9% purity. Additional complexity is added where other metals are present; for example, some 
deposits also contain the radioactive element thorium, which needs to be safely separated and stored as 
part of the extraction process.   
Demand 
Applications 
Rare earth elements are used for a wide variety of applications, although four markets (magnets, fluid 
cracking catalysts (FCC), polishing powder and batteries), accounted for two thirds of total rare earth 
demand in 2010 (Figure A6.3). However each of the rare earth elements possesses slight differences in its 
properties such that each has a unique use, and substitution of one for another is often not possible.   
  
 
Figure A6.3: Rare earth demand by application, 2010 (tonnes) 
 
Source: Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2010  
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Figure A6.4 shows the applications for the six focus rare earth elements of this report. This figure con-
firms the key markets of magnets for praseodymium, neodymium and dysprosium; and of phosphors for 
yttrium, terbium and europium. In terms of the geographic distribution of rare earth demand, 60% of 
overall rare earth oxide demand is within China, as of 2010.  Japan and North East Asia account for 20%, 
the USA 12% and others the remaining 8% (Kingsnorth, IMCOA, 2012). Some differences are apparent for 
specific sub-markets however: 
• for rare earth magnets, where China’s market share is around 80% 
• for phosphors, where China’s market share is around 65%. 
 
 
Figure A6.4: Selected elemental rare earth demand by application, 2010 (tonnes) 
 
Source: Lynas Corporation Ltd, 2010 
Principal users 
In order to identify the principal users for rare earth magnets and phosphors, some additional data is 
required on the specific markets for these intermediate products. Table A6.3 provides considerable 
details on the applications for rare earth magnets for 2008 and projections for 2014. It also contains 
useful information on the dysprosium content of different types of magnets, which varies considerably 
from <0.1% in hard disc drives to up to 8.7% in hybrid and electric vehicles. Average dysprosium content 
is approximately 3% across all of the applications. Motors, hard disc drives, electric bikes and loudspeak-
ers are currently the largest applications for rare earth magnets; with wind power generators and hybrid 
and electric vehicles are two important emerging applications. 
• For automobiles, the EU trade association ACEA has 16 companies that are full members 
(ACEA, n.d.). Toyota, Honda and Nissan are among the leading companies for sales of hybrid 
and electric vehicles.   
• For hard disc drives the three leading manufactures are Seagate, Western Digital and Toshi-
ba; although all major computers e.g. Dell, Apple and Hewlett Packard; can be considered 
principal users. 
• For wind power generators important users include General Electric, Siemens, Vestas and 
Enercon (Oakdene Hollins, 2010). 
 
Figure A6.5 shows the breakdown for world phosphors markets for 2002 and 2011. Fluorescent tubes 
represent nearly 90% of the total market, although CCFL LCD backlights have emerged an important 
market following the demise of CRT screens. The EU trade association lists 12 companies among its 
membership, including General Electric, Phillips Lighting and Osram (European Lamp Companies Federa-
tion, n.d.), which can be considered to be the principal users for rare earth phosphors. 
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Table A6.3: Rare earth magnet applications 
Applications Typical Dy 
Content 
(%) 
Applications 
2008 
(% of mix) 
Applications 
2014e 
(% of mix) 
Motors, industrial, general auto, etc. 4.1 26.0 23.0 
HDD, CD, DVD <0.1 14.8 18.0 
Electric bicycles 4.1 9.2 11.4 
Wind power generators 4.1 0.5 9.6 
Hybrid & electric traction drive 8.7 3.0 6.1 
Transducers, loudspeakers <0.1 9.0 6.0 
Magnetic separation 2.8 5.0 3.5 
MRI 1.4 4.0 1.5 
Sensors 1.4 3.0 1.5 
Torque-coupled drives 4.1 3.0 2.5 
Generators 6.4 2.5 1.0 
Hysteresis clutch 2.8 2.5 1.5 
Energy storage systems 4.1 2.0 2.5 
Gauges 2.8 1.5 0.8 
Magnetic braking 4.1 1.5 0.8 
Relays and switches 4.1 1.2 0.2 
Pipe inspection systems 4.1 1.0 1.0 
Wave Guides: TWT, undulators, wigglers 6.4 1.0 1.0 
Magnetically levitated transportation 4.1 1.0 1.0 
Reprographics 4.1 0.7 0.5 
Magnetic refrigeration 1.4 0.3 0.5 
Advertising <0.1 0.1 <0.1 
Unidentified and all other 1.4 7.2 6.0 
Source: Arnold Magnetic Technologies, 2011 
 
 
 
Figure A6.5: World phosphor market 2002 and 2011 (%)
Source: Roskill, 2012  
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Market pricing 
Rare earth elements are traded through long-term supply contracts and individual trades between large 
consumers and suppliers as well as private trading houses. Potential buyers and sellers can also list 
proposals on specialist websites that attempt to match counterparties together. The terms of such trades 
are generally unavailable publicly and a ‘market price’ in the conventional sense does not exist. Publicly 
available price quotes actually represent expert estimates of representative prices in trades being exe-
cuted on a particular day, which are compiled through recurring interviews with individual traders. These 
markets are therefore by their nature much smaller and more opaque than the exchange traded markets. 
 
Historic prices for rare earth elements are given in Figure A6.6 (light rare earth elements) and Figure A6.7 
(heavy rare earth elements). There has been considerable interest around the world in rare earth ele-
ments, following China’s systematic tightening of export quotas and subsequent supply bottlenecks 
witnessed by many industries during 2010 and 2011. As a result rare earth oxide prices rose dramatically.  
Prices are also commonly quoted for rare earth carbonates, which can be considered the raw material for 
mixed rare earths and for mischmetal and didymium (which are mixtures of the quoted rare earths).   
 
Figure A6.8 shows the trends for specific rare earth prices. This shows that price of light rare earths have 
rose the sharpest, but have recently fallen back to near their 2009 levels. In contrast, prices for heavy 
rare earth elements rose more steadily and have since been much more resilient. This in part reflects the 
distortions of the Chinese rare earth export quota system that originally did not distinguish between 
specific rare earth, and hence encouraged traders to sell the more expensive (heavy) rare earths to the 
rest of the world, pushing up the price of light rare earths more as a result. However, changing the export 
quota system to differentiate between specific rare earths, and the supply-demand dynamics for light 
versus heavy rare earths, are now more effectively represented in the prices. 
 
Based on 2010 prices and production, the value of production is estimated at approximately US$5 billion 
for rare earth elements in total. The value of production for each of the focus rare earth elements is: 
 
• lanthanum at $690m 
• cerium at $825m 
• praseodymium at $320m 
• neodymium at $1,160m 
• europium at $215m 
• terbium at $200m 
• dysprosium at $525m 
• yttrium at $350m. 
 
 
Figure A6.6: La, Ce, Pr, and Nd oxide prices, min 99% purity, FOB China basis (US$/kg) 
 
Source: Metal Pages, n.d. 
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
230 
 
 
 
Figure A6.7: Eu, Tb, Dy, and Y* oxide prices, min 99% purity, FOB China basis (US$/kg)
 
* Y oxide, min 99.999% purity; Source: Metal Pages, n.d. 
 
Figure A6.8: Price multiples for rare earth oxides, versus 2009 
 
Source: Metal Pages, n.d. 
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A.6.2 Gallium 
Supply 
 
 Common sources 
Gallium (Ga) is a silvery metal with one of the lowest melting points (29.78°C) of all metals but it has a 
high boiling point of 2403°C. It therefore has the longest liquid range of all elements (Vulcan, 2009).  Its 
density is 6.095 g/cm3 at 29.8°C (liquid) and 5.904 g/cm3 at 24.6°C (solid) (Greber, 2012). The metal 
expands in the phase transition from liquid to solid (like water). With a density higher than 5 g/cm3, 
gallium ranks among the heavy metals. Gallium is a metalloid with a good electrical conductivity. Alt-
hough gallium is quite soft and can be cut with a knife, it has the peculiarity that compact pieces can 
splinter under sudden mechanical stress with conchoidal fracture forming small, sharp-edged chips 
(Angerer et al., 2009).  
 
The average concentration in earth’s crust is 19 ppm and it ranks 34th-35th in order of abundance 
(Enghag, 2004). Elemental gallium does not occur in nature and gallium minerals (e.g. gallite, CuGaS2) are 
very rare (Enghag, 2004). Gallium occurs in trace amounts in bauxite (aluminium ore), zinc blende and 
coal, probably due to similar lattice constants (Enghag, 2004). The gallium content in bauxite varies from 
30-80 ppm, on average 50 g gallium per tonne of bauxite (Greber, 2012). The largest reserves of gallium 
are contained in phosphate ores and coal of various kinds. Gallium is concentrated in flue dust of phos-
phorous production and fly ash of coal. The total gallium reserves in phosphates and coals have been 
estimated at several million tonnes and thus exceed those in bauxite (Greber, 2012).   
 
Gallium’s world resources in bauxite alone are estimated to be 1 million tonnes (Moss et al., 2011). Since 
gallium is finely dispersed, estimation of gallium occurrence is difficult.  Considering e.g. bauxite reserves 
implies a rough estimation of gallium reserves. According to the Indium Corporation, gallium reserves 
amount to 760,000 tonnes. With a production of about 150 tonnes per year, the reserves are sufficient 
for decades (Indium Corporation, 2011). 
 
 World production 
Due to its low concentration, gallium is recovered as a by-product during the production of aluminium, 
zinc and copper, and is not mined as a primary commodity. Nowadays, gallium is mostly recovered during 
the refining of alumina that principally uses the Bayer liquor process (Indium Corporation, 2010). In 2011, 
the estimated world primary gallium production was 216 t, up from approximately 182 t in 2010 (Figure 
A6.9). The principal producing countries are listed in Table A6.4 (USGS, 2010a; USGS, 2012).   
 
About 50% of the worldwide supply of gallium came from recycled new scrap, amounting to approxi-
mately 310 tonnes in 2011 (USGS, 2012a; Roskill, 2011). Gallium was recycled from new scrap in Canada, 
Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US (USGS, 2010a). 
 
There was a remarkable change of key producer countries during the past 15 years. In 1999, Australia, 
Kazakhstan and Russia were alongside China, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Slovakia and Ukraine as the key 
producing countries for gallium (USGS, 2012). Today, China, Germany and Kazakhstan are the top three 
producers. Although China is the major supplier of gallium, supply risk is limited since there are other 
large, reliable producers (e.g. Japan, US). Furthermore, there are very large gallium reserves (21,400 t) in 
bauxite ores in Europe (Moss et al., 2011). 
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Table A6.4: Estimated world annual primary gallium production capacity (December 2010) 
Country Capacity 
(metric tons) 
China 141 
Germany 35 
Kazakhstan 25 
Republic of Korea 16 
Ukraine 15 
Japan 10 
Russia 10 
Hungary 8 
Total 260 
Includes operating plants as well as at plants on standby basis 
Source: USGS, 2010a 
 
Figure A6.9: World primary production of gallium 
 
Source: USGS, 2011a, estimated values 
 
 Leading companies 
The number of companies that are currently separating out gallium is low (Moss et al., 2011). In the top 
three producing countries, only 10% of the companies recover gallium from bauxite (Indium Corporation, 
2010). China’s leading gallium manufacturers were: the Aluminium Corporation of China Ltd., Beijing JiYa 
Semiconductor Material Co. Ltd, China Crystal Technologies Ltd, East Hope Mianchi Gallium Industry Co, 
and Zhuhai Fangyuan (USGS, 2010a). 
 
Europe’s share of primary gallium production capacity is about 12% of world capacity: 30 tonnes per year 
in Europe compared to 260 tonnes worldwide. Two companies within Europe are known to be active in 
recovering gallium: AOS Ingal in Germany at their Stade plant (25-30 tonnes of gallium per year) and MAL 
Magyar in Hungary (around 4 tonnes of gallium per year) (Moss et al., 2011). Gallium recovery only 
represents a small share of the revenue at an alumina refinery.  There are a number of other active 
alumina refineries in Europe which do not recover gallium at their facilities. 
Processing routes 
The main process for gallium manufacture is the extraction of the metal from the circulating liquors in 
the Bayer process for aluminium oxide manufacture. There are three types of process which are used to 
extract gallium: Fractional precipitation, electrolytic processes and extraction with chelating agents. 
Crude gallium from extraction processes has a purity of 99-99.9% (2-3N). However, for many applications 
- such as for semiconductor manufacture - much higher purities (up to 99.999999%, 8N) are necessary. A 
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range of procedures is applied to remove the impurities: washing with aqueous acids and alkalis, frac-
tional crystallization, zone melting and single crystal growth or distillation of volatile metals under vacu-
um (Greber, 2012). 
Demand 
 
 Applications 
Gallium is mainly used for semiconductors as a compound with arsenic (as gallium arsenide, GaAs) and in 
light-emitting diodes (LEDs) (as gallium arsenide or gallium phosphide, Greber, 2012). It is used for inte-
grated circuits (chips) especially for mobile phones, LEDs, laser diodes, photo-detectors, solar cells, 
amplifiers, transistors, blue laser diodes for Blu-ray DVD devices, high-temperature thermometers, high-
quality mirrors, dental applications, magnets and catalysts (Vulcan, 2009). The distribution of end uses in 
2010 for the US is shown in Figure A6.10. Alternative estimates of the uses of gallium are shown in Figure 
A6.11, courtesy of Indium Corporation. The value of worldwide GaAs device consumption increased to 
US$4.9 billion in 2010 (+32% compared to 2009), the value of GaN LED consumption increased to US$8.4 
billion (+75%) and the high-brightness LED market increased to US$10.8 billion (+93%) (USGS, 2010a). 
 
 
Figure A6.10: US Consumption of gallium metal and compounds in 2010 by end use in kg 
 
Source: USGS, 2010a 
 
Figure A6.11: Uses of virgin Gallium, 2010
 
Source: Indium Corporation, 2010 
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 Principal users 
The principal users of gallium are to be found in the integrated circuits (ICs) sector as well as among 
manufacturers of LEDs and Laser diodes (e.g. Aixtron AG, Veeco Instruments). Consumption in 2010 in 
the US for gallium use in ICs increased by 26% (due to GaAs-rich smartphones) and gallium use in LEDs 
and laser diodes increased by 75%, whereas gallium consumption in solar cells and photo-detectors 
decreased by 28% due to the worldwide economic downturn and decreasing prices of silicon-based solar 
cells (USGS, 2010a).  
 
Further substitution possibilities for gallium are liquid crystals for use in LEDs, indium phosphide compo-
nents for substituting GaAs in infrared laser diodes, and the substitution of GaAs by helium-neon lasers in 
visible laser applications. Gallium for GaAs-based integrated circuits in many defence-related applications 
cannot be substituted thus far (USGS, 2012). 
 
The European Commission classified gallium and 13 other raw materials as critical (EC, 2010a). The high 
supply risk results from China’s dominating position in gallium manufacture. Besides this, there are few 
substitutes for gallium and there is no recycling from post-consumer products (Buchert et al., 2009). 
Thus, a heavy reliance on primary resources arises. Demand growth for gallium is forecast to be around 
10% per annum, driven mainly by fast growth in photovoltaic applications (EC, 2010a). 
 
 Market pricing 
Gallium is traded through long-term supply contracts and individual trades between large consumers and 
suppliers as well as private trading houses. Potential buyers and sellers can also list proposals on special-
ist websites that attempt to match counterparties together. The terms of such trades are generally 
unavailable publicly and a ‘market price’ in the conventional sense does not exist. Publicly available price 
quotes, actually represent expert estimates of representative prices in trades being executed on a partic-
ular day, which are compiled through recurring interviews with individual traders. These markets are by 
their nature much smaller and more opaque than the exchange traded markets. 
 
The development of the gallium price over the past ten years is shown in Figure A6.12. Following a sharp 
increase in 2001, the price for gallium continued on a rather moderate level until 2006. In 2007 and 2011 
gallium price reached two smaller peaks, which were considerably lower than the peak in 2001. 
 
 
Figure A6.12: Price of gallium (99.99% Purity, CIF Main Airport (EU)) 
 
Source: Metal Pages  
Critical Metals in the Path towards the Decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector 
 
 
 
235 
 
A.6.3 Tellurium 
Supply 
Common sources 
Tellurium (Te) is a brittle, silver-white metal is closely associated with selenium, its periodic table neigh-
bour, and the two metals are often found together. Tellurium is an element widely distributed through-
out the Earth’s crust; however, it is rarely found in its pure state but often as a compound in ores of 
bismuth, copper, gold, lead, mercury, nickel, silver and zinc. Tellurium rarely occurs in concentrations 
high enough to justify mining solely for its content, although some primary deposits do exist in China and 
Mexico. The element is mainly accumulated as a by-product during the copper refining process. The USGS 
estimates that tellurium reserves (contained within copper reserves) at 24,000 tonnes (USGS, 2012). 
World production 
Due to secrecy, official data on the tellurium production are only available for few states, although pro-
duction of tellurium containing products is known to exist in a number of different countries. For 2011, 
the USGS estimated world production in Canada, Japan, Peru and Russia to be 115 tonnes. USGS’s long-
standing estimate for global tellurium production is that it has been between 450 and 500 tonnes per 
year (USGS, 2008).   
 
However, in a recent publication the USGS has revised its view upwards, estimating world tellurium 
production at 630 tonnes in 2010 (Bauer et al., 2011). A range of other estimates exist: 
 
• Data compiled on behalf of the ICSG, estimates world tellurium production at 450-470 tonnes for 
2011. The major producing countries include China, Japan, Belgium and Germany (Table A6.5). Telluri-
um production for the EU is estimated at 120-125 tonnes or 30% of world supply (Figure A6.13).   
• First Solar, a leading manufacturer of CdTe Solar panels, estimate world current tellurium supply at 
770 tonnes, rising to 1,460 tonnes in 2020. Their methodology takes a top-down approach considering 
the likely supply from copper, lead, directly mined and recycled sources (Table A6.6).   
• Naumov offers a wide range for world tellurium production of 400-700 tonnes (Naumov, 2010). 
 
 
 
Table A6.5: Estimated world tellurium refinery production by country, 2011 
Country Refinery production 
(tonnes of Te content) 
Belgium 60 
Canada 25 
China 80-100 
Germany 30-35 
India 10-12 
Indonesia 15 
Japan 65 
Kazakhstan 20 
Philippines 20 
Russia 25 
South Korea 20 
Sweden/Finland 20 
Others 50 
Total 450-470 
Source: International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012  
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Figure A6.13: Estimated world tellurium refinery production by region, 2011 (tonnes of Te content) 
 
Source: International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012 
 
 
Table A6.6: Long-term supply of tellurium (tonnes) 
Type 2010-2012 2014-2016 2020 
via Copper 650 850 1,200 
via Lead & others 40 44 64 
direct mined 15 40 85 
via recycling 65 76 111 
Total 770 1,010 1,460 
Source: First Solar, 2012 
Leading companies 
The supply of crude tellurium products is highly fragmented, with over 30 important suppliers identified 
in the survey conducted by the ICSG and only identified as possessing a market share greater than 10% of 
world supply for tellurium (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012).   
 
However of these listed producers, it should be noted that many of the companies do not produce re-
fined tellurium metal. The majority produce crude tellurium dioxide or copper telluride, which needs 
further upgrading. Important European players include Umicore (Belgium), Aurubis (Germany) and 
Boliden (Sweden and Finland). Outside Europe the largest players include Jiangxi Copper (China), Pan 
Pacific Copper (Japan), Xstrata (Canada), Sumitomo (Japan), Kazakhmys (Kazakhstan), Pasar (Philippines), 
Ural Electromed (Russia) and LS-Nikko Copper (South Korea).   
 
In terms of the production of refined tellurium metal and CdTe, evidence suggests that supply is signifi-
cantly more concentrated compared to that the supply of tellurium containing production (International 
Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012):   
 
• The leading supplier for tellurium metal is said to be 5N Plus, although the company does not re-
lease any production figures. 5N Plus is the supplier of choice to the world’s largest producer of 
CdTe Photovoltaic Solar, First Solar.   
• The second largest producer of tellurium metal would seem to be Pacific Rare Speciality Metals & 
Chemicals in the Philippines, which reports its production of refined tellurium metal as 130-150 
tonnes per year.    
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Processing routes  
The main source of tellurium production is from copper refining.  Figure A6.13 provides an overview of 
the processes involved at Xstrata’s Canadian Copper Refinery. The USGS estimates that more than 90% of 
world tellurium is produced from anode slimes collected from electrolytic copper refining. The remainder 
is derived from skimmings at lead refineries and from flue dusts and gases generated during the smelting 
of bismuth, copper, and lead ores (USGS, 2012).   
 
Figure A6.14: Flow process of Xstrata’s Canadian copper refinery 
 
Source: Xstrata, n.d. 
 
It should be noted, however, that not all copper mines contain tellurium. In general terms it is the copper 
sulphide ores that contain the greatest tellurium content, although there is considerable variability in the 
tellurium content of ores. In a 2006 survey by the USGS of 56 worldwide copper refineries, 45 plants 
reported tellurium content in the slimes, at an average of 2% concentration (U.S. Geological Survey, 
2008). However, many refineries in the CIS reported tellurium content in excess of 4%, with some at 8% 
or more (Moats et al, 2007). 
 
Tellurium is recovered from copper anode slimes collected from the electrolytic refining of smelted 
copper. In this process, crude copper from a smelter is used as the anode in a bath of sulphuric acid. The 
copper is plated onto a thin pure copper or stainless steel cathode.  In this operation impurities that may 
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be present in the crude copper anodes such as the gold, silver, platinum, arsenic, molybdenum, selenium 
and tellurium can be made either to dissolve in the acid or fall out as anode slime, which can then be 
collected and processed for trace metals that have been concentrated by this process (Lifton, 2009). The 
slimes undergo a number of treatment processes such as auto-copper roasting, de-copperising and 
further refining in order to produce the different tellurium containing products. Different tellurium 
precipitation processes exist for refining the anode slimes, which can be used to optimise the trade-off 
between tellurium recovery against recovery of precious metals, notably gold and silver. The tellurium 
containing products: crude tellurium dioxide (≈70% Te), copper telluride (≈20-45% Te) or low grade 
tellurium concentrate (≈10% Te), then require further upgrading to produce tellurium metal.   
 
There has been considerable recent comment on the shift of copper refining towards new processes that 
are more suitable for extracting copper from lower grade ores, notably the hydro-metallurgic process 
Solvent Extraction Electro-Winning (SX-EW). These processes may actually be more efficient at recovering 
molybdenum; however, the solvent leach technology does not lend itself to capturing the selenium or 
tellurium. There is therefore concern that as the higher grades of copper ore are being exhausted, this 
could affect future tellurium supply. The USGS comments that the increased use of leaching SX-EW 
processes for copper extraction has limited the future supply of tellurium supply from certain copper 
deposit types. However, this concern may have been somewhat exaggerated. This is because the copper 
sulphide ores that generally contain the higher tellurium content cannot be refined using the SX-EW 
process because of the sulphur content; therefore the actual tellurium being lost to the market as a 
result of SX-EW is probably quite low (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012). 
Demand 
Applications 
For tellurium usage, according to the latest statistics provided by the Selenium Tellurium Development 
Association (STDA), two applications for tellurium account for an estimated 70% its usage (Figure A6.15): 
 
• In photovoltaic solar (40%), tellurium is used alongside cadmium in cadmium telluride (CdTe) thin 
films, which are becoming increasingly efficient and cost-competitive. 
• In thermoelectric modules (TEM) (30%) tellurium is used in an alloy. By applying a low voltage DC 
power source to TEM semiconductor components, heat will be moved through the module from 
one side to the other, i.e. one side will be cooled while the opposite side will be heated.   
• Other applications for tellurium include metallurgy where tellurium is included as an alloying ad-
ditive to improve machining characteristics, as a vulcanising accelerator in the rubber industry 
and some other usages in the chemicals and pharmaceutical industries. 
 
In terms of trends in tellurium usage, it is noticeable that in earlier sources metallurgy is commonly 
quoted as the most significant application with 42% of usage, followed by photovoltaic solar (26%) and 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals (21%) (EC, 2010a). The growth in the use of tellurium in solar PV is strik-
ing, as is its relative decline in some of the traditional applications. However, the current outlook for 
tellurium in this market is weak. Traders report that the PV solar industry is currently taking a ‘holiday’ in 
purchasing new material, instead of using up existing inventories which could last several years, to im-
prove their cash-flow situation amidst highly competitive market conditions for panels (see Figure A6.16).   
 
The STDA comments that tellurium’s use in the rubber industry is price-sensitive and long term substitu-
tion is possible in metallurgy (although this is more for the long term, as it requires formulation changes 
in steel) (International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012). Much of tellurium usage in TEMs is also price-
sensitive; although at the high end - for example mobile devices, laptops and phase change memory - the 
price sensitivity is lower. 
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Figure A6.15: Major applications for tellurium, 2011 
 
Source: International Study Group for Nickel et al., 2012 
 
 
Figure A6.16: Tellurium demand profile 2011 & projected 2012 
Source: First Solar, 2012 
 
Principal users 
Attention here is focused on the two largest markets for tellurium. For photovoltaic solar, First Solar is 
the world’s largest user of tellurium in its thin film CdTe solar panels. It is the dominant player for CdTe 
with a market share of near 90% for this technology, with installations and manufacturing across the US, 
Europe and Asia (NREL, 2007). Other market players include: Antec Solar, Clyxco (both Europe), AVA Solar 
and Primestar Solar (both United States). 
 
For the second largest market for tellurium, i.e. thermoelectric modules, the International Thermoelectric 
Society lists over 30 module manufacturers on its company directory. Most of these are located in the US, 
China, Russia or Ukraine (Table A6.7). There are also several manufacturers within Europe. 
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Table A6.7: List of thermoelectric module manufacturers by country 
United States China Russia or Ukraine Others 
Custom Thermoelectric Beijing Huayu-Landian 
Refrigeration Technology 
Adv-Engineering AMS ThermoTech 
(Germany) 
Ferrotec Beijing Huimao Cooling 
Equipment 
Crystal Aquaport International 
(Australia) 
HiTECH Technologies Fujitaka Kryotherm Cidete (Spain) 
Magaland Technology Hicooltec Electronic Modul EURECA Messtechnik 
(Germany) 
Marlow Industries Hui Mao Cooling Equip-
ment 
Osterm Komatsu Group (Japan) 
Melcor Corporation Shenzhen Wellen  
Technology 
RMT SIREC Thermoelectric 
Products (Germany) 
TE Technology Thermonamic  
Electronics 
S&PF Module Supercool (Sweden) 
Tellurex  Thermion TE Energy (Finland) 
ThermoTek  Thermix  
Source: International Thermoelectric Society, n.d. 
 
Market pricing 
Tellurium is traded through long-term supply contracts and individual trades between large consumers 
and suppliers as well as private trading houses. Potential buyers and sellers can also list proposals on 
specialist websites that attempt to match counterparties together. The terms of such trades are generally 
unavailable publicly and a ‘market price’ in the conventional sense does not exist. Publicly available price 
quotes actually represent expert estimates of representative prices in trades being executed on a particu-
lar day, which are compiled through recurring interviews with individual traders. These markets are by 
their nature much smaller and more opaque than the exchange traded markets. 
 
The price of tellurium has fallen considerably from its high of nearly US$450 per kg in mid-2011 to a 
current (2012) level of US$200 per kg. This has unwound much of the increase that occurred during 2010 
and 2011, which saw a trebling of prices from US$150 per kg. Based upon an average price of around 
US$300 per kg, this implies a market size of around US$150 million. 
 
 
Figure A6.17: Tellurium metal prices, 99.99% purity IWH Rotterdam (US$/kg)
 
Source: Metal Pages, n.d. 
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Abstract 
In order to tackle climate change, to increase energy supply security and to foster the sustainability and 
competitiveness of the European economy, the EU has made the transition to a low-carbon economy a 
central policy priority. This report builds on the first study conducted by the JRC in 2011 (Critical Metals in 
Strategic Energy Technologies), where critical metals were identified, which could become a bottleneck 
to the supply-chain of the low-carbon energy technologies addressed by the Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan (SET-Plan), namely: wind, solar (both PV and CSP), CCS, nuclear fission, bioenergy and the electricity 
grid. Fourteen metals were identified to be a cause for concern. After taking into account market and 
geopolitical parameters, five metals were labelled ‘critical’, namely: tellurium, indium, gallium, neodymi-
um and dysprosium. The potential supply chain constraints for these materials were most applicable to 
the deployment of wind and PV energy technologies.   
 
In the follow-up study reported here, other energy and low-carbon technologies are investigated that not 
only play an important role in the EU's path towards decarbonisation but also may compete for the same 
metals as identified in the six SET-Plan technologies. Eleven technologies are analysed including fuel cells, 
electricity storage, electric vehicles and lighting. As in the first report, sixty metals, i.e. metallic elements, 
metallic minerals and metalloids are considered; only iron, aluminium and radioactive elements (used as 
fuel in nuclear plants) were specifically excluded. Graphite was also included, reflecting its status as one 
of the critical raw materials identified by the EU Raw Materials Initiative. Where possible, the study 
models the implications for materials demand as a result of the scenarios described in the EU Energy 
Roadmap 2050. Consequently, the results obtained in the first study are updated to reflect the data that 
has become available in the roadmap. This second study found that eight metals have a high criticality 
rating and are therefore classified as ‘critical’. These are the six rare earth elements (dysprosium, europi-
um, terbium, yttrium, praseodymium and neodymium), and the two metals gallium and tellurium. Four 
metals (graphite, rhenium, indium and platinum) are found to have a medium-to-high rating and are 
classified as ‘near critical’, suggesting that the market conditions for these metals should be monitored in 
case the markets for these metals deteriorate thereby increasing the risk of supply chain bottlenecks. The 
applications, i.e. technologies, of particular concern are electric vehicles, wind and solar energy, and 
lighting. As in the first report, ways of mitigating the supply-chain risks for the critical metals are consid-
ered. These fall into three categories: increasing primary supply, reuse/recycling and substitution. In 
addition, a number of topics were identified as possibly meriting further research, but could not be 
considered within the immediate scope of this study. These include conducting further studies to look at 
raw materials requirements for hybrid and electric vehicles for a wider range of technology uptake and 
penetration scenarios; developing new and more detailed scenarios for the uptake and technology mix of 
options for stationary energy storage; undertaking similar studies in defence and aerospace; improving 
statistics on the contribution of recycling to world production for a number of metals; and investigating 
the contribution of greater traceability and transparency to reducing raw materials supply risk. Finally, it 
is important not to overstate the bottlenecks due to the risks of raw material shortages for key technolo-
gies. This is because there are still many years before the large uptake of some technologies and in the 
coming years, there are numerous options that will become available to mitigate the identified risks. 
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